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ABSTRACT
This dissertation explores the origins of interstate reconciliation after traumatic conflicts,
mainly through the comparative study of postwar Sino-Japanese and (West) German-Polish
relations. While Germany and Poland have basically achieved deep reconciliation, the Sino-
Japanese relationship is still dominated by mistrust and simmering animosity. I test and
compare two competing theories to explain the different reconciliation outcomes.
Realist theory argues that common security interests solely drive post-conflict reconciliation.
I develop the second theory, historical mythmaking theory, which suggests that elite
mythmaking of the conflict history for instrumental purposes will obstruct long-term
reconciliation. Because national myths glorify and whitewash the action of their own nations
and belittle others, they can cause the memories of former adversary states to clash. Such
mutually divergent narratives will provoke negative emotions and perception of each other's
hostile intention, both mechanisms contributing to bilateral conflict.
The case studies show the relative strength of historical mythmaking theory. The Cold War
structural pressure initially blocked reconciliation in both dyads. At that time Chinese and
Japanese war memories actually converged on a common myth that blames only a small
handful of Japanese militarists for the war. It is because China tried to win the hearts and
minds of the Japanese people in order to obtain Japanese official recognition of the
Communist regime. Since the Sino-U.S. rapprochement and East-West detente in the 1970s,
however, structural conditions turned favorable to reconciliation. But China and Japan only
brushed aside historical legacy to make way for diplomatic normalization. A Sino-Japanese
honeymoon quickly disintegrated in the early 1980s when the changing domestic context
prompted elites to create new national myths and escalate bilateral historiographic disputes.
Since then, the history problem has aggravated mutual threat perception and popular
hostility, seriously straining bilateral relations. In contrast, from the early 1970s West
Germany and Poland narrowed their memory divergence through restitution measures and
textbook cooperation. These efforts created a strong sense of closeness and trust, paving
the way for the eventual reconciliation in the 1990s.
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Chapter One
Introduction
How do states reconcile with each other after traumatic conflicts? Why have some
former enemy states managed to establish durable peace while others remain mired in
animosity? How important are history and memory, as compared to other domestic and
international variables, in shaping post-conflict interstate relationship? This dissertation
explores the origins of deep interstate reconciliation after traumatic conflicts. I argue that
the key to realizing deep reconciliation is the harmonization of the national memories
between the parties involved, while their memory divergence as a result of historical
mythmaking tends to harm the long-term prospect of reconciliation. As H. Richard
Niebuhr says in The Meaning of Revelation, "where common memory is lacking, where people
do not share in the same past, there can be no real community, and where community is to
be formed common memory must be created... the measure of our unity is the extent of our
common memory."'
This line of argument directly challenges the standard realist explanation of
international conflict and cooperation. A hard-nosed realist, concerned about nothing but
power, would equate reconciliation with political and military cooperation that should occur
when states share common strategic interests. For them, remembering and forgetting of
traumatic history is irrelevant to the question of interstate reconciliation. However, I
propose in this dissertation the concept of "deep interstate reconciliation," which means two
states share a joint understanding that war is unthinkable and hold generally warm feelings
about each other. It is a kind of relationship that has to be cemented by not only short-run
security needs but also sustainable mutual understanding and trust. Because the enduring
psychological and emotional consequences of past traumatic conflict constitute the main
source of bilateral grievances and mistrust, one cannot avoid addressing the political
significance of historical memory when searching for a path to deep reconciliation.
1 Quoted in Donald W. Shriver Jr., "The Long Road to Reconciliation: Some Moral Stepping Stones," in
Robert L. Rothstein, ed. After the Peace: Resistance and Reconciliation (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1999), p. 210.
Remembering the past is not a simple act of recording historical events, but a
process of constant reinterpreting of those events in light of present social and political
changes. From a realist point of view national collective memory is essentially reflection or
justification of structurally defined national interest. However historical mythmaking theory
formulated in this dissertation suggests that both international constraints and domestic
attributes can shape the way in which a nation interprets its past; moreover, once formed,
historical memory can take on a life of its own and exert independent impact on interstate
relations. Therefore, one needs to focus on both the causes and consequences of historical
memory when applying this theory to post-conflict interstate relations. Empirical evidence
presented in this study suggests that the ruling class harboring special political-ideological
goals tend to construct historical myths that try to glorify or whitewash the actions of one's
own nation during past conflict while blaming others for causing the tragedy. The
prevalence of historical myths in national consciousness would cause a sharp disagreement
between two former enemy states on the interpretation of their past conflict, which then
spark bitter mutual emotions and hostile perception of each other's intention, seriously
slowing down or setting back the reconciliation process. On the other hand, when two
former enemy states by and large agree upon the basic facts of their past conflict, take
substantial measures to address the responsibility for causing the trauma, as well as to amend
it, they are more likely to remove the historical root of public grievances and
intergovernmental friction.
To emphasize the importance of shared history is not to reject the explanatory
power of realist theory in its entirety. Realism is still right in pointing out that cooperation is
unlikely for strategic adversaries locked in an intense game of mutual balancing. Although
positive systemic conditions alone cannot bring about interstate reconciliation, this
dissertation shows that at least some degree of compatibility between two states' security
interests is helpful for the reconciliation process to burgeon in the first place. But it is also
found that the work to stop national mythmaking and construct shared memory is a critical
step towards deep interstate reconciliation, which could begin to take root even at a time of
bilateral security conflict and, if greatly encouraged by governments, will flourish when the
conflict lessens.
Understanding the nature of interstate reconciliation is the first step toward
unraveling the complicated conditions and mechanisms leading to its rise and decline in
international history. This introductory chapter first conceptualizs deep reconciliation and
explains the importance of this topic to current international relations. It also reviews the
existing literature and proposes two competing explanations for post-conflict interstate
relations: realist theory and historical mythmaking theory. In what Imre Lakatos has termed
"three-cornered fight," this dissertation is designed to test the two theories against each
other and against the null hypothesis. So the findings of this investigation will illuminate
both the relative and absolute explanatory power of the two theories. Following that I offer
an explanation of the qualitative case study method applied in this project. This chapter
concludes with a summary of my major empirical findings for the two main cases in this
dissertation: postwar Sino-Japanese and (West) German-Polish relations.
CONCEPTUAL DEFINITION OF DEEP INTERSTATE RECONCILATION
The concept of reconciliation can be simplified to restoring friendship and harmony
between parties who are locked in a chronic cycle of mistrust, fear, and hatred by past
traumatic experience.2 In international relations, traumatic experience of a state usually
originates from its protracted, destructive conflicts with the outside world in the recent
history.3 Such conflicts not only generate massive combat casualties but also often involve
gross violations of human rights and even result in national annexation, territorial loss, or
pillage of important national resources that may threaten the survival of a nation. Besides,
states suffer psychological wound of humiliation at the same time when they undergo
horrendous physical damages. So collective sorrow and grief grow rampant and become
national trauma,4 which predisposes states to mutual enmity and belligerence. To obtain
2 Ann L. Phillips, Power and Influence after the Cold War: Germany in East-CentralEurope (Lanham: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2000), p. 52.
3 Traumatic experience could be incurred by both domestic and international conflicts, but it is the later that
has more political and psychological impact on interstate relations. The concept of protracted conflict is
discussed in Robert L. Rothstein, "In Fear of Peace: Getting Past Maybe," and Herbert C. Kelman,
"Transforming the Relationship Between Former Enemies: A Social-Psychological Analysis," in Rothstein,
After the Peace.
4 Elazar Barkan, The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices (New York: Norton, 2000), p.
345.
deep interstate reconciliation is exactly to build a relationship devoid of mutual belligerence
and grievances stemming from their traumatic history. Following this general presumption,
a conceptual framework of deep interstate reconciliation embodies two key components,
stable peace and amicable atmosphere, that cover both the inter-government and people-to-
people relationships between former enemy states.
Stable Peace
The first conceptual component of deep interstate reconciliation is a high degree of
peacefulness between former adversaries. It is a truism that peace is equal to the state of no
war, when war is defined as "large-scale institutionally organized lethal violence" that may
cause over one thousand battle fatalities.5 But modem history suggests that, even in the
absence of intense armed conflicts, international relations can still be precarious and easily
deteriorate into war. For example, the peace between the U.S. and Great Britain and its
colonies such as Canada from 1776 was quite fragile and eventually collapsed with the war of
1812.6 Likewise, the so-called "long peace" during the Cold War was fraught with subsystem
conflicts, proxy wars, and international crises and war brinkmanship.7 Also the "long peace"
is more a retrospective conclusion than the cognition at the time when superpower war was
a constant danger in the world.
Hence one need go beyond the "no war" definition of peace to take into account the
stability of international relationship. In this dissertation I apply the notion of stable peace
to define the peacefulness of deep interstate reconciliation. This notion evokes Immanuel
Kant's assertion in his classic work Perpetual Peace that peace is not simply a "suspension of
hostilities" but rather "an end to all hostilities," which means the elimination of "all existing
reasons for a future war."8 In Kenneth Boulding's interpretation, "stable peace is a situation
5 Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: PrinctpesforA Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1993), p. 12.
6 Kenneth E. Boulding, Stable Peace (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978), p. 44.
7 Michael Brecher & Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "International Crises and Global Instability: the Myth of the 'Long
Peace'," in Charles W. Kegley, The Long Postwar Peace: Contending Explanations and Projections (New York, NY:
HarperCollins Publishers, 1991).
8 Erik G. Yesson illustrates the connection between the "stable peace" concept and Kantian ideas. See
Alexander L.George, Foreword to Stable Peace among Nations by Arie M. Kacowicz, et al. (Lanham, Md.:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), p. xii.
in which the probability of war is so small that it does not really enter into the calculations of
any of the people involved."' Therefore, the benchmark held for peace here is not merely
the absence of war but "a condition in which even the possibility of armed conflict has been
virtually eliminated.""1
Sstable peace is not absolutely short of conflicts. Disputes may still arise in such
areas as trade, immigration or environmental regulations. If conflict refers to any
"redistributional situation where there is gain for some and loss for others,"" it is almost an
inevitable phenomenon in international relations. As someone said, "conflict seems to be a
permanent truth - perhaps the deepest of them."' 2 Peace proves itself not by the absence of
conflict, but by how conflict is dealt with. When stable peace is firmly established, "neither
side considers employing force, or even making a threat of force, in any dispute, even serious
disputes, between them."' 3 In other words, there is a cognitive threshold in stable peace that
both states perceive a minimual danger of war.14
Amicable Atmosphere
Reestablishing friendship between former adversaries is "a mutual, consensual
process" that cannot be simply "legislated or imposed" by political institutions but need be
supported by voluntaristic emotions and actions sprung from the societal dimension."
Therefore, in addition to the notion of stable peace that largely pertains to the government-
to-government relationship, deep reconciliation is also characterized by an amicable people-
to-people relationship. Political cooperation and popular good will are two indispensable
conceptual components of deep interstate reconciliation, for one without the other only
makes superficial and fragile reconciliation.
9 Boulding, Stable Peace. P. 13.
10 Stephen R. Rock, Why Peace Breaks Out: Greatpower Rapprochement in Historical Perspective (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1989), p. ix.
11 Boulding, Stable Peace. P. 10.
12 Quoted from Mervyn T. Love, Peace Building through Reconciliation in Northern Ireland (Aldershot, Brookfield:
Avebury; Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1995), p. 4.
13 George, Foreword to Stable Peace among Nations, p. xiii.
14 Kacowicz, "Stable Peace: A Conceptual Framework," in Kacowicz, Stable Peace among Nations, p. 16.
Is Phillips, Power and Influence after the Cold War, p. 53.
Generally speaking, the atmosphere between two peoples is considered amicable if it
is dominated by mutual trust and/or a sense of affinity. For countries that fought a
traumatic conflict(s) in the past, amicable, harmonious popular atmosphere is not attainable
unless the historically rooted grievances and animosity have been eliminated. This does not
mean that history issue has disappeared from social discourses. People may still actively
research, evaluate and commemorate the traumatic history, but they do not treat it as a major
source of resentments or hold it against one another country. Although mutual complaints
may still exist, especially at times of new bilateral disputes, the tendency to use history to
justify or reinforce such complaints has been stalled or marginalized. To put it in a simple
way, popular reconciliation means that the people of two former enemy states have
permanently put behind them the traumatic history.
WHY DEEP RECONCILIATION MATTERS
Above I have argued that, as opposed to the commonsensical belief, a world without
armed conflicts is not necessarily peaceful. Beyond stopping a war, much more work is
needed to do away with the psychological and emotional shadow of past trauma that may
cause the use of force once again. History of international relations keenly attests to this
concern. Studies show that a great proportion of international militarized conflicts are
concentrated in a small number of dyadic relations. This is the so-called "enduring rivalries"
phenomenon, where the same enemies keep fighting with one another over an extended
period of time."16 A rivalry became enduring not always because the same conflict of interest
did not get resolved but often due to the fact that the psychological wounds suffered in the
last traumatic conflict had never been treated timely and satisfactorily, begetting new rounds
of conflict on and on. Deep reconciliation that aims at thorough removal of historical
burden offers an effective solution to end the vicious cycle of repeated wars.17
16 See Gary Goertz and Paul Diehl, "The empirical importance of enduring rivalries," International Interactions
No. 18 (1992): 151-63; Paul F. Diehl, The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1998); Paul Diehl and Gary Goertz, War and Peace in International Rivaly (Ann Arbor: University Of Michigan
Press, 2000). Enduring rivalry is formally defined by Diehl and Goertz as a dyad that has experienced at least
six militarized disputes in a time period lasting at least 20 years. See Diehl and Goertz 2000, p. 45.
17 The literature on enduring rivalry has offered some solutions or described certain conditions under which the
rivalry can be ended, including conflict management, democratization of domestic politics, and international
The importance of this question is illuminated by post-Cold War international
relations. Since the East-West ideological and strategic confrontation receded, the ancient
bitterness about historical trauma has reemerged as one major threat to international peace.
East Asia saw a resurgence of vivid memories of Japanese aggression during the first half of
the 20 century. An unprecedented international barrage of anger has been charged against
Japan in such forms as official criticism, mass demonstrations, and court actions."8 The lack
of deep reconciliation between Japan and its neighbors has cast a dismal shadow over the
prospect of regional security cooperation in Asia.'" Likewise, long-standing rivals in other
regions, such as Israel and the Palestinians, and India and Pakistan, have not yet overcome
their hereditary feuds to attain true peace.
This project would have no prescriptive value if history had not provided signs for
optimism. Deep reconciliation was indeed accomplished in the case of postwar Franco-
German relationship. Since the end of World War II, the two countries have formed a
security alliance, engaged in the economic and political integration of the European
community, and even jointly written history textbooks.20 Similarly, despite their brutal
fighting that was ended by the use of nuclear weapons,21 the U.S. and Japan put behind their
system change. See Diehl and Goertz, War and Peace in International Rivaly, Chapter 10 & 11. The first two
solutions are more manageable by human efforts than the systemic approach, but they are either inadequate or
not always necessary. I will address them in literature review following this section.
18 Tanaka Hiroshi, "Why is Asia Demanding Postwar Compensation Now?" Hitotsubashi Journal of Social
Studies 28 (1996): 1-14; "Not Bought Off: Former Sex Slaves Want Compensation, Not Charity," Far East
Economic Review 159, no. 30 (1996); Kiichi Fujiwara, "Sens6 no Kioku, Kokumin no Monokatari (War
Memories, Nation's Stories)," Sobun (April 1999): 18-21; "Japanese Call '37 Massacre A War Myth, Stirring
Storm," The New York Times, January 23, 2000; "Japan's Murky Past Catches Up," The Economist, July 8,
2000.
19 On the negative impact of historical legacy on Japan's relations with other Asian countries, see Allen S.
Whiting, China Eyes Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Thomas J. Christensen, "Chinese
Realpolitik," Foreign Affair 75, No. 5 (1996); William Lee Lowell, "The Inheritance of War: Japan's domestic
politics and international ambitions," in Gerrit W.Gong, Remembering and Forgetting: the Legacy of War and Peace in
EastAsia (Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic International Studies, 1996); Nicholas D. Kristof, "The
Problem of Memory," Foreign Affairs 77, No. 6 (1998); Thomas U. Berger, "Tangled Visions: Culture,
Historical Memory and Japan's External Relations in Asia," paper submitted to the Annual meeting of the
American Political Science Association, 1998, Boston, MA.
20 For a recount of postwar Franco-German reconciliation in the context of European integration, see Karl W.
Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); F. Roy Willis, France, Germany, and the New Europe, 1945-1967
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968); Stephen A.Kocs, Autonomy or Power? The Franco-German Relationship
and Europe's Strategic Choices, 1955-1995 (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995). For Franco-German cooperation on
textbook writing, see the section on "Joint History Writing" in Chapter 2 of the dissertation.
21 For understanding the enormous hatred and contempt held by the U.S. and Japan against each other during
the Pacific War and the terror of American atomic bombing that left a irremovable scar on Japanese national
war history and established the most influential and solid alliance in postwar Asian-Pacific
region.2 Profound changes epitomizing deep reconciliation have also emerged between
Germany and its East-Central European neighbors, including Poland and the Czech
Republic.23 In some other cases where deep reconciliation has yet to materialize, various
governmental and civilian efforts towards this goal are gaining momentum, as revealed in the
progress of Russo-Japanese reconciliation since Gorbachev's reforms in the mid-1980s and
the on-going peace rapprochement between Greece and Turkey.24
So studying post-conflict reconciliation not only helps advance our theoretical
knowledge about international conflict and peace, but also has practical significance.
Through a comparative investigation of both successful and failed reconciliation processes,
this dissertation yields important advice for political leaders and concerned activists to
prevent negative historical legacies from destabilizing international relations.
ASSESSING THE EXISITING LITERATURE
psyche, see John W. Dower, War without Mercy (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986); John W. Dower, "The
Bombed: Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japanese memory," Diplomatic History 19, No. 2 (Spring 1995); James J.
Orr, The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i
Press, 2001), Chapter 3.
22 Being a subject of heated debate among American and Japanese historians in postwar era notwithstanding,
the memory on the Pacific War in general and American nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in
specific has never been a significant source of US-Japan political and popular tension. For these
historiographic debates, see Daizabur6 Yui, Nichibei Sensdkan no Sokoku (The Conflct between Japanese andAmerican
Views of War) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995); Laura Hein and Mark Selden, Living with the Bomb: American and
Japanese Cultural Conflicts in the NuclearAge (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1997); David Thelen, "History after the
Enola Gay Controversy: An Introduction," The Journal of American History (December 1995); Otto Mayr,
"The Enola Gay Fiasco: History, Politics, and the Museum," Technology and Culture 39, no. 3 (July 1998).
23 Ann L. Phillips, "The Politics of Reconciliation: Germany in Central-East Europe," German Politics 7, No. 2
(1998); idem., Power and Influence after the Cold War, Chapter 3 & 4; Vladimir Handl, "Czech-German Declaration
on Reconciliation," German Politics 6, No. 2 (August 1997).
24 For some recent works on Russo-Japanese relationship progresses, see Gilbert Rozman, Japan and Russia: the
tortuous path to normakYiation, 1949-1999 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000); William F. Nimmo, Japan and
Russia: A Reevaluation in the Post-Soviet Era (Westport in Connecticut, and London: Greenwood Press, 1994);
Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Jonathan Haslam, and Andrew C. Kuchins eds., Russia and Japan: An Unresolved Dilemma
Between Distant Neighbors (Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley, 1993); Rajan Menon, "Japan-Russia
relations and North-east Asian Security," Survival 38, No.2 (Summer 1996); William Nester, "Japan, Russia,
and the Northern Territories: continuities, changes, obstacles, opportunities," Third World Quarterly 14, No. 4
(1993).
On Greek-Turkish peace process, see Suleyman Demirel, "The Need for Dialogue: Turkey, Greece, and the
possibility of Reconciliation," Harvard International Review 21, No. 1 (1998); "Friendlier Greece and Turkey,"
The Economist 352, no. 8137 (1999); "Greek Foreign Minister on Landmark Turkey Visit," The New York
Times, January 19, 2000; "Turkey and Greece: let's be friends," The Economist 363, no. 8268 (2002).
In the study of international relations, the outbreak and maintenance of peace
between nation-states are understudied, if compared to the profuse scholarly attention
devoted to the causes, conduct, and consequences of war. Geoffrey Blainey even declares
that "for every thousand pages published on the causes of wars there is less than one page
directly on the causes of peace."25 Since the 1950s when the area of peace research was first
created in the modem social science tradition, it has been mostly focused on the earlier steps
of conflict termination and resolution including negotiation, good offices, arbitration,
conciliation, and mediation.26 The literature has rarely addressed "how peace, once obtained,
can be stabilized and maintained," the question that critically bears on post-conflict
reconciliation.27
Three bodies of literature on peace research make the exception. The first is the
booming studies on democratic peace, which stress that democracies are less likely to use
lethal violence against one another because of their shared liberal norms and the constraints
of their democratic institutions.28 So it is suggested that democratization of both former
enemy states should lead to stable peace.29 If liberal democracy were the necessary condition
for stable peace, then deep reconciliation between non-democracies or one democracy and
one non-democracy would be far from reach. Yet history contains cases of durable peace
between some non-democracies, such as members of the ASEAN, or between states only
one of which is a democracy, like the relationship between the U.S. and Mexico until the
1980s.30 Also, because bringing democracy to a state is a difficult and highly unpredictable
25 Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (New York: Free Press, 1988), p.3.
26 For some latest peace study works that emphasize the importance of conflict management approaches, see
Ho-Won Jeong, Conflict Resolution: Dynamics, Process and Structure (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999); idem., Peace and
Conflict Studies: An Introduction (Aldershot; Burlington: Ashgate, 2000); J. Michael Greig, "Moments of
Opportunity: Recognizing Conditions of Ripeness for International Mediation between Enduring Rivals,"
Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, No. 6 (2001); C. R. Mitchell, Gestures of Conciliation: Factors Contributing to
Successful Olive Branches (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000); Louis Kriesberg and Stuart J. Thorson, Timing the
De-escalation ofInternational Conflicts (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1991).
27 Kacowicz, "Stable Peace: A Conceptual Framework," p. 13.
28 Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Philosophy & Public Affairs 12, No. 4 (Fall
1983); Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, Chapter 2; John M. Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic
Peace," International Security 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994).
29 For example, Edward Friedman argues that China and Japan cannot peacefully coexist unless China becomes
a democracy, see Friedman, "Preventing War Between China and Japan," in Edward Friedman and Barrett L.
McCormick, What If China Doesn't Democratize? Implcations for War and Peace (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2000).
30 Amitav Acharya, "Collective Identity and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia," in Emanuel Adler and
Michael N. Barnett eds., Security Communities (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998);
Kacowicz, "Stable Peace: A Conceptual Framework," p. 16.
process, this theory hardly gives any feasible policy prescriptions. The main purpose of this
dissertation is to search for practical solutions to post-conflict reconciliation.
The second related literature is regarding security community, the idea that was
pioneered by Karl Deutsch in 1957 and recently received an outstanding revisit from the
constructivist perspective in the work of Adler and Barnett. According to these studies,
pluralistic security communities featured by a shared regional identity and strong sense of
community usually render stable peace between member states; among the essential
conditions for the rise of security communities are shared main values, multiple ranges of
communication and transactions, and considerable mutual predictability of behavior.31
However, the concept of security community holds a much higher threshold than the
definition of stable peace, which does not always require common identity and sense of "we
feeling." Besides, this explanation tends to reverse cause and effect because security
communities are more likely a result of stable peace than its cause. Therefore, the literature
is more useful for identifying some important indicators of stable peace rather than for
tracing its causal conditions and mechanisms.
The third body of literature focuses on the normative arguments and practical
agenda of transitional justice in the aftermath of civil wars, ethnic conflicts, or political
democratization.32 A near consensus of these works is that redressing "historical injustices"
- meaning unjust, criminal, exploitative, and genocidal actions that have ended but their
consequences continue to impact on the survivors - between former adversaries is an
indispensable step towards reconciliation.33 The solutions they propose largely center on
measures of restitution that correct wrongs, heal wounds and restore trust, including apology
and forgiveness, compensation, truth-telling commissions, and restorative justice. These
findings are useful for us to understand the institutions and practices through which
31 Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, Chapter 2; Adler and Barnett, Security
Communities, Chapter 2.
32 For a sample of the recent literature boom on these topics, see Barkan, The Guilt ofNations; Rothstein, After
the Peace; John Borneman, Settling Accounts: Violence, Justice, andAccountability in Postsociahst Europe (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1997); Colin Knox and Pidraic Quirk, Peace Building in Northern Ireland, Israel and
South Africa: Transition, Transformation and Reconciliation (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000); Dorothy C. Shea,
The South African Truth Commission: The Politics of Recondliation (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace
Press, 2000); Lynn Berat and Yossi Shain, "Retribution or Truth-Telling in South Africa? Legacies of the
Transitional Phase," Law and Social Inquiry 20, No. 1 (1995).
historical grievances can be considerably allayed between the relevant parties. But the
transitional justice literature tends to be confined within domestic contexts where the
reconciliation process mainly involves remedying harms committed by dominant groups
against groups of ethnic minority or inferior socioeconomic status, or by authoritarian
governments against political dissidents. For two sovereign states each of which makes its
own national history and is sensitive to national interests and autonomy, however, the
mechanisms in which history factor influences reconciliation process need major
modifications.
EXPLAINING DEEP INTERSTATE RECONCILIATION
The inadequacy of the existing literature engenders the need to look for more useful
explanations of the success and failure of post-conflict reconciliation. Two theories on
international conflict and cooperation seem to be particularly pertinent. They are realist
explanation that emphasizes common strategic interests behind interstate peace, and theory
of historical mythmaking that stresses the importance of removing historical myths in favor
of shared history between former adversaries. I briefly summarize these theories below and
offer a full explanation in Chapter 2.
Realist Explanation
Realism makes no direct predictions about the pathways toward deep reconciliation
as it is defined here. Realists assume that states exist an anarchic world where there is no
overarching international authority to protect them but they must look out for themselves.
The dominance of the self-help principle prompts competitive security policies to balance
against other states that may endanger their national survival. Therefore, cooperation is a
rare phenomenon, especially between adversaries who are engaged in mutual balancing.34
The only widely acknowledged form of international cooperation in realist literature exists
33 For a discussion of "historical injustices" in common sense, see Barkan, The Guilt ofNations, p. xxx.
34 On the scarcity and difficulty of international cooperation in an anarchic world, see Robert Jervis,
"Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30 (January 1978); Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and
the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," Interational Organization
between allies who share common security interest to balance against an external threat."
And even alliances are not stable, for the international system often changes and states'
security interests would alter accordingly.
Nevertheless, the realist approach need not be rejected offhand when one tries to
understand the conditions under which different types of interstate relations may arise after a
traumatic conflict. The logic that states come together or drift apart in accordance with their
security needs at least suggests that, as long as an international sstemicpattern sustains, states with
shared security interests should maintain close political and economic cooperation, and their
popular relationship will also be friendly for public feeling is entirely malleable and follow in
the direction of critical national interest. This is in fact deep reconciliation, although
conditioned on structural continuity. Likewise, two states will be less likely to develop such
a relationship if they have very limited security interest in common, or even constitute
security threats to each other, either directly or by their external alignment. This theory is
primarily concerned with a state's position in the international system, treating such
ideational variables of history and memory as nearly negligible.
Historical Mythmaking Explanation
Historical mythmaking theory disagrees with the realist view that international
circumstances determine policy decisions while ideas merely serve to justify those rationally
made decisions. Instead, it departs from a different assumption that beliefs and ideas,
including historical ideas, can be an independent factor shaping international relations.
According to this theory, chauvinist mythmaking of a nation's history, especially those
traumatic or controversial episodes, is a powerful ideational force that can cause conflictual
foreign policies, international tension, and even wars. Historical myths distort historical facts
to perform self-glorification, self-whitewashing, or other-maligning roles.36 They are created
by political elites to mobilize public support to their domestic or international policies or to
42, No. 3 (Summer 1988); Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International
Security 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 54-57.
35 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory ofIntemrationalPolitics (Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979); Stephen M. Walt,
The Origins ofAlliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of
International Institutions," International Security 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), p. 13.
36 Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," International Security 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994).
fortify the political and ideological foundation of their regime legitimacy. Despite the
instrumental nature of their origins, the influence of historical myths can easily get out of
control and stir up public animosity and threat perception that are often unintended by their
creators.
The theory predicts failure of interstate reconciliation with the presence of historical
mythmaking. If former enemy states form their collective memories based on these myths,
their perceptions of the traumatic history will greatly diverge. The divergence of historical
narratives will then aggravate threat assessment and poison mutual emotions. Specifically,
both elite and public will hold strong mistrust against each other country, and emotions of
grievances and frustration will prevail at the popular level, often falling into a spiral of finger-
pointing and negative stereotyping. In addition, intergovernmental disputes over history-
related issues will repeatedly heat up, and conflicts in other issue areas also become harder to
resolve either due to governments' intention to utilize the history issue for political gains, or
simply because the prevalent public resentments tend to heighten political sensitivity to any
conciliatory policies. Even if the two governments agree on a mythical interpretation of
history due to some more pressing internal or external needs at the time, the agreement
tends to be fragile and quickly shatter once the old myths are challenged and replaced by
new myths in an altered political situation, in which case bitter historiographic friction would
follow and bilateral relationship regress.
Contrarily, if states reject national myths through bilateral history dialogues and
institutional arrangements on historical restitution, their national memories of the past conflict
will converge on a shared history of what happened, who is responsible, and what need to be
done to amend wrongs. Shared history can heal the wounds of the victims and rehabilitate
the moral and political image of the perpetrators, so as to bring back mutual trust and respect
between the two peoples. Besides, historiographic convergence will dramatically decrease
history-related disputes and foreclose political use of history that would have complicated
political disputes in other issue areas. Other things being equal, the theory predicts that shared
history will significantly facilitate interstate reconciliation.
METHODOLOGY AND CASE SELECTION
Comparative study of historical cases is the primary methodology to be used in this
dissertation. I mainly follow the congruence procedure and process tracing methods.3 7 I
first spell out the internal logic of the two theories and deduce from each of them a set of
predictions on post-conflict interstate relations. My case studies make paired observations
of values on the independent and dependent variables across different periods of time within
each case, and then assess whether these values co-vary in a manner consistent with those
predictions. In order to establish that the observed correlation is causal, not spurious, I not
only examine the degree of congruence between the predicted and actual outcomes but also
process-trace such outcomes to test the cause-effect links framed by the theories.
Cases studied in this dissertation are two postwar dyadic relationships between Japan
and China, and between (West) Germany and Poland. The two dyads are similar in their
geographic proximity, traditional economic and cultural ties, recent history of traumatic
conflict, and the structural environment they faced immediately after the conflict. In
addition, both ties experienced substantial variations in international structural conditions
and the degree of bilateral historiographic divergence. Yet the outcomes of their
reconciliation process are at great variance: as of the beginning of the 2 1st century, the united
Germany has by and large achieved deep reconciliation with Poland, while the Sino-Japanese
relationship is still dominated by a general atmosphere of mistrust and simmering hostility.
When examining the Sino-Japanese relations, I widely use primary sources including archival
and other governmental documents, interviews, memoirs, media data, and schoolbook texts,
as well as pertinent secondary materials. The study of (West) German-Polish relations
mainly draws upon secondary sources in English language.
Not only to test theories and explore the origins of reconciliation, the case studies
also address a key puzzle in contemporary Sino-Japanese relationship, which is the
emergence of the problem of history as a prominent source of bilateral tension since the
37 For illustrations of these methods, see Alexander George, "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational
Decision Making," in Advances in Information Processing in Organizations (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1984). Vol.
2; Gary King et al. eds., Designing Social Inquiry: sdentific inference in qualitative research (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
1980s. This phenominon defies two aspects of conventional wisdom. First is the hope that
time heals all wounds: the more distant the trauma is, the more likely that painful memories
would fade away. Second is the belief that increasing diplomatic, economic and social
interactions between both nations would mitigate historical grievances. Why then did China
and Japan quarrel over history not immediately after the war but only from the early 1980s
when the majority of their population had no direct experience of the war, and well after
their diplomatic normalization and the development of thick economic and social ties?
Uncovering the causes of this puzzle is useful to both evaluating the significance of historical
memory in shaping international relations and predicting the future trend of the strategic and
popular relationships between the two major powers in the East Asian region.
SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
I devide the case of postwar Sino-Japanese relations into three sub-cases: 1) 1950s-
1960s, 2) 1970s, and 3) 1980s-1990s. The case of (West) German-Polish relations is devided
into four sub-cases: 1) 1950s-mid 1960s, 2) late 1960s-late 1970s, 3) 1980s, and 4) 1990s.
Overall, historical mythmaking theory passes six out of the total seven sub-case tests, failing
to explain Sino-Japanese relations in the 1950s-60s, while realist theory only passes half of
the tests, including Sino-Japanese relations in the 1950s-60s and 1990s (not the 1980s), and
German-Polish relations in the 1950s-60s and the late 1960s-late 1970s.
Specifically, realist theory well explains the total lack of Sino-Japanese reconciliation
in the 1950s-60s. During this period, Japan was allied to the U.S. who led the Western
containment against the communist bloc including China. Their antagonistic positions in
the bipolar world system determined their mutual expectation of immediate war, Tokyo's
policy of non-recognition to Beijing and restrictions on bilateral trade, as well as the failure
of Beijing's strategy to reverse these Japanese policies through the "People's Diplomacy."
University Press, 1994); Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methodsfor Students ofPolitical Science (Ithaca: Comell
University Press, 1997).
As for the historiography, ruling elites in both countries created and perpetuated self-
glorifying and whitewashing myths with regard to the war history. But superisingly, the war
narratives of the perpetrator state Japan and victim state China converged on the mythical
distincition between a small handful of Japanese militarists and the vast majority of innocent
Japanese people, and Chinese official propaganda deemphasized any points of divergence
with Japanese historiography. It is because China tried to win the hearts and minds of the
Japanese people in order to obtain Japanese official recognition of the Communist regime.
This myth also supported the class-based communist ideology claiming that proletarians of
all countries could form an international united front against the evil capitalist system. So
historical mythmaking in the two countries, albeit indisputably significant, would still have
allowed a certain degree of bilateral reconciliation if it had not been the negative structural
conditions.
During the 1970s, profound structural changes, including the Sino-Soviet conflict
and Sino-American rapprochement, were the primary driving forces behind the
improvement of bilateral relations. They first normalized diplomatic relations and developed
a much higher degree of political and economic cooperation than before. But historical
mythmaking theory rather than realist theory explains the absence of deep reconciliation
despite the positive systemic conditions in the 1970s. One of the major obstacles to the
forging of a solid bilateral friendship was China's deeply entrenched bias against Japan. It is
because Chinese and Japanese elites did not try to settle their historiographic disagreement
but continue to limit, cover up or simply set it aside to clear the way for the more immediate
strategic needs. Political gestures substituted sincere, concrete restitution, and propaganda
of national myths prevented rigorous investigation of the historical facts and clarification of
war responsibility. As a result of the Chinese suspicion of and antipathy to Japan stemming
from bitter war memories, bilateral cooperation in security and economic cooperation
remained limited, and the popular friendship was more superficial and imaginary than solid.
Historical mythmaking theory again fits the evidence in the Sino-Japanese relations
after the early 1980s, when their honeymoon disintegrated despite the continuation of
favorable structural conditions. The relationship downturn should be attributed to the new
historical mythmaking patterns and eruption of bilateral memory conflict in the changing
domestic political context. In China, pragmatic leader Deng Xiaoping's economic reform
and open-door policy met with strong resistance from the conservative old guards within the
Communist Party. Meanwhile, after the Cultural Revolution the party's prestige in the
country declined considerably. To solve these problems, the government propaganda
shifted its focus from the communist ideology to an assertive nationalism, which portrayed
the Western powers as a negative out-group that threatened the interest of the in-group,
which is the Chinese nation. The assertive nationalism was useful both to appease the party
hardliners and to strengthen national cohesion and enhance regime legitimacy.
In order to foster this assertive nationalist ideology, the government changed
historical mythmaking patterns. Unlike its previous emphasis on class struggle and
ideological conflict, Chinese school education now tried to promote a national history
centering on the conflict between the Chinese nation and foreign nations that invaded China
in the past, especially Japan. By targeting on Japan as the national enemy, the new narrative
also tried to create a sense of solidarity between the Communist mainland China and
Nationalist-controlled Taiwan and justify the cause of national unification, also an important
pillar of the Communist regime legitimacy. The education campaign particularly highlighted
Japanese war atrocities and Chinese sufferings. A direct result of the patriotic education
campaign is an outpouring of Chinese victim consciousness and anti-Japanese sentiments.
More and more ordinary Chinese people began to believe that the entire Japanese nation was
brutal and aggressive.
In such a process of significant renegotiation and reconstruction, war narratives of
the two countries directly clashed. Since the 1982 textbook controversy, the so-called
"history problem" frequently flared up and strained bilateral relations by fomenting negative
emotions and perception of hostile intentions. My research of Chinese popular opinions
shows that historical grievance about the war history and the lack of Japanese contrition was
a major source of Chinese popular animosity towards Japan since the 1980s. The majority of
Japanese people indeed felt sorry for its war of aggression to China, but not so sorry to the
extent that they would be willing to provide substantial restitution. As a result of the
memory gap, emotions of disgust and frustration with China spread in the Japanese society
in reaction to Chinese historical grievance. In terms of intentions, I found a clear pattern
among Chinese strategic elites since the early 1980s to associate Japanese historical amnesia
with the Japanese tendency to act aggressively again in the world. However, most Japanese
strategic elites rejected such a Chinese argument based on history but suspected that China
tried to use history as a card to extort economic benefits from Japan or simply to justify its
own assertive military strategy. Such negative emotions and perception of hostile intentions
also interacted with one another and underlined uncompromising foreign policies at times of
bilateral disputes, including the trade friction around the mid-1980s, the 1987 Kokaryo
incident regarding the legal status of Taiwan, two island disputes in the 1990s and the cut-
down of Japanese ODA (Official Development Assistance) to China in 2000.
Realist theory fails to explain why the relationship worsened from the early 1980s
rather than the end of the decade when the common Soviet threat vanished. Even after the
Cold War, realist factors compounded but did not obscure the significant impact of
historical myths. The sense of structural uncertainty in the 1990s and the active attempts of
China and Japan to pursue military buildup and assertive international strategy contributed to
the tension in bilateral relations. But the five year time lag between the disappreance of the
common Soviet threat and the substantial increase of their fear of mutual threat, as well as
the absence of major shift in their power balance, suggest that the relationship was
determined by not just power distribution but also perception of intention, which was to a
large extent influenced by the historical interpretations.
In contrast to the Sino-Japanese relations, postwar (West) German-Polish relations is
a case of reconciliation success. Like in the Asian case, the Cold War structure initially
locked West Germany and Poland, allies of the U. and USSR respectively, in mutual hostility
and ruled out the possibility of reconciliation. By the mid-1960s, ruling elites in both
countries created historical myths that demonized the entire nation of each other and
clashed head-on regarding Germany's Eastern frontier and postwar expulsion of Germans
from the Eastern territories. Such intense historiographic conflict aggravated the political
barriers to bilateral reconciliation. So both theories pass the test successfully.
Then the rise of d6tente in Europe since the late 1960s allowed bilateral cooperation
to emerge under more favorable structural conditions, which fits the prediction of realist
theory. Historical mythmaking theory also passes the test because it was from this phase
that bilateral historiographic divergence began to narrow, due to German actions of
contrition and the bilateral historians' dialogue sponsored by the German-Polish Textbook
Commission.
In the tests against the next two phases of bilateral relations, historical mythmaking
theory performs better than realist theory. In the 1980s, the trend of historical settlement
through restitution and joint history writing persisted, which cushioned the negative impact
that the decline of detente had exerted on bilateral relations. After the end of the Cold War,
both countries have committed to fostering mutual understanding and trust through
comprehensive exchange programs and efforts to construct shared history about their past
traumatic conflicts. So even in the absence of pressing common security threat,
historiographic convergence contributed to the institutionalized security and economic
cooperation between Germany and Poland and their amicable populat relations, all indicative
of the stage of deep reconciliation.
The subsequent chapters of this dissertation are structured as follows. Chapter Two
illustrates the operational definition of interstate reconciliation and lays out the theoretical
assumptions and causal mechanisms of the two competing explanations. Chapter Three,
Four and Five examine Sino-Japanese relations in the 1950s-60s, the 1970s, and the 1980s-
90s respectively. Chapter Six addresses (West) German-Polish relations since the end of
WWII up to the 1990s. Chapter Seven summarizes the findings of case study chapters,
discusses the agenda of future research, and illustrates the theoretical and policy implications
of the dissertation.
Chapter Two
Explaining Deep Interstate Reconciliation
Kenneth Boulding once argued that an international war-peace system consists of
four general phases - stable war, unstable war, unstable peace, and stable peace - and the
system shifts from one phase to another when the stability of the system varies
substantially.38 If two former adversary states constitute a war-peace system, their post-
conflict reconciliation process stands for a system transition from the phase of unstable
peace, where violent conflicts have been halted but possibility of more violence still exists, to
the phase of stable peace, where the likelihood of war drops to nearly nonexistence. Before
formulating explanations for such a system transition, I first illustrate how to identify and
measure different phases of the system. After providing the operational definition of
interstate reconciliation, I elaborate on the arguments and predictions of the two competing
theories of reconciliation.
OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF INTERSTATE RECONCILIATION
This dissertation mainly draws on existing operational definitions of peace that place
stable peace in a continuum of interstate relationships. Alexander George divides post-
conflict international relationships into three categories of peace: 1) precariouspeace, when
peace between two states means little more than temporary absence of war and is maintained
by immediate military deterrence, such as the Arabian-Israeli and Indo-Pakistani
relationships for several decades; 2) conditionalpeace, when general deterrence plays the
dominant role in maintaining a less acute, less heated conflict relationship while resort to
immediate military deterrence is rare, like the U.S.-Soviet relationship during the Cold War;
3) stablepeace, when both states consider it unthinkable to use military force or to adopt
deterrence strategy backed by threats of military force in resolving any mutual disputes, such
38 Boulding, Stable Peace, Chapter 2.
as the relationships among European Union countries. 39 Similarly, Benjamin Miller offers a
typology including three types of peace as coldpeace, where returning to the use of force is a
present danger, normalpeace, when most conflictual issues have been resolved but war is not
ruled out as a policy instrument, and warmpeace, when the use of force is unthinkable as a
conflict resolution approach."
Building on these typologies, I define three stages of interstate reconciliation: 1)
Non-Reconciliation; 2) Shallow Reconciliation; 3) Deep Reconciliation. The stage of
Shallow Reconciliation is further divided into two sub-stages of "Friction" and
"Rapprochement." Each stage has distinctive characteristics in both intergovernmental and
popular dimensions. I use three indicators to measure intergovernmental relationship:
expectation of war, national recognition, and economic interaction. They illustrate
respectively a state's fundamental assessment of its security relations with the former enemy
state, whether they recognize each other's basic rights of survival and sovereignty, and
whether they trust each other enough to engage in economic cooperation. Given the
conceptual definition of reconciliation laid out in the introduction chapter, mutual
expectation of war should be the most decisive indicator while the other two are subsidiary
indicators that are useful in identifying changes in two important aspects of inter-
governmental relationship. When defining popular relations, I use the indicator of popular
feeling that captures the general atmosphere between the two nations. The divergent values
on these indicators for various stages and sub-stages of interstate reconciliation are
summarized in Table 1.
Non-Reconciliation
This stage refers to a bilateral relationship that bears great resemblance to the
category ofprecarious peace proposed by George or coldpeace by Miller. It is marked by intense
mutual hostility and high danger of returning to the use of force. The following four
indicators signify the stage of Non-Reconciliation.
31 Summarized from Alexander George, Foreword to Stable Peace among Nations. George first presented these
categories of peace in the Preface to Europe Undivided: The New Logic of Peace in U.S.-Russian Relations, by James E.
Goodby (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998).
40 Introduced in Kacowicz, et al., Stable Peace among Nations, pp. 20-21.
Table 1: Measuring Interstate Reconciliation
Deep Shallow Reconciliation Non-
Reconciliation Reconciliation
Rapprochement Friction
Government Common Expectation Moderate Expectation Moderate Expectation Imminent
- To- of No War of War: of War: Expectation of
Government Cautious Cooperation Prepare for Remote War War
Full National Partial National Partial National No National
Recognition Recognition: Recognition: Recognition
Sovereignty Sovereignty
Controversies Shelved Controversies Cause
Tension
Smooth and Limited Economic Limited Economic Minimal Economic
Flourishing Economic Interaction: Interaction: Interaction
Interaction Economic friction Economic friction
Manageable Escalates to Political
Disputes
People- Harmonious Mutual Moderate Public Moderate Public Public Hatred and
To- Feeling Tension; Tension; Fear
People Illusory Friendship Mutual Estrangement
Possible and Suspicion
1) Imminent Expectation of War. Two former enemy states hold a common perception of an
imminent war between them, which can be identified from policy comments by elite made in
open or private settings, government strategic planning, or force postures of the military.
This is the direct signal of a Non-Reconciliation type of political relationship, while the next
two indicators are the corollaries of constant worry about war.
2) No National Recognition: Although the traumatic conflict between them has ended, the two
states have yet to establish formal diplomatic relationship. Refusing to accept each other's
national survival and identity, they openly clash on the issues of international legitimacy,
national territories, and boundaries.41
3) Minimal Economic Interaction: Due to alarming security concerns over adverse relative gains
and mutual vulnerability in economic interdependence, states normally reduce their trade,
41 For the notion that reconciliation should start with satisfying the fundamental needs of one another party,
fulfilling their national aspiration, and accepting their national identity, see Herbert C. Kelman, "Transforming
the Relationship Between Former Enemies," p. 198.
technological transfer and other economic interactions to the minimum.42 Trade embargoes
against one another are common, and economic isolation is the standard state of affair,
especially in a distinctly bipolar international system where the sensitivity to relative gains is
particularly high.43
4) Public Hatred and Fear. Antagonistic feelings against each other are widespread in the two
countries, and the tendency to attribute whatever current bilateral disputes to the past
traumatic conflict is prevalent. Besides, the two nations perceive serious mutual threat and
believe a war between them can be imminent.
Shallow Reconciliation
This stage basically fits into George's conditionalpeace category or Miller's normalpeace
type. Here the open hostility between the two states has been considerably mitigated but
war is still not ruled out as a legitimate instrument of statecraft. Two different types of
relationship can be found in this stage - "Friction" and "Rapprochement." The former
relationship is still plagued with frequent political disputes and simmering popular
resentment, though there is no immediate danger of war; the later is generally devoid of
serious mutual disputes, at least at the governmental level, but such political friendship
42 Realism predicts that states have a strong security incentive to resist adverse relative gains. Because wealth
can be transformed into military capability, states fearing that another state might use force against them will be
concerned about the "security externalities" of trade, especially if the gaps in their economic gains from trade
favor the other state. So states are more inclined to trade with allies than with adversaries when the "specter of
war" is present. See Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," The
American Political Science Review 85, No. 4 (December 1991); Joseph Grieco, Cooperation among Nations:
Europe, America, and Non-tariffBarriers to Trade (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); Joanne S. Gowa, Allies,
Adversaries, and International Trade (Princeton: N.J., Princeton University Press, 1994).
On the question of economic interdependence, Kenneth Waltz argues that interdependence should not be seen
as mutual sensitivity but as mutual vulnerability, where "the costs of breaking their relations or of reducing
their exchanges are about equal for each of them." So the more a state is dependent on another for imported
goods and services, the greater damage it faces when the supplies are cut off, especially if the import is
strategically important to the state. Hence states that are expecting mutual war will try to avoid economic
dependence on each other by cutting down their trade. See Waltz, Theory ofInternationalPolitics, p. 143. For a
recent critique of the Waltzian view on the impact of security conflict on interstate trade relations, see Jack
Levy, "Sleeping with the Enemy: The Impact of War on Trade," Journal of Peace Research vol. 36, No. 4
(1999).
43 It is true that states sometimes trade with their strategic adversaries shortly before or even during their
military confrontation, but such phenomena are proved to be more common in a multipolar world where the
security ramifications of relative gains are considerably lower than in a bipolar world. See Peter Liberman,
"Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains," International Security 21, No.1 (Summer
1996).
remains fragile and has short time frame. The subtle yet important differences between the
two sub-categories are described bellow.
1) Moderate Expectation of War: the first and foremost feature of the stage of Shallow-
Reconciliation is the reduced fear about war but also the lack of a common perception that
their conflicts of interest never need be settled with force. In a "Friction" relationship, war
is considered possible but unlikely in the immediate future. States in a "Rapprochement"
relationship support mutual cooperation in the short run but do not definitely forgo war as
an instrument to solve bilateral disputes; so they still take caution towards each other in case
the cooperation fails at any time.
2) Partial National Recognition: Two states have normal diplomatic relations but still conflict
over sovereignty issues: they may retain official or semi-official contacts with each other
government's rival regime, and/or fail to reach a permanent settlement on bilateral territorial
or border disputes. However, "Rapprochement" states usually prevent these issues from
damaging political relationship by downplaying or temporarily shelving them, while
"Friction" states allow them to escalate into political crises.
3) Limited Economic Interaction: States begin to benefit from bilateral trade, technology transfer,
and capital flow. But they are still wary of mutual vulnerability and tend to limit the level of
trade dependence and/or the exchange of strategically important goods and technologies.
Besides, security sensitivity to adverse relative gains can generate bilateral friction over trade
deficit, delay in key technology transfer, and regulations of economic transactions. 44
Economic friction is usually subdued in a "Rapprochement" relationship but tends to cause
political tension in a "Friction" relationship.
44 Relative-gains sensitivity can be based on both security reasons and concerns about economic
competitiveness and prosperity. See Liberman, "Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic
Gains," pp. 155-158. But economic frictions originated from these two sources of relative-gains sensitivity
differ in two aspects. First, only states with equivalent economic capabilities in certain economic sectors worry
that adverse relative gains may confer the other side competitive advantage in these sectors. If states with a
high disparity of economic capabilities clash not in any specific economic sectors but over the overall trade
policy, it is more likely caused by the concern that the extra gain of the other side from their trade would hurt
their own national security interests. Second, economic frictions caused by competitiveness and prosperity
4) Moderate Public Tension: Public perception of imminent mutual threat has considerably
abated, but history-derived mistrust and hatred nevertheless remain deep-seated, and
bilateral disputes over various issues may still provoke widespread emotions of mutual
enmity, especially in the "Friction" sub-stage. It is possible that governments can
manipulate public attitudes to create an illusory atmosphere of popular closeness in the
"Rapprochement" sub-stage, but the two nations have not truly developed deep mutual
understanding free of the burden of historical legacies.45
Deep Reconciliation
Deep Reconciliation is equivalent to George's conception of "stable peace" and
Miller's definition of "warm peace." As the following four indicators illustrate, in this stage the
two former adversaries fully cooperate in political, security, economic, and societal exchange
areas with abundant mutual understanding, trust, and respect.
1) Common Expectation of No War: War against one another has become unthinkable as a
policy instrument to solve any bilateral conflict. States feel secure with each other and tend
to engage in comprehensive, long-term political and security cooperation.
2) Full National Recognition: The two governments have formally recognized each other's legal
status according to normal standards of international law, ended bilateral controversies
surrounding competing regimes, and reached permanent settlement on their territorial
integrity and border inviolability.
3) Smooth and Flourishing Economic Interaction: Former adversaries that have deeply reconciled
will not only develop large-scale economic interactions but also tolerate economic
dependence on one another. Economic friction, although still present, is mainly due to
concerns about economic competitiveness rather than national security and will be limited to
the economic arena without damaging political relationship.
concerns tend to be limited to economic dimension, while that caused by security concerns will spread to other
issue areas and lead to bilateral political tension.
45 For the effect of a dynamic mutual understanding on uprooting old stereotype views, see Herbert C. Kelman,
"Transforming the Relationship Between Former Enemies," pp. 203-204.
4) Harmonious Mutual Feeling: The two nations now hold a feeling of mutual closeness and
fondness, or at least strong empathy for each other. They also share a common wish for
bilateral friendship and consider war unlikely in the foreseeable future. When bilateral
disputes erupt, the public generally responds with calm and no longer associate current
problems with past traumatic conflict.
The three stages of interstate reconciliation described above cover different possible
outcomes in the aftermath of traumatic conflict. What explains such dramatic variations on
post-conflict interstate relationship? Now we turn to theories of interstate reconciliation. In
this dissertation, interstate reconciliation is treated as both a process and result, which is tied to
not only the formulation and execution of accommodative foreign policies but also the
positive effects of these policies. Therefore, a theoretical explanation is considered useful if
its predictions match either the outcomes of bilateral relationship orforeignpolices that by logic will
lead to such outcomes.
REALISM
Realists argue that, in an anarchic world where no central authority will come to an
individual state's rescue, a state is more likely to survive and prosper if it seeks to maximize
its own capability vis-a-vis other states. Such a structural pressure for self-help behavior
promises a prevalent inclination toward competition in international relations. 46 As a result,
international cooperation becomes difficult, especially between adversaries, because anarchy
"requires states to worry about the relative gains of cooperation and the possibility that
adversaries will cheat on agreements."47 Instead, states are commonly engaged in
international balancing against other states or coalitions that may endanger its national
security. Therefore, as Joseph Grieco says, "realism presents a fundamentally pessimistic
analysis of the prospects for international cooperation."48 The only possible situation for
interstate cooperation to take place is when they share common security interests. States
46 For the nature and implication of self-help principle, see Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 105-107, 111-
112.
47 Glaser, "Realists as Optimists," p. 50.48John M. Grieco, Cooperation among Nations, p. 27.
who are direct allies or belong to the same power coalition to counter a common security
threat usually have the greatest shared security interests. Post-conflict interstate
reconciliation is simply a form of political cooperation driven by states' common security
needs. From these realist assumptions, I infer three concrete predictions regarding
intergovernmental reconciliation, popular reconciliation, and the general trend of
reconciliation respectively.
Prediction 1: The more common securit interests that two former enemy states share, the more positive are
the structural conditions for theirpolitical cooperation, and the more likely they will recondle with each other
at the government-to government level.
Realism claims that systemic factors have decisive impact on states' policy decision
on external cooperation or conflict. Here I use the version of realism arguing that balance of
threat rather than balance of power is the key systemic factor.49 It predicts three outcomes
of intergovernmental relationship under different systemic conditions.
The systemic conditions are positive if states face common security threat(s), which is
often seen in relationships between security allies or states that belong to the same security
bloc without necessarily forming a mutual alliance. States will have great incentive to
provide mutual assistance and coordinate their policies in order to maximize their combined
power vis-a-vis their enemies. So helping each other is a means of self-help. They naturally
feel no need to use force against each other because that would undermine their balancing
strategy against the external threat. If the positive systemic conditions are durable, such
expectation of no war can last for a long term. Absolute gains concerns rather than relative
gains concerns dominate bilateral relationship, and smooth and intimate political and
economic cooperation will follow.
In contrast, states confront negative systemic conditions when they pose direct and
immediate threat to one another. In order to prevent each other from gaining
49 The definitive study proving that balancing is a far more common international behavior than bandwagoning
and that states, especially regional powers, balance against security threat rather than the dominant or rising
power is Walt, The Origins ofAlliances.
predominance, they will either engage in one-on-one balancing, or join opposing power
coalitions to get external assistance. However, mutual threat is not always the original reason
for two states to join enemy blocs; they may do so in order to seek powerful allies to contain
the threat from a third country. Yet the intense inter-bloc rivalry can be so overwhelming
that it compels members of the two blocs to pursue conflict against one another regardless
of their original intention. The security dilemma between either the two states themselves or
the opposing strategic coalitions that they belong to constitutes negative structural
conditions. Given the highly competitive international circumstances, war is considered an
important policy option at times of serious conflict of interest, and relative gains concerns
create immense obstacles for political and economic cooperation.
When states have neither common nor conflictual security concerns, they land in a
situation of neutral systemic conditions. Typically, this occurs if their previous common
security threat has diminished, or there is a sharp decrease of either mutual threat or the
pressure from their bloc leaders for antagonism. Consequently, alliances will loosen or
dissolve, and the erstwhile tension between adversaries will relax. The two states thus enter
a fluid relationship, in which they are only potential rivals to each other, and war is
considered a possible but less immediate danger. However sensitive to adverse relative
gains, they also appreciate the benefit of absolute gains, given their moderate concerns about
mutual threat and remote expectation of war. So under neutral systemic conditions, states
have certain interest in mutual cooperation but also hold considerable reservations, and the
trajectory of official reconciliation should be slow and tortuous.
Prediction 2: The more positive the structural conditions are, the more likely that the two nations will
reconcile with each other at the popular level, and vice versa.
Realism emphasizes that nation-states are unitary, rational actors that behave
primarily in response to national security needs. It dismisses the impact of unit-level
attributes on international relations such as public opinion and state-society relationship
because systemic factors are so powerful that they will trump disagreeing interests and
orientations at societal or individual levels. When international structure undergoes
fundamental transformation, interstate popular relationship should vary in parallel with
political relationship.
Concretely speaking, positive systemic conditions will create strong companionship
between two nations. While embracing each other country to counter their common
security threat, people would willingly put behind ill feelings associated with the past
traumatic conflict. In the meantime, official policy of bilateral cooperation will facilitate
societal contacts, eliminate negative mutual stereotypes, and convince the public of each
other country's benign intention. The result is an overall amicable atmosphere which,
combined with the general expectation of no war suggested by Prediction 1, indicates Deep
Reconciliation as long as the positive structural conditions continue.
On the other hand, negative systemic conditions will antagonize two nations because
they generate intense threat perception and distrust among the general public. People
commonly use past history to attack each other, not because they are truly obsessed with the
historical trauma but because it is a useful justification for the security-driven mutual
hostility. Meanwhile, the official policy of bilateral confrontation discourages or even
prohibits dynamic societal interaction, precluding genuine mutual understanding, confidence,
and sense of closeness. So opportunity for popular reconciliation will be quite slim which,
taken together with Prediction 1, suggests that negative structural conditions should lead to
Non-Reconciliation.
By the same logic, neutral systemic conditions lead to general stagnation in popular
relationship because there are neither immediate structural incentives for promoting public
friendship nor insurmountable structural barriers against it. Governments show some
interest in facilitating societal contacts but install certain limitations due to remaining security
concerns. Also, intergovernmental relations rather than any genuine emotions about history
sway the public feelings. At times of bilateral disputes, mutual popular antipathy tends to
grow and the history issue is often utilized as a weapon to criticize the other country; when
disputes calm down, the negative popular sentiments will abate and the history problem is
also let go. Such a popular relationship, together with the limited political cooperation,
forms the stage of Shallow Reconciliation. Prediction 1 and 2 are illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Structural Realist Explanation of Interstate Reconciliation
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Prediction 3: The trend of overall interstate reconciliation will follow the same direction of international
system changes.
Prediction 3 is logically deduced from the first two predictions. If the nature of both
political and popular relationship between two states is correlated with certain kinds of
systemic conditions, I infer that any substantial improvement in systemic conditions should
lead to overall progress of interstate reconciliation, and any substantial deterioration in
systemic conditions should cause the reconciliation process to regress. Other variables
including historical ideas do not have independent impact on the general trend of interstate
reconciliation development.
HISTORICAL MYTHMAKING
A theory on the casual links between historical memory and interstate reconciliation
has not been formulated in the field. But the significant impact of beliefs and ideas,
including historical ideas, on international relations has been acknowledged in many existing
works, particular in the burgeoning literature on "ideas and foreign policy."50 This body of
literature rejects the rationalist view that international actors' preferences and interests are
given and political outcomes are only determined by variations in structural constraints. It also
criticizes the reflectivists who admit the endogenous nature of preferences and causal beliefs
but have been "slow to articulate or test hypotheses" of their political influence. Instead,
beliefs and ideas are considered as not simply justification for political decisions made
rationally but an independent source of foreign policy, and the causal role of beliefs and ideas
in government policy-making can be identified and systematically examined.51 As two students
of international relations recently claimed, "the issue is no longer whether but rather how and
how much ideas matter under different conditions."52
This dissertation builds and tests a theory of historical mythmaking that purports to
reveal how a certain type of idea, historical myth, shapes post-conflict interstate reconciliation
development. The theory has its intellectual roots in the study of social memories, which
stresses the social and collective nature of memory formation. Political scientists are new
comers to the study of social memories, which has long been an endeavor carried out mainly
by sociologists, anthropologists and psychologists after it became a distinctive research
subject at the late 19th and early 20 century. A sociologist whose work is a particularly
important contribution to this field is Maurice Halbwachs, who argues in his path-breaking
book, On Collective Memory, that memory is essentially social and cannot be correctly
understood unless it is placed in the perspective of certain social groups that collectively
reconstruct memory.53
50 Some characteristic works on policy implications of ideational forces include Judith Goldstein and Robert O.
Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework," in Ideas and Foreign Poligy: Beliefs, Institutions, and
Political Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Peter A. Hall, The Political Power of Economic Ideas:
Kgynesianism across nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); Michael Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign
Polig (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987); Peter J. Katzenstein, The Culture ofNationalSecurity: Norms and
Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
51 Goldstein & Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy," pp. 4-7.
52 Stephen G. Brooks & William C. Wohlforth, "Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War:
Reevaluating A Landmark Case for Ideas," International Security 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000/01), p. 6.
53 See Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992). For a recent,
comprehensive review of the literature on social memory studies, see Jeffrey K. Olick & Joyce Robbins, "Social
Memory Studies: From 'Collective Memory' to the Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices," Annual
Review of Sociology 24 (August 1998).
Starting from the basic assumptions of social memory studies, historical mythmaking
theory argues that national collective memory is a narrative of a nation's past history that can
shape and be shaped by concerns in the present. A common form of national collective
memory is national myths. In this dissertation, I focus on national myths created by political
elites, which are false narratives about the origin, identity and purposes of a nation.5 4 They
constitute an integral part of the ideological and spiritual foundation for nation and
nationalism. As Anthony Smith states in his recent work, "what gives nationalism its power
are myths, memories, traditions, and symbols of ethnic heritages and the way in which a
popular living past has been, and can be, rediscovered and reinterpreted by modern nationalist
intelligentsias." ss Although national myths contain obvious distortions of historical facts, they
can be very popular because they present a picture of shared past that can evoke the deepest
emotional resonance from the populace. In Lucian Pye's words, "national myths are thus
objective factors in giving meaning to public life...The fact that they may not accurately
report actual historical events does not diminish their significance.""5 6
Then what is the political ramification of these popular national myths? In building
historical mythmaking theory, I draw on a number of recent studies arguing that myths are
not value-neutral but have potential danger, such as to stimulate conspiracy theories,
scapegoating, or xenophobia,57 or to disseminate antisemitism and racism.58 Other scholars
further suggest a causal relationship between hyper-nationalism poisoned by mythologized
national history on the one hand, and international conflict and war on the other hand.
Stephen Van Evera argues that chauvinist mythmaking is particularly pernicious to
international relations. It is because, by claiming "the rightness of its own cause, and the
54 Not all national myths can be identified as totally false. Some myths are half-truth narratives, blending
historical facts with traditional stories and legends, and others are not subject to falsification, such as the
examples given by Jack Snyder, "it is good to be Ruritanian," or "Ruritanians deserve their own state." See
Jack Snyder, "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas," International Security 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996). My
theory focuses on falsifiable national myths, and especially those conflict-prone pernicious myths made by
ruling elites that are politically influential and can have significant impact on a country's foreign relations. This
point will be discussed further in this section.
55Anthony D. Smith, Myths and Memories of the Nation (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 9.
56 Lucian Pye, "Memory, Imagination, and National Myths," in Gerrit W. Gong, Remembering and Forgetting: The
Legagy of War and Peace in EastAsia (Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic International Studies, 1996), p.
21.
57 George Schopflin, "The Functions of Myth and a Taxonomy of Myths," in Geoffrey A. Hosking and George
Sch6pflin eds., Myths and Nationhood (London: Hurst, 1997), p. 25.
58 Chris Quispel, "Faithful Servants and Dangerous Beasts: Race, Nationalism and Historical Mythmaking,"
Patterns of Prejudice 33, no. 3 (1999).
wrongfulness and maliciousness of the grievances of others," these myths would inculcate a
sense of innate superiority, inflame mutual hatred and fear, and, as a result, exacerbate
international misperception and provoke aggressive foreign policies.59
The historical mythmaking explanation for post-conflict interstate relationship is
largely derived from theories of pernicious historical myths and war. Below I first specify the
orgins and nature of national myths in question. The following section describes the
institutional tools with which myths are purveyed. Subsequently, I outline two causal
mechanisms of emotions and intentions through which historical mythmaking is linked to
international conflict, and then propose historical settlement based on shared history and
restitution arrangements as an effective measure to curb mythmaking. Finally, I will draw
from historical mythmaking theory two predictions for post-conflict interstate relations.
Origins and Nature of National Myths
Where do national myths come from? One school of social memory studies argues
that social actors intentionally seek to manipulate the interpretation of the past to serve
particular purposes and interests in the present. Another school contends that historical
myths are products of cultural constraints in the present. Here the concept of culture is very
broad: it can be the political culture of an entire nation, or community culture in a specific
locality, or a tribal tradition or class culture. Sociologist Michael Schudson labels these two
approaches to collective memory as "interest theory" and "cultural theory.""6
59 Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15, No. 3
(Winter1990/91), pp. 23-24. Also see idem., "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War." Other examples of
recent studies on nationalism suggesting a causal relationship between elite mythmaking and war and conflict
include Ben Kiernan, "Myth, Nationalism and Genocide," Joumal of Genocide Research 3, No. 2 (2001); Jack
Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York: Norton, 2000); David
Mendeloff, Truth-Telling and Mythmaking in Post-Soviet Russia: Pernidous Historical Ideas, Mass Education, and Interests
Conflict, Ph.D. dissertation (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2001).
60 Schudson also points out a third approach, "radical social construtionism," which argues that there is no
independent past for the past is totally dependent on the present interpretation. See Michale Schudson,
Watergate in American Memory: How We Remember, Forget, and Reconstruct the Past (New York: Basic Books, 1992),
pp. 52-55. Historical mythmaking theory acknowledges that the past has its own power and is not completely
subject to the present rhetoric. I agree with sociologist Barry Schwartz that there is an independently existing
body of raw materials from the past that shapes the perimeter of present memory discourse. The past can be
discovered and rediscovered, can be reconstructed and manipulated, but there are limits on the malleability of
the past: the past has its own power. See Barry Schwartz, "The Social Context of Commemoration: A Study in
Collective Memory," Social Forces 61, No. 2 (December 1982).
Both approaches have some utilities. Any self-interested social actors can construct
their own distinctive myths about the national history. Myths made by such groups as
families, gender groups, or local associations can be indeed based on the cultural orientations
and backgrounds of the group members; they do not need to be instrumentally created and
implemented, and are not always falsifiable. However, an interest theory better accounts for
those myths created by elites, especially ruling elites. Ruling elites and other social actors are
all engaged in the contestation of national collective memory, which is essentially a process
of political struggle. As Michel Foucault says, "since memory is actually a very important
factor in struggle...if one controls people's memory, one controls their dynamism.""6 The
political stake for ruling elite in the struggle over the past is particularly high, usually
involving the survival in office. For this reason, ruling elites have greater incentives to create
myths for instrumental purposes than other social actors.
Of course ruling elites do not always have to create falsifiable, pernicious myths
because meddling with history can also entail costs, including the danger of damaging
relations with foreign countries. But under certain conditions, such as when they are
entangled in fierce domestic power struggle, when there is a serious regime crisis because of
economic failure or social instability, or when the country faces imminent external threat, the
political gains of mythmaking may outweigh its costs in the eyes of elites. Even if sometimes
their historical ideas are genuinely motivated by cultural beliefs, when selling these ideas to
the masses elites still need to employ exaggeration and manipulation to solve the collective
action problem in a large group like a nation.
Ruling elites tend to create national myths to serve the following important political
goals. First of all, national myths can be part of elite propaganda to justify national security
policy, just like what realist theory predicts. But the factors driving elite's mythmaking
behaviors are not limited to strategic constraints but also include domestic political
motivations such as regime legitimacy concerns, social mobilization needs, and diversionary
strategy at times of internal political crisis. 62 In addition to these state-centered interests,
domestic parochial interests, such as factional and organizational imperatives and pressure of
61 Quoted from Olick & Robbins, "Social Memory Studies," p. 126.
62 Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," pp. 30-32.
special interest groups, may also deviate national historiography away from historical truth to
support mythical interpretation of history.63
Historical mythmaking theory focuses on three types of elite-sponsored national myths
that can cause interstate tension and impede reconciliation process.64 The first is self-
glorification myths that explicitly incorporate inflated or false claims of special virtue and
competence. Besides past achievements, perceptions of victimization can fuel self-
glorification become they create a "cult of national martyrdom" that bestows a nation with
moral superiority and legitimizes national missions and aspirations. 65 The second type of
national myths, self-whitewashing myths, deny or rationalize past wrongdoing against others.
The third type is other-maligning myths, which denigrate others with false accusations of their
cultural inferiority, malicious intention, or primary responsibility for past trauma.66
Spread of National Myths and Divergence of Historical Perceptions
63 The impact of bureaucratic politics and organizational interests on foreign policy has been well studied by the
decision-making literature. Some recently works have also explored the causal link between domestic parochial
interests and the rise of certain national ideologies or doctrinal beliefs. See Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire:
Domestic Politics and InternationalAmbition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); Jack Snyder, The Ideology
of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Comell University Press, 1984);
Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca: Comell
University Press, 1984).
64 Here I mainly draw on previous categorization of pernicious national myths proposed in Stephen Van Evera,
"Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," pp. 27-30; idem., Causes of War, (PH.D. dissertation, University of
California, Berkeley, 1984), Chapter 8: National Mythmaking; Mendeloff, Truth-Telling and Mythmaking in Post-
Soviet Russia, pp. 86-87.
65 The self-glorification role of victimhood myths has been revealed in many works on nationalism.
On the role of victim consciousness in Polish nationalism, see Jan Tomasz Gross, Polish Society under German
Occupation: the GeneralGouvernement, 1939-1944 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 4-9; Andrzej
Walicki, "The Three Traditions in Polish Patriotism," in eds. Polish Paradoxes (London; New York: Routledge,
1990), pp. 30-35.
On Jewish victimhood, see Michael Wolffsohn, Eternal Guilt? Fory years of German-Jewish-Israeli Relations (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
On Japanese victim consciousness, see James Orr, The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in
Postwar Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001); Kiichi Fujiwara, "Imaging the Past, Remembering
the Future," Social Science Japan (April 1995): 3-5.
On Chinese victimhood and nationalism, see Neil Renwick & Cao Qing, "Victimhood and Identity in China's
Political Discourse," ISA Annual Convention, 1999.
66 The tendency to remember only the evils of others nations while trying to justify and legitimat the
wrongdoings that one's own nation perpetuated is commonly seen in national historiography. For examples of
historiographic gap caused by national mythmaking between the Japanese and American, the Japanese and
Russian, the Israelis and Palestinians, and Croats and Serbs in modem history, see C. G. Jacobsen, "Myths,
Politics and the Not-So-New World Order," Journal of Peace Research 30, No. 3 (1993).
National myths created by the ruling elites from the top down do not automatically
become the hegemonic national memory and gain great political influence. They still need to
compete with other versions of national memory constructed from the bottom up. Because
a nation comprises of various social and political groups with different beliefs, interests, and
aspirations, how to remember a nation's past is constantly contested. Whether elites can
dominate national collective memory and shape the core ideas of national identity largely
depend on whether they control institutional tools to purvey and perpetuate national myths.
In his study of the institutional origins of Japanese war memories, Steven Benfell
argues that institutions can guide the development of ideas and interests, including historical
memories and national identity; such institutions include not just formal organizations but
also less formal rules, norms, symbolic gestures and even ritual activities.6 7 In this
dissertation, I concentrate on the following set of institutional tools of history-making. The
first is mass education, particularly school textbooks, which is one of the most important
venues to inculcate the public with authoritative "narrative of nationhood."68 The war-
provoking danger of history textbooks spreading chauvinistic national myths has been
recognized since the end of WWI and directly stimulated the textbook reassessment and
revision campaigns during the inter-war and post-WWII periods. 69 Still, postwar school
textbooks, especially in countries that had experienced traumatic conflicts during the war, are
still wrestling with truthful or mythologized interpretation of their national past.70
67 Steven Benfell, "Selective Memories: Politics, Institutions, and War Memories in Postwar Japan," Annual
Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Chicago, 2002.
68 On mass education and particularly school textbooks as direct carriers of nationalist ideology, see Barry
Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power," International Security 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993); Laura
Hein and Mark Selden, Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United States (Armonk:
M.E. Sharpe, 2000); Michael W. Apple, CulturalPoltics and Education (New York: Teachers College Press, 1996);
Suzanne De Castell et al., Language, Authority, and Criticism: Readings on the School Textbook (London; New York:
Falmer Press, 1989).
69 Post-WWI historians' scrutiny of history education lent strong support to the argument that pernicious
national myths purveyed by prewar school textbooks was a significant source of international conflict. See
John Langdon-davies, Militarism in Education (London: Headley Bros. Publisher, Ltd, 1919); Jonathan French
Scott, The Menace ofNationalism in Education (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1926); V. H. Friedel, The German School
as a War Nursery (New York: MacMillan, 1918); Mark Starr, Lies and Hate in Education (London: Hogarth Press,
1929).
70 For some examples of studies critiquing postwar German school curriculum, see Hildegund M. Calvert,
Germany's Nazi Past: A CriticalAnalysis of the Period in West German High School History Textbooks. Ph.D.
dissertation (Muncie, Indiana: Ball State University, 1987); Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, "Identity and
Transnationalization in German School Textbooks," in Hein and Selden, Censoring History.
On postwar Japanese textbooks, see Saburo lenaga, "The glorification of war in Japanese education."
International Security 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/1994); Yoshiko Nozaki and Inokuchi Hiromitsu, "Japanese
The second institutional tool is media control and manipulation. Studies of the
political role of mass media suggest that mass media can act as "collaborators" or
"coconspirators" of political and bureaucratic authority to enhance state legitimacy.71 So the
theory of historical mythmaking assumes that political elites can use public communication
methods including the print and broadcast media, films and literature to circulate national
myths at a wide scale. It is done either directly or indirectly, depending on the extent to
which media is centralized in a given country.
The third way to institutionalize national myths is public commemoration through
museums, monuments, commemorative rituals, and ceremonies. Different from simply
recording historical events, "commemoration is the evaluative aspect of chronicling,"
celebrating people and events that the group deemed extraordinary under the present
circumstances.7 2 Commemoration sites and activities serving as durable symbol or dramatic
presentation of national myths can greatly accentuate the centrality of these myths in
national collective memory.7 3
Education, Nationalism, and Ienaga Saburo's Textbook Lawsuits," in Hein and Selden, Censoring History;
Robert Fish, "From The Manchurian Incident to Nagasaki in 20 Pages: The Pacific War as Seen in Postwar
Japanese High School History Textbooks," in Edward Beauchamp ed. Education in Modern Japan: Old Voices, New
Voices (Armonk, New York: M.E.Sharpe, 2004).
On postwar Chinese textbooks, see Dorothea A. L. Martin, The Making ofa Sino-Marxist World View: Perceptions
and Interpretations of World History in the People's Republic of China (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1990); Weihsun
Mao, World History in China Mainland and Taiwan Secondary School Textbooks: A Historical and Comparative Study
(Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1995).
On postwar South Korean textbooks, see S6ji Takasaki, Hannichi Kanjo: Kankoku.Chosenjin to Nihonjin (Anti-
Japanese Emotions: South Korea.Korea People andJapanese People) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1993), Chapter 1; Jae-jeong
Chung, Kankoku to Nihon: Rekishi Kyoiku no Shisd (South Korea and Japan: Thoughts of History Education) (Tokyo,
Suzusawa Shoten, 1998).
71 For some recent works on this subject, see Laurie Anne Freeman, Closing the Shop: Information Cartels and
Japan's Mass Media (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000); Ellis S. Krauss, Broadcasting Politics in
Japan: NHK and Television News (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000).
72 Schwartz, "The Social Context of Commemoration," p. 377.
73 For more on the role played by public commemoration in the formation of nationalist memory, see John R.
Gillis, Commemoration: The Politics ofNationalldentity (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); J. M.
Winter, Sites ofMemogy, Sites ofMourning: the Great War in European Cultural Histogy (Cambridge; New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1995); Lyn Spillman, Nation and Commemoration: Creating National Identities in the
United States andAustralia (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Sarah Boxer, "A
Memorial Is Itself a Shaper of Memory," New York Times October 27, 2001; Rana Mitter, "Behind the Scenes
at the Museum: Nationalism, History and Memory in the Beijing War of Resistance Museum, 1987-1997," The
China Quarterly 161 (March 2000); Barry Schwatz, "Commemoration and the Politics of Recognition: The
Korean War Veterans Memorial," American Behavioral Scientist 42, No. 6 (March 1999); John E. Bodnar,
Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1992).
Another important instrument to establish the official status of national myths is
post-conflict resolution arrangements, including domestic compensation programs and
interstate agreements providing reparation to the victim country. Political elites may seek to
manipulate these resolution arrangements so that the primary blame for past traumatic
conflict is placed on others while the pure innocence and victimhood of their own country
receive state and international acknowledgment. Other institutional tools useful to purvey
national myths involve tampering with legal prosecution of war criminals, disingenuous
protection of nationalist symbols, such as Japanese monarchy system, and discrimination
against alien residents, especially nationals of the former enemy states.
Historical Mythmaking and International Conflict
The triumph of pernicious historical myths in national collective memory would lead
to divergent interpretations of the same historical events across countries. They tend to
generate negative emotions and hostile perception of each other's intention, which often
grow out of the control of the elite who created those national myths and are capable of
straining intergovernmental and popular relationships.
Divergence of Historical Memories
The first issue of historiographic disagreement is about what happened in the past
conflict. Each state claims its own mythical recount of the past conflict to be the only
truthful chronicle while accusing the other side of lying. Secondly, starting from divergent
historical narratives of what happened, the two states will define historical responsibility in
dramatically different ways. They will disagree on their answers to the question of "who
bear what kind of responsibility to whom for having done what during the past conflict."74
Pernicious historical myths that glorify their own states' beneficent behavior and fine
74 This is a formula delineating the key parameters of traumatic conflict responsibility. I derive it from existing
writings on war responsibility by progressive Japanese intellectuals. For example, see Takeshi Ishida, Kioku to
Bdkyaku no Setjigaku (The Politics of Remembering and Forgetting) (Tokyo: Akiishi Shoten, 2000), p. 165; Saburo
Ienaga, Sens6 Sekinin (War Responsibility) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2000), pp. 29-35; Yukio Mochida, "'Sens6
Sekinin. Sengo Sekinin' Mondai no Suiiki (The Water Area of the Issue of 'War Responsibility and Postwar
Responsibility')," in Kentar6 Awaya, Senso Sekin n e Sengo Sekinin (War Responsibility and Postwar Responsibility)
(Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Sha, 1999).
qualities, deny guilt for committing wrongdoings, and falsely blame others for all the
sufferings will create an enormous gap between two nations' perceptions of the nature,
severity and scope of responsibility for the traumatic conflict. Hence dishonest
historiography tends to undermine the fulfillment of various obligations rendered by the
historical responsibility, including acknowledging and apologizing for moral guilt, amending
historical injustices with political rehabilitation and material compensations, and bringing
culpable actors to legal justice. Unfulfilled obligations will then harden the perpetrator side's
claim of their own innocence and the victim side's demand for payment of historical debts.
So mythmaking begets mythmaking, and the gap between their national memories becomes
wider and more definite.
The Mechanism of Emotions
Pernicious historical myths can exert great emotional impact upon people who
experienced immense trauma in the past. Myths of victimhood and self-righteousness by the
victim state will plant deep grievances toward the perpetrator state. They are first reflected in a
sorrowful feeling, often to the extent of self-pity, about the nation's enormous sufferings in
the traumatic conflict. Grievances also show in the sense of injustice by the victim side for
not only its past loss and pain but also the continuing national humiliation, economic
backwardness, and even hardship in individual lives, which are all blamed on the atrocious
and predatory aggression of the perpetrator side. Besides, other-maligning myths can
stimulate a strong feeling of contempt for the perpetor country, who is condemned to be not
only criminal but also morally despicable.
Human emotions can be noninstrumental, simply expressing feelings without raising
demands for actionsl; they can also be instrumental, "trigger(ing) action to satisfy a pressing
concern."75 The emotion of pgrievances and contempt embody both noninstrumental and
instrumental characteristics, the later affecting post-conflict interstate relations. First, the
public grievances in the victim state give vent to the bitterness about their unwarranted
75 The definition of emotion as an instrumental mechanism is drawn from Roger Petersen, Understanding Ethnic
Violence: Fear, Hared, and Resentment in Twentieth-century Eastern Europe (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 2002). The quote is from p. 17.
suffering and pain, causing intense antipathy against the perpetrator side and scathing
attitude toward all its actions. Second, grievances can translate into a strong sense of
entitlement among the public that constantly demands concessions from the perpetrator
side. Public emotions then put great pressure on the government to adopt an
uncompromising position at times of bilateral disputes, often against the will of the
government. More severe than these policies of pressure is a policy of confrontation, where
the other state is treated as the nation's archenemy and any of their gains must be stalled
because it is our loss. The most extreme kind of confrontational policy is a policy of
retribution, which aims at settling historical accounts with violent means.
As far as the perpetrator side is concerned, its self-whitewashing and other-maligning
myths will lead to remarkable lack of sympathy to the sufferings of others and utter failure to
understand the victim side's animosity and bitterness. Dismissing the demands of the
victims as unreasonable and self-indulgent, the people of the perpetrator state will develop
strong disgust and frustration for the victim state. They do not just find it an annoyance that
they are constantly reminded of their disgraceful past that they wish to forget, but also hold
great resentment for having their national morality damaged and world image tarnished by the
victim's accusation that they are criminals of murdering, raping, and looting. They feel a
terrible national shame (not guilt), which is not blamed on their past crimes but on the
victim's obsession with the past.
Such emotions of disgust, frustration and resentment held by the people of the
perpetrator state not only poison the popular feelings toward and uglify the image of the
victim state but also encourage policies of estrangement and hard lines. In their eyes, it is
the victim state that is being unreasonable, intransigent and ridiculous by bringing up the
past time and time again, so they tend to ignore its grievances and demands, or even refuse
to deal with that state. If the government makes any concessions to the victim state, it will
instigate considerable domestic backlash, which criticizes the government for being soft-
kneed and the victim state for extorting with the history card.
The Mechanism of Intentions
Conflict over historical interpretation of the traumatic history also gives rise to
negative perception of each other's intention. The perpetrator that evades responsibility for
its past wrongdoings and refuses to amend them with political and economic measures
makes the victim state suspect that the past aggressor may be mulling over renewed acts of
aggression against itself. So the victim state tends to link the unrepentant attitude of the
perpetrator to its evil intention, and constantly worries about the remaining or reviving
aggressive ambition of the perpetrator. On the other hand, the perpetrator state finds the
sense of entitlement of the victim side totally unjustified but only a disguise of its aggressive
intentions. Especially the victim state's demand for vengeance will stimulate fear of
revanchist menace on the perpetrator side.
Therefore, historiographic divergence can greatly amplify mutual threat perception.
Not only the governments but also the general public will view each other's state as a major
security threat based on their disagreement over the treatment of past conflict history. Even
if the government tries to convince its people otherwise, the public will not easily change
their view once they have internalized the linkage between the other country's historical
attitude and its intention. The intense mutual mistrust and feeling of insecurity then prompt
states to watch out for foreign attack and prepare military response to such attack.
Consequently, expectation of war would rise high, and the bilateral relationship is dominated
by sharp concerns over adverse relative gains that impede bilateral cooperation and contacts.
The two causal mechanisms of emotions and intentions are illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Historical Mythmaking
Historical Settlement and Interstate Reconciliation
The most effective way to prevent egoist, pernicious national myths is for two
countries to form common historical interpretation of their past conflict. The
"reconciliation of memories" paves the way for the emergence of mutual trust and closeness
pivotal to deep interstate reconciliation. Two states may try to establish shared historical
memory about their past conflict through joint history-writing and serious restitution
measures, which will contribute to a thorough settlement of bilateral emotional and physical
debts. Based on such historical settlement states can engage in high level of cooperation in
both governmental and popuplar dimensions.
Joint-histo7y Writing
Shared historical memory has to be established first through joint research and
dialogue between independent historians of relevant countries. Truthfully recording what
happened during the past traumatic conflict often poses a formidable intellectual challenge
to historians because of the particularly incomplete, fragmentary, and unstable nature of the
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evidence pool.7 6 So close collaborations between historians of both sides is essential for
obtaining more comprehensive source materials and updated research findings.
Transnational historians' dialogue can also bridge the gap between nationally bounded
historical interpretations. History books written without external scrutiny are vulnerable to
deliberate political distortions. In the past century, frustrated by the widening disparity of
opinions vented through isolated national history-writing and its negative impact on
interstate reconciliation, historians of some former adversary countries have taken the
initiative to launch transnational dialogues. They include the International Committee on
Intellectual Cooperation set up under the auspices of the League of Nations between the
two world wars, postwar UNESCO-supported multilateral and bilateral historians' dialogues,
the textbook cooperation between (West) German and Polish historians from the 1970s
onward,77 and the serial East Asia History Education Symposium and Japanese-South
Korean Joint Workshops on History Textbooks starting from the mid-1980s.78
Restitution Measures
Having built the factual consensus on what happened in the past conflict and who
was responsible, states still need to establish the dominant status of the shared history in
76 For example, the epistemological challenge to historians studying Nanjing Massacre, the symbol of Sino-
Japanese historical trauma, is elaborated in DaqingYang, "Rekishigakusha e no Ch6sen: 'Nankin Atrocities' no
Kenkyi o Megutte," (Challenge to Historians: Concerning the Research of Nanjing Atrocities), Shis6 (August
1998).
77 For an overview of transnational historians' dialogues in Europe since the end of World War I up to the
present, see Takahiro Kondo, Kokusai Rekishi Kydkasho Taiwa: Yoroppa ni Okeru 'Kako' no Saihen (International
History Textbook Dialogue: Reorganizing the Past of Europe) (Tokyo: Chfio Shinsho, 1998).
For more on postwar international textbook research and revision efforts, see Volker Rolf Berghahnand and
Hanna Schissler Perceptions of History: International Textbook Research on Britain, Germany, and the United States
(Leamington Spa; New York: Berg, 1987) "Introduction"; E. H. Dance, History the Betrayer: A Study in Bias
(London, Hutchinson & CO. LTD, 1960), Chapter 6; UNESCO, Bilateral Consultations for the Improvement of
History Textbook (Paris, 1953); Otto Ernst Schiiddekopf, History Teaching and History Textbook Revision (Strasbourg,
Council for Cultural Co-operation of the Council of Europe, 1967); Library of Congress European Affairs
Division, Textbooks, Their Examination and Improvement: A Report on International and National Planning and Studies
(Washington, 1948); Isaac James Quillen et al., Textbook Improvement and International Understanding (Washington:,
American Council on Education, 1948).
78 On Asian historian's exchanges, see Kazuhiko Kimijima, et al. "Rekishigaku to Rekishi Ky6iku no Aida
(Between Historiography and History Education)," Rekishigaku KenkyWi (Journal of Historical Studies) 651
(October 1993); idem., "Ky6kasho Kokusai K6ryfi no Keiken Kara Mita 'Kokumin no Rekishi' ('"The History
of A Nation': Viewed from the Experience of International Textbook Exchange)," Kikan Sens6 Sekinin
Kenkyfi (The Report on Japan's War Responsibility), 29 (Fall 2000); idem., "The Continuing Legacy of
Japanese Colonialism: the Japan-South Korea Joint Study Group on History Textbooks," in Hein and Selden,
Censoring History.
public memory both with the aforementioned domestic institutions of textbooks, media, and
commemoration, and through inter-governmental agreements, especially regarding
restitution measures. Restitution in strict sense means "the return of the specific actual
belongings that were confiscated, seized, or stolen.""7 9 Here it refers to a wide range of
rectifying means including apology and forgiveness, legal accountability and material
compensation that will mollify, but certainly never perfectly undo, the physical and
psychological damage to the victims. If the past trauma cast a dire shadow preventing
current relationship from moving on, "restitution provide(s) a mechanism for dealing with
pain and recognizing loss and responsibility," with which "victims and perpetrators
collaborate in searching for an exit from the bonds of history."80
To begin with, the bitter grievances of the victims for their sufferings during the
traumatic conflict demands unambiguous, complete, and public apology from the
perpetrator state. With an apology, "the offender puts her fault and feelings of remorse on
the record.""' Apologies stated in public by government heads usually have the greatest
power of impact. An apology should start with acknowledgment of specific acts of
wrongdoings in the past. It should also accept ultimate responsibility and express sorrow
and remorse. A message of regret that only admits harm but does not confess one's moral
wrong involved in the action is not a complete apology.82 Finally, a full apology should
promise not to repeat the offense."8 By publicly renouncing one's past behavior and
pledging no more wrongdoings, the perpetrator's apology serves to console and rehabilitate
the victims so that they can turn resentment to mourning, as well as to assure them of future
peaceful coexistence.
Meanwhile, it is honorable for the perpetrator side to apologize for its fault, because
it can end collective shame and restore cleaner consciences. It actually shifts the moral
burden to the victim side, who is now obliged to issue forgiveness. In his study of political
forgiveness, Peter Digeser argues:
79 Barkan, The Guilt of Nations, p. xix.80 Barkan, The Guilt of Nations, p. XXIV, p. XL.
81 Barry O'Neill, Honor, Symbols, and War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), p. 183.
82 O'Neill, Honor, Symbols, and War, p. 185.
83 Nicholas Tavuchis, Mea Culpa: A Sodology ofApology and Recondliation (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
Preface, 1991).
In a world in which what is done at one moment cannot be undone the next, forgiving
relieves the burdens created by wrongful actions and unbearable debts. In relieving those
burdens, forgiveness presents the opportunity to start afresh or reestablish a relationship of
moral equality between victim and transgressor.84 (emphasis is mine)
If apology uplifts the victims, forgiveness can set the perpetrators free. Particularly,
forgiveness contains the commitment that the perpetrator's misdeeds in the past can no
longer be used as a moral excuse for future actions against it.85 So the exchange of apology
and forgiveness will put history-based hostility to rest.
Still, the perpetrator's apology should precede victim's forgiveness to ensure long-
term amicability. The governments may agree to let go the past for political expediency, but
the pain and bitterness held by the public remain alive, which will trigger new tension in the
future. In the same vein, true forgiveness will not be forthcoming if even the minimal
demand of legal accountability is not met. Take blanket amnesty for example, there is
absence of any investigations, prosecutions, or trials. It completely shuts down the pursuit
of justice and twists forgiveness into insult because people do not even know "who is
forgiving whom for what."86 As Donarld Shriver Jr. says, the slogan "cannot be forgiveness
for the past and accountability for the future," but "accountability for the past as a step
toward forgiving it."87 After all, forgiveness is not forgetting.
Nonetheless, the fact that historical wrongs can never be completely undone renders
perfect justice impossible."88 And too much penalty will only become revenge. Domestic
cases of regime transition remind us of other values equally important to legal justice. For
example, during South Africa's transition to democracy in the 1990s, truth-telling actions
carried out without prosecuting the guilty helped stabilize the process of democratization,
due to the subtle power distribution at the time in South Africa. Mandela personally
opposed Nuremburg-style tribunals or a public witch-hunt in protection of the spirit of
mutual confidence. Instead, he stated that he was willing to forgive those perpetrators of
84 Peter Digeser, Politicalforgiveness (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), pp. 11-12.
85 O'Neill, Honor, Symbols, and War, p. 184; Digeser, Political Forgiveness, p. 71.
86 Digeser, PoliticalForgiveness, pp. 55.
87 Donald W. Shriver Jr., "The Long Road to Reconciliation," p. 211.
88 Digeser, PoliticalForgiveness, pp. 52-53.
past crimes as long as they came forward and publicly disclosed their behavior.8 9" Same
dilemma exists in interstate relations where retribution via prosecution may well trigger
emotional and political backlash on the perpetrator side. The two most influential war
criminal trials after WWII, the Nuremberg Trial and Tokyo Trial, have been not only long
criticized from legalist point of view, but also vehemently rejected by right-wingers in the
perpetrator states as "victor's justice."" So instead of relying on legal prosecution,
governments should conduct serious investigation of past wrongdoings and encourage free
discussions and debates about past conflict in the society. If doing so can bring the
perpetrators to acknowledge their responsibility and issue sincere apologies, legal penalty can
be even dropped as a gesture of forgiveness.
Lastly, governments need to address the bilateral historical debts with financial
means. Like legal accountability, full compensation of loss is not always possible due to the
difficulty to measure sufferings in monetary terms, and because it may spark new
resentments from the perpetrator side if the payment threatens to drain national resources
and destabilize the economy. On the other hand, some amount of material compensation is
still necessary, especially if the victims are in desperate need of financial assistance, such as
the poor and dying Korean comfort women. But even when retribution is done through
material compensation, the issues of moral and legal responsibility must be clearly, publicly
stated before the victims would be even willing to accept the payment.9'
The joint history writing and institutional arrangement of retribution discussed above
can thoroughly settle the historical account between former enemy states. Through the
89 See Berat and Shain, "Retribution or Truth-Telling in South Africa?"
90 For critiques on the legal problems of these trials, see David Lubin, "The legacies of Nuremberg," Social
Research 51, No. 4 (Winter 1987); Richard H. Minear, Victors'Justice; the Tokyo war crimes trial (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1971); John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the wake of World War II (New
York: W.W. Norton & Co./New Press, 1999), Chapter 15: "Victor's Justice, Loser's Justice."
Political conservatives in Japan have been particularly upset about the verdict of Tokyo Trial since the first day
of its announcement. Since the 1980s, the Japanese society has seen a resurgence of bitter resentments against
Tokyo Trial and simultaneous rationalization of Japan's aggressive war. For more details, see Yasuaki Onuma,
Tokyo Saiban Kara Sengo Sekirin no Shisd e (From the Tokyo Trial to Postwar Thoughts on War responsibiliy) (Tokyo:
Toshito, 1993).
91 For example, American POWs and Korean comfort women all made it clear that truth-telling and genuine
official Japanese apology are their foremost demands, and financially they only ask for a token amount as a
symbol of repentance. For a recent, comprehensive account of controversy surrounding the apology vs.
monetary compensation choices for Korean comfort women, see C. Sarah Soh, "Japan's Responsibility Toward
Comfort Women Survivors," JPRI Working Paper 77 (May 2001).
process, both the victims and perpetrators are healed and rehabilitated, so as to be
reintegrated "into some approximate positive civic relationship.""2 Specifically, the negative
emotions of grievances and resentment will be discarded because the victim's needs for
honor and compensation have been addressed and perpetrator's historical stigma is cleaned.
Meanwhile, the perpetrator's forthright acknowledgment of responsibility and pledge not to
repeat past wrongdoings will eliminate worry about its future aggression, and fear of the
victim's revanchist threat will dissipate as the victim promises that past wrongdoings will no
longer be held against the perpetrator state today. As threat perception and expectation of
war diminish, two governments will be generally confident in carrying out comprehensive
and deep-going cooperation in security, economic, and other areas. At the popular level,
stereotyped negative image will be dropped and mutual understanding and trust will be
restored, all of which will help bring the two nations into a truly amicable relationship.
Hypotheses on Historical Mythmaking and Interstate Reconciliation
Proceeding from the above assumptions and arguments, I infer two predictions on
concrete outcomes of interstate reconciliation.
Prediction 4: The greater divergence between two countries' historical interpretation of theirpast traumatic
conflict is, the more difficult they are to recondle with each other; the more convergent their historical narratives
are, the more easily they are to reach deep reconciliation.
Historiographic divergence is the greatest when historical mythmaking of the two
states constructs combative narratives, which have three characteristics. One is that these
narratives do not just defame certain political or social groups of the other state but hold its
entire nation from past to present accountable for the conflict. It will stir up indiscriminate,
all-out hostile feelings and actions towards each other. Second, these narratives clash on
issues of major interest to these states even up to the present, such as territorial/border
rights and population dislocation, which calls for immediate, violent responses. Third,
combative narratives place the issue of historical burden in the center of bilateral
relationship, the resolution of which is made the starting point of any bilateral cooperation.
92 Donald W. Shriver Jr., "The Long Road to Reconciliation," p. 213.
Therefore, combative narratives set a prohibitively high hurdle for reconciliation. The result
is a typical Non-Reconciliation type of relationship.
Less divergent historical memories are presented in the form of conJlictual narratives,
where historiographic clash still prevails but room for compromise also exists. Countries
holding these narratives still disagree on the scope and nature of historical responsibility, but
they tend to blame not the entire nation of the other side but only certain groups, and make
some distinction between the past and present behaviors. These narratives usually do not
involve historical disputes that affect substantial national interests of the present day. In
addition, although their contest with each other over whether and how much contrite
actions should be made, they tend not to hold the perpetrator's action of contrition as a
major precondition for their limited cooperation. Conflictual narratives still foster negative
emotions and strong threat perception, but they do not inflame outright belligerence. They
particularly exclude a policy of vengeance that may dramatically worsen the security dilemma
between the two states. Animosity is simmering among the public, but will not form
overwhelming pressure for political standoff or societal isolation. The result is the Shallow-
Reconciliation stage of relations.
Convergent narratives first emerge from bilateral historian's dialogue and joint history-
writing, which tends to give an honest representation of the historical facts in the past
traumatic conflict as well as unambiguous definition of the responsibility for the conflict.
Such a shared historical interpretation is further perpetuated through interstate restitution
arrangements where the perpetrator state makes substantial efforts to redress its
responsibility and promise no more aggression, and the victim state agrees to forgive if not
forget. Convergent narratives serve to resolve both the physical burden and psychological
trauma left behind by the conflict history. Intergovernmental cooperation and societal
contacts will flourish, and popular atmosphere will become increasingly harmonious.
Therefore, the outcome of Deep Reconciliation will follow.
There is still a possibility that the historical myths of the two sides may overlap in
great part with one another, forming a shared but false historical memory. But this type of
quasi-convergent narratives is usually based on tacit agreements between the ruling elites rather
than any serious bilateral measures of historical settlement. It may or may not suppress, but
will never truly remove, the negative emotions and perception of intention deeply
entrenched among the public, even though it could promote certain degree of cooperation
between the governments. In addition, the expedient nature of elite agreements on a
specific kind of historical myths determines that the agreements would be fragile and
unsustainable, subject to elite readjustment of political priorities and societal demands for
truth and justice. So the quasi-convergence in historiography can easily break down and
develop into more historiographic divergence. The interstate relationship with such
narratives fall into the stage of Shallow Reconciliation rather than Deep Reconciliation.
Prediction 4 is illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Historical Mythmaking and International Reconciliation
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Prediction 5: The trend of interstate reconciliation should be consistent with variations in the degree of
historiographic divergence/convergence.
Assuming the validity of Prediction 4, we can draw another prediction that an
increase of historiographic divergence will cause considerable setback in the reconciliation
process, while an increase of convergence will lead to considerable reconciliation progress.
Chapter Three
Age of Darkness: Pre-Normalization Sino-Japanese Relations
The Chinese and Japanese nations are intimately related, not only from the point of view of
communications but in all other respects as well. There is a saying among the people of both
countries that China and Japan are brother nations, whose people are of a similar race and culture;
that, therefore, they should join hands in common effort.
-- Sun Yat-sen 93
I believe, if we both abide by the five principles of peace and coexistence, the peaceful and friendly
relationship will surely progress continuously, and the friendship between our two great nations will
definitely pass on from generation to generation.
-- Zhou En-lai 94
With your country, there has emerged a relationship of mutual commitment to everlasting peace
and friendship for the future, thanks to the enthusiasm and efforts of the two countries, and there
are between them ever deepening exchanges in broad fields. I am heartily pleased at such a
development of relations between our peoples and earnestly desire that such happy relations
become immutable.
-- Emperor Akihito95
The past fifty years of Sino-Japanese relations make a history of paradox. After
World War II, the majority of Japanese population believed that diplomatic relations with
People's Republic of China should be restored,"96 and Chinese government persistently
sought breakthrough in official relationship with its proactive "People's diplomacy."97
93 Quoted from Sun's speech delivered at a welcome dinner on November 28, 1924, at the Oriental Hotel in
Kobe. See Yat-sen Sun, China and Japan: NaturalFriends - UnnaturalEnemies (Shanghai: China United Press,
1941), p. 135.
94 Quoted from Zhou's toast to visiting Japanese prime minister Tanaka Kakuei at a state banquet on
September 28, 1972, the eve of Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization. Huan Tian, ed. Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi
Wenxianji (Documents on Postwar Sino-Japanese Relations) (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue, 1997), Vol. 2, p. 109.
95 Quoted from Emperor Akihito's speech at a welcome banquet in Beijing held by Chinese president Yang
Shangkun on October 23, 1992. FBIS Daily Report: China,, October 26, 1992.
96 For example, in two opinion polls held by Asahi Shimbun in May 1952 and June 1953, only 10 to 11 percent
of people questioned approved the absence of normal diplomatic relationship with Red China, while more than
one-half were dissatisfied and urged a change. See Allan Burnett Cole & Naomichi Nakanishi, Japanese Opinion
Polls with Socio-PoliticalSignificance, 1947-1957 (Medford, Mass.: Tufts University, 1959), p. 679, p. 691. A survey
of Japanese elite opinion in 1954 shows even greater approval of closer ties with China among businessmen
(62%), government officials (76%) and scholars and labor leaders (90%). See Douglas Heusted Mendel, The
Japanese Peopk and Foreign Polig (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), p. 235.
97 For semi-official recount of the process of "People's Diplomacy" towards Japan, see Mouhong Xue, Dangdai
Zhongguo Wadfiao (Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy), (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue, 1990), Chapter 16; Taiping
Wang, Xingzhongguo Wafiiao Wushinian (Fify Years of Chinese Diplomagy) (Beijing: Beijing Press, 1999). Chapter 3.
Also for some recollections of Chinese diplomats who were personally involved in "People's Diplomacy," see
Pinghua Sun, Nihon to no 30 Nen: Chlinichi Ytikd Zuisoroku (30 Years with Japan: Occasional Thoughts on Sino-Japanese
However, the two countries remained in a state of war for more than two decades before
finally normalizing diplomatic tie in 1972. After a short interlude of friendship boom, Sino-
Japanese relations since 1980s again displayed symptoms of mistrust and agony despite their
mutually complementary economies and common interest in a stable relationship. They also
began to quarrel about how to interprete the war history, something that they rarely did in
previous decades.
Why have Sino-Japanese relations repeatedly veered off the track of smooth
cooperation and solid friendship? Were there any lost chances? Why did the history issue
become politically salient from the 1980s but not immediately after the war when most
people had first-hand war experience? In order to answer these questions, one needs to take
into account of not only structural conditions but also the influence of ideas, emotions, and
perceptions that are particularly associated with national trauma suffered in the war. While
the Cold War international structure initially blocked any meaningful cooperation between
China and Japan that were allied to opposing strategic blocs, since the formal Sino-Soviet
split and Sino-U.S. political rapprochement at the turn of the 1970s, the two former
adversary countries were actually presented with a golden chance for deep reconciliation.
This chance was however squandered, in large part because governments were so anxious to
brush aside the history problem to make way for immediate political cooperation that they
made few efforts to address historical trauma or eliminate their pernicious national myths
that they created in the earlier period. When changing political conditions in the early 1980s,
mainly domestic ones, exposed and escalated previously covered up bilateral historiographic
conflict, Sino-Japanese Honeymoon quickly disintegrated despite the favorable structural
environment. After the Cold War, with the history problem remaining outstanding and
compounded by the diminution of the common Soviet threat, Sino-Japanese relations have
stagnated in a state of political volatility and popular estrangement.
In this chapter I first outline the negative historical legacies between the two
countries. Following that I introduce periodization of postwar Sino-Japanese relations by
the standard of different reconciliation stages. The rest of this chapter will test realist theory
Friendship) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1987); Xiangqian Xiao, Eien no Rinkoku to Shite (Being Eternal Neighbors) (Tokyo:
Saimru, 1997), Chapter 1.
and historical mythmaking theory by examining pre-normalization Sino-Japanese relations.
The next two chapters will test these theories against post-normalization bilateral relations in
the 1970s and 1980s-90s respectively.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Postwar Sino-Japanese relations unfolded against the background of about half
century of violent clashes, including two full-scale wars, from the late 19th century till mid-
20th century."98 The 1894-1895 Sino-Japanese war, concluded with a military fiasco and
fragrantly unequal treaties for China. In bilateral interactions during subsequent decades, the
Chinese endured even graver pain and shame, marked by such infamous events as "Twenty
One Demands,""99 bloodbath in Jinan in 1928,100 and the annexation of Manchuria since
1931. But nothing bears comparison to the all-out war between China and Japan from 1937
to 1945 in terms of scale, brutality, and destructiveness. The war left immense physical and
psychological trauma to both nations that are beyond perfect cure.
Damages and Legacies in China
Estimates of Chinese casualties range from several million to 30 million. The
Nationalist government officially states that total Chinese military casualties is about 3.3
million, and civilian casualties approximately 8.4 million.1"' For several decades the
Communist government had maintained a figure of more than 21 million Chinese casualties,
98 With a more relaxed standard, Goertz Gary and Paul Diehl count 34 militarized conflicts between China and
Japan over a period of 85 years from 1873 to 1958. See Diehl & Goertz, War and Peace in International Rivaly, p.
146.
99 An Japanese attempt to extend its sphere of influence to Manchuria, Mongolia, and Shandong, as well as to
secure control of Chinese military, commercial, and financial affairs. First presented to the Chinese
government in 1915 with an ultimatum, some important elements of the "21 demands" were forced on China
in 1917 through a secret treaty. After the end of WWI, the German possessions in Shandong were awarded to
Japan by the Versailles Treaty. But upon vehement Chinese protest, which culminated in the May Fourth
Movement of 1919, Japan had to withdraw its troops from Shandong.
100 In Spring 1928 when China's National Revolution Army approached Jinan, the capital city of Shandong
province, Japanese troops moved in under the pretext of protecting Japanese residents, and slaughtered
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including 10 million dead.' 02 But in 1995 President Jiang Zemin dramatically raised the
casualty estimate to 35 million in a public speech commemorating the end of WWII.1' 3
Today historians tend to agree that approximately 10 million Chinese people died and
"uncertain millions" of people were wounded during the war.'0 4
Statistics of human loss only reflect one aspect of the catastrophic war, compared to
which Japanese wartime atrocities are probably remembered more vividly. Indiscriminate
killing of Chinese noncombatants occurred frequently after Japanese expansion in China
began, but escalated to a massive scale in winter 1937 when Japanese troops captured
China's capital city, Nanjing. In the incident known as Nanjing Massacre, over two hundred
thousand Chinese civilians and POWs are believed to have been killed, and approximately
two thousand cases of rape and numerous cases of looting and destruction took place.'05
Such large-scale murders within a short period of time may be an isolated case, but Japanese
atrocities were common phenomena throughout the war and occupation in China. In order
to consolidate its control over the Communist areas in northern China, the Japanese military
implemented the barbaric "three-all" policy of "kill all, burn all, destroy all" (sankd-seisaku),
which led to as many as 19 million of population reduction during the period of 1941-
1942.10' The Japanese Imperial Army's notorious Unit 731 used live human beings as
biological test materials in Manchuria and killed thousands of people, most of whom were
Chinese citizens. 107 Among the over 41,000 Chinese laborers who were brought to Japan by
force, about 17% died of slavery working conditions there. The mortality rate even reached
102 White Paper of Human Rights in China, Information Office of the State Council of The People of Republic of
China (Beijing, November 1991), Part 1.
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to 41 to 52 % in about 33 mining units that claimed more Chinese lives.1 '8 Other Chinese
war victims include those "comfort women" who were forced to provide sexual service to
the Japanese military, and many ordinary citizens under the harsh and arrogant Japanese
occupation.
In addition to personal sufferings, Chinese economic activities were paralyzed and
social life deadly disrupted because totally 26 out of 30 Chinese provinces were engulfed in
the war, 930 cities were occupied, and 23 provinces suffered Japanese air raids.'0 9 The eight
years of full-scale war caused $62 billion in direct losses and $500 billion in indirect losses to
China.10
The war ended in 1945 but many wounds inflicted by the war have remained open
even up to today. The large quantity of Japanese chemical shells left in China have since the
end of war killed or injured 2,000 Chinese. The cleansing of these chemicals was postponed
until a bilateral government agreement was reached in 1996.11" The war also created some
outstanding political controversies, including the legal status of Taiwan, a former Japanese
colony that Japan, and the territorial disputes concerning Diaoyu/Senkaku Island, part of the
Taiwan colony but occupied by the United States until the 1970s. These problems still strain
contemporary Sino-Japanese relations.
Japanese Experiences and Memories
Japanese official estimate of war dead is over three percent of the total Japanese
population, including 1.7 million military deaths and nearly 1 million civilians killed in
American firebombing of Tokyo and 60 other cities, atomic bombing of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, and the battle of Okinawa. Although Japanese people mostly remember the war
108 Official statistics released by the Japanese government, cited by People's Daily on January 8 and March 12,
2002.
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as Pacific War against the United States instead of China, even by Japanese government's
own calculations, nearly 400,000 Japanese servicemen perished in China.112
Physical and psychological damages of the war are enduring. Hiroshima and
Nagasaki stand out as the icon of Japan's national trauma. Atomic bomb victims, the
bombed (Hibakusha), suffered radiation illness and psychological disorders long after the war
was over, which was compounded by serious stigmatization of these victims in the postwar
Japanese society."3 Today Hibakusha groups are still demanding state compensation for their
enormous pains.i 4
Japanese memories remain vivid about the horrific firebomb raids of Tokyo that
killed 100,000 people in one night and other devastating raids on Japanese cities in the spring
and summer of 1945."1 Ordinary people also remembered that they experienced appalling
food shortage at the end of the war, repatriates lost all their possessions and personal dignity
when coming back to Japan, and war orphans and homeless children were abandoned to a
life of misery. Not to mention the thousands of Japanese orphans who stayed behind in
China and could not return to homeland until Sino-Japanese normalization." 6 Last but not
the least, the defeat and unconditional surrender, and the seven-year foreign occupation that
deprived Japan of sovereignty rights are all regarded as national shame.
PERIODIZATION OF POSTWAR SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS
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Postwar Sino-Japanese relations can be divided into three periods. In the first
period, the 1950s and 1960s, China and Japan were stuck in a state of Non-Reconciliation.
They treated each other as enemies and prepared for immediate danger of violent conflict.
They had neither formal diplomatic relationship nor large-scale economic interaction.
Meanwhile, short of normal means for personnel exchange, the two societies were isolated
from one another and negative sterotyping prevailed in mutual public perceptions.
After normalization in 1972, China and Japan entered the stage of Shallow
Reconciliation, during which their relationship went through several twists and turns. The
second period, the 1970s, was in the sub-stage of "Rapprochement", in which political and
economic cooperation expanded smoothly and mutual feeling became generally benign. But
they never accomplished stable peace because the inter-government cooperation failed to
reach a comprehensive level, especially on security affairs, and the warm atmosphere
between the two peoples was more a product of political manipulation and romanticized
imagination rather than truly mutual understanding and trust. In the 1980s-90s, the third
period, the short-lived "Rapprochement" was replaced by the sub-stage of "Friction," in
which the theme of friendship has been drown out by bilateral quarrels and conflicts in both
inter-governmental and popular dimensions.
The following sections evaluate and compare the contributions to pre-1972 Sino-
Japanese relations by international structural pressures and state's historical mythmaking
behaviors. I begin with coding international structural conditions and historical mythmaking
actions of Japan and China, as well as inferring predictions for reconciliation development
from the two theories. Then I process trace the evolution of Sino-Japanese relations during
this period to examine the degree of congruence between predictions and evidence. Of this,
I argue that systemic constraints and incentives played more decisive role while historical
mythmaking was the subsidiary factor at this stage. However, the formation of historical
myths was not entirely penetrated by international structure but also had domestic political
motivations, and historical mythmaking theory makes fairly accurate predictions for the
policy preferences of the two countries, if not the policy outcomes.
CAUSAL FACTORS AND PREDICTIONS
I. The International System: Antagonism at Creation
At the end of WWII in Asia, formal Sino-Japanese tie was out of the question
because Japan was placed under American occupation and China embroiled in an all-out civil
war. By the time they became united, sovereign states, the Cold War had already unfolded,
forcing them to make strategic choices between the American and Soviet blocs. Japan
endorsed strategic collaboration with the United States in order to regain national
sovereignty and receive generous economic assistance, while China sought security and
economic partnership with the Soviet Union. Despite the absence of direct mutual threat,
China and Japan nevertheless were deeply enmeshed in the global rivalry between the East
and West blocs. For about two decades structural conditions were quite unfavorable for
bilateral reconciliation to take place.
Containment and the US-Japan Strategic Collaboration
After the war, the United States secured exclusive occupation of Japan as well as
obtained military control of mandated islands and Okinawa for building forward bases in the
Pacific Ocean. But in the early stage of the occupation, the US mainly desired to disarm and
demilitarize Japan to make sure that it would no longer pose a military threat."117 It was
George Kennan's conception of containment policy that harbingered the intimate
integration of policy towards Japan with American national security policy. In his X article
in Foreign Affairs of July 1947, Kennan argued that it was in America's vital interest to restore
the economic health and armed strength of Western Europe and Japan so that they would
not be vulnerable to Soviet military attack or material lure." 8 Kennan's proposal to accord
strategic priority to Germany and Japan was soon embraced by the Truman administration,
which on October 7, 1948 approved NSC 13/2 stipulated the so-called "reverse course" of
117 See the "United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" released on September 22, 1945, in Chihiro
Hosoya ed., Nichibei Kankei Shiyd6shu 1945-97 (A Documentary History of U.S.-Japanese Relations) (Tokyo: The
University of Tokyo Press, 1999), p. 28.
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(New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), Chapter 2.
US occupation policy in Japan, which shifted the focus of occupation from punishment to
rehabilitation of Japan."' Soon after, Washington articulated the key role of Japanese
defense in American strategy in Asia on a number of occasions including the NSC 48/2 of
December 1949, and the speech by Secretary of State Dean Acheson in January 1950
declaring the Pacific "defense perimeter" to run from the Aleutians to Japan, the Ryukyus,
and down to the Philippines. 120
With Japan ascending to a position of vital importance for Americ to win the Cold
War, Washington began to press Japan to rearm. After the outbreak of the Korean War, it
made rearmament and military bases in Japan as preconditions for the conclusion of a peace
treaty with Japan. In January 1952 Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru gave his promise to
establish a National Security Force (Hoantat) immediately after the peace treaty was signed.
The US-Japan security treaty further knitted Japan into a broad defense framework
by granting the U.S. with exclusive rights to use military bases in Japan, and agreeing that
American forces stationed there would be utilized "to contribute to the maintenance of
international peace and security in the Far East." The geographic boundary of "Far East"
was never spelt out, but in the context of the Cold War in Asia this clause actually carried
with it a profound connotation that Japan should provide base facilities and other support to
American military actions in China, Taiwan, Soviet Union, or on the high seas.'21
The Yoshida government was not mainly driven by security fear to committed to
strategic collaboration with the U.S. not mainly because of its. It is revealed in later analysis
that Yoshida did not perceive the threat of monolithic international communism, and
believed the security benefit of rearmament, American military bases and other restrictive
provisions was outweighed by their economic and political cost. However, such seemingly
rational cost-benefit calculation made little sense to a country that was still under occupation
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Security Archives.
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and dependent on American economic aid and political backing for national rebuilding and
state legitimacy. Since the security alliance was directly linked to an early conclusion of peace
treaty and restoration of Japanese sovereignty, the former was actually quidpro quo for the
later. Japan had few other choices but to become America's Cold War ally.m22
Sino-Soviet Alliance and the Korean War
Just as Japan was not America's natural ally, neither was China America's natural
enemy. The U.S. and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) actually maintained a reasonably
good relationship during their wartime cooperation.1 23 In the Chinese Civil War, however,
the Communists grew increasingly resentful that Washington provided its political adversary,
Kuomingtang or the Nationalists (KMT), with large-scale military aid. However distrusting
the Truman administration, the CCP believed it was still possible to get American
recognition when it won the civil war.124 This anticipation was not entirely off the mark,
given the Truman administration initially adopted Kennan's proposal of strongpoint defense
and excluded Taiwan from its scope.
But recognizing the Chinese Communist regime and abandoning Taiwan would have
rendered serious inconsistency in Washington's overall containment strategy when it was
trying to convince the reluctant public and isolationists in the Congress to underwrite the
anti-Communist programs in Europe, Japan, and Southeast Asia.125  Meanwhile, CCP's
policies hardly convinced the Americans that it was not a Soviet puppet and Chinese Titoism
would separate the two Communist states. In June 1949, Mao Zedong declared that China
would lean to one side, the side of socialism, and dismissed it as a naive idea that China
122 Dower, Empire andAftermath, p. 370.
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needed help from the imperialist British and U.S. governments. 126 After the founding of the
Republic, Mao committed to resolute removal of Western influences in China, a policy
named with a metaphor, "sweeping the house clean before inviting guests." 127 Moreover, in
February 1950, China signed a formal treaty military alliance with the U.S.S.R.
The Sino-Soviet Treaty challenged the fundamentals of Truman's China policy.
Hard-liners such as John Foster Dulles and Dean Rusk argued that the CCP, supported by
Soviet aid, "constitute(s) an increasing threat to the already greatly weakened United States
position in the Far East."'128 They strongly demanded a reconsideration of China policy,
especially to increase military assistance to Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan. But a fundamental
policy reversal did not take place until the outbreak of the Korean War, shortly after which
the Truman administration adopted the NSC-68 that had been shelved ever since being
approved in April 1950. The document called for containment of Communism worldwide
and brought Kennan's strategy of strongpoint defense to the end.' 29 To mark a departure
from its previous China policy, Truman ordered a naval blockade of the Taiwan Strait and
declared that the future status of Taiwan must await determination. China saw American
action in Taiwan Strait as "aggression against the territory of China" and vowed that "all the
people of our country will certainly fight to the end single-mindedly to liberate Taiwan from
the grasp of the American aggressors."' 13 Chinese suspicions only loomed larger when the
American-led U.N. troops crossed the 38 parallel and advanced towards Yalu River that
divides Chinese and Korean territories. The situation turned so perilous that China feared
126 See Mao Zedong's speech "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship: in commemoration of the 28th
anniversary of the Communist Party of China, June 30, 1949," in Mao Zedong Xuanji (Selected Works ofMao
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that the U.S. might launch a two-front attack from Manchuria and the Taiwan Strait, at
which point Mao decided to face down the U.S. in the battlefield.31
Cold War in Asia and the Roles of China and Japan
Thus far, the rise of bipolar international structure since the late 1940s had not only
drawn China and Japan into the opposing strategic camps but also made them adversaries in
the first hot war in the postwar history. The evolution of Cold War in Asia after the Korean
War continued to entangle the two countries and directly pitted them against one other.
The U.S. China policy in the following two decades was characterized by A. Doak
Barnett as "containment and isolation." 132 President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State
Dulles saw Communist China as a belligerent, untrustworthy enemy and believed that China
would not be weaned from the Soviet Union unless it was dealt with maximum pressure
rather than by conciliation. 133 Washington maintained its security commitment to Taiwan,
leaving little room for Sino-American political compromise. Twice in the 1950s, during the
Taiwan Strait crises of 1954-1955 and 1958, the Taiwan issue pushed the two countries to
the brink of war. During the Kennedy/Johnson period, Sino-Soviet split became so obvious
that most American strategists no long believed the threat of monolithic communism. But
they still perceived China as the principal threat to American interest in the Asian-Pacific
region, especially when China became a nuclear weapon power in 1964.134 And Chinese
conviction of ulterior intention of "American imperialists" never wavered. Sino-American
hostility was exacerbated after the U.S. intervened in Vietnam. Washington viewed the
conflict closely related to its struggle against Communist China and was afraid that soft
American reaction in this essentially peripheral area would damage its credibility among
131 For discussions of the difficult circumstances under which Mao made the war decision, see Jonathan
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principal allies. In the meantime, China maintained an uncompromising stance on
Indochina, providing Vietnamese Communists with large-scale military aid until 1968.135
American containment against China requied active cooperation with its Asian allies.
Eisenhower and Dulles tried to construct a ring of states aligned with the U.S., including the
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan, to deter
Communist aggression. Japan played a critical role in this framework. First of all, Japan was
encouraged to expand trade and investment to non-Communist countries in Asia in order to
increase the economic strength and political stability of this area. 136 Besides using Japan as
the regional economic engine, the U.S. also emphasized Japan's military duty. The Mutual
Security Assistance (MSA) concluded in March 1954 committed Japan to incremental
remilitarization and promised to revive Japanese defense industry and supply millions of
American weapons and military equipment to Japan. The agreement clarified the U.S.-Japan
security relationship and confirmed Japan's indefinite entanglement with America's
containment strategy in Asia.137
Japan's embracing of US policy placed it in directly opposite position against China.
The most divisive issue was Taiwan's international status. In Chinese eyes, the close political
and economic cooperation between Japan and Taiwan was an outright defiance of Chinese
security interest. Regarding South Korea, from the early 1950s the U.S. urged Tokyo to
improve its relationship with Seoul in order to ease the cost of containment in Korea.138 The
two countries normalized their relationship through the 1965 Japan-South Korean Basic
Treaty. Because South Korea was China's adversary during the Korean War and an
important military ally of the U.S., China was sensitive to Japanese assistance to South
Korea. Chinese anger over Japanese cooperation with Taiwan and South Korea soared
especially when Prime Minister Sato agreed in the joint statement with Nixon in 1969 to link
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Japanese national security to the defense of Taiwan and South Korea. Besides, Sato publicly
justified the American war in Vietnam, facilitated its military operations from bases in Japan,
and provided aid to Southeast Asia. Such Japanese attitude again clashed with the interest
and policy of China.
Predictions for Sino-Japanese Relations
The systemic conditions for Sino-Japanese reconciliation were very negative in the
1950s and 1960s, which was mainly caused by the inter-bloc confrontation rather than direct
security dilemma between the two countries. Realist theory predicts that they would stay in
the stage of Non-Reconciliation. First of all, imminent expectation of bilateral armed
conflict should be prevalent among elite, not because war was intended as an effective policy
to counter mutual threat, but due to the fear that they would be dragged into the conflict
between the opposing power blocs. Mutual national recognition was because the bloc
leaders would exert pressure stop their regional allies from flirting with their own Cold War
adversaries. In addition, economic cooperation should also be scarce, which is not a natural
phenomenon, given their economic interests, but the result of the irresistible demand from
their bloc leaders to cut down economic ties with the enemy bloc.
Moreover, realist theory predicts that the Japanese and Chinese people would be
openly hostile to each other, not because of their bitter memories of the recent war but due
to the negative structural conditions that set apart the people. First, there should be intentse
mutual aversion and fear among the public, which should arise from government
propaganda promoting the perception of incompatible national security interests. Although
people might still bring up the war history, they do so mainly to justify or reinforce official
criticism against the other state's current policies rather than to seek rectification of historical
wrongs. Systemic constraints should also minimize the freedom of bilateral personnel
exchange and information flow, which would diminish the chance for the public to develop
opinions about each other country independent of government propaganda.
II. Historical Mythmaking: Conflictual/Quasi-Convergent Narratives
The aftermath of Sino-Japanese war saw both nations trying to come to grips with
their traumatic experiences. In the process of remembering and forgetting the past, Japanese
and Chinese ruling elites engineered and perpetuated through various institutional tools the
mythologizing of war memory that embodied a clear bias to glorify or whitewash the actions
of one's own nation while blaming others for causing the tragedy. These myths were driven
by a multitude of instrumental motivations including strategic goals, domestic political
interests, and ideological doctrines. Evidently divergent in a number of different ways, the
narratives of the two sides both assigned war responsibility to only a small group of Japanese
militarists. Consequently, mutually conflictual war narratives with important elements of
quasi-convergence emerged.
Myths in Japanese War Memory
Domestic and International Motivations in Historical Mythmaking
Japan's conservative elites tried to reconstruct a national history in postwar Japan
that would best serve their domestic and international interests. This group centered around
Yoshida Shigeru, a prewar diplomat who reemerged as a leading conservative leader in
postwar Japan. Those closely affiliated with this group include prewar high-ranking
bureaucrats, the imperial court officials, conservative party politicians, big capitalists, and
conservative intellectuals. They represented continuity from prewar politics as many had
been loyal supporters of the imperial government and after the war still tried to maintain
traditional patterns of authority. But this group soon faced challenge from the resurrection
of the political Left, who moved rapidly to the political stage in the early postwar years. The
Japan Socialist Party (JSP) alone won 2 0% of Diet seats in the first postwar election (April
1946) and even organized a short-lived coalition government under Katayama Tetsu.
Meanwhile, the leftists were active in promoting the "revolution from below" through labor
movement, and the Japan Communist Party (JCP) supported by labor unions increased its
representation in the Diet from 4 to 39 in January 1949 election.139 Conservative fears of the
leftist competition for power were exacerbated by the attitude of the occupation authorities,
especially the idealist "New Dealers" in the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
(SCAP). The "New Dealers" were sympathetic to the leftists, who in their eyes possessed
the strongest democratic credential for they had "spoken publicly and unequivocally against
the war, and have languished in jail for their temerity."'14 In contrast, the conservative group
was politically vulnerable because of its close ties to the wartime government and many of its
members were targets of occupation purges.'41 Not surprisingly, the JCP leader Nosaka
Sanzo once declared, "we communists are the true patriots and the true service brigade for
democracy."'142 Under the serious threat from the Left, the conservatives were confronted
with the urgent task of strengthening their control of state power.
Power consolidation was also important to fulfilling the group's agenda of economic
recovery and prosperity. The conservative elites tied in their strategy of economic
reconstruction with the triple alliance of bureaucracy, business class, and the conservative
parties, which was aimed at the regenesis of a business-dominated economy. But their
interest clashed with that of the political Left, who admonished that social equality was no
less important that pure economic growth and any economic recovery program should not
be implemented at the expense of labor interest.143 Heavily influenced by socialist ideas, the
leftists made it their top priority to fight for "people's democracy" through grass-roots mass
movements, which jeopardized the capitalist socioeconomic interests represented by the
conservatives.
The rivalry between the conservatives and leftists also involved Japan's international
strategy. The conservative mainstream deemed American political and security support
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critical for ending the occupation early and maintaining conservative dominance of domestic
politics. Also they depended on American economic aid to alleviate immediate food
shortage and rebuild the national economy. But the policy of strategic collaboration with the
West was far from a national consensus. With the advent of "reverse course" in the
occupation policy, those on the left who initially embraced occupation reform programs now
drifted away from the pro-U.S. stance. The Communists and the radical wing of organized
labor turned explicitly anti-U.S., while the moderate liberals, such as the prominent
intellectual Nanbara Shigeru, were also disillusioned about the Americans and came to
advocate that Japan should stay neutral and detach itself from the U.S. containment policy.144
The two sides particularly collided on the question of peace treaty. Whereas the
conservatives wanted to follow the U.S. direction to negotiate separate peace (Tandoku Kowa)
with only Western allies, the leftists and liberals opted to sign an overall peace treaty (Zenmen
Kdwa) with all belligerent states including the Soviet Union and China.'45 The Diet voting
that passed the San Francisco Peace Treaty in late 1951 crystallized the polarization of
opinions across the political spectrum. 461 out of total 481 approval votes were cast by
conservative parties, while 71 out of total 92 opposition votes came from the JCP and the
left wing of the JSP. 146
Therefore, in the years after the end of the war Japan's conservative elite met
considerably political hurdles in carrying out its domestic and international policies. It was
imperative for them to find some powerful ideological instruments to boost the prestige and
influence of conservative power. To this end, they used historical mythmaking to reinvent a
national tradition that would win the hearts and minds of the public. Specifically, the
conservatives created myths to resurrect the national identity of "Kokutai" and exonerate the
emperor and other important members of the conservative group, minimize Japan's war
whereas the JSP drew 59% of its support from blue-collar and white-collar workers. Gerald L. Curtis, The
Japanese Way of Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 120-121.
144 For a review Nanbara's opinions on Japan's international strategy, see Takashi Kato, Nanbara Shigeru (Tokyo:
Iwanami Shoten, 1997), pp. 160-164.
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responsibility, and reclaim national pride by emphasizing Japanese victimhood and pacifism
and praising the glory of the imperial soldiers.
Myths of Self-Whitewashing and Glorification
1. "Emperor First" 147
When trying to consolidate power, Japanese conservative elites attached great
importance to preserving the Kokutai, or "national polity." Essentially an ideology that
reveres the emperor as the symbolic head of a nation united by blood ties, the Kokutai idea
served as a powerful spiritual tool for the imperial government to unite the nation behind its
military expansion policy. After the war, the conservatives continued to anchor national
identity on the historical and psychological legacies of the Kokutai ideology in order to retain
power. But at the time there was widespread suspicion that Emperor Hirohito bore
irrefutable responsibility for starting, expanding, and prolonging the war. It was
inconceivable to many that the emperor could completely avoid responsibility because at the
very least he signed the declaration of war.148 So enormous pressure came from both allied
countries and Japanese progressives demanding that the emperor step down and be
indicted. 149
However, an image of the emperor tarnished by war guilt would have led to the
crumbling of the Kokutai ideology and political justification of the conservative rule. The
conservative group was determined to defend the absolute impunity of the emperor. The
main tactics was to portray him as a pacifist, anti-militarist, and passive onlooker who
147 1 borrow this phrase from Herbert Bix's description of the political psyche of postwar Japanese
conservatives, "emperor first, economic reconstruction second, and morals last." See Herbert P. Bix, "The
Showa Emperor's 'Monologue' and the Problem of War Responsibility," Journal of Japanese Studies 18, No. 2
(1992), p. 312.
148 For many decades after the war discussing the Showa emperor's historical role had been a taboo in Japan.
As time went by and especially after his death in 1989, historians have found more evidence to prove that
Hirohito was not simply a passive figurehead manipulated by people surrounding him but a major protagonist
in making the war. For a most recent scholarly study on this subject, see Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making
of Modern Japan (New York: HarperCollins, 2000). For critiques against Bix's argument, see Ben-Ami Shillony's
book review in Journal of Japanese Studies 28, No. 1 (Winter 2002) and Andrew Gordon's book review in
Japanese Journal of Political Science 2, No. 2 (2001).
149 For discussions of internal and external pressure for the emperor to abdicate and stand war crimes trial, see
Michael Schaller, The American Occupation ofJapan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1985), p. 5; Bix, "The Showa Emperor's 'Monologue' and the Problem of War
Responsibility," p. 305, pp. 312-317; Dower, Embracing Defeat, pp. 320-322.
himself was deceived by the jingoist military. In the "Imperial Rescript for Ending the War"
broadcast to his "Good and Loyal Subjects" on August 15, Hirohito described Japan's
decision to capitulate as a magnanimous act that might save all human civilization itself
from annihilation. Not even once did he mention Japan's aggression, neither did he give the
slightest hint of his personal responsibility for the war. He concluded by calling on the
Japanese people to remain united as a great family and devote to the reconstruction of a
nation that would preserve its traditional Kokutai identity.'5 0 In a matter of a few hours after
the emperor's surrender broadcast, Prime Minister Suzuki praised on the radio "His
Majesty's gracious benevolence" for his sacred decision to end the war and stated that the
whole nation "sincerely apologizes to His Majesty" because they failed to attain victory.
Here again the emperor was commended as a magnanimous peacemaker, and it was his
subjects who must assume responsibility, not for Japan's aggression, but for its defeat.'5
The primary mission of the succeeding Higashikuni Cabinet was to preserve imperial
institution. In a statement issued on August 28 of 1945, Higashikuni reiterated Suzuki's
point by declaring that Japanese collective penitence, the so-called "the repentance of the
hundred million"(Ichioku Sdsange), for losing the war was the first step toward national
reconstruction.152 Furthermore, on November 5, the Shidehara Cabinet issued the following
official statement establishing a mythified image of the emperor as a peace-loving
constitutionalist and principled seeker of diplomatic solutions to US-Japan conflict, in a
patent attempt to fend off domestic and international attack on his war responsibility:
"1. That we believe the Empire was compelled to embark upon the Greater East Asian War in view of
the surrounding circumstances.
2. That His Majesty the Emperor worried over negotiations with the United States and did not give up
trying to reach a peaceful settlement until the very end.
3. Concerning matters such as the decision to begin hostilities and the carrying out of operational
plans, His Majesty the Emperor followed established constitutional practices and did not reject the
decisions of the imperial headquarters and the government.
4...
5. The imperial rescript declaring war was an internal rescript, intended for the nation.
6..."153
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2. Minimalist Definition of the Scope of War Guilt
Due to their inextricable ties to the wartime ruling circles, the conservative elites
were caught in a difficult situation in the bid for power against their morally cleaner leftist
adversaries. So removing their historical stain became critical to the political legitimacy of
the conservative government. To this end, the conservative historiography took a minimalist
approach to defining the scope of Japan's war responsibility.
First of all, the conservatives created a "myth of military clique" to drive a wedge
between the evil militarists on the one hand, and the innocent emperor, the majority of the
conservative ruling class, and ordinary Japanese people on the other hand. After Japan
surrendered, numerous conservative elites including Prince Konoe and Yoshida lobbied the
victors that war criminal investigation should exclude the emperor but go after Toj6 Hideki,
a general and prime minister of Japan during much of the Pacific War.'5 4 At the same time,
they were alerted by the public backlash against the notion of collective penitence that
absolved the conservative elite while holding the ordinary Japanese people, who sacrificed
far more than the senior military and civilian officials, responsible.'55 Therefore, the 89t
Diet session during the Shidehara administration passed a bill asserting that "war
responsibility should not extend to ordinary people (ippan kokumin) who, after the declaration
of war, dedicated themselves to duty in a lawful manner in order to conduct the war,
obediently following the orders of the state."'5 6 So those who should bear war responsibility
were only a small group of militarists like Tojo, who were accused of usurping authority
from the emperor and politicians and duping the populace into waging an aggressive war.
Second, they argue that, given the hostile international environment in the 1930s,
Japan really had no alternatives but to go to war to defend itself. By blaming the external
conditions for the Pacific War, they watered down Japan's imperialistic ambition and left out
its aggression in Asia that could not be readily explained away by the argument of Western
power encirclement. This notion of self-defense war first emerged in the emperor's
53 Qoted in Bix, "The Showa Emperor's 'Monologue' and the Problem of War Responsibility," p. 306.
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Ashgate, 1997), p. 5.
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surrender rescript, where he maintained that Japan resorted to war with the West to ensure
"the survival of the empire and stability in East Asia." Later in a personal testimony to be
used in the upcoming Tokyo Trial, the emperor again reflected that if he "had not granted
permission to stand up and act in that time of crisis," there would have been "enormous civil
strife at home" like a coup and "ultimately, a furious war would have developed anyway and
would have brought about a tragedy far worse than this war."'57 Postwar conservative
governments quickly picked up the self-defense argument as part of the official
historiography and wrote it into school textbooks.
Third, the conservatives accepted Japanese responsibility for opening hostilities with
Western countries, but de-emphasized Japanese atrocities during the war and colonial
occupation, especially in Asia. Acknowledging and thoroughly investigating war crimes
would have incriminated a wide range of people outside the military clique. Hence the
conservative narrative of war history was featured by Western centrism. In this view, the 15
years of belligerence between Japan and China was never a war but a string of incidents
(Jiken), and Japan was defeated only because of the overwhelming American power, which
the militarists either grossly underestimated or intentionally concealed from the Japanese
people. This narrative was an outright distortion of historical facts, for even after 1941,
about 30-60% of Japanese military budget and a large proportion of army forces were
drained by Japanese operations in Chinese mainland, not even to mention the cost of
colonizing Manchuria, Taiwan and Korea.'58 Neither did it acknowledge that the tenacious
indigenous resistance movement in China and other Asian countries dealt severe blow to
Japan's imperialist expansion and accelerated its defeat.
3. Victimhood and Pacifism
The above myths were all predicated on a strong sense of Japanese victimhood,
which emphasized that the vast majority of the nation were unfortunate victims because of
157 Quoted from the Emperor's Monologue that his aides helped him compile shortly before the opening of the
Tokyo War Crimes Trial. This document was believed to have been handed over to the International
Prosecution Section (IPS) but was never published until 1990 after the Showa emperor died. See Hidenari
Terasaki & Mariko Terasaki Miller Eds. Showa Tennd no Kokuhakuroku (The Showa Emperor's Monologue) (Tokyo,
Bungei Shunju Sha, 1991), p. 137. A translation of this section can be found in Bix, "The Showa Emperor's
'Monologue' and the Problem of War Responsibility," p. 350.
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the intentional deception and disastrous misjudgment of the military clique, the precarious
external conditions, or Western material superiority. By highlighting Japanese suffering and
whitewashing their wrongdoings, the conservative historiography tried to shape a clean
image of Japan in postwar international society.
The myth of Japanese victim consciousness was closely related to a pacifist view of
history. The conservative narrative argued that because the Japanese people suffered so
much during the war and generally loathed more external violence, postwar Japan naturally
became a peace-loving country. During the occupation years, Yoshida repeatedly issued
passionate statements of pacifist ideals to regain international acceptance of Japan.15 9
Admittedly, Japanese people suffered tremendously during the war, but the suffering itself
should not in any way exculpate Japan of the guilt for invading other countries and killing
numerous civilians.
4. Sacrifice as Hero
Another myth of self-glorification was to honor those who "served and died for the
nation" during the war. The conservative government gave the imperial army special honor
and care because they answered the call when the country needed them and have made great
sacrifices, or Gisei, for the country. When it came to their responsibility for fighting an
aggressive war and committed atrocities, the government defended the glorious image of the
military by arguing that the soldiers simply followed the order of their superiors. Even those
convicted war criminals were also held as heroes because they did what they believed was
good for the Japanese nation. Perhaps the first official gesture that eulogized the imperial
army and obscured their war responsibility was the speech by Prime Minister Ikeda at the
first annual ceremony in commemoration of "the End of War Memorial Day," or Shuisen
Kirenbi, on August 15, 1963. The main thrust of the speech, which was often repeated by
later prime ministers, conspicuously brushed aside the question of war responsibility with the
claim that those died in the war paved the foundation for today's prosperity of Japan. 1' 6
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It is worth noting that the conservatives were not solely responsible for the rise of
pernicious national myths in Japan. The left-wingers did not always reject and in some cases
even readily echoed with the government. On the question of Japan's war guilt, the
progressive historiography also shunned the responsibility of "the people," or collective
responsibility."' It also converged with the conservatives on Japanese victimhood and
pacifist outlook, although due to quite different political motivations. At the end of the
1940s, the political Left launched the "peace movement" to press the government for
Japan's strategic neutrality and an overall peace treaty with all former enemies. In this
tradition, a massive anti-nuclear campaign broke out in the mid-1950s to oppose the non-
democratic, capitalist state and its dangerous foreign policy. But the anti-nuclear
movement dwelled more on war destruction at home than Japanese atrocities abroad, and its
indiscriminate opposition to all wars blurred the distinction between Japanese war of
aggression and the war of resistance by Asian people.
Institutionalization of Mythologized Historiography in Japan
Since the end of war until the 1960s, Japanese conservative elites took advantage of
some important institutional tools, including war crimes trials, media and school education,
war compensation policies, and commemoration, to legitimize these self-whitewashing and
glorification myths. In addition to the convenient access to state apparatus by the
conservative elites, the inherent paradox of the occupation policy and its dramatic shift from
liberal reforms to strengthening the conservative power in Japan in the late 1940s helped
these myths prevail in national collective memory.
1. The War Crimes Trials
Postwar penalization of individuals bearing war responsibility was the most
important legal institution to establish an official view of war history. The Tokyo War
Crimes Trial held between 1946 and 1948 stood by the conservative position on the
161 The term "collective responsibility" is used as opposed to "collective guilt." As German president on May
8, 1945, Richard von Weizsaicker pointed out in his world-famous speech in the Bundestag, "there is no such
thing as the guilt or innocence of an entire nation. Guilt is, like innocence, not collective, but personal." But
speaking of individual guilt does not negate the "collective responsibility" of a nation, including for its younger
emperor's innocence and the minimalist approach to defining Japan's war responsibility.
The conservatives achieved their goals by skillfully playing into the needs and interests of the
occupation authority. For one thing, the prosecution staff relied heavily on their
cooperation because a large portion of Japanese government documents had been destroyed
right before surrender. But a more important reason for the close collaboration between the
conqueror and conquered on war crimes trials lied in the Truman administration's policy to
achieve occupation objectives with an "indirect rule" of Japan, mainly through the monarchy
system.162
MacArthur and his military secretary and the chief of his psychological-warfare
operations, General Bonner F. Fellers, were among the most enthusiastic American
advocates of the "indirect rule." In March 1946, before the Tokyo Trial was opened, Fellers
specifically coached Japanese politicians to persuade Tojo to "bear all responsibility at his
trial" while the emperor should be proved to be "completely blameless."' 63 Chief prosecutor
Joseph Keenan representing the United States absolved the emperor of all responsibility at
the outset of his case. 164 So the American prosecutors, Japanese conservative elites, and
defendants in jails acted in concert to detach the emperor from any hint of war responsibility
charge. In the end, only twenty-five officials of the imperial government were convicted, of
whome seven were sentenced to death. Besides Tojo, all but one of the other six executed
were former army officers. Thereafter, no further trials promised were carried out, and all
other suspects were released. Those sentenced to imprisonment were also set free after the
San Francisco Peace Treaty.165
The war crimes trial also perpetuated a strong Western-centrist bias in Japanese war
memory. Only three (from China, the Philippines, and India) of the eleven justices were
Asian, while the rest were from Western countries. Besides, the bulk of the prosecution time
was devoted to "crimes against peace" through "overall conspiracy," while guilt of atrocities,
generation to keep alive the memories and acknowledge the disgraceful aspects of its past. See Jeffrey Herf,
Divided Memory: The Naýi Past in the Two Germanys (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 357-358.162 For a detailed account of the Japan-US collaboration to preserve the monarchy system, see Herbert Bix,
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a far more important issue in Japan's war in Asia, was greatly downplayed. Except for
testimonies on Nanjing Massacre and "Rape of Manila," the tribunal failed to investigate
many notorious Japanese war atrocities. 166
2. Media Control and Educational Policies
The occupation authorities used media censorship and decentralization reform of
education system to end the imperial indoctrination of militarism, xenophobia, and
intolerance. In addition to dismantling the ideological foundation of wartime militarist
politics, the occupation authories also established the so-called "Pacific War View of
History" (Taiheiyd Sensdkan) as the official interpretation of the war history. Spread by the
occupation authorities mainly to define the aggressive nature of the war, this view also met
the Japanese conservative needs to minimize Japan's war responsibility.
In September 1945, the GHQ publish the "Press Code," prohibiting inflammatory
media reporting that would compromise the interests and authority of the occupation
forces. 167 Moreover, every month the Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD) within the Civil
Information and Education Section (CI&E) issued a checklist of prohibited subjects in
media reports. National newspapers serialized "A History of the Pacific War" penned by the
staff of CI&E, and NHK broadcasted the 10-week long program "This is Truth" (Shinsd wa
kdda). Both programs stressed American military superiority as the main cause of Japanese
defeat, shedding little light on resistance movements in Asia. On Japanese war guilt, they
only held the military clique accountable while portraying the rest of the nation as mere
victims who were kept from learning the truth.1 68
Concerning school education, the SCAP ordered the purge of ultra-nationalist
personnel from the teaching and bureaucratic ranks, outlawed State Shintoism in education
materials, and suspended the teaching of geography, history and morals courses, the three
subjects deemed most pervasively nationalistic. The CI&E also exercised direct supervision
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over the drafting of new curricula and teaching materials. However, the new textbooks such
as Kuni no Ayumi (Footsteps of the Nation), Nihon Rekishi (Japanese History) and Minshushugi
(Democracy) presented a historical view largely consistent with the Japanese conservative
perspective, which laid the war responsibility solely on the militarists and left the emperor
and everyone else unaccountable.' 69 Later when the conservatives regained much of its
prewar power over education policy, they made renewed efforts to introduce traditional
values into school textbooks."'
The abortive occupation reform of education institutions mainly accounted for the
prevalence of conservative historiography in school textbooks. SCAP failed to reach the
alleged goal of devolving power over education to elected local Boards of Education, as
stipulated by the 1947 Fundamental Education Law and 1948 Textbook Law. In the spirit
of "indirect rule," SCAP let Mombusho (Ministry of Education) take charge of textbook
certification system as a temporary measure and planed to distribute power to local boards
of education once they were set up. However, the certification process passed entirely into
Mombush6's control after the end of textbook censorship by SCAP in July 1950.
Furthermore, in 1956, the government abolished elective boards of education and let heads
of local governments appoint the boards instead. As a result, Mombush6 was able to use
centralized textbook certification system and the publication of teaching guidelines as two
important institutional tools to control educational content.'71
An examination of history textbooks published in the early 1950s shows that the
1931-1945 was depicted as a period of "fascism from above" (a term coined by an influential
Japanese political scientist Maruyama Masao) in Japan. They typically ascribed the blame to
only the military faction and a small group of right-wing members of the government, who
had duped the Japanese people. And they all focused on the battles much more than the
suffering of the people in the occupied territories.172 Since mid-1950s, the anti-nuclear
movement spread nationwide, causing an ephemeral change in textbook coverage. More
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detailed accounts of Japanese experience of atomic bombing were added to school
textbooks, which accentuated the theme of an exceptional Japanese atomic victimhood and
justified the mission for Japan to fight for absolute world peace. 173
The progressive sway over textbooks soon diminished when the conservative
government began to crack down the influence of the left-wing Japan Teachers' Union
JTU). In the so-called campaign of "The Problem of Deplorable Textbooks (ureubeki
kyokasho mondaz)," the government attacked the textbooks recommended by the JTU for
spreading communist thoughts in Japan and tightened textbook screening from the late
1950s. In the Textbook Certification Investigation Council that provided expert opinion on
textbook authorization, liberal members were replaced by people with conservative mind.
Publishers were put under greater pressure to keep their textbook content in conformity
with Mombusho's instruction.174 Consequently, textbooks released since the late 1950s
tended to "sanitize" the war history. They claimed that Japan's policy of aggression was
understandable in the hostile international environment and the populace were patriotic
supporters of the war efforts. The description of Japanese people's suffering was cut down,
including that on the atomic victim consciousness.
Treatment of war in textbooks of the 1960s textbook was the most ambiguous and
conservative. The militarists and the right wing were much more clearly singled out from
the rest of the nation than in the previous stage. Concerning other powers, the textbooks
included only an antiseptic and minimal coverage of both American air raids and the atomic
bombs while emphatically criticized the Soviet Union for launching an undeclared war that
violated their 1941 neutrality pact.'75 So in 1965, a well-known progressive historian lenaga
Sabur6 filed his first law suit against Mombush6 for historical distortion, beginning his
three-decade legal fight for textbook freedom.'7 6
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3. Postwar Resolution Measures
The institutional framework to "bring resolution to the postwar" (Sengo Shon) also
helped perpetuate the conservative historiography. During the occupation, the system to
pay special compensation to military personnel was abolished. Only days after regaining
sovereignty, however, Japanese government promulgated the Wounded Veteran and
Bereaved Family Assistance Act to resume payments to injured and killed soldiers and their
families "in the spirit of state compensation" (Kokka Hosho no Seishin ni Motozuki). Following
that was a formal revival of military pension system, Gunjin Onkyi, through the Pension Law
enacted in August 1953, offering blanket reward to the military for their service for the
nation. The law even made it clear that having received a sentence as a war criminal would
have no effect on their eligibility for benefits.'77
Compared to its swift action to compensate the military, the government dragged its
feet in providing relief to general victims of war. Statistics show that the cumulative
payments for military pensions and survivors' benefits by 1959 reached 567 billion Yen,
while that for aid to repatriates and families of those stranded abroad totaled 13.4 bilion Yen,
only about 2% of the former. 17" State compensation to Hibakusba in particular was largely
put off. Since the mid-1950s when the atomic victimhood was accepted by the society due
to the rising anti-nuclear movement, Hibakusha asserted their entitlement to state
compensation. Despite so, the 1957 Atomic Bomb Victim Medical Care Law still treated
relief to Hibakusha as a special kind of social welfare rather than state compensation and only
extended small amount of payment to a limited number of Hibakusha.'79 The large
discrepancy between government compensation policies to military and non-military victims
testified to the intention of the conservative government to defend wartime policies and
avoid addressing the national disaster that such policies had led to.
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However unevenly distributed, government compensation to domestic victims still
by far exceeded its external reparation. The vast majority of Japanese people were so
preoccupied with their own pain that they could not grasp the magnitude of Asian people's
war suffering, nor were they willing to face up to their obligation to compensate such
suffering. It is calculated that up to 1993 domestic war compensation was 40 times of what
Japan had paid in external reparations. Meanwhile, a "citizenship clause" has been applied to
almost all domestic compensation programs to exclude former colonial subjects from
receiving benefits. This attested to what a Japanese historian called the "Japan first, Japan
only" characteristic of postwar resolution policy. 180
4. Commemoration
Memorializing the war dead was granted great significance in postwar Japan. The
first official public commemoration for this purpose was held on May 2, 1952, shortly after
the occupation ended. The emperor presided at the ceremony, offering "condolences" to
"innumerable victims" of the war and urging the nation to uphold pacifist ideals.' s' The
emperor's remarks set the tone for subsequent memorials, which since 1963 were turned
into annual public commemoration ceremony on August 15, the anniversary of Japanese
surrender. At such ceremonies Japanese leaders would eulogize those who gave their lives
for their country but avoid commenting on the aggressive nature of the war or Japanese
responsibility for inflicting trauma on other Asian people.
Besides holding official ceremonies, the government also tacitly encouraged
memorial service sponsored by Yasukuni Shrine that glorified the patriotic spirit of Japanese
military. On November 19, 1945, Showa emperor, other royal family members, and Prime
Minister Shidehara and his cabinet members joined about 1,000 war bereaved family
members in Yasukuni Shrine to honor WWII Japanese war dead that had not been formally
enshrined there.182 But when state Shintoism was banned in December, Yasukuni was
turned into a pure religious entity whose connection with the government was formally
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severed. Soon after the occupation ended, conservative Diet members requested that WWII
war dead be honored there. Outside the government, an important interest group, Japanese
Bereaved Families Association or JBFA (Nihon Izokukai), passed a resolution in November
1952 demanding state financing of Yasukuni's memorial services, Kokka Goji, and launched
in 1959 a nationwide signature campaign to solicit public support.'83
In response to their calls, beginning from 1953, the Diet authorized the
transportation section of the government to provide special price discount to bereaved
family members who would travel to Tokyo to worship at Yasukuni. In April 1956, the
Ministry of Health and Welfare issued an official notification directing all levels of local
government to work with Yasukuni to investigate those soldiers who had died in the recent
war and inform their families, with all cost underwritten by state budget. According to this
notification, every year Yasukuni Shrine would hold memorial services twice for those
deceased soldiers whose names appeared in the list compiled by the government. This
actually circumvented the constitutional principle of separation between religion and politics
and extended de facto state sponsorship to Yasukuni memorial rituals.'8 4 Emboldened by
implicit governmental endorsement of their self-glorification historiography, Yasukuni
Shrine gradually scaled up its commemorative activities. It began to enshrine BC-Class war
criminals in 1959 and A-Class war criminals in 1966, and succeeded for the first time in 1975
in having the prime minister worship Yasukuni Shrine in official capacity.'"
Japanese war commemoration did not only honor the dead soldiers but also gave
great emphasis to national suffering. First opened in 1955, the Atomic Bomb Memorial
Museum concentrated its exhibition on portraying the horror of the atomic bombing and
conveying a pacifist message that condemned all wars as evil.18 6 Besides, since 1946 the city
administration and parliament have held annual memorial ceremony on August 6, the
anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. The prime minister usually sent a
183 Nobumasu Tanaka, et al., Izoku to Sengo (War Bereaved Families and Postwar) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995),pp. 207-209.
184 Itagaki, Yasukuni Koshiki Sanhai no Sokatsu, pp. 306-310; Asahi Shimbun, August 11, 2001.
185 Asahi Shimbun, August 11, 2001.
186 The Peace Museum underwent a renovation around 1994 when the Socialist Party took lead of thegovernment. Since then the museum has featured more exhibits on the historical context of the atomic
bombing and Hiroshima's link to the Japanese war of aggression.
nationally reported supporting message to the ceremony, and the attendance by cabinet
members began in 1960.'87 What was absent from the Hiroshima memory was the Japanese
reflection on the historical context of the atomic bombing, including Japan's provocation of
the war, its prolonged, cruel victimization of foreign people, and its rejection of the Allies'
demand for an early surrender.'8 8 Another sign of Japan's lack of guilt feeling was the
exclusion of foreign victims, most notably the 20,000 to 30,000 Korean atomic bomb dead,
from the official representation of Hiroshima history until 1970.189
Myths in Chinese Historiography
Domestic and International Motivations in Historical Mythmaking
In the first period of Sino-Japanese relations, historiography was used by the
communist government as a convenient ideological weapon to arouse public enthusiasm
towards the communist cause and hostility against reactionary forces, including the KMT
regime in Taiwan, American imperialism, and any other political actors that aligned with the
KMT and U.S. The purpose was to consolidate the power and legitimacy of the CCP
regime, counter foreign threat to national security, and ensure the smooth implementation of
domestic and foreign policy agenda.
In the first few years after the CCP won the civil war, the government faced a
volatile situation at home. First, the CCP had not gained absolute political dominance
because officially China was ruled by a coalition government joined by a number of
influential, bourgeois-minded "democratic parties" (Minzhu Dang~az) that had rights to
question the policies of the central government. In the meantime, anti-Communist guerrilla
forces supported by the KMT and America still operated in various parts of the mainland.
The war-wrecked national economy was slow to recover, compounded by the complexity
187 Satoru Ubuki, Heiwa Kinen Shikiten no Ayumi (The Steps of Peace Memorial Ceremony) (Hiroshima: Hiroshima
Peace Culture Foundation, 1992), pp. 75-78.
188 Lisa Yoneyama, Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space, and the Dialectics of Memory (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1999), pp. 17-18.
189 Lisa Yoneyama, "Memory Matters: Hiroshima's Korean Atom Bomb Memorial and the Politics of
Ethnicity," in Laura Hein and Mark Selden, Living with the Bomb: American and Japanese Cultural Conflicts in the
NuclarAge (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1997).
involved in the nationwide land reform, crackdown of economic crimes, and the emergent
demands for the Korean War. Besides domestic instability, the internationalized Taiwan
problem also posed an external challenge to the Communist regime legitimacy. Because the
U.S. treated the KMT regime as the sole legal representative of China, the CCP government
was excluded from the United Nation.
Domestic programs of socialist transformation only completed in the mid-1950s,
when the focus of government policy shifted from political struggle to economic
development. But stability did not last long. The subsequent two decades or so saw the wax
and wane of radical socioeconomic policies such as the "People's Commune" and "Great
Leap Forward," factional conflicts between Mao and his political opponents like Liu Shaqi,
Deng Xiaoping, Peng Dehuai and Lin Biao, campaigns of class struggle like the "Anti-
Rightist Movement" in 1957, and even mass turmoil like the Red Guard riots during the
Cultural Revolution. Domestic politics was often in flux, and Mao was constantly concerned
that bourgeois ideas or his political critics would endanger his supreme authority.
On the international strategic front, Chinese communist leaders believed that the
U.S. and China had a fundamental clash in their national security interests. First of all, the
American government supported the rival regime in Taiwan and denied the survival right of
the communist state, which was a direct cause of persistent tensions across the Taiwan Strait
throughout this period. Second, U.S. was seen to have the intention to overthrow the CCP
government either by direct military invasion or through support to domestic subversion.
The U.S. also organized military encirclement among China's surrounding countries and
enforced anti-Chinese international trade embargoes. Therefore, the central theme of
Chinese grand strategy in this period was to balance the threat of "American imperialism,"
by strengthening Chinese defense capabilities and seeking external assistance, especially from
the USSR.
Related to the struggle against the U.S. was China's strategy toward American allies.
Chinese leaders saw the world not merely dominated by confrontation between two
superpower blocs, but also containing tensions between superpowers and smaller powers. If
China could build a "United Front" spanning both socialist countries and smaller Western
powers, it could erode the international support to American Cold War strategy and
eventually break down the Western isolation of the CCP regime. Being the biggest
American ally in Asia, Japan was treated as an important target of the "United Front"
strategy.') Differentiating Japanese ruling class and ordinary people in remembering war
history was useful for increasing favorable impression of Communist China in the Japanese
society and gradually encouraging Japanese government to abandon the US-Japan security
alliance and anti-China policy.
The imminent goal to stand up against the aforementioned domestic and
international pressures prompted Chinese communist ideologues to invent a national identity
that would effectively rally public support to the government. The official propaganda was
primarily predicated on the communist ideology of class struggle rather than ethno-
nationalism. Instead of drawing the dividing line between the China and foreign perpetrator
countries, the communist national identity emphasized the irreconcilable antagonism
between capitalist and imperialist forces on the one hand, and the proletariat mass on the
other hand. To fit into the ideological framework, Chinese official representation of national
history twisted, covered up, or misinterpreted facts to instate a class-based, Maxist
historiography. The narrative about the Sino-Japanese War in this period exalted the role of
the CCP in China's campaign of national liberation and independence, demonized the KMT
and American governments, condemned the Japanese militarists but sympathized with the
Japanese people, and praised the heroic resistance by the Chinese people but wiped off the
disgraceful history of Chinese collaboration with the invaders.
Myths of Self-Glorification and Other-Maligning
1. Leadership and Heorism of the Chinese Communists
190 For the evolution of Chinese "united front" strategy, see Tatsumi Okabe, Chtigoku no Tainichi Seisaku (China's
Japan Poligy) (Tokyo: The University of Tokyo Press, 1976), pp. 22-39; Jisi Wang, "International Relations
Theory and the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy: A Chinese Perspective," in Thomas W. Robinson and David
L. Shambaugh Chinese Foreign Poke: Theory and Practice (Oxford, New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University
Press, 1994).
Chinese official historiography established the CCP as the sole leader of the "Great
Chinese War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression," and the CCP-led Eighth Route
Army, New Fourth Army and other guerrilla troops were praised as the predominant
resistance forces in China. The role of Nationalist troops in the resistance campaign was
generally ignored. Foreign assistance to Chinese resistance also received scarce treatment.
Only Soviet military aid was briefly mentioned, even though they were given to the KMT
rather than the CCP forces during the war. Therefore, the Chinese communists took the
main credit for driving out Japanese aggressors.
It is noteworthy that Chinese war history during this period did not encourage victim
consciousness because it conspicuously avoided elaborate treatment of Japanese war
atrocities and Chinese casualties. Instead of having Chinese people perceive themselves as
tragic war victims, the communist ideologues constructED a triumphant narrative that could
boost national morale and pubic confidence in the successful leadership of the CCP."'
While highlighting the patriotic, heroic image of the CCP, the Chinese war narrative
whitewashed the CCP's negative actions. The KMT and CCP had a short period of entente
in the first two years of the war, but since 1939 their forces clashed frequently in an intense
contest for influence in various Chinese regions, and in some cases involved severe
casualties. Such internal strife was strategically harmful to the overall resistance campaign
against the Japanese. 192 Refusing to admit its own share of responsibility, the Communist
government always claimed that the communist attacks on the nationalist army were both
191 In fact, the political principles guiding Chinese art works during this period made it clear that individual
happiness would never be placed ahead of the revolutionary cause. Otherwise they would be accused of
disseminating sentimentalism and capitalist humanitarianism that would "dilute our hatred of imperialism" and
"lower our morale" against the enemies. So any artist attempts to "reflect the real life" or "human nature" by
showing individual tragedy or instinct for survival during the revolutionary struggle were sternly criticized. See
Bo Chen, "Genggao di Juqi Mao Zedong Sixiang Hongqi, Wei Chuangzuo Gengduo Genghao de Geming
Junshi Ticai Yinpian er Nuli (Lifting Higher the Red Flag of Mao Zendong Thoughts, Striving for Creating
More and Better Revolutionary Military Movies)," Dianying Yishu (Film Art), Beijing, August 1960, pp. 5-6.
192 For an overview of wartime Nationalist-Communist friction, see Lyman Van Slyke, "The Chinese
Communist Movement during the Sino-Japanese War 1937-1945," in John K. Fairbank, et al. The Cambridge
History of China: Republican China 1912-1949, Part 2, Vol. 13, (Cambridge [Eng.]; New York Cambridge
University Press 1986), pp. 659-671.
self-defense and patriotic actions because the KMT attempted to stop communist troops
from marching to the anti-Japanese battlefield. 93
2. KMT and the American Imperialism as China's Worst Enemies
The Communist narrative described the KMT as a corrupt and oppressive force that
exploited the people, persecuted political dissidents, and was totally reactionary in trying to
wipe out the communist movement in China. The KMT leaders were accused of kowtowing
to and actively collaborating with the Japanese aggressors in exchange for their own safety
and power. So everything that the KMT said and did was against the Chinese national
interest and would have incurred total Japanese conquest of China if the CCP had not stood
up and saved the nation.
Meanwhile, the U.S. government was depicted as another dangerous enemy of the
Chinese nation. The official Chinese historiography neglected to mention American military
aid to fight the Japanese troops, nor did it introduce U.S.-China joint military operation in
the China-Burma-India theatre or the broader picture of U.S. struggle against Japan in the
Pacific War. 194 Instead, it proclaimed that America sat idle while the Chinese people were
suffering, and tried to profit from Sino-Japanese conflict by playing one country against the
other. The worst charge against the Americans centered on their assistance to the KMT
government to suppress Chinese communism.
3. Condemn the Japanese Militarists, Unite with the Japanese People
193 One of the highlighted incidents of CCP-KMT friction was the "Wannan Incident" in 1941, which the
Chinese textbooks said was an evil ambush by the KMT army of a New Fourth Army unit that was on its way
to take up strategic position in the anti-Japanese military campaign. But the incident actually took place amidst
the KMT-CCP struggle to gain greater area of influence, and the KMT's attack was an act of revenge for the
loss of its unit in an early military clash with the communist troops in North Jiangsu area.
194 Soviet Russia was the Nationalist government's first generous friend once the Sino-Japanese hostilities broke
out in 1937, supplying thousands of planes, weapons, munitions, pilots, military advisers. The flow of Soviet
aid decreased after the European war began in 1939 but continued until Nazi Germany invaded the USSR in
1941. Western aid came late. In late 1941 that the U.S. began to send military aid to China under the Lend-
Lease Act, and General Chennault's volunteer group "Flying Tigers" joined air combat in China theatre. From
then on Western aid flowed into China in such large quantity that it caught up with the level of Soviet aid. For
more on foreign military aid to China during Sino-Japanese War, see Lloyd E. Eastman, "Nationalist China
during the Sino-Japanese War 1937-1945," in John King Fairbank, et al., The Cambridge History of China:
Repubican China 1912-1949, Part 2, Vol. 13.
Chinese official war history devoted almost equal space to negative treatment of the
reactionary actions of the KMT/U.S. and the Japanese aggression. But unlike its outright
demonization of the former, Chinese historiography took a qualified approach to Japan's
role in the war, making Japan look like a lesser evil. On the one hand, it decried the long-
time aggressive ambition of Japanese imperialists towards China and the barbarian actions of
the Japanese military during its invasion and occupation in China. On the other hand,
however, a line was explicitly drawn between "the small handful of Japanese militarists" and
the ordinary Japanese people, who were treated as the Chinese people's fellow victim of the
Japanese militarists. As Zhou Enlai told a visiting Japanese Diet delegation in 1954, "(the
history of Japanese militarist aggression) has been something of the past. Chinese people are
able to make distinction between militarists and the people." In the same occasion, Zhou
went so far as to praise those "Japanese friends" who joined the PLA to fight against the
KMT army during the Chinese Civil War or stayed in China after the war to serve the
Chinese people.'"1
4. Patriots vs. Traitors
The eight years of Sino-Japanese hostilities was not a clear-cut history of aggression
versus heroic resistance. The actual relationship between the two sides was much more
complicated, involving not only regular and guerrilla warfare, but also puppet governments
from central to local levels, hundreds of thousands of Chinese military defections, and
numerous petty collaborators living in the Japanese-occupied regions.'"9 However, admitting
that the Chinese nation did not unite in fighting against aggressors and many Chinese were
not patriotic by strict nationalist standards would have compromised the reputation of the
CCP as the successful leader of heroic Chinese struggle for national independence. So the
Communist propaganda offered a simplistic interpretation that divided Chinese people into
only two categories, the vast majority being patriots and a minority being Hanjian, or Chinese
195 "Zhou Enlai's Remarkes in the Meeting with Japanese Diet Delegation and the Delegation of Academic
Survey, October 11, 1954," in Tadao Ishikawa & Mineo Nakajima, Masaru Ikei eds., Sengo Shiryo: Nitchzi Kankei
(Postwar Documents: Japanese-Chinese Relations) (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsya, 1970), pp. 27-33.
196 For historical studies of wartime Sino-Japanese political collaboration and life under Japanese occupation,
see Jie Liu, Nitchui Senso Ka no Gaik6 (Wartime Sino-Japanese Diplomagy) (Tokyo: Yoshigawa H-irobumi Kan, 1995);
Lloyd E. Eastman, "Facets of An Ambivalent Relationship: Smuggling, Puppets, and Atrocities During the
War, 1937-1945," in Akira Iriye ed., The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980); Mark S. Eykholt, Living the Limits of Occupation in Nanjing
China, 1939-1945, Ph.D. dissertation in history (San Diego: University of California, San Diego, 1998).
traitors."' On the other hand, the narrative shunned concrete treatment of those people
who might fall into neither category, such as ordinary people under Japanese occupation. It
simply claimed that these people were either miserable victims or brave members of
underground resistance campaigns led by the CCP.
Institutionalization ofMyths in Chinese National Memory
Compared to Japanese conservative elites, Chinese communist ideologues enjoyed an
even greater degree of monopoly over the reinterpretation of national history. With their
exclusive control of state power and thorough penetration of societal life, the CCP were able
to establish with ease the hegemonic position of these self-glorification and other-maligning
historical myths in national collective memory.
1. School Textbooks
After the founding of the PRC, the State Publication Administration quickly put
together the Editing and Screening Bureau to compile teaching materials."9 8 But time was
not enough to compose new textbooks before school started that year, and some existing
teaching materials were put into use as temporary substitute.'99 One year later, the National
Publication Conference decided to centralize the compilation and distribution of secondary
school textbooks. A key step was the founding of the People's Education Press (PEP) as
the specialized institution to prepare school textbook. This was the inception of tight central
control of education policy in China. Specifically, the government exercised direct authority
over the educational content through Curricular Standards, or called Teaching Guidelines
since 1952, which were drafted by the State Education Commission (SEC) and updated
every few years. The SEC then entrusted the PEP to gather textbook authors to prepare
197 The Communist propaganda almost always attributed the responsibility for the existence of Hanjian to the
Nationalist policy. For example, on the question of military defection, instead of telling the complexity in the
process, communist propaganda adopted a conspiratorial interpretation that accused Chiang Kai-shek of
ordering his own units to defect to the Japanese in order to preserve them for anti-communism campaign. See
Eastman, "Facets of An Ambivalent Relationship," pp. 284-292.
198 Liqun Ye, "Huigu yu Sikao: Zhongxiaoxue JiaocaiJianshe 40 Nian 1949-1989 (Review and Reflection: 40
Years of Developing Secondary School Teaching Materials)," in Institute of Curriculum and Teaching Materials
Research ed., Kechen Jiaocai Yanjiu 10 Nian (10 Years of Research on Curriculum and Teaching Materials), (Beijing:
People's Education Press, 1993), p. 11.
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official textbooks based on Teaching Guidelines.200 So throughout the period, all Chinese
pupils were educated under the so-called Yigang Yiben, or "One Guideline, One Textbook"
system.20'
In the school textbooks published in the 1950s and 1960s (see Appendix 1 for a list
of Chinese textbooks examined in this dissertation), policies of the KMT and CCP were
constantly compared and contrasted to drive home the fundamental difference between the
traitorous, reactionary KMT and the patriotic, progressive CCP. Specifically, all textbooks of
this period held Chiang and his armies accountable for Chinese military defeat, territorial
loss, and human suffering. They criticized that the KMT's troops were so military
incompetent that they were routed at first encounter with the Japanese military (Yichu Jikuz)
and the whole KMT frontline collapsed like a mountain tumbling down (Bingbai Rushandao).
They mostly left out or downplay the important battles fought by the KMT troops but
always gave detailed coverage of communist military actions. 202 Besides, these textbooks
greatly emphasized the importance of anti-Japanese base areas set up by the communist
armies and guerrillas. They claimed that the CCP base areas had resisted 400,000 Japanese
troops by 1938, more than half of total Japanese troops in China,203 and altogether the
199 These substitute materials include history readers used by schools in Shan/Gan/Ning area held by the CCP
during the civil war, and history materials originally prepared for party cadres. Interviews with the research
staff of the National Textbook Library affiliated with the People's Education Press, Beijing June 2000.
200 Up to the mid-1960s the PEP had totally produced four editions of official textbooks under four different
Teaching Guidelines. Except for the radically leftist edition published in 1960 and only used for a very brief
period in limited areas, all three other editions were used by secondary schools nationwide. When the mania of
the Cultural Revolution swept China since 1966, schools were shut down and no textbooks were either
produced or in use. SeeYe, "Huigu yu Sikao: Zhongxiaoxue Jiaocai Jianshe 40 Nian 1949-1989," pp. 31-32.
201 Donggang Zhang, "Zhongri Zhongxue Lishi Jiaokeshu Bijiao (Comparison of Chinese and Japanese Middle
School Textbooks)," The Journal of Tianjin Education College, No. 3, 1992, p. 42.
202 For example, only two substitute textbooks published in 1950 (STM 1, Vol. 2, p. 115; STM 3, pp. 199-200)
mentioned the Nationalist military's major victory in the 1938 Taierzhuang Battle, but tried to play down its
significance by arguing that the battle was won largely because the Eighth Route Army pinned down most of
Japanese troops and the Nationalists quickly lost their advantage in subsequent military fiasco. In contrast, all
textbooks gave great prominence to the communist victory in the Pingxingguan Battle of September 1937,
even though it was a battle of much smaller scale than Taierzhuang, and was only one part of the Shanxi
Campaign jointly fought by the Nationalist and Communist troops. In fact, The Taierzhuang Battle was the
first major Chinese victory in conventional warfare against the Japanese, which lasted about two weeks and
claimed 30,000 Japanese dead. The Pingxingguan Battle was a one-day ambush fight led by the famed
communist military commander Lin Biao, killing about 500 Japanese soldiers. See Lloyd E. Eastman,
"Nationalist China during the Sino-Japanese War 1937-1945," p. 555; Lyman Van Slyke, "The Chinese
Communist Movement during the Sino-Japanese War 1937-1945," p. 639; Danian Liu Zhongguo Fuxing Shuniu:
Kangri Zhangzheng de Banian (The Turning Point of Chinese Resurrection: The Eight Years of War of Resistance against
Japan) (Beijing, Beijing Press, 1997), pp. 31-32, pp. 45-47.
203 HST 2, Vol. 4, p.6 8; MST 4, Vol. 4, P.117; HST 3, p. 61.
communist troops resisted 64% of Japanese troops in China and 95% of total puppet
troops. 204 These textbooks not only attacked the KMT for its cowardliness and ineptitude
but also were eager to expose its atrocities against patriotic mass, close contacts with the
Wang Jingwei puppet regime and wartime diplomatic negotiation with Japan, which were
said to be evident of its intention to betray the Chinese nation.
Compared to the vivid, detailed description of the contrasting strategies of the KMT
and CCP, textbook treatment of Japanese policies and actions was much simpler. Textbooks
of this period did not mince words to condemn Japan for embracing long-time ambition of
imperialist expansion and never hesitating to use conspiracies, lies, and violence to extend its
interest. But most textbooks focused their attack not on the Japanese nation as a whole, but
on Ridi Gapanese imperialism), Rijun Gapanese military), or Rikou Gapanese invaders).
Besides, their treatment of Sino-Japanese military battles was intended not so much to
expose the evilness of the aggressors as to highlight the difference between the KMT and
CCP policies.
These textbooks usually covered Japanese atrocities in general terms, such as "brutal
killing, burning, raping," and "cruel economic exploitation and enslaving education and
cultural policies." Only the Japanese attack of communist base areas received more detailed
treatment,205 but even on this subject equal length was devoted to relate the CCP-led
tenacious military struggle and effective political and economic policies in the base areas.
Nanjing Massacre was the only concrete case of Japanese atrocities mentioned in textbooks,
with the number of 300,000 used as the total victim toll. More intriguingly, many textbooks
blamed the failure of the KMT defense strategy in Nanjing just as bitterly as their
condemnation of the Japanese barbarism. 20 6
204 STM 3, pp. 246-247.
205 For example, the various tactics employed by the Japanese military were detailed in these textbooks, such as
Sanguang (Burn all, Kill all, Destroy all), Saodang (mop-up), Canshi (nibbling), Qingxiang (clearing the countryside),
and biochemical warfare.
206 Only one textbook named the Japanese war criminal convicted by the Nationalist government's war crimes
trial, Tani Toshio, but the same textbook immediately digressed from the course of narration to bash Chiang
Kai-shek's sending back Japanese war criminals in the name of "loving your enemy." See SMT 3, p. 199.
All textbooks of this period differentiated the roles played by different foreign
countries in Chinese war of resistance. They praised the Soviet Union for providing loans
and military supplies and stated that the Soviet declaration of war and attack at Japanese
Kwantung Army in August 1945 accelerated Japanese surrender.20 7 Conversely, they
criticized the U.S. t for sending arms and ammunitions to the Japanese military and
dismissed American sympathy to China as hypocritical. On the American intervention in
Chinese politics in the last stage of the war, the textbooks said that U.S. assisted the KMT to
instigate a new civil war, with the ultimate desire to destroy the CCP and realize its exclusive
colonization of China after the war ended.20 8
Lastly, textbook content varied in accordance with the change of domestic agenda of
the communist government over time. A telling example of domestic political interference
with historiography is the correlation between the change of textbook content and the
downfall of Peng Dehuai, an out-spoken critic of Mao's policy of Great Leap Forward.
Peng was dismissed from his position as defense minister in 1959 and, as soon as the
Cultural Revolution started, disappeared from public view after being arrested and losing his
governmental posts. Only until 1978 was his political reputation rehabilitated. So for over
20 years all textbooks deleted the famous Hundred Regime Offensive that Peng commanded
during the war of resistance against Japan, and only until 1981 did textbooks resume
description of this battle.
2. Commemoration
The government built various memorial sites to commemorate the victory of
Chinese revolution, but very few of them were particularly dedicated to the war of resistance
against Japan. The most famous site was the Monument to the People's Heroes in
Tiananmen Square. A 36 meter obelisk built in 1958, this monument commemorates the
hundred year Chinese struggle against foreign imperialism and domestic reactionary forces.
Of the ten relief sculptures on the monument depicting various revolutionary events in
Chinese history, only one sculpture presents scenes from the anti-Japanese war. So Chinese
official commemoration defined this war was defined as just one episode in a lengthy history
207 Most textbooks told the concrete number of Soviet aid with the exception of the substitute materials
published in the early 1950s. See SMT 1, Vol. 2, pp. 121-122; SMT 2, Vol. 2, pp. 117-118; SMT 3, p. 210.
of Chinese struggle for national independence and liberalization, which ended with the
CCP's triumph over the KMT in 1949.209 This again supported an ideologically based
historiography in China. As Rana Mitter says, these commemorative sites show that the
"defining fundamental fissures" upon which the People's Republic was rested for decades
"was less that between China and Japan than that between the Communists and the
Nationalists." 210
The state-controlled media also played an important role in commemorating the war
against Japan. The first media intervention in war commemoration came on September 18,
1946, the 15' anniversary of the Manchuria Incident, when the Yenan-based communist
mouthpiece, Jiefang Ribao, published an editorial presenting three major reasons why Japan
was able to invade China. Besides the reactionary rule of the Japanese financial magnates
and military clique, the article went into great length condemning Chiang's numerous acts of
betraying the country and American connivance of the Japanese imperialists as the second
and third reasons.211 This practice of issuing anti-KMT/U.S. commemorative editorials or
speeches of government leaders around such important war-related dates as July 7,
September 2, and September 18 was turned on and off throughout the subsequent two
decades.
3. Cultural Propaganda
Artists were also summoned to propagating historical myths through literature,
theatres, and movies. Take the film industry for an example, revolutionary war movies took
up more than half of total movies made from 1949 to 1952, the most difficult period of
domestic power consolidation and external conflict. When political situation stabilized
between 1953 and 1957, this number sharply dropped to only ten percentage. By the end of
the 1950s production of war movies picked up momentum once again, coinciding with the
sharply intensified domestic and international conflicts at the time. In the year 1959 as many
as 20 war movies were produced to mark the 10 th anniversary of PRC. In fact, up to one
208 For examples, see HST2, Vol. 4, p. 70, pp. 83-84; MST4, Vol. 4, p. 119.
209 Wu Hung, "Tiananmen Square: A Political History of Monuments," Representations 35 (1991), p. 100.
210 Rana Mitter, "Behind the Scenes at the Museum," p. 283.
211 "Huigu 15 Nian: Jinian 9.18 (Reflecting on the Past 15 Years: In Commemoration of 9.18)," liefang Ribao
(Yanen), September 18, 1946, in Tian, Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji, Beijing, Zhongguo Shehui Kexue, Vol.
1, pp. 33-36.
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quarter of total movies made from 1959 to 1964 were dedicated revolutionary wars. Only
since the mid-1960s did a substantial decline in these movies take place due to domestic
political changes.212
In terms of the content, these war movies covered several periods of communist
revolutionary history, from the peasant uprising in the 1920s and 1930s, to the war of
resistance against Japan, the Civil War, and the Korean War. Most movies on the Sino-
Japanese war told stories about brave campaigns carried out by communist-led regular
armies, guerrillas, and underground resistance. They highlighted "the valiant, unyielding
patriotism of the Chinese nation" and extolling "the revolutionary vigor and heroic spirit of
revolutionary soldiers and people."213 On the other hand, they portrayed negative images of
not only the Japanese aggressors, but also the KMT reactionaries, and traitors who were
usually described to have colluded with the KMT. Almost all war movies avoided showing
the horror of Japanese atrocities and the suffering of Chinese people. Instead, artists were
compelled to create an ideal image of the fearless Chinese nation inspired by "revolutionary
optimism and heroism."
Predictions for Sino-Japanese Relations
The perpetuation of historical myths in both countries inevitably led to both
divergence and quasi-convergence between their national memories. On the one hand,
some Japanese myths of self-whitewashing and glorification, such as the glorious image of
the imperial army and the Western-centrist perspective, conflicted with the Chinese
historiography that condemned the Japanese military and praised the resistance movement
against Japan. On the other hand, Chinese official propaganda to draw distinction between
Japanese militarists and innocent Japanese people echoed the "myth of military clique" and
212 Following Mao's instructions of late 1963 to mid-1964 that art work should be more devoted to reflecting
"socialist revolution and construction," the literary and art circle cut down production of war movies in favor
of those movies reflecting the "13 Years" since the founding of the PRC. Once the Cultural Revolution
erupted, the entire film industry was paralyzed and a handful of "Model Theaters (Yangbanxt)" made from an
extremely rigid ideological angle dominated the scene of performing arts. But even "Model Theaters" avoided
revolutionary war topics, which was considered by the political radicals as too remote history to provide strong
motivation for the ongoing class struggle. See Dangdai Zhongguo Dianying (Contemporary Chinese Movies) (Beijing:
Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chuban She, 1989), Vol. 1, p. 78, p. 133, pp. 183-184, p. 233, pp. 283-286.
213 Dangdai Zhongguo Dianying, Vol. 1, pp. 81, p. 78.
myth of victimhood propagated in Japan. So Chinese historiography did not hold the entire
Japanese nation accountable but only condemned a small group of Japanese militarists.
Meanwhile, other-maligning myths targeted at China were missing in Japan. In fact, despite
the prevalent self-whitewashing myths, a lot of Japanese felt a guilt feeling towards China,
albeit never expressed in any official forms. Therefore, the war narratives of the two
countries were not mutually combative but only conflictual, with some notable area of
convergence, which should not inflame belligerent emotions and justify total confrontation.
Such history-making actions should predict a Shallow-Reconciliation type of relationship
characterized by limited inter-governmental cooperation and restrained popular tension.
Concretely speaking, war historiography would have significant impact on elite
expectation of bilateral war. Chinese elites should worry that Japan might never have
abandoned its intention for aggression and uprooted militarist institution. But their
perception of hostile Japanese intention should not be linked to any imminent threat of
armed conflict with Japan for Japan was only considered a secondary enemy of China,
compared to the U.S. and KMT. Meanwhile, Japanese elites should fear that China was
hostile to Japan but would go so far as to launch a war with Japan because Chinese
historiography did not embody any explicitly revanchist demands. Secondly, the two
countries should accept partial national recognition for neither critical disputes over
territories, resources, ethnic relationship existed, nor would their quasi-convergent
historiography require historical atonement as a precondition for normalization. Still, their
mutual mistrust should cause them to drag feet on permanently resolving issues of
sovereignty controversy, such as the status of Taiwan. Thirdly, the two countries should be
engaged in a limited degree of economic interaction during this period. Relative gain
concerns should be prominent in cases of economic friction, and should stem directly from
national memory about their economic conflict during the war.
In terms of popular relationship, historical mythmaking theory predicts that the
public should be concerned about mutual threat. The Chinese would found Japan
threatening because of its failure to address their suffering through apologies, legal measures,
or material compensation. Their historical grievances should also trigger emotional public
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reaction to any bilateral political disputes. But the emotional power would not result in
overwhelming public opposition to establishing formal diplomatic contacts or demand for
total confrontation because Chinese people were told that their hatred should be targeted at
only Japanese militarists and their present heirs, not the entire Japanese nation. As for the
Japanese people, without realizing Japan's war responsibility, they would find Chinese alarm
about the Japan threat totally unfounded and a mere justification for its own belligerence. In
the mean time, the two nations should be willing to develop societal contacts to a limited
extent, but because of the lack of any serious measures of historical settlement such contacts
would not eliminate poor stereotypes and substantially foster mutual trust.
EXPLAINING THE OUTCOME
The predictions of realist theory rather than historical mythmaking theory match the
actual outcome of Sino-Japanese Non-Reconciliation in the 1950s and 1960s. Process-
tracing of case history also shows that this outcome was chiefly caused by the Cold War
structure. Severe security concerns as a result of their antagonistic positions in the bipolar
world system constituted the most important cause of the expectation of immediate war
among both strategic elite and general public of the two countries. The overwhelming
systemic constraints also accounted for Japanese policies of non-recognition toward the
Beijing regime and restriction on bilateral economic interactions and societal contacts, as
well as the failure of Beijing's long-term efforts to revert these Japanese policies through
gradual measures of "People's Diplomacy."
Such a relationship could not be a product of the historical mythmaking behaviors of
the Japanese and Chinese elite that only predicted bilateral friction but not straightforward
confrontation in both intergovernmental and popular dimensions. Both nations indeed kept
vivid memories of their past war and a lot of Chinese people even formed negatively
stereotyped image of Japan based on such memories. But no evidence shows that their
historically rooted emotions were ever widely vented in public discourse or played any
significant role in exacerbating bilateral relations. It was mainly because Chinese
government deliberately stressed the convergent part of the two countries' war memories
but de-emphasized or even suppressed the conflictual part. It did so in order to to win the
hearts and minds of the Japanese people and eventually lure the Japanese state to the
Chinese side of the Cold War fault line. Nor was Japanese policy of isolation to China
driven by historical legacy. Without the strong U.S. opposition, most Japanese leaders would
have countenanced a considerably higher degree of cooperation with China in light of their
common economic interest, historical ties, and the Tokyo's desire to enhance its
international status through an autonomous diplomacy to China. So the historical
mythmaking factors, although oftentimes consistent with poligypreferences of both Beijing and
Tokyo, were trumped by structural factors in shaping the actualpoligy outcomes.
I. High Alert for War
Chinese and Japanese strategic thinking and planning during this period revealed
keens concern about bilateral violent conflict and their readiness for military responses. I
argue that elite perception of the precarious situation was more based on realpolitik
considerations than grievances and mistrust derived from their divergent interpretations of
the traumatic war history. For Chinese strategists, war with Japan was imminent not
because of direct Japanese military threat but due to Japan's intimate collaboration with the
U.S. containment strategy in Asia. For Japan, a variety of factors, including Sino-Soviet
alliance, military capabilities, communist infiltration and the danger of conflict entanglement,
explained the anxiety held by different schools of Japanese elites over another war with
China. As for the history factor, an examination of the Chinese media bashing of reviving
Japanese militarism and Japanese reaction from the late 1960s to early 1970s illustrates that
their disagreement on war history interpretation only shaped a moderate level of mistrust on
a regular basis, while incidents of sudden spike of threat perception were actually caused by
their fundamental strategic conflict.
Chinese Perception
In the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance signed in
1950, China clearly treated Japan as an imaginary enemy. The first portion of Article One of
the treaty reads:
Article I. Both High Contracting Parties undertake jointly to take all necessary measures at their
disposal for the purpose of preventing a repetition of aggression and violation of peace on the part of
Japan or any other state which should unite with Japan, directly or indirectly, in acts of aggression. In
the event of one of the High Contracting Parties being attacked by Japan or states allied with it, and
thus being involved in a state of war, the other High Contracting Parties will immediately render
military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal. 214
Here China explicitly warned of the danger of Japanese attack and promised prompt use of
force to respond to such an attack. In 1953, a People's Daily editorial reconfirmed that the
Sino-Soviet alliance treaty "is targeted at aggressive Japanese militarists," and vowed to
destroy any invaders coming into Chinese territories while at the same time "maintaining
peace in the Far Ease and opposing the resurrection of Japanese imperialism." 215
Why did the Sino-Soviet friendship treaty target at Japan, which was still under
American occupation at the time and had no standing army? Even when Japan gradually
developed its military power after the occupation ended and built a ground force of 170,000
men by the end of the 1950s, 216 its capabilities were dwarfed by the multimillion strong
PLA.217 So fear of Japanese military power was unlikely the main cause of Chinese security
concern about Japan. Chinese perception of Japan has to be put into the broad context of
American containment against China, of which Japanese defense force was seen as an
integral part. In September 1951 Zhou Enlai lashed out at the newly established U.S.-Japan
alliance for posing a serious threat to China and provoking a new war:
"The U.S.-Japan bilateral security treaty was intended to rearm Japan and pave the way for completely
transforming Japan into an American military base. This is indisputable evidence of American
government's preparation for aggressive war at greater scale in Asia and Far East. The central
government of the People's Republic of China considers that the San Francisco Peace Treaty and
U.S.-Japan bilateral security treaty signed under American coercion have posed severe security threat
to the PRC and many other Asian countries." 218
From then on, the Chinese official media frequently accused Japan of reviving
militarism by serving as an American "vassal state," "military bridgehead," or even "running
214 Harold C. Hinton, The People's Republic of China, 1949-1979: A Documentary Survey, Vol. 1, (Wilmington, Del.:
Scholarly Resources, 1980), pp. 123-124.
215 "People's Daily Editorial: An Analysis of Sino-Japanese relations, October 30, 1953," in Tian, Zhanhou
Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji, Vol. 1, p. 158.
216 Boei Sangy6 Ky6kai, Jieitai Nenkan (Yearbook of the SelfDefense Force), 1959 (Tokyo: B6ei Nipp6 Sha), p. 139.
217 During the Chinese Civil War the PLA had about 4 million troops. After two major force cut in the 1950s,
the number dropped to its all-time low of 2.4 million by1958. Since 1959, the PLA began massive expansion
and by 1971 its total strength reached 6 million. See Aiping Zhang et al. Eds, Zhongguo RenminJiefang/un (The
Chinese People's Liberation Army) Vol.1 (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo Chubanshe, 1994), p. 48, 144, 155, 254.
dog." Typically, China's rhetoric assault would escalate if Tokyo showed stronger
consolidation with American Cold War strategy. So when Kishi carried out active diplomacy
to America's other regional allies, such as Taiwan, South Korea and Southeast Asia, and
revised the U.S.-Japan alliance treaty, he was accused of taking bold steps to "participate in
the American-led aggressive military organization" and "plot new aggression and war."219
The U.S.-Japan Joint Statement of November 1967 that emphasized Chinese military threat
due to its nuclear menace and political intransigence also provoked a Chinese media
onslaught that dragged on for over four years. It culminated in late 1969 following the
issuing of Nixon-Sato Joint Communique with the "Korea and Taiwan" clause, which in the
Chinese eyes signaled U.S.-Japan joint military adventurism in China's surrounding area.
Beijing also accused the communique's clause on Okinawa settlement of allowing
deployment of American nuclear weapons there and setting the precedent for future nuclear
deployment elsewhere in Japan, a scheme called "Okinawaization of Japanese mainland
(Riben Bentu Chongsheng Hua)."220
China expected Sino-Japanese violent conflict not really in another Japanese
aggression of China, but rather over some strategically important surrounding. As a leading
Chinese historian Yang Kuisong informed us, around the time that Sino-Soviet alliance was
formed, the Chinese leaders were worried about possible military confrontation with the
U.S. in three areas, Taiwan Strait, Vietnam, and Korea. 221 Because Japan provided with the
U.S. with military bases that facilitated its interventions in these areas, Beijing considered
conflict with Japan almost inevitable. For example, during the Korean War, Mao was
seriously worried that MacArthur would send Japanese soldiers to fight against the Chinese
forces. 2 Indeed, Japan closely cooperated with the U.S. during the war by providing
218 "Foreign Minister Zhou En-lai's Statement Regarding the San Francisco Peace Treaty Signed by America
and Its Lackey Countries," September 18, 1951, in Tian, Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji, Vol. 1, p. 1951.
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1960," in Tian, Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji, Vol. 1, p. 479.
220 See "People's Daily Editorial on the Evil Conspiracy of American and Japanese Reactionaries, November
28, 1969," in Tian, Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji, Vol.1, pp. 903-906; Nitchi Kankei Kihon Shiryoshu (Basic
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221 Kuisong Yang, Zhonggongyu Mosike de Guanxi (The CCP-Moscow Relations) (Taipei: Dongda Tushu, 1997), p.
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transport, communication, and maintenance support, and the newly formed Japanese
military even engaged limited military operations under American command. Japan's
endorsing of U.S. security commitment to Taiwan and intervention in Indochina throughout
the 1950s and 1960s only vindicated Beijing's concern.
Another concrete example of China's expectation of conflict with Japan was its
reaction to the controversial "Three-Arrow Research" (M~ya Kenkyu) project of the Japanese
Defense Agency that was incidently leaked to the public. Secretly conducted around the
mid-1960s, this project was a military plan that envisioned the use of Japanese Self Defense
Force (SDF) if an international conflict in Korean Peninsular spilled over to Japan.223
Conceiving this project as a secret war plan aimed at China and North Korea, Beijing
vehemently condemned that "Japanese reactionaries were colluding with the American
imperialists in advancing dangerous, aggressive policy in the Far East." It then urged
Chinese, Korean and people of other Asian countries to maintain a high degree of caution
against aggressive conspiracy of Japan and America.22 4
Japanese Perception
It almost seemed strange that Japan would expect war with China after its peace
constitution had denied Japan of a military force and renounced war as a legitimate means of
settling international disputes. But in reality, except for the first few years of the occupation,
the conservative government always claimed that Japan was entitled to the right to use force
for self-defense purpose.225
223 Akihiko Tanaka, Anzen Hosho: Sengo Gojunen no Mosaku (National Security: A Search in the Postwar 50 Years)
(Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun Sha, 1997), pp. 215-216.
224 "People's Daily Editorial on the Living Ambition of the Japanese Militarism, February 19, 1965," in Tian,
Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji, Vol. 1, pp. 780-782.
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official statement on Japan's defense policy. The main thrust of the statement was that the constitution did not
deny the right of self-defense nor the right to use force for self-defense purposes; while the peace constitution
was to be left unchanged, Japanese SDF was constitutional because it was for defending Japan from external
invasion rather than to settle international disputes. See Dower, Empire and Aftermath, p. 381; Tanaka, Anzen
Hosho, p. 146.
In terms of the source of security threat to Japan, the conservative rightwing pointed
to the global ambition of the ironclad international communism. Chinese policy of "leaning
toward one side" and the anti-Japan focus of the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty became the main
evidence for their worry, which reached its height during the Korean War. Ashida Hitoshi,
president of the Democratic Party and a leading conservative opponent of Yoshida, wrote in
his diary in February 1951 that "Communist China was completely under Soviet control...
Japan would be in great danger if it does not join those increasingly strong liberal countries
to strike hard at Communist China." 226 His diary written betweenl951 and 1952 revealed
grave concerns about Chinese force concentration in Manchuria and Korea, as well as the
Soviet troop deployment in Far East, all believed to be aiming at Japan.2 7 In September
1951, he prepared a report on Soviet military action towards Japan in which he stated that
"in light of the current situation, initiating a world war by the Soviet Union and China was
inseparable from their policy towards Japan."' '
Such a view that China was merely a Soviet satellite state and Chinese intervention in
Korea was part of Soviet global strategy of encircling the West or striking it from its weakest
point was common in elite opinions during the Korean War.229 But even then many people
were skeptical that China would infinitely lean to the Soviet side.230 More importantly, the
conservative mainstream represented by the Yoshida faction disagreed that China by its own
military power or the alliance with the Soviet Union was a serious threat to Japan's national
security. Yoshida in particular held strong contempt for Chinese military power based on his
prewar experience in China. After the establishment of the PRC, Yoshida commented that
Chinese military was merely "primitive coolie army" with no cross-ocean capabilities that
would threaten Japan. His evaluation of Chinese military was not even swayed by its
226 Quoted from Ashida Hitoshi Nikki (Diary ofAshida Hitoshi), February 19, 1952 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten,
1986), Vol. 4, p. 103.
227 Explanation of Ashida Hitoshi Nikki, Vol. 4, pp. 8-9.228 Ashida Hitoshi, "Sochugun no Tainichi Sakusen Handan (udgment on Soviet-Chinese Military Operation
towards Japan), September 5, 1951" in Ashida Hitoshi Nikki (Diary ofAshida Hitoshi), Vol. 7, p. 420.
229 See Eiichi K6go et al. "Soren wa Tsuigi ni D6 Deru ka? (Whither the Soviet Union)," Chfio Karon
(December 1950); Hitoshi Wada, "Chuigoku no Nashonarizumu (On Chinese Nationalism)," Chfio K6ron
(January 1951); Masayoshi Kagami, "Soren no Sekai Seisaku: Tai-Eiseikoku Seisaku (The World Policy of the
Soviet Union: Toward Satellite States), Chido K6ron (April 1951)."
230 For example, Wada believed that Chinese reliance on the Soviet Union had its limit because of both
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performance during the Korean War.23' He also objected the American thesis of monolithic
communism. In his memoirs published in 1957, he argued that the proud Chinese culture
would not tolerate long-term submission to an outside power and predicted the eventual
breakup of the Sino-Soviet alliance. 232 The Sino-Soviet alliance treaty did not seem a real
danger to Yoshida and his entourage. When negotiating with the U.S. regarding peace treaty
with China, the representative of the Yoshida government, Okada Akira told Dulles that the
treaty was of a similar nature as the one signed by the Nationalist government and Soviet
Union in 1945, "both being the natural result of the interaction between two neighboring
powers." 233
Another event that aroused Japanese anxiety about Chinese military capabilities was
China's first nuclear test in 1964. Believing that "Chinese acquirement of nuclear arms is the
most important trigger of great changes to the overall strategic system in the Far East," some
Japanese defense experts called for serious reassessment of Japan's air defense capabilities
and an end to the previously optimistic and care-free attitude towards national defense.2 34 A
small minority of them even cried for either independent nuclear arms or introduction of
American nuclear weapons into Japanese territory in case Japan became the target of Soviet
and Chinese nuclear attacks. 235 But the elite majority responded to the nuclear test with
calm, which was best reflected in the following excerpt from a statement by the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) Research Council on National Security (Anzen Hosho Chosakaz) on
November 18, 1964:
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"The success of Chinese nuclear test does not mean that Chinese military nuclear power would
immediately pose a threat (to Japan). Moreover, even if China develops further certain types of
nuclear arms, it would still be a little plus on top of the Soviet nuclear power that has threatened Japan
from the past, so it is not necessary to be disconcerted and feel particularly shaken now. Rather, the
question is whether Japan's previous attitude and countermeasures vis-i-vis Soviet nuclear power
would suffice to be a perfect solution. If our attitude and countermeasures vis-a-vis Soviet nuclear
power are a perfect solution to the newly built Chinese nuclear power, it would be good if we could
discuss the attitude and countermeasures regarding the further development (of Chinese nuclear
power) ."236
According to the observations of a leading Japanese defense scholar, Wakaizumi Kei, the
kinds of security countermeasures that the government envisioned mainly focused on
strengthening national defense system and maintaining the security alliance with the U.S.
rather than adopting any radical changes of national security policy.237
A more widely agreed form of China threat was not Chinese military power but its
communist infiltration into Japan. Conservative politicians from various factions believed an
"international Communist conspiracy," that is, the domestic radical Left was not an isolated
organization but received support from communist countries to incite anti-government riots.
The fact that the JCP abandoned its previous strategy of "peaceful line" after being criticized
by the Cominform and the CCP in early 1950 seemed to confirm their suspicion.238 The
Public Security Investigation Agency (PSIA) of the Ministry of Justice closely watching the
JCP's influence even estimated Japan had up to one million Communist sympathizers by
1956, with the JCP members in the center, and a host of "front organizations" and
"sympathetic organizations influenced by the JCP," such as the Japan Teachers Union OTU),
forming the outer circles.239 Yoshida called these Japanese communists "a destructive force"
in his memoir, a view that hard-liner LDP members like Ashida also shared.240
Another point of broad consensus not only among the conservatives but across the
entire political spectrum in Japan, was the fear of conflict entanglement that may cause
another war with China. The political Left argued that because Japan was committed to
236 Quoted from Kei Wakaizumi, "Chigoku no Kakubus6 to Nihon no Anzen Hosho (Chinese Nuclear Arms
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238 Dower, Embracing Defeat, pp. 272-273; Benfell, Rich Nation, No Army, pp. 77-79.
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240 Benfell, Rich Nation, No Army, pp. 68-69.
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collective security with the United States to defend Japan and a vaguely defined "Far East"
area, Japan would be easily dragged into American military conflict with the U.S.S.R. and
China even if it did not want to. Conservative elites were also nervous about Japanese
entanglement in international military conflict, not because of the alliance with the U.S.,
which they believed would defend Japan, but due to their understanding that the Communist
expansion and the consequent East-West confrontation had created a number of serious
flash points in East Asia. These flash points included crises in Korean peninsular and
Taiwan Strait, which particularly boded ill for peace between China and Japan. During the
Korean War, Yoshida refused to rearm Japan rapidly in part because he worried that the U.S.
would want Japan to join the fight against Chinese army in Korea, which would replay the
historical nightmare in the last war that numerous Japanese troops were bogged down in
China.24 1 In 1955 Prime Minister Hatoyama even told the Diet that, with the Chinese
Communists crying to liberate Taiwan and the Nationalists vowing to return to the
mainland, there was a high risk of war across the Taiwan Strait which would very likely
escalate into World War Three.242 The "Three Arrow Research" project of the 1960s was an
example of Japanese defense planning in response to the possibility of Sino-Japanese military
conflict inadvertently triggered by tensions elsewhere in the region.
Reviving Japanese Militarism: Indulgence in the Past or Anxiety about the Present?
The above analysis shows that elite expectation of violent conflict between the two
states was mainly the product of the power struggle and tension between the two Cold War
strategic blocs. But did war memory also have significant influence on Chinese and Japanese
strategic thinking? It is true that Chinese rhetoric often warned of Japanese militarist revival,
and based its claim on a crude historical analogy that the anti-China policy of the Japanese
government was a replication of its aggressive policy during the past war. In line with this
general analogy were some more specific arguments that Japan supported Chiang because of
its intention to restore Japanese historical colonization of Taiwan, same explanation applying
to Japan's policy to South Korea.
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However, in terms of the cause of militarist revival, China usually blamed the
American government for intentionally propping up Japanese militarism in order to wage
Cold War rather than Japanese historiography that evaded war responsibility and rejected
repentance. As mentioned above, ther was a pattern that Chinese propaganda would step up
attack on Japanese militarist revival when the current Japanese government closely followed
the footstep of American containment policy. In the meantime, dissatisfaction about
Japanese historical attitude was nearly absent in either Chinese media or the public or private
statements of Chinese government officials.
Take the Chinese media campaign against Sato from the late 1960s to early 1972, the
longest and most fierce one on the subject of reviving Japanese militarism, for an example.
Using the method of content analysis, political scientist Okabe Tatsumi carefully studied the
way in which Japan threat was discussed in Chinese media during this campaign. Okabe
concluded that Chinese criticism of Japanese aggressive nature tended to be made in general
and abstract terms rather than with specific reference to Japanese capabilities or military
plans. Oftentimes, the use of such phrase categories as "overseas deployment of troops,"
"arms buildup," and "anti-China" were used to criticize the negative consequences of U.S.-
Japan security relations rather than Japan threat itself. So what the Chinese media really
suggested was that the revival of militarism equaled Japanese political subordination to the
U.S. 243 This revealed that China's biggest grievances about Sato stemmed not so much from
historical memory but his intention to integrate Japanese power and resources into American
military containment system in Asia.
One rare occasion in which the Chinese did raise concern about Japanese
historiography was during the semi-official negotiation over Sino-Japanese Memorandum
Trade negotiation in spring 1970. Taking place shortly after the declaration of Nixon-Sato
Joint Communique, this round of trade talk was fraught with Chinese delegation's
bombardment of Japanese militarist revival, with the Japanese delegation busy defending the
policy of its government. To rebut the Japanese delegation's denial, the chief Chinese
negotiator Liu Xiwen made a particularly harsh speech on April 2 that listed four major signs
of Japanese militarist revival: 1) Japanese support to Taiwan, troop dispatch to South Korea,
aid to South Vietnam, economic expansion to Southeast Asia, 2) military buildup in the
name of "independent defense" posture, 3) military budget increase, and 4) the public
showing of the movie Yamamoto Isoroku in Japan that was criticized for glorifying Japan's
national history and openly calling Manchuria "Japan's life line."244 But in the next seventeen
days of the negotiation, the Chinese side failed to pursue the last point but only concentrated
on the first three plus the issue of military base in Okinawa. In the joint statement that they
finally reached on April 19, the Chinese side scathingly condemned the Nixon-Sato
Communique and the "new aggressive activities of American and Japanese reactionaries" in
Taiwan, Korea and Vietnam. The statement was concluded by Japanese side's promise to
oppose Sato administration's hostile policy to China and a joint appeal for bilateral
friendship and regional peace.245 Nowhere in the joint statement was the Japanese
historiography criticized or changes of its interpretation demanded. Hence, the earlier
reference to the historiography issued by the Chinese negotiator was only meant for tactical
purpose, not to address Japan's historical myths in a genuine way.
As far as the Japanese reaction to Chinese bashing campaigns is concerned, except
for some left-wing elite, the conservative mainstream completely disagreed that the peril of
Japanese militarism was on the rise. Sticking to their own historical myths of victim
consciousness and pacifism, some conservative politicians even felt the Chinese were
wrongly obsessed with their traumatic past and held malevolent intent with no legitimate
reasons. In the aftermath of the 1970 Memorandum Trade negotiation, the LDP issued a
party statement that blamed the Chinese government for "making one-sided criticism and
assail without opening their eyes to the background and facts of postwar Sino-Japanese
relations," and claimed that "Chinese criticism full of hostility to the Japanese nation was not
only a pure slander but also led to such a suspicion that it was intended to compromise
Japan's friendly relationship with other Asian countries." While admitting that the
unfortunate past of the bilateral relations was indeed unforgettable, this statement contended
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that "Japanese people also paid painful sacrifice for the defeat and are now working towards
the goal of ensuring world peace and building a peace state of Japan."246
But this harsh statement did not reflect the opinions of all LDP politicians but only
the party hawks. The majority of conservative elite did not attribute Chinese bashing of
reviving Japanese militarism to its indulgence with past trauma and excessive anti-Japanese
theme of its historical memories. Instead, they either sympathized with Chinese argument or
thought it was understandable despite their overall disagreement. While the LDP party
meeting was passing this statement, the chief Japanese negotiator of the trade talk, Furui
Yoshimi, walked out the meeting in protest. Furui was one of those dovish LDP politicians
who believed that certain Japanese policies were indeed easy to trigger Chinese
misunderstanding and special efforts should be made to reassure China.247
Not only the party doves but also some hard-liners openly stressed the necessity to
mitigate Chinese suspicion. For example, in his Diet speech in response to LDP politician
Nishimura Naomi's harsh censure of Chinese attitude, Prime Minister Sato who was the
number one target of Chinese media offensive said that Chinese isolation from the rest of
world accounted for its strikingly poor understanding about the real situation in present
Japan; so regardless of Chinese intentional distortion or fundamental misunderstanding,
Japan should adhere to its peace constitution while keeping up the efforts to explain
Japanese policies to China.248 Another important LDP politician who remained calm was
Nakasone Yasuhiro, who served as the director of JDA at the time. Even after being named
by the Chinese media for advancing militarist policy because he advocated independent
Japanese defense and published the first Japanese defense white paper, Nakasone testified at
the Diet that he did not blame the Chinese for being unreasonable or hostile but only
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lamented that his real intention was misunderstood and expressed the hope to do as much as
he could to resolve the misunderstanding.24 9
Other conservative politicians looked for more convincing explanations for the
timing and intensity of Chinese media campaign in China's domestic political conditions and
international environment. The leader of the still influential Yoshida faction, Ohira
Masayoshi, argued at a round-table discussion held by Asahi Shimbun on April 24 that the
Chinese government set a sharp tone in the joint statement of the Memorandum Trade
because it was waging another blatant war of words against the Soviets and felt obligated to
uphold stringent political principle when dealing with other countries like Japan. He also
defused the criticism of some LDP hawks that China was particularly hostile to Japan by
pointing out that China's volatile domestic situation at the time had exacerbated its
relationships with many foreign countries, not just Japan. Furthermore, Ohira suggested
that the primary hurdle for smooth Sino-Japanese relationship was nothing but the Taiwan
issue, without a decisive change of Japanese policy on which Japan could only expect greater
Chinese hostility.25 0 The somber-minded Ohira later played a critical role in fostering Sino-
Japanese diplomatic normalization while serving as the foreign minister of the Tanaka
administration.
Therefore, even though the mainstream Japanese elite found Chinese bashing
campaign something hard to accept, they nevertheless rejected the view that Chinese
hostility and belligerence was only reserved for Japan due to biases in Chinese historical
memory.
II. Absence of National Recognition
The San Francisco peace treaty that ended the state of war between Japan and
belligerent countries left out China, the country that fought Japanese aggression the longest
time and suffered the most. Not only so, Japan signed Japan-ROC peace treaty in April
1952, which recognized the Nationalist regime in Taiwan as the sole legal representative of
249 Kokkai Kaigiroku, Cabinet Committee of the House of Representative, 63rd Diet Session, October 28, 1970.
250 Furukawa, Nitchti Sengo Kankei-Shi, pp. 301-302.
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the Chinese nation. For as long as two decades since then, Japan not only refused to
develop formal relationship with the Communist regime but also actively opposed its U.N.
representation. In 1961 when it became possible for the U.N. to reconsider PRC's
membership, the Ikeda administration joined the U.S. and other three countries to submit
the "important question" proposal that required 2/3 of votes from all member countries for
approving PRC's U.N. seat. This proposal was endorsed and effectively barred China from
the U.N. for another 10 years. Furthermore, in 1971 when the majority of U.N. members
supported the PRC's entry, Tokyo again proposed with Washington the double
representation of both the Communist and Nationalist governments. This time the U.N.
general assembly tossed out the Japanese proposal and recognized the PRC as the only legal
government of China.251
So by the time the PRC entered the U.N. in September 1971, Japan had yet to give
its formal recognition. The stubbornness of Japanese government in maintaining the policy
of non-recognition was driven home by Prime Minister Ikeda's words in 1964. When
questioned at the Diet why Japan still refused to recognize PRC while even some Western
powers like Great Britain and France had already recognized it, he answered that "there is
the view that if Japan becomes the last nation to recognize China, it is not good from the
standpoint of future diplomatic relationship. However, if there are good reasons, then it is
all right to be the last nation."252 Japan was not the last nation to recognize China, but it
certainly lagged behind many other countries.
The absence of mutual recognition was an important indicator of Sino-Japanese non-
reconciliation relationship because it suggested the continuation of the state of war between
them and their refusal to acknowledge each other's right of national survival. Mistrust or
hatred generated by divergence of their historical interpretation was not a good explanation
for Sino-Japanese diplomatic isolation. It is because Beijing implemented an active "People's
Diplomacy" to pave the way for eventual diplomatic normalization with Japan, in the
process of which it replicated the mainstream Japanese myth of military clique while
251 Akihiko Tanaka, Nitchukankei 1945-1990 (Sino-Japanese Relations: 1945-1990) (Tokyo: The University of Tokyo
Press, 1991), pp. 54-55, pp. 71-72.
252 Kokkai Kaigiroku, Budgetary Committee of the House of Representative of the 36th Diet Session, January 31,
1964.
restraining public discourse and government actions that would have rendered a much more
serious inquiry into the question of Japanese war responsibility. Despite Beijng's almost
unilateral actions to write off Japan's historical debts, the "People's Diplomacy" still failed to
bring about Japanese recognition, due to the systemic constraints of the Cold War mainly
manifested in the Taiwan Hurdle.
Writing off Historical Debts
As discussed earlier, China and Japan neither shared a common interpretation of
their past war nor reached a thorough settlement of historical burdens. But this should not
constitute a major obstacle to bilateral recognition. At least Japan's failure in satisfying
Chiang's demands for historical settlement did not stop it from establishing formal
relationship with Taiwan. Pro-Taiwan LDP parliamentarians typically argued that Japan
should maintain closer political and economic ties with Taiwan because of both their
common interest in countering communist threat and Chiang's act of "repaying violence
with virtue" after the war, to which all Japanese should feel indebted.25 3 But a comparison of
how war-related issues, including justice and truth-telling, reparation, and repatriation, were
handled by the Nationalist and Communist governments during this period indicates that the
Taiwan Lobby was dishonest in proclaiming that Chiang was more magnanimous than Mao.
During this period, the Communist government never showed any more interest than the
Nationalist government in rectifying Japanese historiography, nor did it make diplomatic
normalization with Japan conditional on any measures of historical settlement. On the
contrary, Beijing adopted an exceptionally generous policy on the history issue designed to
convince the Japanese people of its good will.
253 A telling example on this kind of opinion is made by Kaya Okinori, a diehard figure of the pro-Taiwan
faction, who published an essay in August 1972 titled "Remonstrance against the recklessness of abandoning
Taiwan," in which he elaborated on Japan's "four-fold deep indebtedness" to Taiwan: (1) Chiang swiftly and
safely repatriated the 2.2 million Japanese soldiers and residents stranded in China after the war despite the
sheer chaos in transportation systems and other domestic infrastructure; (2) Chiang frustrated USSR-led
machinations to abolish the Emperor system by insisting that whether to retain it was up to the decision of the
Japanese people; (3) it was also Chiang who saved Japan from being divided and occupied by multiple powers
after the war; (4) although most entitled, Chiang's China renounced claims for war reparation and protected
Japanese economic reconstruction and development from being crippled. See Wakamiya, The Postwar
Conservative View ofAsia, pp. 126-128.
Justice and Truth-telling
Recent studies of Japan-ROC diplomacy suggested that immediately after the war
Chiang was by no means ready to let Japan off the hook of repaying historical debts.254
Chiang was determined to punish both Japanese war criminals and Chinese traitors, in big
part because doing so would contribute to rebuilding national morale and enhancing his
regime legitimacy. After the war, the Nationalist government held its own war crimes trials,
sentencing 149 Japanese to death (29.7 percent of total accused convicted) and 83 to life in
prison.255 The government also conducted nationwide damage surveys as well as serious
investigation into Japanese atrocities, based on which a large body of evidence was compiled
and presented to war crimes trials held in Nanjing and Tokyo. Besides, in two years after the
war as many as 30,828 Chinese traitors were prosecuted.25 6 These traitor trials altogether
convicted 15,391 people and meted out severe punishment including death penalty.257
Compared to Chiang, Mao was by far more lenient to Japanese war criminals. Soon
after the Japanese surrender, the CCP government pressed for severe punishment of
Japanese war criminals ranging from the military to Emperor Hirohito, the Zaibatsu, pro-war
politicians and bureaucrats, and any perpetrators of war crimes.258 It was highly critical of
the excessively generous verdict of the Tokyo Trial and announced that it reserved the right
to try some noted Japanese war criminals that had been absolved and returned to Japan by
the Nationalist government. 259 But the Communist attitude began to soften since the mid-
1950s. In October 1954, Zhou Enlai told visiting Japanese Diet delegation that China had
254 Chiang did decline to occupy Japan mainly because he was afraid that once China participated the
occupation the Soviet Union would be let in as well, which would make it difficult to stop Soviet influence
from coming into China and strengthening the CCP. See Wakamiya, The Postwar Conservative View ofAsia, p.
130.
255 Philip R. Piccigallo, The Japanese on Triak Allied war crimes operations in the East, 1945-1951 (Austin: University
of Texas Press, 1979), p. 173.
256 Among those openly tried included such famous figures as Chen Gongbo, Acting President of the Nanjing
puppet government, Zhou Fohai, Minister of Finance and Deputy Director of the Executive Yuan of the
Nanjing government, and Zhou Zuoren, a famed writer who agreed to manage cultural and education affairs
under Japanese occupation in Beijing.
257 See Jie Liu, Kankan Saiban (Traitor Trials) (Tokyo: Chaio K6ron Sha, 2000), Chapter 5-7.
258 "Jiefang Ribao Editorial on Severely Punishing War Criminals, September 14, 1945," in Tian, Zhanhou
Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji, Vol. 1, pp. 20-22.
259 Tian, Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji, Vol. 1, pp. 57-59, p. 77. In fact, punishing war criminals was
included as one of the eight preconditions that Mao raised in January 1949 for opening peace negotiation with
the KMT. See Zhou Enka Nianpu 1898-1949 (The Chronicle of Zhou Enlai) (Beijing: Central Documents
Publishing Companies, 1998), p. 827.
been exercising leniency on Japanese war criminals and wished to settle this issue soon.260 By
this time, about 1,000 Japanese war criminals were detained in China, most of them in
Fushun War Criminal Prison in south Manchuria, where they were receiving vigorous
Chinese reeducation.261 When the reeducation program approached its end in late 1955, the
legal authorities prepared a prosecution list of 107 war criminals, 70 of whom were to be
sentenced to death. But they were soon told by Zhou Enlai that the CCP Central
Committee had decided on two principles of dealing with war criminals: no single war
criminal should be executed or sentenced to life in jail, and verdicts of imprison should be
limited to a very small number of people.262 Furthermore, the First Plenary of Chinese
People's Congress passed a resolution before the trial, ordering lenient treatment Japanese
war criminals, in reference to "the changes in the 10 years after Japanese surrender and
current situation, the current development of Sino-Japanese friendly relationship, and
various degree of contrition by the majority of these war criminals during their detention
period." 263 Such policy adjustment was clearly consistent with the new Chinese strategy of
"peaceful coexistence" proposed at the Bandung Conference in 1955 to broaden the
international united front and the "People's Diplomacy" to Japan that was directly linked to
the strategy.
Consequently, the war criminal trial held in June-July 1956 only sentenced 45 to
prison, while over a thousand Japanese war criminals were pardoned and quickly repatriated.
Among those 45 sentenced war criminals, except one person who died during the prison
term, all the others were released by March 1964.264 Japanese war criminals pardoned or
released early commonly expressed their deep appreciation for the Chinese leniency and
many of them became pro-China activists after they returned to Japan.265 On this score,
Chinese policy of good will paid off handsomely.
260 "Zhou Enlai's Remarks in the Meeting with Japanese Diet Delegation and the Delegation of Academic
Survey, October 11, 1954," in Sengo Shiry6: NitchiKankei, p. 32.
261 Yuan Jin, Qiyuan: Yige Zhanfan Guanli Suozhan de Huiyi (Unusual Destiny: Reminiscences ofA Director of War
CriminalPrison) (Beijing: PLA Press, 1999).262 Jin, Qiyuan, Chapter 25.
263 Tian, Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi WIenxianji, Vol. 1, pp. 272-273.264 Jin Yuan, Qiyuan, Chapter 25-27; Tian Huan ed., Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi WenxianJi 1945-1970, pp. 716-718.
265 The most active ones of them organized the Liaison Organization of the Repatriated from China (Chtigoku
Kikansha Renrakukai, or Chbikiren for short) in 1957, which for decades has been actively exposing the Japanese
atrocities in China, supporting compensation claims of Chinese war victims, and advocating Sino-Japanese
rapprochement and opposing US-Japan alliance.
Besides the general policy of pardoning Japanese war criminal, Chinese government
never showed interest in criticizing the cover-up of war atrocities in Japanese textbooks
during this period. Moreover, it deliberately discouraged domestic truth-telling on Japanese
atrocities. According to historian Daqing Yang, scholars in the History Department of
Nanjing University conducted the first Chinese comprehensive study of Nanjing Massacre in
the early 1960s. But its publication would have been out of tune with the "People's
Diplomacy" intending to befriend as many as Japanese people as possible while downplaying
the issue of Japanese war responsibility. So for many years this study remained unpublished
but was only printed for internal circulation in 1979. Another example of suppression of
open discussion of Japanese war atrocities was when the Chinese justice at the Tokyo Trial,
Mei Ruao, called on historical research of the Nanjing Massacre in the 1960s, he was accused
of "stirring up national hatred and revenge" against the Japanese people, and his writing
about Chinese defeat and misery in Nanjing was criticized for accentuating the strength of
the enemy and, therefore, being unpatriotic.2 66
Reparation
Chiang also made a more serious attempt than the Communist government to make
Japan pay war reparations.267 As early as 1943, Chiang ordered war damage survey and the
preparation of Chinese proposals on postwar policy towards Japan, including demands for
Japanese compensation. Having consulted with great powers at Cairo, he began
implementing the policy by confiscating Japanese public and private properties in areas
under its control. Following Japanese surrender, the Nationalist government actively
provided information to the Pauley reparation mission that conducted several months of
investigation in China, which contributed to the harsh demand for Japanese reparation in the
Pauley mission report of December 1945. True that at the time Chiang advocated Kuanda
Zhengce, or a policy of generosity towards Japan, but by "generosity" he actually referred to
the handling of Japanese monarchy system and repatriation of Japanese nationals rather than
war reparation. Chiang was afraid that a soft position on this issue might spark public
266 Yang, "Convergence or Divergence?" p. 858.
267 A recent systematic study of the Nationalist government's reparation policy towards Japan from wartime to
the signing ofJapan-ROC treaty can be found in Yin, Chunichi Senso Baisho Mondai.
resentment at home, which would exacerbate his public support crisis and weaken his power
in the struggle against the communists.
But since 1947 the U.S. shifted the focus of its Japan policy to restoration and
rearmament, which required a dramatic cutdown of reparation burden on Japan. His power
deteriorating rapidly during the Chinese Civil War while dependence on the U.S. aid
growing, Chiang was put in an increasingly weak position to resist the U.S. pressure.
Nevertheless, he maintained reparation demands to Japan even after his government was
driven to Taiwan. He was only forced to drop the demands after the U.S. announced the
seven principles for Japanese peace treaty in November 1950. He did so in order to win the
invitation to attend the peace conference, but he attached a condition that if any other
country got reparation, the Nationalist government should get equal benefits.2 68 Later when
negotiating the terms of the Japan-ROC treaty, Taiwan again demanded Japanese
compensation of Chinese loss through labor service. Japanese negotiators rejected the
demand and threatened that Japan would refuse to apply the peace treaty to the area beyond
Taiwan if Chiang insisted on getting reparation. Afraid that Japan would refuse to recognize
the ROC as the sole legitimate government of China, Chiang finally gave up reparation
claims.
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The history of the Nationalist reparation policy indicated that Chiang did not act in a
spirit of forgiveness that was later extolled by the Taiwan Lobby. He would not have
renounced reparation claims had it not been for his weak bargaining position in the peace
treaty negotiation. In contrast, the Communist government lacked interest in obtaining
Japanese war reparation almost from the very beginning of postwar era. After the Japan-
ROC treaty was signed, Beijing declared that the treaty was illegitimate and it reserved the
right to demand Japanese war reparation. But what really concerned Beijing was Japanese
268 Yin, Chtbnichi 'Senso Baisho Mondai, p. 215, pp. 227-228.
269 Taiwan negotiator still made a last-ditch effort to request that the treaty text should mention that Japan has
the responsibility to pay reparation for having inflicted tremendous pain and loss on the Chinese people, and
then the ROC side would renounce reparation claims citing the miserable situation in Japan and the principle
of generosity. If accepted by the Japanese side, this proposal would have led to implicit admission of Japanese
war responsibility and saved the Nationalist government some face. But Taiwan negotiators were not even able
to get these words written into the final text. See Akira Ishii, "Nikka Heiwa Joyaku Teiketsu Kosho o Meguru
Jakkan no Mondai (Several Problems Concerning the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty Negotiation)," Ky6y6gakka
i(TMhe Journal of the Department of Liberal Arts, the University of Tokyo) 21 (1988), pp. 85-90.
recognition of Taiwan, to protest which it refused to accept any agreements reached between
Japan and Taiwan, including that on reparation. Since then Beijing never raised this issue as
a precondition or bargaining chip during interactions with Japan. Not only so, from the late
1950s it gradually moved to the position of giving up reparation. In 1957, a member of a
visiting JSP delegation, Katsumada Seiichi, asked Zhou Enlai if Chinese government could
adopt a lenient policy on reparation similar to its handling of war criminals when bilateral
diplomatic normalization was realized some day. Zhou was unable to give a clear reply
immediately, but this incident triggered an internal debate among the top leaders in early
1960s, which led to a decision that China would give up reparation to show friendship to
Japanese people.27 0 This internal decision was later announced as China's official policy on
reparation in early 1970s when the normalization negotiation was launched.
Repatriation
On the question of repatriating Japanese nationals, the Chinese Communists were no
less active and cooperative than the Nationalists. By the time that the PRC was founded,
approximately 35,000 Japanese soldiers and civilians were still stranded in mainland China.
For three years no progress was made towards a solution, due to the lack of formal
diplomatic relations. The turning point came in late 1952. In May, one of the three
Japanese Diet members who came to China and signed the first Sino-Japanese non-
government trade agreement, K6ra Tomi brought the issue to the attention of their Chinese
host.271 In response, Chinese official media said in December that Chinese people clearly
understood that Japanese militarists were our enemies but Japanese people were our friends,
and that Chinese government was willing to help those remaining Japanese who wished to
270 Incidentally this decision was leaked in 1965 to the passionate pro-China politician, Utsunomiya Tokuma,
who then told Japanese journalists about the news, very likely because he wanted to boost the image of a
friendly China in Japan. After Yomiuri published this news, Zhou Enlai's right-hand man on Japan policy, Liao
Chenzhi, issued a correction statement that China did not say if it would give up or request reparation, though
he also expressed Chinese reluctance to use Japanese reparation for socialist construction. The
decisionmaking process of Chinese reparation policy from late 1950s to the 1970s is recollected by Zhang
Xiagnshan, an important member of Zhou En-lai's inner group on Japan policy, in his anthology published in
1998. See Xiangshan Zhang, Zhongri Guanxi: GuankuiyuJianýheng (Sino-Japanese Relations: My Humble Opinions and
Testimony) (Beijing: Dandai Shijie Press, 1998), pp. 66-70.
271 Furukawa, Nitchtf Sengo Kankei-Shi, p. 58.
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return to Japan.2 72 In the following two years, the Chinese Red Cross and three non-
governmental Japanese organizations signed agreements on concrete procedures of both
group and individual repatriation, according to which about 29,000 remaining Japanese were
repatriated by March 1955.273
Beijing's repatriation policy was a unilateral, unusually friendly move, considering
that at the same time Tokyo was dragging its feet in allowing Chinese residents in Japan to
return home at their free will. As many as 32,000 of Chinese POWs and forced laborers
who had been taken to Japan survived the war. Only till mid-1953 did Japan allow 551
people and the ashes of 560 dead to be sent back to China with the assistance of non-
governmental organizations. To make things worse, the Japanese government sent some
Chinese residents to Taiwan and imposed strict rules prohibiting all Chinese residents in
Japan to visit the PRC. So the Chinese government actually repatriated Japanese nationals
without getting reciprocal actions from the Japanese side. But in light of the deep anxiety
that Japanese people felt in getting their family members come home after the war, China's
policy appealed to many corners of the Japanese society and facilitated the its "People's
Diplomacy." According to Xiao Xiangqian, member of the Zhou Enlai's inner group on
Japan policy, Liaoban (the Office of Liao Chengzhi), the settlement of the repatriation issue
marked a great breakthrough in Beijing's efforts to cultivate friendly non-governmental
relations with Japan.274
Structural Factor: The Taiwan Hurdle
Japan: U.S. Pressure and Taiwan Lobby
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The Cold War structure rendered the international status of Taiwan the focal point
in Sino-U.S. strategic conflict. Taiwan issue was so crucial to Chinese national security that
whether a foreign country recognized Beijing or Taiwan was one of the most important
yardsticks for China to judge that country's intention. Japan's official recognition of Taiwan
thus convinced China of Japanese collusion with the U.S. to contain China and became in
the eyes of Chinese leaders the chief obstacle to normalizing Sino-Japanese relationship. But
Japan's policy embodied the structural constraints on the trajectory of Japanese foreign
policy rather than its own diplomatic preference. Although most Japanese leaders in this
period wished in various degrees to reopen official relations with the PRC, they had to
restrain the desire so as not to jeopardize Japan's fundamental relations with the U.S.
First of all, it was under the U.S. pressure that the Yoshida government decided
rather reluctantly to recognize the Taiwan regime, not Beijing.275 As for his personal
opinion, Yoshida believed that political and economic interaction with China would be
useful to bring about changes in Chinese domestic and foreign policy, while the policy of
non-recongition would only drive China to the Soviet side. As he pointed out in a letter to
Dulles in February 1951, the first priority in containing communist expansion in Asia was to
"pluck off China from the hand of the Soviet Union." He went on to suggest that because
of its traditional ties with China, Japan could try to infiltrate the "Bamboo Curtain" and
break down Moscow's control over China. However, being afraid that his disagreement
with the U.S. on China policy might complicate the ongoing US-Japan peace treaty
negotiation, he later decided not to send out this letter. On the eve of the San Francisco
peace conference Yoshida yielded to Dulles and promised that Japan had no intention to
negotiate peace treaty with Beijing.
275 The formation of Yoshida's China policy in the early 1950s has been extensively researched. The brief
account offered in this section is largely drawn from the following works that are mainly based on Japanese and
Western archival records: Chen, Sengo Nihon no Chugoku Seisaku, Chapter 1-2; Akira Ishii, "Taiwan ka Pikin ka
(Taiwan or Beijing)?" in Akio Watanabe ed., Sengo Nihon no Taigai Seisaku (Postwar Japan's Foreign Policies) (Tokyo:
Youhikaku, 1985); idem., "Nikka Heiwa Joyaku Teiketsu Kosho o Meguru Jakkan no Mondai;" Dower, Empire
andAftermath, pp. 400-414; Warren I. Cohen, "China in Japanese-American Relations," in Akira Iriye and
Warren I. Cohen eds., The United States and Japan in the Postwar World (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of
Kentucky, 1989).
Although Yoshida never intended to recognize Beijing as the only legitimate Chinese
government, he did hope to maintain ties with both the Communist and Nationalist regimes,
that is, a two-Chinas policy. Now that the U.S. would not tolerate any form of official
relationship between Japan and the PRC, Yoshida envisioned that Japan could establish an
unofficial relationship with Taiwan focusing on economic affairs or an official relationship
with a government that only represented Taiwan. Both options would leave Japan with
political leeway for future interaction with China. So after the signing of the San Francisco
Treaty, Yoshida deliberately procrastinated on developing substantial political contacts with
Taiwan, and even suggested to the Diet a plan to set up official office in Shanghai.
Yoshida's attitude made the U.S. suspicious of Yoshida's loyalty to the anti-
Communist camp. Dulles admonished Tokyo to conclude Japanese-ROC peace negotiation
as soon as possible, or the American congress might refuse to ratify the San Francisco
Treaty, which seemed a highly credible threat given the rising fervor of China Lobby and
McCarthysim in the U.S. Undoubtedly, having the occupation dragging on was Yoshida's
worst fear, to avoid which he chose to comply with the U.S. demand. Such was the
background of the famous "Yoshida Letter" sent to Dulles in December 1951 in which
Yoshida gave his formal words that Japan would sign a peace treaty with the ROC
"applicable to all territories which are now, or which may hereafter be, under the control of'
the Nationalist government. The Japan-ROC peace treaty was eventually signed on April 28,
1952, the same day that San Francisco Treaty became effective. These two treaties set the
status quo of Japanese policy to China for the next two decades.
The status quo was so tenacious that the efforts of a number of succeeding Japanese
leaders failed to break it down. Hatoyama and Ishibashi stood out among postwar Japanese
conservative leaders by their expressed desire to improve diplomatic relationship with China.
Leader of the right-wing Democratic Party and long resentful of Yoshida's one-sided
dependence on the U.S., Hatoyama proclaimed as soon as he took power an autonomous
orientation of Japanese foreign policy, including reopening political contacts with Moscow
and Beijing.276 However, he did not really emphasiz the two Communist countries equally.
The Democratic Party platform advocated "restoration of normal diplomatic relationship
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with the Soviet Union" but only development of trade relationship with Communist
China.277 Normal Japanese-Soviet relationship was crucial to Japan's entry to the U.N. and
to resolving a few emergent issues left by the war such as Japanese nationals remaining in the
Soviet Union and the territorial problem of the Northern Islands. 278 Besides, it would not
hurt the U.S.-Japan alliance because Washington itself maintained formal ties with Moscow.
On the contrary, normalizing relationship with China would have meant termination of
Japan's formal ties with Taiwan, which would substantial challenge the U.S. Cold War
strategy in Asia. Hatoyama only intended to expand the margin of Japanese autonomy
within the basic framework of US-Japan alliance.
In the meantime, the US pressure against Sino-Japanese official relationship loomed
large. American concern about Japan's strategic neutrality was particularly aggravated by the
welcome attitude of a wide scope of Japanese social forces to Zhou Enlai's call for
international peaceful coexistence at the Bandung Conference and to China's "People's
Diplomacy" to Japan. It seemed necessary for Washington to step in and cool off
Hatoyama's enthusiasm to China. When Hatoyama hinted that he might establish limited
official contact with China such as exchange consuls, Noel Hemmendinger, Deputy Director
of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs suggested that the U.S. should intervene to raise
strong objection on the basis that "it is hardly probable that Red Chinese consuls would
stick to consular and commercial functions in Japan and it is also difficult to imagine
Japanese consuls on the Chinese mainland functioning without performing acts which would
imply recognition of the Peiping regime." Hemmendinger also advised that Tokyo should
be told to stop promoting informal contacts with China and not to think that Washington
might recognize Beijing.279 Given such strong American objection, it would be hard to
imagine that Hatoyama would fail to understand the structural limitations on any major
modification of Japan's China policy.
276 Furukawa, Nitchui Sengo Kankei-Shi, p. 76.
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Similar to Hatoyama, Ishibashi also sought to augment Japanese diplomatic
autonomy by expanding political contacts with China. A genuine liberal, Ishibashi had been
famous for his cosmopolitan sympathy to Asia from the prewar time. After the war, he
advocated to anchor Japanese international strategy in closer cooperation with Asian
countries rather than unilateral dependence on America.280 Therefore, when Ishibashi
became prime minister at the end of 1956, therefore, people's expectation for Sino-Japanese
diplomatic breakthrough rose high at home and abroad, only to be disappointed a few
months later by the disintegration of the Ishibashi cabinet due to his illness. During the 71
days of his rule, Ishibashi encouraged trade relationship with China and refused to give in to
the U.S. and Taiwan pressure against the escalation of political contacts through the Third
Sino-Japanese Non-governmental Trade Agreement. Nevertheless, even Ishibashi failed to
take major moves to challenge the U.S.-Japan alliance and the status quo of Japanese official
relationship with Taiwan.2 81
The Cold War structure in Asia and the US pressure on Japanese foreign policy
remained prominent throughout the Kishi years. A right-wing nationalist politician who
actively supported the Pacific War, Kishi seemed to have made a turnaround when he
addressed the U.S. senate in 1957 that "the most important problem with regard to our
relationship with the free world was the cooperation with the U.S."282 But in fact Kishi's
political aspiration after the war had changed from an anti-American ideology to a tactic to
capitalize on the indispensable status of Japan in American Cold War strategy for greater
international influence of Japan. So Kishi actively responded to Eisenhower's call for
strategic collaboration by sending anti-communist overtures to South Korea, seeking active
economic cooperation with Southeast Asia, and becoming the first postwar Japanese prime
minister who personally visited Taiwan. On the eve of this visit, Kishi explicitly told Indian
Prime Minister Nehru that Japan could not recognize China because it was designated by the
U.N. resolution as an aggressive state (during the Korean War).283 During the visit, Kishi
repeatedly announced that Japan would adopt neither pro-communist nor neutral strategic
280 Wakamiya, The Postwar Conservative View ofAsia, Part III, Chapter 4.
281 Furukawa, Nitchi Sengo Kankei-Shi, p. 135; Yoshihide Soeya, Japan's Economic Diplomay with China, 1945-1978(Oxford, New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 9.282 Furukawa, Nitchui Sengo Kankei-Shi, p. 140.
283 Furukawa, Nitchi Sengo Kankei-Shi, p. 138.
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stance, and that Japan and Taiwan should establish particularly intimate cooperation. He
even offered his endorsement of Chiang's cause to recover the mainland territory because
"the danger of communist infiltration to Japan from China was greater than from the Soviet
Union."284
Also enthusiastic about expanding Japanese diplomatic horizon, Prime Minister Sato
took the China question as the most important issue facing Japan and envisioned
fundamental readjustment of China policy. On November 10, 1964, one day after taking
power, Sato released a statement implicitly expressing his desire to promote Sino-Japanese
relations:
"...Japan-Korean negotiations and the question of Communist China are fundamental issues of
Japanese diplomacy, and therefore important questions that are being imposed on the Sato cabinet...
Fortunately or unfortunately, Japan had concluded a peace treaty with the Nationalist government.
But, I do not think that the goodwill displayed by Generalissimo Chiang at the end of the war will
constrain the way Japanese people live. I am very grateful to Generalissimo Chiang, but cannot
dispose of this issue by such an emotional argument."285
What dealt a fatal blow to Sato's plan to revamp China policy was undoubtedly the
escalation of the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War and intensified Sino-American
tensions since mid-1960s.28 6 But the structure pressure was further compounded by a new
change in Japanese domestic politics, the rise of Taiwan Lobby. It was Kishi's political
ascendance that brought about the thriving of Taiwan Lobby. In the late 1950s, Kishi and
Ishii Mitsujiro created the Japan-ROC Cooperation Committee made up of pro-Taiwan LDP
parliamentarians. Soon after Sato came into power at the end of 1964 pro-Taiwan
conservative politicians regrouped into the powerful organization of Asian Problem Study
Group (APSG) as a response to Sato's expressed wish to improve relationship with China
with a forward-looking attitude.287 Because APSG drew most of its members, varying
284 Furukawa, Nitchu Sengo Kankei-Shi, p.139. For overall assessment of Kishi's foreign policy, see Soeya, Japan's
Economic Diplomagy with China, 1945-1978, pp. 9-10; Kitaoka, Jimintd, pp. 75-96. For Kish's policy towards
China, see Furukawa, Nitchui Sengo Kankei-Shi, pp. 133-144. For Ampo revision in 1960, see Yoshihisa Hara,
Kishi Nobusuke: Kensei no Seifika (Kishi Nobusuke: A Powerful Politician) (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1995); Welfield, An
Empire in Eclipse, pp. 141-161; Tadashi Aruga, "The Security Treaty Revision of 1960," in Iriye and Cohen eds.,
The United States and Japan in the Postwar World.
285 Quoted from Soeya, Japan's Economic Diplomag with China, 1945-1978, p. 50.
286 Eiz6 Yamada, Seiden: Sato Eisaku (Authentic Biography: Sato Eisaku) (Tokyo, Shinchosha, 1988), p. 56.
287 Fukui Haruhiro summarized APSG's basic stance on China policy as follows: (1) As long as the Communist
China does not give up its "aggressive" attitude, it should not be admitted to the UN; (2) For the sake of
Japan's own national security, we should prevent Taiwan from being put under communist control; (3) Japan
must maintain the "important question" formula of the issue of China's UN representative status; (4) Based on
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between 80 to 100 Diet member in the 1960s, from mainstream factions of the LDP that
had helped Sato won the presidential election, including Sato's own faction, Sato was
extremely susceptible to the influence of the pro-Taiwan policy stance.
Under the double pressure of external and internal conditions, Sato had to shift his
diplomatic focus from China to the reversion of Okinawa and Bonins Islands as a major
symbol of Japanese prestige enhancement. In order to reach this objective, Sato took an
active attitude towards collaboration with the U.S. Cold War policy. Before his 1967 visit to
the US to hammer out the agreement on Okinawa, Sato made a tour of America's major
regional allies, including Taiwan. Sato even consented to Chiang's three opinions that "Two
Chinas" was wrong, the Communist China must not be recognized, and current disorder in
Vietnam provided a good opportunity for striking back and recovering mainland China.288
When Sato visited the U.S. to finalize the agreement on Okinawa in November 1969, he
agreed to the provocative "Korea-Taiwan" clause. Almost ironically, starting with a positive
stance on China policy, Sato ended up drastically digressing from his original course and
became the worst target of Chinese mistrust and hostility in the postwar period.
China: Taiwan Problem as the Fault Line
Tokyo's refusal to break diplomatic relations with Taipei undoubtedly impeded its
diplomatic normalization with Beijing. But it did not stop Beijing from gradually building
non-governmental ties with Japan through "People's Diplomacy" in the hope of eventually
extending these ties to official level. As Zhou Enlai told a well-known Japanese left-wing
activist Oyama Ikuo in September 1953, before the establishment of formal relations
between the two government, China would encourage the peoples of both countries to
develop their friendship through cultural and economic exchange.289 In this spirit, Beijing
the separation of politics and economies, the use of Export-Import Bank capital should be prohibited in Sino-
Japanese trade and Japan must not grant China more beneficial conditions than it gives to Taiwan, South Korea
and other countries of the "free world." See Haruhiro Fukui, Jiyuminshu-to to Seisaku Kettei (Party in Power: The
LDP and Poligy-Making) (Tokyo: Fukumura Shuppan, 1969), p. 316.
288 Yamada, Seiden: Sato Eisaku, pp. 107-108.
289 "Zhou Enlai's Discussion with Oyama Ikuo on Sino-Japanese Relations, September 28, 1953," Tian,
Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji, Vol. 1, pp. 150-151; Nitchui Kankei Kihon Shiy6dshu, pp. 50-52. Also see Sayuri
Shimizu, "Perennial Anxiety: Japan-U.S. Controversy over Recognition of the PRC, 1952-1958," The Journal
of American-East Asian Relations 4, No. 3 (Fall 1995), pp. 227-228.
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tolerated Japan's Cold War choice and tried to work out an indirect path to secure Japanese
recognition of China. But no matter how shrewdly designed, Beijing's "People's
Diplomacy" could not really bypass the Taiwan issue and Chinese tolerance of Japanese
relations with Taiwan had critical limitations. When it believed that Tokyo was developing
significant strategic cooperation with Taiwan, Beijing felt little hesitation to alienate Japan
and forego whatever it had accomplished through the "People's Diplomacy."
The Taiwan issue particularly discouraged Chinese enthusiasm in exploring
diplomatic relationship with Japan in two occasions, both bringing the bilateral interactions
to an exceptionally low point. One occurred after the aforementioned Nixon-Sato joint
communique. Beijing was so outrageous about Sato administration's pro-Taiwan stance that
it launched a protracted campaign bashing the reviving Japanese militarism. Sato further
angered Beijing by proposing the double representation of both the PRC and ROC in the
U.N. in 1971. Having learned of Sato's decision on the U.N. representation issue, Zhou
Enlai told the delegation of the Japan-China Normalization Promotion Diet Members
League (Nitchuz Kokkd Katfuku Sokushin Giin Renmez) on September 30 that no breakthrough in
Sino-Japanese relationship would happen as long as Sato stayed in power.2 90
Another case was the Nagasaki Flag Incident during the Kishi administration. In
May 1958 a Japanese man was detained for hauling down PRC's national flag at a Chinese
commodity exhibition in Nagasaki but was released the next day without being prosecuted.
Beijing was so furious that it unilaterally decided to cut off all bilateral ties in May.291' But the
deeper cause of the relationship breakdown was Chinese resentment against Kishi's policy to
Taiwan. Since coming to power in February 1957, Kishi showed unusual interest in political
collaboration with Taipei. He had intimate ties with the political circle in Taiwan and was
the founder-father of the pro-Taiwan faction within the LDP.2 92 He even made a personal
290 Tagawa, pp. 350-351.
291 The abruptness and harshness in this decision could be attributed to the general radicalization of Chinese
domestic politics and belligerent foreign policy around 1958, embodied in the Great Leap Forward, second
Taiwan Strait Crisis, and blasting of Yugoslavian revisionism. But the origin of Chinese resentment against
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visit to Taiwan in June, when he vowed to develop close cooperation with Chiang Kaishek
to help restore freedom in the Chinese continent.293 So Beijing began to criticize his policy
openly from July.294 If these were not enough to convince Beijing of Kishi's hostility, his
policy towards bilateral trade relationship certainly dealt a lethal damage. In March 1958, the
Kishi administration issued a statement that it would not recognize the newly signed Fourth
Non-governmental Sino-Japanese Trade Agreement and any diplomatic prerogatives that the
agreement granted China, such as the right to fly PRC flag at Chinese trade representative
offices in Japan. This was a great departure from previous Japanese policy of tacit consent
to trade development and was obviously intended to accommodate the demands of
Washington and Taipei.2 95 It was against this backdrop that Beijing used the Nagasaki Flag
Incident to retaliate the Kishi government.
III. Minimal Economic Interaction
Commerce between China and Japan had been significant to both economies since
the beginning of the 2 0th century, thanks to their geographic propinquity, divergent resource
endowments, and complementary industrial structures. By the 1930s, Japanese direct
investments and loans in China had outstripped all other foreign investments by four times.
Bilateral trade reached 23 percent of Japan's total trade in 1903 and remained over 20
percent throughout the prewar period.296 During the Sino-Japanese War, two-way trade
amounted to one third of Japan's total foreign trade. Before war ended, the level of
Japanese dependence on China market had surged to over 90 percent, due to Japan's
isolation from other markets.297 Besides being an export market, China also occupied a vital
293 Wakamiya, The Postwar Conservative View of Asia, p. 132.
294 For some examples of Chinese official criticism of Kishi, see "Premier Zhou Enlai's Remarks on Sino-
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Guanxi Wenxianji, Vol. 1, pp. 312-315, pp. 321-323, pp. 351-354.
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498-499.
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position in supplying important raw materials to Japan in the first half of the 20t century,
including iron ore, coal, cotton and soybeans.
But with Japanese defeat and the outbreak of the Chinese Civil War, trade volume in
1946 slumping to 3.6 percent of prewar level and 1.2 percent of wartime average.2 9" The
outbreak of the Korean War then cut off trade between China and the American occupied
Japan. After the war, Japan joined the multinational trade embargo institution against China,
CHINCOM, which lasted until 1970. In result, bilateral economic interaction was confined
to an informal, small scale of trade relationship managed by non-governmental
organizations. From 1952 to 1957, China and Japan signed four non-governmental trade
agreements, none of which were fulfilled completely. In the peak year of 1956, bilateral
trade only accounted for 2.6 percentage of Japan's world trade. Following the 1958
Nagasaki Flag Incident, even the informal trade tie was suddenly suspended.
Trade did not resume until 1960 in the form of Friendship Trade, whereby only a
selected group of Japanese "friendly firms" were allowed to trade with China. Two years
later, Liao Chengzhi (L) and moderate LDP politician Takasaki Tatsunosuke (T) signed the
first long-term (5 years) trade agreement, the LT Trade Agreement. LT Trade transformed
into Memorandum Trade (MT Trade) since 1968 after non-governmental trade
representatives of the two countries delegation issued a joint communique to continue their
trade relations. 299 Through Friendship Trade and LT/MT Trade, Sino-Japanese trade grew
steadily and, largely because of the decline in Sino-Soviet trade, in 1964 Japan became
China's leading trading partner and China's share in Japan's Northeast Asian trade exceed
that of Taiwan and South Korea.300 Nevertheless, China market remained economically
insignificant to Japan, if compared to Southeast Asia and the U.S., with which trade made up
about half of Japan's total trade (Table 2). Not to mention the complete absence of
298 Tucker, "American Policy Toward Sino-Japanese Trade in the Postwar Years," p. 194, p.2 0 3.
299 For more discussions on the non-governmental commercial relations between China and Japan during the
1950s and 1960s, see James W. Morley, Soviet and Communist Chinese Policies toward Japan, 1950-1957 (New York:
Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958), Chapters 3, 7-9; Sadako Ogata, "The Business Community and Japanese
Foreign Policy: Normalization of Relations with the People's Republic of China." In Robert A. Scalapino, ed.,
The Foreign Poligy ofModern Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); pp. 178-185; Soeya, Japan's
Economic Diplomagy with China, 1945-1978, Chapters 2-5; Shimizu, "Perennial Anxiety."
300 Soeya, Japan's Economic Diplomagy with China, 1945-1978, p. 1, p. 46.
Japanese investments and industrial activities in China, an important aspect of their
traditional economic relations.
Table 2: Trends in the Composition of Japan's Trade by Market, 1952-1970 (by %)
China Southeast Asia U.S.
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Impo rts
1952 0.0 0.7 N/A N/A 18.0 37.9
1955 1.42 3.3 N/A N/A 22.3 31.3
1960 0.1 0.5 32.2 20.4 27.2 34.6
1965 2.9 2.8 26.0 17.2 29.3 29.0
1970 2.9 1.3 25.4 16.0 30.7 29.4
SOURCE: MITI, Tstishd Hakusho (White Paper on International Trade, Japan); Bureau of Statistics, Office of the
Prime Minister, Nihon T6kei Nenkan Japan Statistical Yearbook), various years.
In addition to the low level of trade volume, bilateral dependence on strategically
important goods was negligible. In terms of the composition of commodities, Japan's
exports to China consisted of textiles, insecticide, general machinery, and small amount of
iron and steel materials. Besides, China purchased plant and technology mainly from the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the 1950s. In the 1960s, China tried to switch to
Western Europe and Japan in the 1960s when the Sino-Soviet relationship deteriorated.
Despite its rapid technical innovation and economic growth at the time, Japan offered little
technology to China. Only one plant contract was concluded with China in the 1960s for a
polyvinylalcohol fiber plant."0'
The lack of substantial economic interactions between the two countries was by no
means a natural phenomenon, had they acted purely based on economic interests. Actually,
after the war both countries were enthusiastic about resuming trade, with China hoping to
use trade with Japan to frustrate American policy of isolation and promote postwar
reconstruction, and Japan anxious to rely on Chinese market for economic regeneration as
well as to weaken China's link with the Soviet Union. But their common interest in trade
expansion was trumped by the Cold War structure in Asia. American containment design
301 Yokoi Yoichi, "Plant and Technology Contracts and the Changing Pattern of Economic Interdependence
Between China and Japan," in Christopher Howe, China andJapan: History, Trends, and Prospects (Oxford New
York, Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 130.
prohibited Japan from establishing formal, substantial trade relationship with China that
would have strengthened Chinese comprehensive capability and led to dangerous Japanese
economic dependence on China. China also applied political preconditions and principles to
bilateral trade that sacrificed economic benefits for strategic gains.
Compared to strategic and economic factors, historical legacy was a rather
insignificant component in both governments' calculus on trade policy. Japanese trade
embargo against China in early 1950s and later its insistence on separating economic and
political relations were mainly driven by the overall strategic choice of collaborating with the
U.S. containment strategy rather than fear of Chinese revanchist threat. Nor did Beijing
consider Japan's lack of historical repentance an obstacle to promoting trade with Japan.
And the continuation of colonial-era trade pattern, selling Chinese raw materials for Japanese
industrial products, did not elicit Chinese worry about the comeback of Japanese "economic
aggression," as it did in the 1980s.
Japan: Trade Embargo and Separation of Politics and Economy
Postwar Japan faced the daunting task of rebuilding the war-ravaged economy. But
the limited amount of high-priced raw materials and food shipped from the U.S. fell short of
the demand of Japanese economic reconstruction, and resentment arose in Japan toward the
economic policy of the occupation authorities. 30 2 It was a common understanding in
Japanese business and political circle in the late 1940s that restoration of the traditional trade
links with mainland China was the real cure to domestic economic crisis because it would
provide Japan with low cost raw materials and a convenient, vast market. Not only pro-
China Japanese political forces like the JCP, but also members of the private sector, such as
Osaka businessmen that had long-term business relationship with China, pressed for China
trade. The government also expressed support. In November 1949 the trade minister of the
Yoshida administration, Inagaki Heitar6, revealed that the government had been planning to
promote trade with China up to 25 to 30 percent of Japan's total foreign trade.303
302 Dower, Empire andAftermath, pp. 422-424.
303 Tucker, "American Policy Toward Sino-Japanese Trade in the Postwar Years," pp. 194-195.
At the time, ideological considerations were often downplayed to make way for an
economic argument based on mutual benefit. Kodaki Akira, administrator general for
international trade of the MITI, believed that China would welcome trade with Japan
because it desperately needed Japanese industrial products.30 4 Despite Chinese
announcement of "lean-to-one-side" policy in June 1949 and introduction of strict control
of foreign trade in September, the Japanese Foreign Ministry was still optimistic in an
October report that China would accommodate economic contacts with Japan because they
were important to its own economic reconstruction. Another report of the Foreign
Ministry on Chinese trade policy argued that China knew it was too costly to depend
completely on the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries and would only use it as
the "Saigo no Kinfuda" (last trump card).305
Perhaps the best manifestation of Japanese eagerness to trade with mainland China
regardless the ideological problem was Prime Minister Yoshida's words said in 1949, "I don't
care whether China is red or green. China is a natural market, and it has become necessary
for Japan to think about markets." 30 6 Besides its economic benefits such as obtaining
Chinese coal at cheap price with convenient transportation, to Yoshida the trading
relationship would also lead to profound changes in Chinese political behaviors. It was
precisely in the context of this economic strategy of influencing China and weakening its ties
with the communist camp that Yoshida once suggested to Dulles that businessmen could
serve as the "fifth column of democracy."307
Despite the national consensus on the importance of Sino-Japanese trade, Japan's
economic activities with China activities during the 1950s and 1960s were kept artificially
low. The causes mainly lied in Japan's participation in the U.S.-led economic warfare against
the socialist bloc and commitment not to allow economic interactions to undermine the
Cold War strategy of isolating China politically.
304 Tucker, "American Policy Toward Sino-Japanese Trade in the Postwar Years," p. 195.
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Beginning from 1948, export regulations targeted at the Soviet Union and Eastern
European countries were introduced that prohibited export of items of direct military utility,
the so-called 1A List of commodities, and set quantitative controls over less militarily useful
goods, the 1B List items. This is the so-called "R procedure," which constituted the policy
basis for the Coordinating Committee (COCOM) of the Consultative Group established in
January 1950, an international organization coordinating export control against the socialist
bloc.30 8 Around the same time, the U.S. government deliberated anti-China export control
measures. In March 1949, President Truman approved the NSC 41 that subjected western
export to China, including export from occupied Japan, to the "R procedure" system. But
the NSC 41 also acknowledged the importance of China market to Japanese self-support,
and warned that extreme isolation of China from Japan and the western world might drive
China "into a position of complete subservience to the USSR." So the document instruct
the SCAP to encourage trade with China in a cautious fashion while at the same time divert
Japan's external economic interaction away from China to other markets, especially
Southeast Asia. 309
The moderate measures of export control on China stipulated by NSC 41 were
dramatically changed after Chinese military intervention in Korea, when the Truman
administration leveled a total economic embargo against Beijing. Occupied Japan was also
prohibited from trading with China, which did not seem an immediate loss to Japan because
a surge of American military orders, known as special procurements, created a temporary
economic boom in Japan. When the war drew to the end, Japan was again in great need of
Chinese market and raw materials, but only to realize it impossible to defy the structural
constraints to recover its traditional economic interactions with China. By this time Japan
had already started searching for alternative economic basis to substitute China. Responding
to the U.S. call for a triangular integration of Japanese economy with the U.S. and Southeast
Asia, Japan sent its first economic mission to Southeast Asia in mid-1951. In February 1952,
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Sut6 Hideo, head of the Economic Stabilization Bureau, submitted a report to the U.S.
government promising that Japan would "cooperate more actively with the economic
development of South East Asia... and thereby increase the imports of goods and materials
from this area..."310 Having settled the national economic strategy on the two legs of U.S.
aid and Southeast Asia trade, the Japanese government then submitted in May an application
to join the COCOM. Japan was later admitted into the China Committee (CHINCOM) that
coordinated anti-Chiona trade embargoes.311
Japan's commitments to the U.S. Cold War in Asia, including the U.S.-Japan military
alliance and trade embargo against China, forced it to pursue economic relations with China
within the limit of Seikei Bunri, or the separation of politics and economics, in the next two
decades. A highly pragmatic policy doctrine to create a modus vivendi with relation to
China within the Cold War framework, Seikei Bunri accepted some degree of China trade to
satisfy domestic business interests and sooth public resentment against western isolation of
China, but still strictly banned official relations with China that might spring from the trade
relations.312 The doctrine determined the failure of the joint efforts of Beijing and Japanese
private organizations to expand non-official trade relations freely, not to mention the goal of
realizing de facto Japanese official recognition of China.
The first bilateral trade agreement was signed in June 1952, right in the middle of
U.S.- Japan negotiation over Japanese membership in COCOM. The three Japanese
parliamentarians from opposition parties who signed the agreement had come to China by
way of Europe without Japanese government permission.313 And the Japanese Foreign
Minister soon assured the American embassy that the trade agreement was no more than a
written statement of intent to trade because of too many unresolved practical problems in
bilateral trade.' 14 The Yoshida government also had little to do with the second trade
agreement, which was signed by a delegation of Japan-China Trade Promotion Diet
309 NSC 41, "United States Policy Regarding Trade with China, February 28, 1949," the National Security
Archive.
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313 The three Diet members are Hoasi Kei and Kora Tomi of the Ryokufu-kai, and Miyakoshi Kisuke of the
Kokumin Kyodo Party.
Members League (JCTPDML), that actually did not anticipated the agreement before they
arrived in China in September 1953. After the Chinese side presented a trade proposal, this
delegation agreed to negotiate and later signed the agreement only in the name of
JCTPDML.31 ' The memorandum attached to the agreement included a proposition that
permanent trade missions would be established in each other's country, which provoked
concerns from Tokyo and Washington. Tokyo publicly dismissed the agreement as
nonbonding and again tried to explain to the American embassy that it would neither expand
Sino-Japanese trade significantly nor change Japanese policy of nonrecognition to China.316
The implementation of these two agreements was also hampered by the American-
led trade embargoes against China. In fact, around this time, Washington brought strong
pressure upon Tokyo concerning export control against China. In July 1953 the NSC just
approved a policy directive (NSC 152/2) that urged the U.S. government to "continue
intensified efforts to persuade our allies to refrain from relaxing their controls on trade with
Communist China."317 And the CHINCOM list of export control was already more
restrictive than that of COCOM against the Soviet Union and its East European allies,
which was known as the China differential. It was only until March 1954 that the NSC
adopted the State Department proposal to "release Japan gradually, as appropriate, from its
obligations under the US-Japanese bilateral agreement... to maintain export controls higher
than the CHINCOM levels.""318 Restrained by the stringent export control regulations, the
total Sino-Japanese trade value between 1952-1954 of approximately $109 million fell far
short of what was expected in the two trade agreements (about $84 million under each
agreement). Moreover, the two agreements designated 40% and 35% of total trade value
respectively to strategic commodities of "Category A," such as Japanese iron and steel and
314 Shimizu, "Perennial Anxiety," p. 227.
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Chinese coal and iron ore. But Japanese export of such commodities was only a small
fraction of the designated level.319
The Hatoyama administration responded favorably to internal and external pressure
to promote China trade, but its actions were still limited by the Cold War framework. In
March 1955, a Chinese trade delegation arrived in Japan to negotiate the third trade
agreement. During the negotiation, the director of the JCTPDML that became a signatory
of the trade agreement, Ikeda Masanosuke, conveyed Prime Minister Hatoyama's "support
and cooperation" to the trade agreement.320 But American diplomats soon intervened in
various ways to "stifle the courtship between Japan and the PRC" under the direction from
the top of the State Department, including Dulles. Although failing to prevent the third
trade agreement from materializing, American pressure did succeed in making the Hatoyama
government promise that the prime minister would not endorse the specific provisions of
the agreement.321 As for the implementation of the trade agreement, Sino-Japanese trade in
the following two years again failed to live up to the standard designated in the trade
agreement because the constraints of the China differential that existed until 1957.
Ishibashi was enthusiastic about expanding Sino-Japanese trade, but his short tenure
prevented him from achieving anything in this respect. It was during the Kishi
administration that the fourth Sino-Japanese trade agreement was concluded. Although an
adamant anti-communist and pro-Taiwan politician, Kishi did not object to expanding pure
economic relations with China. He would have granted Chinese trade representatives in
Tokyo quasi-diplomatic treatment had Washington and Taipei not exerted unprecedented
heavy pressure on Kishi. Taipei even threatened to suspend all business ties with Japan.322
Unwilling to sacrifice existing economic interest in Taiwan for future interest in China and
afraid to alienate the American government, the Kishi government decided to impose
explicit political restrictions on economic relations with China. An official letter was sent to
Japanese signatories of trade agreement on April 9 that the government would give support
319 Japanese export of iron and steel materials to China in three years amounted to only $70,000. See MITI,Tstisho Hakusho, respective years.
320 Soeya, Japan's Economic Diplomagy with China, 1945-1978, pp. 36-40.
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and cooperation to trade expansion only "within the scope of our national laws and on the
basis of the non-recognition of the (Chinese) government, and taking into account the
current international relations." On the same day, the Cabinet Secretary Aichi Kiichi issued
a statement that "the Government had no intention to recognize Communist China, nor to
give privileged public status to the private trade representative that this private agreement
seeks to establish." Aichi particular stressed that the Japanese government would not
recognized some diplomatic privileges stipulated by the fourth trade agreement such as
flying the national flag of the Communist China.323 Such was the prelude of the Nakasaki
Flag Incident of May 1958 and the total rupture of bilateral exchanges.
When Ikeda Hayato, a disciple of Yoshida, replaced Kishi to become the prime
minister, Sino-Japanese trade relationship resumed, thanks to not only the moderate attitude
of the Yoshida faction on China policy, but also China's de facto acceptance of the Seikei
Bunri principle. In August 1960, Zhou Enlai enunciated the "three trade principles" that
allowed space for three forms of bilateral trade, including governmental agreement, private
contract, and individual consideration. As China admitted defeat in pulling the Japanese
government into bilateral trade agreements, bilateral trade was able to develop more
smoothly, althought never allowed to go beyond the limit of Seikei Bunri. Being a faithful
follower of the "Yoshida Doctrine," Ikeda attached great importance to an ambitious agenda
of economic growth, the income-doubling plan, the success of which was primarily
dependent on economic cooperation with the U.S. rather than China. So when President
Kennedy expressed concern over the newly opened Friendly Trade between China and
Japan at the June 1961 US-Japan summit meeting, Ikeda explained that private trade with
Beijing was only of slight scale and value, and reassured Kennedy that Japan did not wish to
disturb her economic relations with the U.S. merely for trade with Beijing because it would
lead to a Japanese economic collapse.324 In October 1962, Ikdea told the press that not only
would the government not take a formal stand on the non-governmental trade relationship,
but also the importance of this relationship should not be over-stated. "There is no
323 Soeya, Japan's Economic Diplomagy with China, 1945-1978, pp. 3 8-3 9 . Similar statements were made by Kishi in
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1961-1963, Vol. 22, p. 697.
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'dreaming of another dream,' thinking of the old continental trade," said Ikeda, "Communist
China would want to buy a lot of things from Japan, but what would Japan buy from
Communist China?" 325
Interestingly, as Ikeda confined Sino-Japanese trade to the political boundary of U.S.-
Japan relations, the U.S. government stayed on the sideline without much need to step in to
give warnings and objections. The more visible external interference with the trade
relationship, according to Soeya Yoshihide's study, came from Taiwan instead. It was due to
the concerted protest of the Taiwan government and domestic Taiwan Lobby that the Ikeda
government put off the granting of export credits by the Export-Import Bank to the export
of a Nichbo chemical fiber plant to China in year 1964.326
The dual pressure of Cold War structure and Taiwan Lobby continue to restrain
trade development during the Sato administration. While Sato stepped up policy
coordination with the U.S. on a wide range of issues from Taiwan and South Korea to
Vietnam, it was out of the question that he would tolerate a breakthrough of the non-
official, small-scale Sino-Japanese trade relationship. In various public occasions, Sato
repeatedly reconfirmed the principle of Seikei Bunri. Regarding the issue of export credits,
Sato not only denied its use for plant exports to China, but also applied the restriction to
other commodities. In result, plans to export about forty plants and related facilities to
China were canceled, and the Chinese third five-year plan excluded Japanese plants and
compensated that with European ones.327
China: Politics First, Economy Second, and History Last
The Chinese Communist government was also eager to promote bilateral trade since
the end of 1940s, hoping to obtain from Japan machinery and other industrial products.328
325 Quoted in Soeya, Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978, p. 48.
326 Soeya, Japan's Economic Diplomagy with China, 1945-1978, pp. 95-99; Cohen, "China in Japanese-American
Relations," pp. 53-54.
327 Soeya, Japan's Economic Diplomagy with China, 1945-1978, pp. 99-100.
328 In 1949, the CCP leaders made it known to American diplomats that China would barter coal and salt or pay
in scarce gold or U.S. currency on deposit in Hong Kong for some Japanese goods important to Chinese
But the economic importance of Sino-Japanese trade decreased greatly since China formed
alliance with the Soviet Union, which provided China with generous economic aid and "the
most comprehensive technology transfer in modern industrial history."329 During 1951-
1952, about 60-70 percent of China's total foreign trade was conducted with the Soviet bloc
countries. Almost all of Chinese exports of strategic and other important materials went to
these countries, who also supplied China with a large proportion of needed iron and steel
and other industrial products that had been traditionally imported from Western countries.33o
Even less important than economic incentives was the factor of historical
perception. The harrowing memory of the colonial and war history when Japan used China
as a source of cheap raw materials and market for Japanese industrial products had little
impact on China's trade policy to Japan. It neither held back Chinese interest in restoring
commercial links with Japan nor made Beijing reject the old trading pattern. In 1954 Zhou
Enlai made the following statement to Japanese visitors suggesting that exchange of Chinese
resources for Japanese finished products was perfectly acceptable to China:
"If Japan needs our coal, we can try to explore more mines and increase production of tens of
thousands tons per year, which is a lot of coal. Also, people's demand (for Japanese products) is
enormous. If everyone of the 600 million Chinese people uses a bit more commodities, that amounts
to a considerable quantity. What we mean by peaceful coexistence is precisely mutual benefits on
equal basis, supplying each other's needs, and coexistence and co-prosperity." 331
Rather than economic or historical factor, political interest was the most powerful
driving force behind China's economic policy to Japan. Throughout this period, China
carried out an active campaign of "People's Diplomacy" towards Japan, the concrete strategy
of which was to "start with the people, and use the people to influence the government"
(Minjian Xianxin, Yimin Cuguan).332 Private economic agreements and cultural exchange
activities were some important channels through which Beijing tried to build "people-to-
people relations" and increase China's friends in Japanese society. The immediate objective
economic survival. See Tucker, "American Policy Toward Sino-Japanese Trade in the Postwar Years," pp. 192-
193.
329 Steven M. Goldstein, "Nationalism and Internationalism: Sino-Soviet Relations," in Robinson and
Shambaugh, Chinese Foreign Policy, pp. 235-236.
330 Zhang, Economic Cold War, p. 94, 108.
331 See Zhou Enlai WaIjiao Wenxuan, p. 90.332 Peizhu Jiang & Guohong Qiu, "Zhongri Guanxi Wutaishang de Huihuang Yuezhang" (A Shining Chapter
on the Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Stage), in Jianzhang Pei, Yanjiu Zhou Enlai: Waifiao Sixiangyu Shifian (A Study of
Zhou Enlai: Diplomatic Thoughts and Practice) (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chuban She, 1989), pp. 226-234.
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was to win Japan's recognition of the PRC, but ultimately China hoped to detach Japan from
the American containment strategy. Zhou once gave the following optimistic forecast of the
"People's Diplomacy" to Japan:
"As the 'People's Diplomacy' carries on, more and more Japanese non-government groups will come
and more and more our groups will go. When (these groups) finish doing everything needed between
the two countries, what is left is only for the foreign ministers of two countries to put down
signatures and drink champagne."333
To these ends, China constantly sought to augment the political implications of
bilateral economic relations. First of all, all four bilateral trade agreements signed in the
1950s designated a large proportion of Japanese export to be strategically sensitive items,
including metal products, large machinery, and transportation equipment. The Chinese side
classified trading commodities and insisted that exchange of strategic items had to be carried
out before less "strategic" commodities could be exchanged.334 Such a regulation was
intended not so much to meet Chinese needs for strategic materials as to test the limit of
western trade embargoes on China.
Second, in a so-called tsumiage (piling up) fashion, China attempted gradual upgrading
of the political profile of these non-government trade agreements and eventually obtaining
Japanese official recognition. The second agreement had a memorandum attached to it that
stipulated the establishment of trade representatives in each other's country, while the third
agreement stated that trade representative office in both capitals would enjoy diplomatic
privileges, and that commodity exhibitions would be held in each other's country. The
fourth agreement went the furthest and specified the diplomatic privileges of trade
representatives to include freedom of travel, the right to fly the national flag, and no finger-
printing. Moreover, since the third trade agreement, a special article was included stipulating
that signatories should urge their own governments to hold bilateral negotiation on trade
affairs as early as possible. It was precisely the escalation of Chinese "People's Diplomacy"
through trade agreements that compelled the Kishi government to reassert political
limitations on economic relations in Spring 1958.
333 Jiang & Qiu, "Zhongri Guanxi Wutaishang de Huihuang Yuezhang," p. 227.
334 Soeya, Japan's Economic Diplomagy with China, 1945-1978, p. 34.
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Interestingly, around the same time of Nagasaki Flag Incident, an incident involving
historiographic conflict also took place. Escaping in July 1945 from a coal mine in
Hokkaido where he was forced to work under severe conditions, Chinese national Liu
Lianren stayed in hiding for 13 years without knowing that war had long ended. On
February 9, 1958 Liu was found by the Japanese authority and since then his story became
public. Chinese initial reaction to this incident was rather slow and cautious. Only in mid-
March did the People's Daily published a short article criticizing Japanese government for
holding Liu under the charge of illegal entry and calling it a ungrateful action in light of
Chinese friendly treatment of Japanese nationals in China.335 But since April Beijing
escalated the Liu Lianren Incident, which coincided with Kishi's intervention in trade policy.
On April 9, the semi-official Chinese Red Cross issued a rebuttal of Japanese official
explanation that Liu and other workers were not taken to Japan by force but sent under legal
labor contracts, and demanded thorough investigation of Chinese forced labor in Japan
during the war. One week later, a lengthy editorial appeared in People's Daily that explicitly
held the Kishi government responsible for the Sino-Japanese war and Japanese war crimes.336
It was the first time since the war ended that the Chinese official media demanded Japanese
actions to address war responsibility. But instead of concentrating its charges on postwar
Japanese historiography, the editorial attributed Japan's handling of the Liu Lianren Incident
to Kishi's subservience to American Cold War strategy. The fact that the miserable situation
of Chinese forced labor in Japan, no news to the world by then, did not draw Beijing's
attention until the point of bilateral standoff over the trade relations suggested that the Liu
Lianren Incident was a highly politicized event that China used to add moral as well as
political pressure on Kishi.
Besides, the Liu Lianren incident played no role in China's decision to suspend
bilateral contacts in May. When Chinese foreign minister Chen Yi announced the
suspension of relations, he only cited Kishi government's refusal to recognize the PRC and
collusion with the U.S. and Chiang Kai-shek as the main reason for Chinese indignation.
335 "People's Daily Editorial on Japanese responsibility for Liu Lianren's situation, March 17, 1958," in Tian,
Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji, Vol. 1, pp. 343-344.
336 "Chinese Red Cross Spokesman on Japanese government's full responsibility for Liu Lianren Incident, April
9, 1958"; "People's Daily editorial requesting the Japanese government to explain the Liu Lianren Incident,
April 17, 1958," in Tian, Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji, Vol. 1, pp. 355-356, pp. 364-366.
Nor was the history issue included in the preconditions that China proposed afterwards for
reopening bilateral exchanges. In meeting with a visiting JSP Dietman of the Upper House,
Sada Tadataka, in August, the Chinese side demanded the Kishi government to stop its
hostile policy against China, conspiracy to create "two Chinas," and obstruction of Sino-
Japanese diplomatic normalization. 337 Later called the "three political principles," these
preconditions did not make any reference to history accounts but only focused on political
issues.
Based on Zhou's "three trade principles" in 1960, Beijing agreed to a new form of
trade relations, Friendship Trade, which means China would trade with those "friendly
firms" recommended by private Japanese organizations. A nod to economic exchanges
involving private business actors, Friendship Trade still subordinated economic interests to
political considerations. China juxstaposed the "three political principles" and the "three
trade principles"as equally important preconditions for Friendship Trade. While Japanese
trade organizations recommended "friendly firms," Beijing had the final say on which
Japanese firms would be accepted. Typically, only those firms that endorsed the "three
political principles" were allowed to do business with China.
China's connections with the political forces behind Japanese trade organizations
also affected the selection of "friendsly firms." Initially, Japanese firms close to the JCP-
supported Japan-China Trade Promotion Association GCTPA) were most privileged. But
after the JCP-CCP rift since mid-1960s, China eliminated pro-JCP elements from Friendship
Trade, and the dominant position of JCTPA-affiliated firms was soon taken over by firms
backed up by the Japan Association for the Promotion of International Trade GAPIT).338 Its
original internationalist orientation notwithstanding, in order to continue China trade the
JAPIT had to accept political conditions set by Beijing, which became increasingly militant in
the later part of the 1960s. In March 1967, a JAPIT delegation to Beijing agreed to sign a
joint communique with China that not only reaffirmed the "three political principles," "three
trade principles," and the principle of inseparability of politics and economics, but also
337 "The Report of the visit to China by Japanese member of the House of Councilors Sada Tadataka, August
29, 1958," Tian, Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji, Vol. 1, pp. 392-399.
338 Soeya, Japan's Economic Diplomag with China, 1945-1978, pp. 67-74.
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designated the U.S. imperialism, Japanese reactionaries, Soviet revisionism, and JCP
revisionists as the "four enemies" that all friendly firms must oppose.339
The second channel of bilateral trade in the 1960s, LT/MT Trade, was originally
envisioned to correspond more directly to economic interests. The 1962 LT trade
agreement avoided mentioning any political conditions. The reason probably lied in the
semi-official nature of this channel, which involved LDP politicians close to the Japanese
governments and bureaucrats from varies ministries. Opening such a semi-official trade link
itself was already a political success for China. However, when Sino-Japanese relations
worsened during the Sato administration, LT/MT Trade was subject to political heat as well.
The MT agreement in March 1968 also included the "three political principles" and the
principle of inseparability of politics and economics. Meanwhile, China insisted to reduce
the term of the agreement from five years to one, citing Sato's anti-Chinese policy as the
reason. Deeply embroiled in the Chinese media campaign assailing reviving Japanese
militarism, subsequent Memorandum Trade talks became an annual ordeal for Japanese
negotiators. As analyzed earlier, it was not really Chinese historical resentment toward Japan
but rather political opposition to Sato's collaboration with Washington and Taiwan that was
fanning the fierce campaign. Not only the joint communique of MT Trade signed in April
1970 but also the additional preconditions for future bilateral trade development enunciated
by Zhou Enlai, dubbed "Zhou's Four Principles," were entirely political by nature.3" These
new conditions were then applied to both Friendship Trade and LT/MT Trade.
IV. Popular Hostility
33" Tian, Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji, Vol. 1, pp. 870-872; Nitchu Kankei Kihon Shiryoshu, p. 304. Examples
of Chinese political pressure on friendly firms also include such requirements for them to show support to
"The Chinese Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," protest Sato's Taiwan policy, and even study
"Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong." See Soeya, Japan's Economic Diplomagy with China, 1945-1978, p. 77.
340 "Zhou's Four Principles" stated that China would not deal with (1) trading firms and manufacturers
supporting aggression of mainland by Chiang Kai-shek and of North Korea by Park Chun-hee, (2) trading
firms and manufacturers with large investments in Taiwan and South Korea, (3) enterprises supplying arms and
ammunitions to the US imperialism for invading Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and (4) US-Japan joint
enterprises and subsidiaries of US firms in Japan. See Furukawa, Nitchu Sengo Kankei-Shi, p. 302; Ogata, "The
Business Community and Japanese Foreign Policy," p. 1185; Soeya, Japan's Economic Diplomay with China, 1945-
1978, p. 113.
The mutual images held by the Japanese and Chinese public were predominantly
negative during this period. Japanese public opinion surveys show that the percentage of
those Japanese who disliked Communist China by far exceeded those who felt affection
(Chart 1). In fact, China was the second least favorite country to the Japanese, only to be
topped by the Soviet Union.
Chart 1: Japanese Public Feeling about China and the USSR, 1960-1971.
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SOURCES: Yoron Chosa Nenkan (Opinion Polls Yearbook), Naikaku Sori Daijin Kanb6 Shingishitsu, various years.
In China, the tight control of public thoughts by the government and the lack of
objective polling data made it a hard task to gauge genuine Chinese popular feelings about
Japan. Nevertheless, with the textbooks, media and other officially sanctioned propaganda
tools all portraying Japan as a belligerent, brutal nation with a historical penchant for
aggression of China, it is difficult to imagine that Chinese people would feel anything else
about Japan other than believing it was a dangerous and hostile country. The public not
only was antipathetic about Japan but also strongly supported a policy of confrontation with
to Japanese government. At least in the 1960s a number of mass demonstrations occurred
in various Chinese cities denouncing Japanese government policy.341
The public feeling of repugnance between the two countries was largely shaped by
national security imperatives in the context of Cold War. The Chinese public opinions were
greatly manipulated by the strategically oriented government propaganda, while the Japanese
perception of China was worsened by fears about Chinese security threat. Bitter emotions
rooted in the traumatic war history did reinforce Chinese negative perception of Japan, but
they did not prove an important factor in explaining Japanese popular feelings about China.
Besides, negative perceptions were exacerbated by the lack of societal contacts that
prevented objective mutual evaluation and a sense of closeness between them. What mainly
stood in the way of bilateral societal contacts were not historical memories but the travel
restrictions applied by the Japanese government, who feared that unrestrained personnel
exchange might undermine Japan's policy of non-recognition to China.
Origins of Popular animosity: History or Structure?
After the war ended, Chinese people held fear and hatred of Japan, which wasf
manifested in the spontaneous student movement of Fan Meifuri (Opposing the American
build-up of Japan) in 1948 that involved Chinese of all political shades and persuasions.3 42
The Chinese feeling of bitterness toward Japan stemming from personal war experience was
exacerbated by the official propaganda on Japanese militarist revival and the lack of
information about postwar Japanese society. Chinese people easily formed poor stereotypes
of Japan as a single-minded aggressor with the kind of ferocity and brutality challenged by
few other foreign countries. Chinese utter disgust for Japanese was personified by the
household word in China, Riben Gui~i (Japanese Devil), referring to Japanese soldiers, who
they believed were the typical representatives of Japanese nation.
But given the conflictual rather than combative nature of Chinese and Japanese
historical myths of this period, it was doubtful that historical memory would have generated
articulated political demands for confrontational Japan policy. Emotions alone could not
explain several large-scale public demonstrations held from the late 1960s to early 1970s
decrying the Japanese reactionaries in the Sato administration and supporting the
government's firm position dealing with Sato. All these mass campaigns were actually
341 See Kuang-sheng Liao, Antiforeignism and Modernization in China, 1860-1980 (Hong Kong: Chinese University
Press, 1986), p. 269, 270, 282, 284.
342 Hong Zhang, "Fan Meifuri: The Chinese Student Movement Opposing the U.S. Rehabilitation of Japan,
1948," The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 5, No. 2 (Summer 1996).
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organized by the Chinese government as part of a concerted political offensive against Sato,
whose unusually close relations with the U.S., Taiwan and South Korea had alarmed Chinese
strategists.343 So the Cold War reality had direct impact on Chinese popular perception of
Japan. But the public would not have become such captive audience of the government
propaganda on reviving Japanese militarism had they not been also influenced by memories
about the traumatic Sino-Japanese history. Here historical memory functioned as an
aggravating factor in the public mobilization campaign by the Chinese government to meet
national security needs.
The influence of historical memory on Japanese public perception of China was even
more ambivalent. On the one hand, Japanese people remembered vividly the bloody war
scenes in China and the wartime hardship on the home front.344" On the other hand, even if
there were some bitter emotions about the former enemy and resentments about Chinese
media attack of Japanese militarism, they would have been well offset by different opinions
about history.345 Historically, Japanese people had a sentimental attachment toward China
stemming from the two countries' racial, cultural, and geographic affinity. A Japanese
survey in 1970 showed that 79 percent of all respondents agreed that Japanese culture took
influence from China, 72 percent believed that Japanese people understood Chinese
emotions better than the Americans did, although they did not feel the Chinese had
reciprocal deep understanding of themselves.346 Such a sense of closeness was perpetuated
by a strong nostalgia for China held by numerous Japanese people who had lived there
before, blended with which was a certain degree of guilty consciousness. Although the
mainstream historiography did not acknowledge Japanese war responsibility to China, many
343 Besides strategic motivations, the desire to consolidate power and strengthen leadership by the pro-Mao
leftists also contributed to the vigorousness of these anti-foreign mass movements that they organized in late
1960s. See Liao, Antiforeignism and Modernization in China, 1860-1980, pp. 184-185.
344 Japanese veterans recollections about the war that came out in the 1950s and 1960s were mostly written by
former staff-class officers who served in the navy or air force and did not fight hand-to-hand with the enemy
so much as the army did. Nevertheless, memories of the truly bloody and barbaric ground battles in China
theater were kept alive in the mind of Japanese military repatriates, who later came forward to speak about their
experiences in the 1980s. See Hicks, Japan's WarMemories, pp. 23-24; Yoshida, Nihonjin no Sensdkan, pp. 90-97.
345 For studies on the complexity in Japanese feeling about China in the 1950s-60s, see Shao Chuan Leng, Japan
and Communist China (Kyoto: Doshisha University Press, 1958), Chapter 6; Mendel, The Japanese People and Foreign
poly, Chapter 9; Sadako Ogata, "Japanese Attitude toward China." Asian Survey V, No. 8, (August 1965).
346 Naikaku Sori Daijin Kanb6 Shingishitsu, ed. Yoron Chosa Nenkan: Zenkoku Yoron Chosa no Genkyo (Opinion
Polls Yearbook:Current Situation of National Public Opinion Investigation), 1970, pp. 558-559.
Japanese people regretted deeply in their heart about what Japan had done to China during
the war, and left-wing activists and intellectuals even openly expressed their guilt feelings.347
Another positive view of China from historical perspective was the traditional lure of
mainland China market. The Kansai area (Kyoto-Osaka-Kobe) in particularly had a uniquely
strong desire to recover its traditionally intimate economic ties with mainland China.
Speaker Yoshimune Sadayuki of Osaka municipal assembly, For example, said in a 1957
interview that "Osaka's industry and economy have long depended on trade with China so
you can't think of Osaka's prosperity without it."348 The traumatic war history meant very
little to these Japanese who had a keen interest in commercial links with China and were
ready to put behind the past for the sake of current business benefits.
It was not memories of the past war but rather their fears about Communist China
threat or inadvertent violent conflicts with China that mainly explained the negative image of
China in Japan. For one thing, most Japanese people disapproved and feared the
Communist ideology.3 49 While the public opinion polarized between the two strategies of
allying with the West and staying neutral, the vast majority of Japanese people persistently
stayed away from the third option of being associated with the Communist bloc.350 In
adition, Japanese perception of China contained worry about Chinese military power, which
they thought was posing a great security threat to Japan. In a 1970 poll, China was perceived
as a dark (64%), strong (69%0/), cold (62%) and sharp (54%) country.3 51 Japanese
apprehension worsened particularly when China obtained its own nuclear weapons and
strategic delivery means. Upon hearing the news that China would carry out a nuclear test,
347 For a famous example, an influential writer Takeuchi Yoshimi once asserted that Japan need not be sorry
about fighting with other imperialist powers but must bear the responsibility for invading China. See Onuma,
Tokyd Saiban kara Sengo Sekirin no Shisd e, p. 175. Yet, these positive sentiments about China could not be
exaggerated because the postwar generation, which exceeded half of the total population since 1960, was less
affected by the sense of kinship and guilt feeling and more receptive to the historical myths purveyed by
conservative elites.
348 Quoted from Mendel, The Japanese People and Foreign Poky, p. 226.
349 Left-wing Japanese elite admired Chinese Communist revolution as the model of Asian nationalist
movement and believed that the two countries were fighting the common enemy of American imperialism.
However, such a romantic feeling about Communist China existed only in a limited circle.
350 See annual opinion polls conducted by Jiji Tsushin Sha, in Yoron Chosa Nenkan, various years.
351 National public opinion survey on "China and Chinese People," Mainichi Shimbun, March 1970, in Yoron
Chosa Nenkan, 1970, p 560.
150
68 percent respondents said that Japan's national security would be endangered.35 2 In
another survey of 1970, 58.4 percent of people said they felt threat from China because it
was developing nuclear weapons one after another and now even launched a man-made
satellite that was capable of delivering those nuclear weapons.35 3
Apart from Chinese military strength, the danger of Japan being dragged into a Sino-
U.S. war also contributed to Japanese feeling of threat. Polling data in Table 3 show a high
degree of public concerns about war entanglement.
Table 3: Japanese Worry about War Entanglement
Nov. 1965 August 1965 April 1969 Dec. 1969
Sorifu Asahi Mainichi Shimbun Sha Kyodo Tsushi Sha
Kohoshitsu Shimbun Sha
A: Worry about war 60% (Vietnam
entanglement or 4 9 % War spillover 55 % 56.6%
national security to Japan)
East-West
Reasons for confrontation 16.5%
A Age of
(multiple nuclear war 14.1%
choices) Conflicts Korean Peninsular 72% Korean Peninsular
in Asia 20.1% Sino-Soviet border 36% 42.8%
Taiwan Strait 23% Taiwan Strait 7.7%
Southeast Asia 23% Southeast Asia 14.7%
U.S.-Japan
alliance and
U.S. military 12.1% 35%
bases in Japan
Other 21.2% 25% 23% 34.8%
B: Do not worry about war
entanglement or 22% 19% 38% 28.8%
national security
C: Do not know 29% 21% 7% 15.6%
SOURCES: Yoron Chosa Nenkan (Opinion Polls Yearbook).
The major causes of international conflicts cited here included general tensions
between the Eastern and Western blocs, the unpredictable nuclear age, and more
importantly, the spillover of regional crises in Korean peninsular, Taiwan strait, and
352 Tokyo Shimbun survey, March 1963, in Yoron Chosa Nenkan 1962 (covering April 1962-March 1963), p. 73.
353 Yomiuri Shimbun survey on U.S.-Japan alliance and national security, May 1970, in Yoron Chosa Nenkan,
1971, p. 538.
Indochina, all involving a great danger of dragging Japan into violent conflict with China.
The fear of war entanglement in Asia loomed even larger when Okinawa was returned to
Japan by the end of 1960s with the U.S. military bases attached. In a 1969 survey, 56 percent
of those questioned said Japan should reject American request to send troops from Okinawa
to the Korean Peninsular and Taiwan, 20 percent thought it depended on the concrete
situation, while only 9 percent said Japan should accept such request.354 When asked in
another survey in 1970 if they were worried about military reprisal on Japan if American war
planes took off from bases here to fight the enemy, 77.2 percent gave positive answer.355
Structural Constraints of Societal Contacts
Like non-governmental trade links, bilateral personnel exchange was also a target
area of Chinese "People's Democracy" to cultivate pro-China interest in Japanese society
and eventually bring about positive change in Japanese government policy toward China.
Historical memory about past Sino-Japanese war did not compromise Chinese efforts to
promote larger scale and wider scope of exchange activities, for the Chinese official position
to distinguish bad Japanese militarists and good Japanese people provided the justification to
put behind historical burdens. Beijing's enthusiasm about societal contacts was reciprocated
by the interest of left-wing Japanese social and political groups. Ever since the occupation
period ended, these Japanese groups began unyielding endeavors to facilitate trade, cultural
and political cooperation with China.
But the fear that too many societal contacts might challenge the official policy of
nonrecognition of Beijing prompted Tokyo to impose restrictive policy of immigration
regulations and tight border control to restrain such contacts. Therefore, in May 1952 the
three Japanese parliamentarians who signed the first bilateral non-official trade agreement
had to travel to Beijing via third countries. After returning to Japan, they were immediately
prosecuted for violating passport regulations and traveling to prohibited "Communist
354 Asahi Shimbun survey on the U.S.-Japan alliance and the return of Okinawa, August-September 1969, in
Yoron Ch6sa Nenkan, 1970, p. 500.
355 Kyodo Tsushin Sha survey on national security, U.S.-Japan alliance, price and daily living, cabinet and party
approval rates, April 1970, in Yoron Chbda Nenkan, 1971, p. 521.
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area." 35 6 The government also turned down the travel application of a Japanese delegation
including representatives of the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyo) and other
left-wing groups to go to the 1952 May Day celebration in Beijing. When this delegation
plotted to sneak out of a Japanese port, all members were arrested before they made the
attempt.357 Representatives of Japanese labor organizations were again prohibited from
going to China before the May Day of 1953 and 1954.358 The first Japanese group permitted
to travel to China was a delegation entrusted with the important mission of obtaining
Chinese cooperation in repatriating stranded Japanese nationals. They were allowed to visit
Beijing in January 1953 only because the enormous public concerns about repatriation issue
had created great pressure on the Yoshida government to seek an early solution.359 Also the
first group of Chinese visitors that entered Japan in Ocotober 1954 was a Chinese Red Cross
delegation to reconfirm the joint settlement on the repatriation issue.3 60
Tokyo's stonewalling position on personnel exchange was slightly relaxed since
Hatoyama took power. The three years of 1955-1957 saw the same Tsumiage (piling up)
pattern of bilateral trade development working in the field of societal contacts as well. For
example, exchanges between Japanese and Chinese labor organizations won permission since
the May Day of 1955. Besides, contacts extended to such areas as science and technology,
medicine, culture and religion, and media. Exchanges even spread from national
organizations to municipal and prefectural levels.361 But even during the Tsumiage period,
restrictions on mutual visits were never completely removed. For example, the official ban
on visit to China by Chinese immigrants in Japan was strictly enforced. In an incident in
October 1956, where ten Chinese immigrants were rejected of reentry visas after returning
from a trip to China, triggered widespread appeal in the Japanese society for free travel to
China. Japanese government finally made a small concession in April 1957 to grant
identification certificates issued by Japan Red Cross instead of formal passports to Chinese
356 Xiao, Eien no Rinkoku to Shite, p. 18.
357 Homusho Nyfikoku Kanrikyoku (Immigration Bureau of the Ministry of Justice), Shinyikoku Kanri no Kaiko
to Tenbd (Retrospect and Prospect of Immigration Regulations), 1981, p. 271.358 The National Headquarters of the Japan-China Friendship Association, Nitchti Yfikd Undo, pp. 79-81.359 The National Headquarters of the Japan-China Friendship Association, Nitchti Ytikd Undo Shi, pp. 60-61.
360 Homusho Nyfikoku Kanrikyoku, Shtinyfikoku Kanri no Kaiko to Tenbd, p. 277.
361 The National Headquarters of the Japan-China Friendship Association, Nitchti Yuikd Undo Shi, pp. 67-84.
immigrants in Japan who desired to go to China only for such "humanitarian needs" as
meeting relatives or visiting family tombs.3 62
Table 4 shows the scarce number of mutual visitors in the 1950s. The exchange
boom since mid-1950s was brought to a sudden halt following the Nagasaki Flag Incident,
which served a reminder of the existence of structural constraints on further development of
bilateral societal contacts. Non-governmental exchange programs gradually recovered from
1960 and reached another height around the mid-1960s. But the total volume of personnel
exchange was kept artificially low, especially the number of Chinese visitors to Japan (Table
5). From the very beginning, Chinese applications for Japan visa were ruled on the case-by-
case basis, where numerous cases were rejected on the ground of political sensitivity. Even
the Ikeda and Sato government that took a moderate stance toward societal contacts did not
hesitate to keep out Chinese visitors whose objectives of travel were deemed detrimental to
Japanese strategic relationship with the US and official policy on the Taiwan issue.363
Table 4: Travelers between Japan and China, 1952-1959
Year Japan to China China to Japan
Group Individual Group Individual
1952 11 50 0 0
1953 16 139 0 0
1954 21 192 1 10
1955 52 847 4 100
1956 108 1,182 7 142
1957 133 1,243 16 140
1958 Unknown 594 5 93
1959 20 191 0 0
SOURCE: Soeya, Japan's Economic Diplomay with China, 1945-1978, p. 43.
362 See Homusho Nyfikoku Kanrikyoku, Shfinyukoku Kanri no Kaiko to Tenbo, pp. 85-86. It was only until 1970
that Chinese immigrants began to be granted certificates issued by the Immigration Bureau of the Ministry of
Justice and were allowed to visit China not only for "humanitarian needs" but also business matters.
363 Among those denied of entry visas in the 1960s were such important Chinese political figures as Peng
Zheng, then member of CCP Central Poliburo and Beijing Mayor, Zhao Anbo, Secretary-General of the
China-Japan Friendship Association and one of the core members of the Liaoban, and Liu Ningyi, then Vice
Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.
Table 5: Visitors between Japan and China, 1964-1971
Year Japan to China China to Japan
1964 1,508 562
1965 3,921 576
1966 2,869 503
1967 1,526 150
1968 1,170 11
1969 661 16
1970 1,447 139
1971 5,176 283
SOUCE: Japan Ministry of Justice, Shunyukoku Kanti Tokei Nenpo (Annual Report ofImmigration Statistics), various
years.
The biggest tumult caused by Japanese travel restriction policy was a three-month
standoff in 1965 between the Japanese government and members of a Japanese youth
delegation who were denied passports to visit China. Since late June Beijing began to
prepare a large-scale bilateral youth exchange program to escalate political pressure on the
Sato administration that had just denied the provision of Export-Import funds to China for
purchasing Japanese plants and signed the Japan-ROK Basic Treaty. Japanese Labor Union
and many left-wing groups actively responded to Chinese invitation by assembling about 500
young Japanese people selected nationwide. Well aware of the purpose of this program, the
Japanese government reluctantly issued passports to 281 people before it suddenly
announced on August 18 that no more passports would be issued because a 500-men
delegation to China would be against the national interest and endanger public security.
While those who had obtained travel permission embarked on the trip to China, the rest
people staged prolonged demonstration outside government offices where violent clashes
between the protesters and riot police occurred. These people finally managed to go to
China after getting their passports in November.
Both groups of Japanese youths were received by Chinese leaders including Mao
Zedong and Zhou Enlai and arranged to visit many cities, where they vowed with their
Chinese hosts to oppose Japanese government collusion with the "American imperialism"
and the revival of Japanese militarism. The first group even held a joint parade with Chinese
youths in Shanghai and shouted anti-American slogans to about 100,000 cheering Chinese
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people along the route, which was an obvious product of Chinese government mobilization.
The completely politicized goal of the youth exchange program easily explained why the Sato
government dragged its feet in issuing travel permission to the Japanese delegation. One
year later, the government turned down passport application of the entire Japanese
delegation of 670 people.3 64
The consequence of these political restrictions on bilateral societal contacts denied
the public of unbiased, independent source information about one other country.
Throughout the 1950s and 60s, only senior Chinese government officials or cultural elites
had the privilege to visit Japan, largely to serve as agents of Chinese "People's Diplomacy,"
while ordinary Chinese people did not have first-hand experience of postwar Japanese
society. So the public knowledge about contemporary Japan was confined to government
propaganda.36" In the meantime, most Japanese could only understand Communist China
from books, news, school teaching, or anecdotes told by others who had visited China.3 66
The shortage of free information in both societies only exacerbated negative stereotypes
people held toward each other country.
364 The National Headquarters of the Japan-China Friendship Association, Nitchtu Ytikd Undo Shi, pp. 133-140.
The youth exchange program held in August and November 1965 were visually recorded in two Chinese
documentary films titled ZhongriQingnian Diyjie Youhao Da Lianhua (The first friendship gathering of Sino-
Japanese youths) and TuanjieJiushi Liliang (United we have power). For descriptions of the two films, see
Dianying Yishu (The Film Arts), No. 6, 1965 and No. 3, 1966.
365 For a keen observation by a Japanese intellectual that even the few number of Chinese cultural elite who
were fortunate to visit Japan once or two after the war ended failed to understand the postwar Japanese society,
see Takeshir6 Kuraishi, "Chfigokujin no Mita Sengo no Nihon (Postwar Japan in the Eyes of the Chinese),"
Chilo Koron No. 4 (1957). Having studied in China in prewar years, Kuraishi returned to Japan and taught at
Kyoto University and Tokyo University until the 1970s as an expert on Chinese language. He was also famous
for compiling the acclaimed Iwanami Chinese Dictionary.
366 National public opinion survey on "China and Chinese People," Mainichi Shimbun, March 1970, in Yoron
Chdsa Nenkan, 1970, p. 559. Admittedly, Japanese literature or stories told by Japanese visitors to China,
especially those left-wing Japanese, often gave favorable descriptions of China. Certain segments of the
Japanese public were attracted to China by their romanticized feeling about China's socialist achievements
rather than deep, dynamic understanding of present Chinese politics and society. The majority of the Japanese
people, however, were deeply suspicious of the leftist portrayal of a bright and liberated China. See Leng, Japan
and Communist China, pp. 114-117; Chalmers Johnson, "The Patterns of Japanese Relations with China, 1952-
1982," Pacific Affairs 59, No. 3 (1986), p. 400.
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SUMMARY
The historical evidence collected from Sino-Japanese relations during the 19 50s-60s
to test the two theories of interstate reconciliation is summarized in Table 6. It shows that
predictions made by realist theory are more congruent with the general outcome of Sino-
Japanese Non-Reconciliation and match the causes and formation process of the four
indicators of this relationship, the high alert for war, lack of national recognition, minimal
economic interaction, and outright public animosity. Historical mythmaking theory does not
fit the total lack of reconciliation momentum between the two countries during this period,
although its predictions sometimes reinforce phenomena also predicted by the realist theory,
such as the Chinese elite suspicion of the Japanese militarist revival and public hostility to
Japan.
However a less useful explanation for the reconciliation outcome, historical
mythmaking was still important factor in bilateral relations. First of all, historical ideas make
predictions consistent with the policy preferences of the Chinese and Japanese elites, who
would have embraced a higher degree of bilateral cooperation if there had not been the
overwhelming structural pressure of inter-bloc confrontation. It is true that historical ideas
were partially manipulated to serve such diplomatic preferences in the first place, such as
China's accepting Japanese myth of military clique and suppressing anti-Japanese narratives
in order to facilitate the "People's Diplomacy." But Chinese elites also had strong domestic
political and ideological objectives in mind when they created those myths convergent with
Japan's, and to better manage the relationship with China was never the main driving force
of historical mythmaking in Japan. So the causes of national myths proved to be not entirely
dominated by international structure as realist theory would predict but was to a great extent
also shaped by domestic political and ideological motivations.
Second, historical myths constructed and institutionalized during this period gained
tremendous staying power. They became the default national collective memory that proved
extremely hard to change in later periods. The resultant huge gap between the two
countries' historical memories not just prevented thorough settlement of historical account
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at the time but also blocked the path to such settlement in the future. For example, the
Chinese acceptance of the innocence of the vast majority of Japanese people and the
decision to renounce its claim to war reparation in this period largely denied the future
chance of readdressing historical issues with legal and financial measures. Study of post-
normalization bilateral relations in the following chapters shows that serious history problem
later really harks back to historical myths made during the 1950s-60s.
Table 6: Theory-testing Summary (Sino-Japanese Relations 1950s-60s)
PREDICTIONS THEORY
(I) Realist Theory (II) Theory of OUTCOMES ASSESSMENT
Historical Mythmaking
Causes of National myths are mere elite National myths are shaped by Japanese conservative elites created war myths to Theory II better fits
Historical propaganda to justify national a multitude of instrumental consolidate state power and justify Japan's strategic the evidence
Myths security policy motivations including strategic collaboration with the U.S.;
goals, domestic political Chinese Communists used war myths to invent a
interests, and ideological class-based communist national identity that coulddoctrines rally public support to the government's internal and
external policies
Interstate Non-Reconciliation as a Shallow-Reconciliation as a Non-Reconciliation Theory I better fits
Reconciliation result of negative structural result of Conflictual/Quasi- the evidence
Result conditions (inter-bloc rivalry Convergent narratives
rather than direct bilateral
security dilemma)
Indicators of 1: Expectation of imminent mutual war - Theory I better fits
Interstate High alert for war caused by Moderate expectation of war Chinese perception was mainly shaped by concerns the evidence;
Reconciliation ter-bloc confrontation because the historical about the U.S.-Japan collaboration in containment; Theory II supports
Stageinterbloc confrontation because the historical Chinese suspicion of
narratives generated mistrust Japanese right-wing feared monolithic communism Japan on a regular
but did not instigate and Chinese military power, while both right wing basis but not highimmediate confrontation and moderate mainstream feared communist alert of war
infiltration and war entanglement;
China's media camapaign to attack reviving
Japanese militarism can be explained by strategic
reasons;
Japanese reaction to Chinese media campaign was
rather rationally than emotionally based.
Table 6 continued
2:
No national recognition
because of pressure from bloc
leaders
3:
Scarce economic interaction
due to the fear of adverse
relative gains
4:
Outright popular animosity
caused by perception of
bilateral strategic conflict or
government manipulation of
public opinion to foster such
perception
Partial national recognition
because narratives did not
contain critical
land/resources/ethnic
disputes or raise historical
atonement as precondition for
normalization
Limited economic links with
frictions fed by negative
historical legacies
Simmering grievances and
mistrust derived from
historical memories should
lead to popular estrangement
but no request for direct
confrontation
No national recognition -
Despite its exceptionally generous policy on history
to write offJapan's historical debts, Beijing's
"People's Diplomacy" failed to bring about Japanese
recognition because Japan was constrained by both
the U.S.-led Cold War framework and domestic
Taiwan Lobby to recognize the Taiwan regime
Minimal economic interaction -
Japan's economic policy to China was constrained
by its participation in the U.S.-led economic warfare
against the Socialist Bloc for fear of adverse relative
gains and commitment not to allow economic
interactions to undermine the Cold War strategy of
isolating China;
China tried to manipulate bilateral economic
relations to serve strategic goals of undermining U.S.
containment, for which it was willing to sacrifice
economic interests;
Historical legacies was never an obstacle to bilateral
economic interaction
Public hatred and fear -
Chinese public opinion was largely manipulated by
strategically-oriented government propaganda and
reinforced by historical memory;
Japanese feeling was mainly shaped by disgust with
Communist ideology, fear about Chinese power, and
concerns about war entanglement
Theory I better fits the
evidence;
Theory II is consistent
with policy
preferences rather
than policy outcomes
Theory I better fits the
evidence;
Theory II is consistent
with policy
preferences rather
than policy outcomes
Theory I better fits the
evidence;
Theory I and II both
support Chinese
popular hostility to
Japan
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Indicators of
Interstate
Reconciliation
Outcomes
Chapter Four
The "Honeymoon" Period: Sino-Japanese Relations, 1972-1981
This chapter explains the significant progress in Sino-Japanese reconciliation from
their diplomatic normalization in 1972 to the beginning of the 1980s. I first examine the two
causal variables in question, international system and history-making practices in both
countries, and deduce from them competing predictions for bilateral relations. The
subsequent section will test the degree of congruence between the predictions and actual
outcomes by process-tracing the development of Sino-Japanese relations during this period.
This section argues that the profound change in international power structure was the
primary driving force behind the relationship improvement while their historiographic
disagreements were intentionally limited, covered up, or simply set aside to clear the way for
the more immediate strategic needs. On the other hand, the case study also shows that
positive systemic conditions alone failed to bring about deep reconciliation predicted by
realist theory. Japan's reluctance to form a tight military alliance with China provocative to
the Soviets and China's deep-rooted suspicion of Japan derived from bitter war memories
stood out to be the major obstacles to the forging of solid bilateral friendship. So the
combination of both structural factors and historical memory brought about a generally
warm and cooperative relationship that nevertheless falls short of truly stable peace and
amicable atmosphere, which is best categorized into the sub-stage of "Shallow
Reconciliation-Rapprochement."
CAUSAL FACTORS AND PREDICTIONS
Positive International Structural Conditions
Sino-US Rapprochement and the Fragile Ditente
The international power configuration underwent profound transformation during
this period when China formed strategic collaboration with the U.S. to balance a more
imminent threat from its former socialist ally, the Soviet Union. Such a sea change in
international system created rather positive structural conditions for China's reconciliation
with Japan, America's most important Asian ally.
Tensions between the two socialist giants, the Soviet Union and China, began to rise
since the late 1950s due to their intense competition for the leadership of the international
communist movement and Chinese grievances about what they saw as Soviet chauvinistic
attempt to infringe on China's sovereignty rights and force China into a status of
subordination in the alliance.367 Moscow showed gross disrespect for the national
sovereignty of its junior allies in its invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and the
Brezhnev Doctrine enunciated post hoc that tried to justify its right for armed intervention
in other socialist states to manipulate their regimes. Worse than that, Moscow built up its
forces along China's northern border and promoted a hostile Asian collective security pact
with China's regional adversaries, such as India, Japan, and Vietnam. Heated border clashes
occurred in March 1969 between Soviet and Chinese troops along their border formed by
the Amur River and Ussuri River, and spread from there to Central Asia. Soviet military
deployment along the Sino-Soviet border increased from 30 divisions in 1970 to 44 divisions
a year later.368 With Washington beginning its gradual extrication from the war in Indochina
through the policy of Vietnamization and Moscow's hostility to Beijing showed no signs of
abating, the Soviet Union replaced the United States to be a potentially more dangerous and
immediate adversary to China.
In order to find a counterweight to neutralize the immediate Soviet threat, Beijing
moved away from its strategy of struggling against both superpowers in the 1960s and
reached out to the West. Chinese intention coincided with the interests of the Nixon
administration that was seeking Chinese support to its immediate policy of ending the
367 On the history of Sino-Soviet friction since late 1950s to mid-1960s, see Michael Yahuda, China's Role in
WorldAffairs (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), Chapter 4.
368 Joseph Y. S. Cheng, "Mao Zedong's Perception of the World in 1968-1972: Rationale for the Sino-
American Rapprochement," The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 7, No. 3-4 (Fall-Winter 1998), p.
251.
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Vietnam War and the long-term goal of balancing the Soviet power that had managed to
reach a rare strategic parity with the U.S. So Harry Harding argues that it is perception of
each other's weakness vis-a-vis Moscow that brought Washington and Beijing together.
Sino-US ambassadorial talks reopened in Warsaw in January 1970, but a breakthrough in
their relations did not materialize right away because of internal opposition, represented by
Lin Bao, to Mao's dramatic shift of strategy and the escalation of the war in Indochina
following American invasion of Cambodia in May.
It was only until the autumn that Mao's policy of rapprochement with the U.S. was
adopted as the party's general line and progress in bilateral relations started to take place.
After a series of diplomatic exchanges including ping-pong diplomacy and Kissinger's two
legendary missions to China in 1971, President Nixon went to China in February 1972 and
signed the Shanghai Communique. The Chinese government was particularly pleased with
the fact that Nixon visited China before going to Moscow and accepted a reference in the
communique to oppose to "hegemony," China's code word for the Soviet Union.369
Therefore, the Shanghai Communique heralded a new strategic partnership between China
and the United States, who had been fiercely hostile to each other in the past two decades
but now shared the common security interest to check the Soviet predominance. 370
But the US-China-USSR triangular relations did not instantly shift towards an
ostensible Sino-US alignment against the Soviet Union, the direction that China would have
preferred. During the Nixon-Ford period, American foreign policy was to improve relations
with Beijing and construct detente with Moscow simultaneously. In its annual foreign policy
report issued on the eve of his trip to China, Nixon dismissed the view that American policy
toward China was aimed against Moscow.371 Henry Kissinger, who was the key architect of
detente policy, said in his memoir that "It (triangular diplomacy) must avoid the impression
369 The Shanghai Communique, February 27, 1972, in Hinton, The People's Republic of China, 1949-1979, pp.
2362-2363.
370 The discussion here of dramatic transformation of the U.S., USSR and China strategic triangle in the 1970s
draws heavily on Lowell Dittmer, "The Strategic Triangle: An Elementary Game-Theoretical Analysis," World
Politics 33, No. 4 (1981); Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet relationsfrom Nixon to
Reagan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994), Chapters 6-7, Chapter 20; Harding, A Fragile
Relationship, Chapter 2.
that one is 'using' either of the (other) contenders against the other; otherwise one becomes
vulnerable to retaliation or blackmail. The hostility between China and the Soviet Union
served our purposes best if we maintained closer relations with each side than they did with
each other."372
Washington's even-handed policy towards Beijing and Moscow only melted away
towards the late 1970s, when Moscow adopted an active policy of military intervention in
the Third World, including the Soviet-Cuban intervention in the Horn of Africa and Soviet
support of Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978, and its own invasion of Afghanistan
in 1979. As superpower d6tente deteriorated into confrontation, Washington drew closer to
Beijing, who had persistently treated Moscow as the most dangerous enemy even during the
detente years. As a result, China and the U.S. signed the communique of diplomatic
normalization in December 1978 that announced American diplomatic recognition of the
PRC and reiterated the anti-hegemony line. Shortly afterward, Deng Xiaoping visited
America, where he openly denounced Soviet hegemonism and sought American
endorsement of China's military action to contain the Soviet-supported Vietnam. China also
began to receive limited amounts of American military technology since 1980.373 By that
time, the strategic triangle had transformed from a "romantic marriage" structure pivoted on
the U.S. to a "stable marriage" between China and the U.S. in the face of increasingly
audacious Soviet expansion.374
Predictions for Sino-Japanese Relations
Realist theory would predict significant progress in Sino-Japanese reconciliation
process. Concretely speaking, the escalation of Sino-Soviet confrontation by the end of the
1960s and the subsequent dramatic Sino-US rapprochement should drive China and Japan,
371 "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of Peace; A Report to the Congress by Richard
Nixon, President of the United States, Issued on February 9, 1972. Quoted from Garthoff, Detente and
Confrontation, p. 266.
372 Quoted from Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 277.
373 William T. Tow, "China and the International Strategic System," in Thomas W. Robinson and David L.
Shambaugh Chinese Foreign Poligy, p. 137; Robert E. Bedeski, The Fragile Entente (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983),
p. 182.
374 Lowell Dittmer, "The Strategic Triangle," p. 59.
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the most important American ally in Asia, towards strategic alignment against their common
Soviet threat. Such positive structural conditions should play a decisive role in diminishing
elite expectation of armed conflict with one another state and propelling their diplomatic
normalization and settlement of major controversies on national sovereignty. Common
security interest should also give rise to their close military collaboration as well as
comprehensive economic interdependence in terms of both economic sensitivity and
strategic vulnerability.
Regarding popular relations, realist theory suggests that the security incentives to
counteract the Soviet threat should generate firm solidarity between the two nations because
popular feeling is malleable and can be fully penetrated by structural conditions.
Consequently, a strong sense of closeness and mutual trust should grow between the
ordinary Japanese and Chinese people, and any negative emotions and perception of threat
derived from historical memory should be eliminated. The positive structural conditions
should also remove previous travel restrictions imposed for political reasons, which would
greatly facilitate intimate, dynamic interaction between the two nations. Therefore, the
amicable atmosphere at the popular level should not be the product of people's imagination
or pure government propaganda but based on reasonably accurate information of each other
society. In general, one should expect to see the emergence of deep reconciliation between
China and Japan during the 1970s.
Historiographic Continuity
In the years between 1972-1981, the pattern and content of historical mythmaking by
Japanese and Chinese ruling elites were by and large unchanged from the previous period.
War memories of the two countries continued to converge on some mythical interpretations
while their points of divergence were intentionally limited or covered up, albeit due to a
different set of reasons from the previous stage. Consequently, despite their historical
mythmaking and lack of settlement of historical account, bilateral political controversy over
war historiography was by and large absent during this period.
Continuity in Chinese Historiography
Chinese war historiography retained most of the self-glorifying, other-maligning and
self-justification myths constructed and institutionalized before. First of all, the sharp
contrast between the righteous CCP and evil KMT was still a central theme in official war
history. It is true that the security and legitimacy challenge to the Communist government
posed by the Nationalist regime in Taiwan diminished significantly. However, Taipei was
still a strong political and military adversary of Beijing because Washington kept diplomatic
relations with Taipei until January 1979 and maintained defense commitments to it
throughout the 1970s. Although the possibility of a direct attack by "the U.S. imperialist and
Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces" seemed low, it was still a top political agenda for the
Chinese government to isolate Taiwan on world diplomatic stage and insulate its influence
from ordinary Chinese people.
In the meantime, the communist ideological propaganda remained strong despite the
decline of class struggle campaign after the climax of the Cultural Revolution and China's
accommodative policy to the capitalist America. It was partly due to inertia, but more
importantly because of the still strong influence of the radical forces in Chinese domestic
politics after Lin Bao died. But even after the downfall of the Gang of Four in 1976, a class-
based ideology was still much needed to salvage public reverence to the party leadership that
had been clearly responsible for initiating and perpetuating the radical, catastrophic political
turmoil. Facing challenge from the burgeoning dissident movement in the late 1970s calling
for "the fifth modernization," democracy, the new generation of communist leaders was
determined to reconfirm the orthodox status of Maoist ideology lest the party's political
dominance be undermined.
Therefore, Deng Xiaoping gave an important speech at the theoretical conference of
the party in March 1979 that enunciated the following "Four Cardinal Principles (Sixiang
Jiben Yuanze)": We must keep to the socialist road; We must uphold the dictatorship of the
proletariat; We must uphold the leadership of the Communist Party; We must uphold
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought."375 And in an authoritative evaluation of the
Cultural Revolution and the legacy of Mao that the CCP Central Committee completed in
375 See "Uphold the Four Cardinal Principles," in Xiaoping Deng, Selected works of Deng Xiaoping 1975-1982
(Beijing: Renmin Chuban She, 1994), pp. 166-191.
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1981, it was claimed that Mao had been correct 70 percent of the time and at fault for only
30 percent of the time, and any attempt to use Mao's mistakes to "try to negate the scientific
value of Mao Zedong thought and to deny its guiding role in our revolution and our
construction" would be "entirely wrong." So it was concluded that "socialism and socialism
alone can save China." 376
So in a new ideological offensive to shore up the party's prestige and legitimacy, and
the antagonism between the CCP and KMT in the history again made a typical example of
the irreconcilable contradiction between the proletariat and capitalist classes. The first two
editions of post-Cultural Revolution Chinese history textbook published in 1978 and 1981
hardly changed the wording in glorifying the CCP leadership and bashing the defeatist and
reactionary KMT government during the war of resistance against Japan.377 The movie
industry resumed production of revolutionary films since 1979 along a similar propaganda
line. However, compared to those made in the earlier period, new movies on the war
focused more on individual experiences than the military struggle themselves, and depicted
the heroic image of the CCP-led soldiers from a more humanistic perspective.378
The continuing salience of communist ideology also sustained a generally negative
image of America in official interpretation of the war history. History textbook still
criticized American assistance to the KMT in waging the civil war against the communist
forces. However, apparently reflecting the newly formed Sino-American strategic
alignment, textbooks and media commemorative articles no longer accused the U.S. of
conniving Japanese aggression. Meanwhile, except for one sentence on Soviet attack of
Japanese troops in Manchuria by the end of the war, the 1978 history textbook deleted past
treatment on Soviet aid to Chinese war efforts. Only when Sino-Soviet relations began to
thaw in the early 1980s did the topic of Soviet aid receive brief mentioning in the 1981
edition textbook.37"
376 Quoted in Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: W.W. Norton), p. 679.
377 See MST 5, Vol. 4; MST 6, Vol. 4.
378 Interview with a senior faculty member of the Beijing Film Academy on November 22, 2002. Also see
Dangdai Zhongguo Dianying, Vol. 1, pp. 362-366; Si Chun, "Zhuoyi Miaoyie Renwu de Dute Minyun
(Concentrating on Describing the Distinctive Fates of Individual Characters)," Dianying Yishu (The Film Arts),
April 1980.
379 See MST 5, Vol. 4; MST 6, Vol. 4.
Another major myth that was kept intact was the distinction between Japanese
militarists and ordinary Japanese people. Unlike in the previous period when this historical
myth was promoted to encourage the Japanese government to adopt a less hostile policy to
China, now it was used to justify the newly established friendship between the two countries.
Japan's strategic and political cooperation was important to China's strategy of forming a
broad anti-Soviet alignment. In addition, Japanese economic aid and advance technology
were also essential to the success of China's ambitious program of "Four Modernizations,"
which was first proposed by Zhou Enlai in January 1975 and designated as the top national
priority at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP in December
1978. So the official Chinese war historiography de-emphasized the conflict period,
stressed their friendly interaction in the long history of bilateral relations, as well as highlight
the common victimization of both the Chinese and Japanese people during the war. All
these themes converged with the prevailing "myth of military clique" and victim
consciousness in Japanese mainstream historiography.
So Zhou Enlai reaffirmed this historical view at the welcome banquet for Prime
Minister Tanaka on September 25, 1972, when he stated that the few militarists must be
strictly distinguished from the vast majority of the Japanese people, and that both the
Chinese and Japanese people were traumatized during the war.380 For a whole decade since
then, Chinese government statements and official media had consistently propagated this
contrast of good Japanese versus bad Japanese. Textbook coverage of Japanese military
savagery and Chinese people's suffering was confined to simple and general descriptions.
The above-mentioned new war movies also paid little direct attention to these aspects of the
war. In fact, during this period the film industry made less movies on the war of resistance
against Japan than those on CCP revolutionary struggle with the KMT before and after the
war. Besides, due to the nation's fresh memory of the Cultural Revolution, a so-called "the
Literature of Wounds" reflecting on the most recent horrors and tragedies became so
popular that artistic representation of the war was pushed down the ladder of importance.
The only exception to such low-key treatment of the war by the film industry was the
sensational movie, Yipan Wei Xiawan de Qi (An Unfinished Go Game), jointly produced by
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Chinese and Japanese artists to commemorate the 10 anniversary of bilateral diplomatic
normalization.38 1 This film was made under the direct supervision of the Culture
Department of the Chinese State Council. The movie tells a tragic story of two families of
go players, one from China and the other from Japan, whose dream to bring the skill and art
of go-playing to perfection through cross-national exchange was smashed by the evil
Japanese militarists. The intimate links between the two families, a symbol of Sino-Japanese
friendship, was highlighted by their common cultural roots, ties by marriage, and shared
experience of suffering - almost to an equal degree of severity, as one family lost a son and
the daughter of the other family was mentally traumatized - at the hand of Japanese military
police during the war. This movie conveys a straightforward message that both Chinese and
Japanese people were victims of the Japanese militarists and they should move beyond past
trauma to construct a relationship of peace and friendship.
Dominance of Conservative Historiography in Japan
Just like in the previous period, to remain in power was still the primary political goal
of Japanese conservative elites. By the end of the 1960s, traditional opposition parties like
the JCP expanded electoral gains while several new opposition parties were created,
including the Japan Democratic Socialist Party and the K6meito, mostly in response to
LDP's failure to address various social ills generated by the rapid industrialization. While
ideological polarization had contracted in the Diet due to the sharp decline of the JSP's share
of popular votes and diet seats, the opposition competition was no less intense in light of the
budding multiparty system.382 In the 1972 general election, the LDP won fewer seats than
ever before, sparking for the first time the fear of an end to its political dominance since the
"1955 system" was established. At the local level, the party hegemony confronted credible
threat from the rise of opposition prefectural and municipal governments, as well as the
380 Tian, Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji, Vol. 2, pp. 103-104.
381 While the movie was released in August 1982 in the middle of the Japanese textbook controversy, the script
revision and film production process was mainly conducted between 1979-1981 when Sino-Japanese relations
were still in the honeymoon period. For more on this movie, see Hong Zhou & Kang Tong, " 'Yipan Wei
Xiawan de Qi' Juben Chuangzuo Shimo (The Beginning and End of the Script Production Process of 'An
Unfinished Go Game'), Dianying Yishu (The Film Arts), November 1982; Wang Binnan, "Zhunzhong Lishi,
Zhenxi Youyi (Respecting History, Cherishing Friendship)," and Pinhua Sun, "Xiezai 'Yipan Wei Xiawan de
Qi' Shangying Zhiqian (Written before the Show of 'An Unfinished Go Game')." In Zhongguo Dianying
Nianjian (The Yearbook of Chinese Movie), 1983, pp. 328-329.
surging citizen movements demanding better government service to improve the quality of
life that had been ignored by the growth-oriented policy before.383 These challenges were
compounded by the economic disarray following the Oil Shock and public resentment of
LDP corruption, which culminated in the Lockheed scandal that even implicated Prime
Minister Tanaka Kakuei.
In the face of mounting societal dissatisfaction, Japanese conservatives again found
historical mythmaking a useful strategy to consolidate their control of state power and arrest
the popularity decline of LDP leaders. In he 1970s, the same kind of whitewashing and self-
glorifying myths regarding the past conflict with China continued to be purveyed as the
mainstay of national historiography. The government maintained an evasive attitude on the
issue of war responsibility while praising the military for its spirit of sacrifice and
emphasizing Japanese victimization. On August 15, 1975, Miki Takeo became the first
postwar Japanese prime minister to worship at Yasukuni. Since then, Japanese prime
ministers routinely worshiped there, even though executed Class A war criminals including
Tojo were enshrined there in 1978. Moreover, newly found documents suggested the Showa
emperor's significant role during the war and polling data showed that more than half of
Japanese people found the official position on the emperor's innocence suspicious. But
when the emperor visited Europe in 1971 and the US in 1975, in both trips Japanese
government avoided the question of emperor's war responsibility.384
Neither did Japanese government make any significant restitution efforts to address
its historical debts to Asian war victims. It is true that Tokyo took some major diplomatic
actions to foster political and economic cooperation with Southeast Asia, South Korea, and
China during this period. In a famous speech at the end of his tour of six ASEAN countries
in August 1977, Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo proclaimed that Japan desired to develop a
heart-to-heart relationship with ASEAN countries. This is the so-called "Fukuda Doctrine,"
which marked an important milestone in postwar Japan's diplomacy towards Southeast Asia.
However, Japan's issuing of "Fukuda Doctrine" was by no means driven by an aspiration to
382 Curtis, The Japanese Way of Politics, pp. 18-30.
383 Curtis, The Japanese Way of Politics, pp. 62-64.
384 Yoshida, Nihonjin no Sensdkan, pp. 161-164.
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atone for its past aggression, but by some more practical interests important at the time. In
his memoir Fukuda explained that, in the wake of the fall of Saigon and U.S. withdrawal
from South Vietnam, Japan's closer cooperation with Southeast Asia would ease the feeling
of uncertainty permeating the region and contribute to a stable environment; and it was also
essential to the economic prosperity of Japan itself.385 Similarly, relationship between Japan
and South Korea progressed considerably in the late 1970s, motivated by both their
common concern about American policy of retrenchment in East Asia and mutual economic
interest.386 But Japan took hardly any concrete measures to express repentance for causing
suffering to Korean people during the colonial era. When addressing domestic audience,
Prime Minister Tanaka even sought to justify Japan's colonial rule of Korea by saying that it
made positive contribution to the development of Korean education and economy.387
As far as mass education of war history is concerned, since the early 1970s textbooks
gave some coverage of Asian people's suffering inflicted by the Japanese military. Often
buried in footnotes and without boldface print, however, the new information had very
limited pedagogical impact.388 In the meantime, Ienaga won partial victory in his textbook
lawsuits when Tokyo District Court ruled twice in 1970 and 1974 against the abuse of power
by Mombush6 in ordering specific changes in educational content, but the verdicts still
affirmed the constitutionality of government screening of textbooks. In 1973, the Ministry
approved lenaga's textbook that contained more detailed descriptions of Japanese aggression
in South Korea and China.389
But such slight revision of the canonized conservative historiography soon provoked
a new wave of push for tightening up textbook control. In 1980, conservative elites
launched the so-called "Biased Textbooks Campaign (Kenkd Kyokasho Kyanpein)," the second
postwar crackdown on progressive elements of textbook content since the "UreubekZ'
campaign of the 1950s. A host of articles published in conservative journals to attack the
385 Takeo Fukuda, Kaiko KIjuinen (Recollection ofNinety Years) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995), pp. 276-280.
386 Victor Cha, Alignment despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1999), Chapter 5.
387 Tanaka's speech at the plenary session of the Lower House on January 24, 1974, quoted in Yoshida, Nihonjin
no Sensdkan, p. 139; Wakamiya, The Postwar Conservative View ofAsia, pp. 195-196.
388 Fish, "From The Manchurian Incident to Nagasaki in 20 Pages."
389 Nozaki and Inokuchi, "Japanese Education, Nationalism, and Ienaga Saburo's Textbook Lawsuits," p. 111.
progressive trend in school education were echoed by some LDP cabinet members such as
Justice Minister Okuno Seisuke and Education Minister Tanaka Tatsuo, who issued
statements criticizing the lack of patriotism in current school textbooks. The LDP even set
up several subcommittees at the end of 1980 to consider the reform of the entire education
system. In June 1981, the Subcommittee on the Textbook Problem published a report that
advocated the strengthening of textbook authorization and limiting of the influence of the
left-wing JTU. Based on the report the LDP called for revising school textbooks. History
textbooks was a natural target of the campaign. Education Minister Tanaka explicitly told
textbook writers and publishers in their preparation of textbooks for the 1983-6 triennium to
"soften their approach to Japan's excesses during World War II" and place more stress on
patriotism. As the statement issued by the LDP party conference in January 1982 pointed
out, the conservative government desired to use school education to "cultivate the Japanese
spirit and foster national pride." As a result, Japanese school textbooks in this period
continued to glorify the Japanese military while encouraging public amnesia of its crimes."
Predictions for Sino-Japanese Relations
To sum up, in the 1970s Japanese and Chinese ruling elite basically perpetuated those
old historical myths originally constructed and purveyed in the 1950s and 1960s. The
relationship between their war narratives remained conflictural/quasi-convergent, not combative.
There was considerable overlap between some of their important interpretations, and public
attention to those areas where significant disagreements existed was rather lacking. With
little variation on the independent variable from the previous stage, historical mythmaking
theory would predict no major change with regard to the dependent variable of bilateral
relations. Sino-Japanese relations should stay in Shallow Reconciliation in the 1970s if the
history factor is indeed the dominant driving force of interstate reconciliation.
EXPLANING THE OUTCOME
390 Caroline Rose, Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations: A Case Study in Political Decision-making (London;
New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 68-71.
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Upon diplomatic normalization the two countries progressed significantly on the
path of reconciliation, which is more congruent with the prediction of realist theory than
historical mythmaking theory. Process-tracing of the four main indicators of Sino-Japanese
relations in the 1970s also demonstrates that the shift in international systemic environment
generated the biggest momentum for their close cooperation in inter-governmental
dimension while bilateral disagreements on the history issue did not stop such cooperation
from taking place. However, because the two governments attempted to conclude the
history issue with haste and prematurity, they failed to bridge historiographic gap through
serious joint research and restitution measures. This impeded the neutralization of negative
public emotions and the rise of genuine mutual trust between both the two countries, which
constituted an important factor preventing bilateral relations from reaching the stage of deep
reconciliation. So the relationship outcome was in the Shallow Reconciliation-
Rapprochement stage, which fits the prediction of historical mythmaking theory better.
Moderate Expectation of War
Strategic Incentives for Sino-Japanese Cooperation
As the Sino-Soviet confrontation escalated sharply while China and the U.S. reached
political rapprochement, defending the country against the Soviet threat rather than
"American imperialism" became the primary goal of China's security policy. Therefore, for
the first time in postwar history, China's security interests came to great convergence with
that of Japan, which also saw the Soviet Union as posing the most serious challenges to its
military security. The emergence of a common security threat created strong incentives for
China and Japan to develop a new relationship of strategic cooperation.
The formidable Soviet threat notwithstanding, China and Japan would have been less
eager to join hands if they had received unwavering American support to their national
defense. As Victor Cha argues in his quasi-alliance model, two states facing high threat
levels may not form tight alignment if the common ally maintains a strong commitment to
collective defense. It is because their security needs have been met while additional
commitments between themselves would only raise the danger of entrapment.391 But in the
1970s China did not find American security support sufficient and reliable. Beijing actually
watched the East-West d6tente with great anxiety. As mentioned above, America's even-
handed policy towards Beijing and Moscow prevented the Sino-American rapprochement
from espousing a clear-cut theme of confrontation with Moscow. Mao reportedly
complained to Kissinger that the U.S. had been ineffective in resisting Soviet
expansionism.3 92 So while opting to align with "American imperialism" because it feared the
"Soviet social imperialism" even more, Beijing did not take American cooperation for
granted and intended to bring more countries into the struggle against Soviet hegemonism.
Beijing's desire to expand international support base was evidenced by its revival of
the "united front" strategy since 1970 that had been left in obscurity during the height of the
Cultural Revolution. At the twelfth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee of October
1968 and Ninth Party Congress of April 1969, the scope of united front was expanded to
include not just socialist countries and all the oppressed people and nations but also
"countries having different social systems" on the basis of the Five Principles of peaceful
coexistence that Zhou Enlai advocated during the Bangdung Conference.3 93 Along this line
Beijing formulated the "Three Worlds Theory," which was formally presented by Deng
Xiaoping in a speech at the United Nation Assembly in 1974. The theory categorized the
America and Soviet Union as the "First World," the middle-sized Western powers the
"Second World," and the developing countries including China itself as the "Third World."
And it argued that superpower competition for hegemony was the main source of
international instability, to curb which all "progressive forces" of the Third World and the
Second World should combine their power to struggle for world peace and development.3 94
The strategic goal of building a broad international united front against the Soviet
Union clearly motivated China to seek early diplomatic normalization with Japan, an
391 For an elaboration of the quasi-alliance model, see Cha, Alignment despite Antagonism, pp. 48-50; idem.,
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393 Cheng, "Mao Zedong's Perception of the World in 1968-1972," pp. 243-244.
394 William T. Tow, "China and the International Strategic System," p. 130.
important representative of the Second World in Asia. In a classified report on international
situation presented within the party in December 1971, Zhou Enlai made it clear that
China's main enemies were the United States and Soviet Union, and China should extend the
international united front to the two "Intermediate Zones," the first including Asia, Africa,
and Latin America, and the second including West Europe, Japan, Canada and Oceania. He
further suggested to scale down ideological attacks on countries of the second intermediate
zone and develop relationship with members of the capitalist ruling class so that China could
have fewer enemies and more allies.3 95
In addition, shortly before Prime Minister Tanaka came to China to finalize
normalization terms, the CCP Central Committee issued a document on the significance of
the upcoming negotiation with Tanaka on diplomatic normalization. It called the
negotiation "an important strategic step of Chairman Mao and the party" because it would
first of all "contribute to the struggle against the American and Soviet hegemony, especially
the Soviet revisionism," and also be useful to fighting Japanese militarism, liberating Taiwan
and mitigating tension in Asia.396 In the text of Sino-Japanese joint communique of
September 1972, Beijing insisted on inserting an anti-hegemony clause, which had clear
strategic connotation of counterbalancing the Soviet Union.
Another direct result of its desire to turn Japan into a security partner against the
common Soviet threat was the dramatic shift in China's attitude toward Japanese
rearmament and the U.S.-Japan alliance. Until the opening of Sino-American secret talks on
rapprochement, Beijing had persistently opposed Japanese military buildup and demanded
U.S. troops withdrawal from Japan. In these talks, Kissinger reassured China that Japanese
rearmament was in response to the Soviet threat in the region rather than to threaten China
and that the U.S. presence in Japan actually corked the revival of Japanese militarism rather
395 "Shfi Onlai Kokusai Josei ni Kansuru Himitsu Ensetsu (Zhou Enlai's Secrete Speeches on the Current
International Situation)," Chfi6 Koron, November 1976, pp. 163-169.
396 "Guanyu Jiedai Riben Tianzhong Shouxiang Fanghua de Neibu Xuanchuan Tigang (The Internaal
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175
than encouraged it.397 When Nixon visited China in February 1972, he again stressed that
Japan should not be left "neutral and unarmed," and it was in the common interest of China
and the U.S. for American military presence in Europe and Japan to be maintained at its
present level. "If we were to leave Japan naked and defenseless," Nixon warned Zhou Enlai,
"they would have to turn to others for help or build the capability to defend themselves. If
we had no defense arrangement with Japan, we would have no influence where they were
concerned."
What Nixon alluded to in these remarks was the prospect of Japanese-Soviet
alignment or the strengthening of Japan's independent defense capabilities, both striking the
sensitive nerve of the Chinese leaders.3 98 While the later option had more to do with
Chinese memory of Japanese aggression, which will be discussed later in this chapter, the
former was more a realpolitik concern. In fact, throughout the 1970s, Chinese leaders were
never completely confident that Japan would stand firmly with China in the general
atmosphere of East-West Detente. Since the end of the 1960s Moscow had tried to sell to
Asian countries the idea of forming an Asian collective security system, which was seen by
Beijing as a conspiracy to encircle China. Almost immediately after the Sino-Japanese
normalization, Moscow made open protest to Tokyo regarding the anti-hegemony clause of
the joint communique, in response to which Foreign Minister Ohira flew to Moscow in
October to explain to Soviet foreign minister Gromyko that the clause was not intended as
an anti-Soviet mutual defense pact.
Largely in order to appease Moscow, the Tanaka administration set out in the next
year to negotiate Japanese-Soviet diplomatic normalization. It was rather disturbing to
Chinese leaders that Japanese-Soviet negotiation gave the Soviets another chance to
persuade Japan to support the Asian collective security system.3" In an inner-party speech
of March 1973, Zhou Enlai noted the multiple characters of Japanese foreign policy by
pointing out that Japan was relying on the U.S., embracing China, while at the same time
397 See recollections of John Holdridge, who accompanied Kissinger to Beijing in July 1971, that were quoted in
Christensen, A Troubled Triangle, pp. 33-34.
398 Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p. 567. Also see
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trying to improve relationship with the Soviet Union. Zhou indicated his belief that Japan
actually adopted anti-Soviet policy politically and militarily, though in appearance it was
seeking accommodation with the Soviet Union. Then, as if to address remaining concerns
of himself and other Chinese leaders, he still admitted that Japan was standing at the cross-
road without deciding where to go, and suggested that much work was needed to further
China's connections with Japan.400
It is the fear that Tokyo might opt for neutrality that propelled Beijing to accept
Nixon's view that the U.S.-Japan security alliance should be taken as an integral part of the
overall strategy of balancing the Soviet threat. As if to add annotation to the American
argument, former JDA director and then Minister of International Trade and Industry
Nakasone showed a map to Zhou Enlai on January 17-19 1973 that the majority of Japanese
military power was concentrated in Hokkaido and meant to guard against the Soviet Union
rather than China.40' Nakasone's map might have indeed impressed Chinese leader for it
was on January 18 that Zhou told visiting Dietman Kimura Takeo about China's positive
attitude regarding the U.S.-Japan alliance, which it used to accuse of threatening China's vital
national interest. In the meeting Zhou said that "it has to be admitted that U.S.-Japan
security treaty is necessary for Japan, so is American nuclear umbrella to counterbalance the
Soviet Union."402 In October, Chinese foreign minister Ji Pengfei further explained to the
Japanese that China could understand the alliance because "(it) needs to be maintained in
order to protect yourselves from Soviet threat. Although it is desirable for Japan to keep
independent defense capability, Japan is now placed under American nuclear umbrella,
making it unrealistic to scrap the alliance relationship. I think that Japan has to depend on
the U.S. to certain extent." 4 3
In line with the attempt to draw Japan to an anti-Soviet strategic alignment, Beijing
endorsed and sometimes even encouraged Japanese defense buildup.404 Deng Xiaoping,
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who was temporarily restored to power in the mid-1970s after being purged by the political
radicals, told visiting Japanese Diet members that "it is necessary for China and Japan to join
hands to be prepared for the 'North'," and he "support the strengthening of Japanese self-
defense power."4 5 When meeting visiting Japanese defense experts in 1977, Liao Chengzhi
gave a three-point message that criticized Japan for being too relaxed about the Soviet threat,
admitted that the U.S.-Japan security system was the most important foreign policy for
Japan, and pointed out the significance of the Sino-Japanese relations. Considered in the
context of the ongoing China-Japan Peace and Friendship Treaty (PFT) negotiation, Liao's
message was intended to show that Japan's equal-distant diplomacy to Beijing and Moscow
was merely wishful thinking and urge Japan to develop necessary military capabilities to
counterbalance the Soviet Union. 406
Soon after the PFT was signed, Liao reiterated Chinese position that the U.S.-Japan
alliance was now useful in light of Soviet expansion and Japan needed more self-defense
power. And to the surprise of the outside world, Liao openly expressed disagreement with
China's long-time political friend, the JSP, by claiming that China had never supported
unarmed neutrality of Japan since 1952.4o7 Perhaps China's most straightforward urging of
Japanese defense buildup within a reasonable scope was conveyed by Wu Xiuquan, then the
Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA, in April 1978 to the delegation of Japanese military
reporters:
"The SDF's role has two aspects of both oppressing the people and defending (national)
independence. (We) should emphasize the second aspect and must not treat the SDF as enemy. As
far as China is concerned, we hope that the SDF would strengthen its capabilities and become a
military that can defend Japan independence. We must oppose it if the SDF becomes militaristic, but
I do not think it is turning militaristic." 408
As far as Japanese leaders are concerned, many existing studies argue that whether
or not Japan could normalize relations with China "was a matter of survival in domestic
politics." Tanaka was able to win the prime minister election in July 1972 precisely because
he vowed to pursue bilateral normalization as the government's top priority and won backup
from multiple factions wihtin the LDP. So the normalization issue between China and Japan
405 Tadashi It6, "Kore ga Beichinichi Gunji Teikei no Jittai da (This Is the Fact of U.S.-China-Japan Military
Cooperation)," Chfi6 K6ron No. 10 (1978), p. 164.
406 "Chiigoku no Gunjiryoku o Mite (Observing Chinese Military Power)," Chii6 K6ron, September 1977.
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actually became one between various Japanese political actors (the so-called Nitchgi Mondai wa
Nini Mondai).409 But the urgency of the issue did not originate in domestic politics but
resulted from the profound shift in systemic environment. The first Nixon Shock, that
Nixon announced in July 1971 his plan to visit China the next year without prior consult
with Japan, made Tokyo realize that Japan had lagged behind in adjusting to the new
international situation. In the past Japan had often wished to extend the horizon of its
autonomous diplomacy to China but was prevented from doing so by American insistence
on political isolation of China. Now the U.S. constraints had quietly evaporated but Japan
was kept unknown about it. The Japanese felt strongly that they would lose another
opportunity to assert an autonomous foreign policy if it again acted too slow and simply
followed the steps of America. This explained the unusual swiftness with which Tokyo
approached Beijing and realized the diplomatic normalization.
Besides the desire to enhance Japanese diplomacy autonomy, weakened confidence
in the U.S. commitment to Asian defense also compelled an active Japanese diplomacy
toward China. Japanese worry about U.S. retrenchment in Asia was first aroused by the
Nixon Doctrine issued on Guam in July 1969, which essentially urged American allies to
assume a greater burden to defend themselves. The subsequent Nixon Shock further
alienated the Japanese who were afraid that their national interests might be neglected in
political deals among big powers. Some feared that the U.S.-Soviet detente and Sino-U.S.
rapprochement would prompt Washington to redefine its "defense perimeter" based on the
Pre-Korean War island-chain notion that left out Taiwan and South Korea, in which case
Japan would have to bear the brunt of Soviet threat. Perceiving that it was now caught in
the narrow valley (Tanima) of the Sino-U.S.-U.S.S.R. triangle, Japan found it an urgent task to
improve relations with all foreign countries, especially China, lest it be isolated and become
"an orphan of Asia." 410
The negotiation of the Sino-Japanese PFT provides compelling evidence that
strategic imperative decisively caused the remarkable improvement of bilateral relations. The
treaty negotiation almost completely focused on the anti-hegemony issue. Because of
409 Ogata, Normalization with China, p. 50; Furukawa, Nitchti Sengo Kankei-Shi, p. 360.
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Japanese resistance to the clear anti-Soviet signal that this clause would send to the outside
world and also the unstable Chinese domestic politics in the mid-1970s, the talk did not
conclude in half year as many predicted at the time but dragged on for four years since it
started in 1974. It was until Deng returned to power in July 1977 and the U.S.-China-
U.S.S.R. made another important shift at about the same time that the treaty negotiation
gained momentum. By 1978, American-Soviet relations had severely deteriorated and the
Carter administration had to nurture the China connection to balance the Soviet Union,
which was the so-called "China card" strategy.
In the meantime, Japan's effort since 1972 to settle territorial disputes with the
Soviet Union, a major step its omnidirectional diplomacy, had gone nowhere as the Soviets
refused to make concessions. Nor was Japan's trust in U.S. security commitment completely
restored during the Carter administration, which considered withdrawing American troops
from South Korea and kept U.S. involvement in Asia a low priority while intending the
"China card" to substitute such involvement.41 Japan was left with no other choices than
consolidating the relationship with China as the U.S. wished. The systemic pressure must
have been keenly understood in Tokyo because Japanese foreign minister Sonoda told the
LDP Committee of Foreign Affairs in January 1978 that the United States intended to view
the Sino-Japanese PFT as "one link of its global strategy." When questioned in the Diet on
what he actually meant by this statement, Sonoda said he was merely describing America'
thinking, not Japan's. But he also pointed out that the U.S. policy and the treaty were not
completely unrelated because of their implication to peace in Asia.412
Reservation was certainly obvious on the Japanese side, especially in the field of
military affairs, lest the Soviets have any misperception about a Sino-Japanese alliance. But
in the eyes of the Soviets, the inclusion of an anti-hegemony clause itself embodied an
unmistakable message of opposing the Soviet Union. Soviet suspicion was exacerbated by
the observation that Washington explicitly encouraged Prime Minister Fukuda, such as
410 For a typical example of this line of arugment, see Hiroshi Shinohara, "Beichfi Sekkin to Nihon no Boei
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through Carter-Fukuda summit in March 1977 and Brzezinski's visit to Asia in April 1978, to
conclude the PFT with China as soon as possible.413 So despite Tokyo's statement that it
wished to build omnidirectional relations with all foreign countries, Moscow charged that the
Sino-Japanese PFT clearly signaled Japanese intention to take uniform action with China in
future Sino-Soviet conflicts. 414
The image of U.S.-China-Japan military alliance loomed even larger in early 1979 as
China and America normalized relationship and, when conflict between China and Soviet-
supported Vietnam intensified, China requested political backup from both the U.S. and
Japan. What China used to justify its demand to Japan was precisely the anti-hegemony
clause of the PFT. The "demonstrable effect" of the PFT was so enormous that even the
Vietnamese media sounded the alarm to the rising "Beijing-Washington-Tokyo axis." 415
Thus, regardless of its resistance, Japan was still entangled in Sino-Soviet conflict.
Reduced Danger of Mutual Conflict
The Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization in 1972 led to a dramatic lessening of
their mutual expectation of war. Their joint communique signed on September 29 not only
terminated the state of war between the two countries but also enunciated the principles of
mutual nonaggression and peaceful resolution of all disputes without resorting to the use of
force or threat of force.416 In the aftermath of the diplomatic normalization, government
leaders and political elites of both states generally held an optimistic outlook for future Sino-
Japanese peace and friendship. On September 30, People's Daily published an editorial
entitled with an eye-catching headline, "A New Chapter in the History of Sino-Japanese Relations."
It proclaimed that, despite their different social systems, the two countries could solve any
problems between them and peacefully coexist "as long as they refer to the spirit of mutual
understanding and seek common ground on major issues while accepting existing minor
413 Ogata, Normalization with China, p. 95; pp. 172-173.
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differences."417 In Japan, the immediate reactions of the political circle to the diplomatic
normalization mostly struck a positive note. On the 29th, the ruling LDP party issued a
statement praising the joint communique as "an epoch-making document in postwar
Japanese diplomatic history" that "laid down the foundation for lasting friendship between
the two countries in the future." It explicitly acknowledged the improvement of bilateral
security relationship by stating that "(diplomatic normalization) not only has great
significance to enhancing Sino-Japanese mutual understanding and cooperation but also
contributes tremendously to peace and prosperity in Asia and the whole world."418
The PFT signed in August 1978 further promised to reduce the risk of militarized
disputes. It reiterated the principles of nonaggression and settling bilateral conflicts by
peaceful means, and vowed to "develop durable relations of peace and friendship."419 So the
congratulatory article in People's Daily announced that, with the signing of the treaty, the two
countries had entered a new stage of friendship, which it predicted would "last generation
after generation." 420
Amid the warm atmosphere brought about by the diplomatic normalization and
PFT, China and Japan no longer viewed each other as the apparent imaginary enemy. In
Tokyo, the notion of China threat was greatly played down. At a Diet committee hearing in
1973, Prime Minister Tanaka said with a definite tone that since he came back from Beijing
he believed that Chinese nuclear weapons were not a threat to Japan.421 Meanwhile,
previous concerns about monolithic Communist expansion basically disappeared from
Japanese strategic analyses and military operation plans published in defense-related journals.
Instead, these journals chiefly focused on Japanese countermeasures to Soviet military trend,
especially since the deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relationship and the escalation of Vietnam-
Cambodia conflict in late 1970s. Chinese military doctrines and defense postures continued
to be closely examined, but mostly under the assumption of China's keen perception of
417 See Tian, Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji, Vol. 2, pp. 115-116; Nitchti Kankei Kihon Shigydshu, pp. 446-448.
418 See Tian, Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji, Vol. 2, pp. 117-118.
419 For the text of Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty, see Tian, Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji, Vol.
2, pp. 228-229; Nitchbi Kankei Kihon Shitydshu, pp. 514-516.
420 "People's Daily Editorial on Everlasting Sino-Japanese Friendship, August 14, 1978," in Tian, Zhanhou
Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji, Vol. 2, pp. 230-232.
182
Soviet military threat.422 In 1978, Chinese vice prime minister at the time, Deng, assured
Japanese foreign minister Sonoda Tadashi that the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty that included
an anti-Japanese theme existed only in name, and expressed China's intention to terminate
the treaty in accordance with the treaty provisions.423 China did announce on April 3, 1979
that it intended to terminate the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual
Assistance, clearing Japan's last doubt.
China also held a much more relaxed assessment of possible security conflict with
Japan than before. This was best reflected in China's action to seek a greater military role of
Japan in the anti-Soviet united front. Not only supporting the U.S.-Japan alliance and a
limited improvement in Japan's national defense capabilities, Beijing now showed strong
interest in exploring military exchanges with Japan. Since 1977, a number of Japanese
defense researchers, active and retired SDF officers were invited to visit China, which
constituted indirect communication between China and the JDA. Beijing actively promoted
military-to-military contacts with Japan because they would not only strengthen the symbolic
significance of the Sino-Japanese strategic alignment but also benefit China's military
modernization and increase its capabilities to counter the Soviet threat.4 24
Limits of Sino-Japanese Security Cooperation
Despite the generally cordial relationship in the 1970s, it would be mistaken to
believe that China and Japan had developed close security cooperation. An important
reason was that Japan was fearful of provoking Soviet hostility and getting itself embroiled in
big power conflict. Having learned Washington's reassurance of its engagement in the
Korean peninsular and also perceived lessened Soviet threat during the mid-1970s, Japan felt
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that a too close strategic alignment with China would not bring much security benefit but
only increase the danger of Japan's entrapment in future Sino-Soviet conflict.425
So Japan was rather cautious in establishing formal military contacts with China.
When three Japanese military technicians specializing in tank development were invited to
China, the JDA declared that it had nothing to do with the invitation.426 Only in late 1979
did the JDA approve a medical inspection visit by SDF medical officers to China.4 27 Beside,
Tokyo openly rejected the use of Japanese economic aid to China for military purposes. In
December 1979 when the Ohira administration unveiled the first Yen Loan Package for
China, it announced three principle of economic aid to China, one of which denied any form
of military assistance to China.428 As Nakasone clearly indicated to the PLA Vice Chief-of-
Staff Wu Xiuquan in April 1980, the military area was to be excluded from the fields of Sino-
Japanese cooperation. 429
The tortuous process of negotiating the PFT also attested to Japanese hesitation to
be firmly tied to China's strategic blueprint. In the course of the negotiation, Beijing was
often frustrated by Tokyo's attempt to dilute the practical implication of the anti-hegemony
clause. In September 1975, Foreign Minister Miyazawa of the Miki administration brought
up the "Miyazawa's Four Principles" that tried to neutralize the anti-Soviet strategic
implications of the anti-hegemony clause by denying that it was aimed at a third country or
implied Sino-Japanese common action.430 Unready to negotiate "the third country clause"
when domestic radicals were still in power, Beijing called back its ambassador to Japan to
express displeasure at Tokyo. The talk was brought to a halt, and did not resume until July
1978 when both sides softened their positions. While Tokyo accepted the anti-hegemony
clause, Beijing also had to acknowledge in private the "Miyazawa's Four Principles" to the
425 For a discussion ofJapan's perception of lessened external threat and fear of entrapment in the mid-1970s,
see Cha, Alignment despite Antagonism, pp. 103-109.426 Joachim Glaubitz, "Japan," in Gerald Segal and William T. Tow, Chinese Defense Polig (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1984), pp. 228-231.
427 Bedeski, The Fragile Entente, p. 99.
428 Tanaka, Nitchft Kankei 1945-1990, pp. 109-110.
429 Joachim Glaubitz, "Japan," p. 230.
430 The Miyazawa's Four Principles include: 1) hegemony will be opposed not only in the Asia-Pacific region
but also anywhere else, 2) anti-hegemony is not directed against a specific third party, 3) anti-hegemony does
not mean any common action by Japan and China, 4) a principle that is in contradiction to the spirit of the
United Nations Charter cannot be accepted. See Soeya, Japan's Economic Diplomaay with China, 1945-1978, p. 141.
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new Prime Minister Fukuda and agreed to include the "third country clause" in the treaty
text.431 Evidently, Japan's reluctance to endorse China's strategic goal of countering the
Soviet Union in joint actions accentuated the temporary and tenuous nature of the Sino-
Japanese cooperation, a relationship that Bedeski calls a "fragile entente." 432
The second major obstacle to forging a highly stable and truly trustful relationship
was the shadow of history, which served to remind the Chinese that Japan would always be a
potential threat even though the immediate danger of conflict seemed to be low.
Undoubtedly, Chinese acceptance and even encouragement of Japanese defense buildup
marked a drastic departure from prior harsh condemnation of Japanese attempt to revive
wartime militarism in the name of national defense. But China's attitude change did not take
place in a carefree fashion. Witnesses of Sino-U.S. secret negotiations on rapprochement
testified the deeply entrenched mistrust and panic that Chinese leaders had towards an
economically and militarily powerful Japan, to mitigate which American negotiators resorted
to the even bigger and more imminent Soviet threat.433 While persuaded by the practical
security interest to form strategic alignment with Japan, Chinese leaders did not forgo
suspicion regarding Japan's intention and future trend. In the inner party report on world
situation given in March 1973, Zhou expressed his opinion about Japan's ambiguous policy
if free of the U.S. restraint:
"Japan is afraid of Soviet military threat. In the past it depended on the nuclear umbrella of the
United States, but what would it do now? If it becomes completely reliant on America's military
protection, it is clear that America will hold the economic throat of Japan. Therefore Japan has no
choice but to develop its own military power. But with military buildup there is the worry that Japan
may walk down the old path of militarism! Japan is currently agonized by this problem." 434
In a formal statement on China's official policy issued in 1973, the vice chair of the China-
Japan Friendship Association Zhang Xiangshan echoed Zhou's concern about potential
Japanese threat:
"We are by no means optimistic about the current world situation. While digging trenches to get
ready for surprise attacks by the Soviet Revisionism, we are considering the worst scenario with four
enemies (attacking us): the Soviet Revisionism from the north, American imperialism from the South,
Indian reactionaries from the west, and reviving Japanese militarism from Qingdao and
Shanghai... China, Japan and the United States have promised that none of the three countries would
seek hegemonism in Asian-Pacific region, but the joint communique between the United States and
431 Furukawa, Nitchtl Sengo Kankei-Shi, pp. 406-411.
432 Bedeski,The Fragile Entente.
433 Christensen, A Troubled Triangle, pp. 33-35.
434 "Shfi Onlai Kokusai Josei ni Kansuru Himitsu Ensetsu," p. 174.
Soviet Union did not make such promise. Now that Japan is carrying out peace treaty negotiation
with the Soviet Union, (we wonder) how this question will be dealt with in the negotiation." 435
Given its fear of Japan's repeating the history of aggression in the first half of the
century, China's attitude to Japan did not shift from outright hostility all the way to whole-
hearted embracing, but rather guarded optimism. The Chinese media campaign since late
1960s to bash Japanese militarist revival began to decline in late 1971 and diminished sharply
since early 1972. But alert for Japanese militarism remained alive among Chinese political
elites and was brought up every now and then, even in the mist of the media chorus
adulating bilateral friendship. In fall 1972, Liao Chengzhi reminded people of the right-wing
power in Japan led by people like Kishi Nobusuke and Kaya Okinori, and expressed
concerns about residual Japanese militarism.436 When he signaled Chinese acceptance of US-
Japan alliance in January 1973, Zhou Enlai cautioned Japan not to revive militarism in the
name of self-defense.437 And when the negotiation on PFT stagnated, a People's Daily editorial
commemorating the war of resistance against Japan in 1975 once again mentioned the
existence of a small political group in Japan that was still dreaming of reviving militarism.4 38
Problems of National Recognition
The Dissolution of the Taiwan Hurdle
In the 1950s-60s the Taiwan issue was a matter of crucial national security interest to
China and Japan's recognition of Taiwan was the biggest hurdle for Beijing and Tokyo to
establish normal relations. In June 1971 when meeting with Komeit6 central committee
chairman Takeiri Yoshikazu, Zhou Enlai put forward "Three Principles for the Restoration
of Relations" with Japan, all focused on Taiwan. The "Three Principles" demand Tokyo to
acknowledge that (1) the PRC is the sole legitimate government representing China, (2)
Taiwan is a province of China and an inalienable part of the Chinese territories, and (3) the
435 Takeji Muno, "Pikin de Kangaeta Nihon to Chfigoku no Dans6 (The Dislocation between Japan and China
Being Considered in Beijing)," Chfio K6ron, July 1973, pp. 216-217.
436 For example, see "Main Points of Liao Chengzhi's Discussion with the Delegation ofJapan-China
Friendship Association, October 16, 1972," in Tian, Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji, Vol. 2, pp. 122-125.
437 "Japanese newspaper report on Premier Zhou Enlai's remarks to Dietman Kimura Takeo on US-Japan
alliance treaty and other issues, January 18, 1973," Nitchub Kankei Kihon Shigyoshu, pp. 455-456.
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Japan-ROC treaty is unlawful and should be abolished.43 9 It was now clear to Tokyo that
diplomatic normalization with Beijing would not be possible unless a dramatic change of its
policy on the Taiwan issue was to be introduced. Fortunately, China's top priority now was
to expand the anti-Soviet united front that should be stopped by none including the
Taiwan issue. Also the Sino-American rapprochement removed much of the external
constraints that had deprived Japan of the diplomatic choice of recognizing the Chinese
communist regime in the past two decades. So the new international system created the
motivations and conditions for Japan and China to reach compromise on the Taiwan issue.
The first sign that China softened its policy was sent out in May 1972, when Zhou
Enlai told the visiting "old friend" Furui that China would give due consideration to the
investment that many Japanese companies had made in Taiwan, which was a reversal of the
harsh "Zhou's Four Principles" and appealed to the interest of Japanese business circle."'
At that time, Beijing was not yet ready to make further concessions regarding the legal status
of Taiwan. As Zhou told Takeiri, now serving as the secret messenger of prime minister
Tanaka, in July that the Sino-Japanese joint communique of diplomatic normalization should
include the "Three Principles for the Restoration of Relations" and declare the termination
of the state of war between the two countries.44" But this so-called Takeiri Memo still
signaled Chinese willingness to tolerate Japan's links with Taiwan at the practical level even
after Sino-Japanese normalization.
Unlike in the past when China's insistence on the legal status of Taiwan always
created deadlock in Japanese decision-making process, this time Tokyo was able to move
ahead with the support of a rare internal consensus. At the Conference of Sino-Japanese
Diplomatic Normalization (Nitchzi Kokkd Seiodka Ky6gikai), reorganized in July on the basis of
the LDP Research Council on China Problem (Chzigoku Mondai Chdsakaz) to be directly
supervised by the party president, the proposal to push for normalization was passed with a
438 People's Daily Editorial Commemorating the 30th Anniversary of the Victory of the War of Resistance
against Japan, September 3, 1975," in Tian, Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji, Vol. 2, pp. 190-192.
439 "Zhou Enlai's Talk with Japanese K6meit6 central committee chairman Takeiri Yoshikazu, June 28, 1971,"
Tian, Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji, Vol. 2, p. 20. Also see Tanaka, Nitchi Kankei 1945-1990, pp. 69-70;
Nagano, Tenno to Td Shohei no Akushu, pp. 12-13; Soeya, Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978, p. 111.
440 Furukawa, Nitchzi Sengo Kankei-Shi, pp. 365-366.
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big margin despite the opposition by the pro-Taiwan faction. Having learned China's
objection to official relationship between Japan and Taiwan from the Takeiri Memo, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced in August the official position of the government that
Japan would be unable to continue diplomatic relations with the ROC once normalization
with the PRC was realized, though practical links in trade and economic affairs would be
dealt with in a pragmatic manner. When asked to enunciate the nature of Japan's
relationship with Taiwan after Sino-Japanese normalization, Ohira and Tanaka put out the
argument of "natural termination," which stated that the Japan-ROC peace treaty would
have to lapse, and their diplomatic relationship would end accordingly. 442
Partial Settlement of Sovereignty Right Issues
Although overruled in the decision to cut formal relationship with Taiwan, the pro-
Taiwan faction in the LDP did manage to retain existing non-official contacts with Taiwan.
Moreover, their stubborn opposition also prevented the government from making further
concessions to China regarding the legal status of Taiwan and the Japan-ROC peace treaty.
So Tokyo sent two delegations to China led by Furui and chairman of the Conference of
Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Normalization K6saka Zantar6 in early and middle September
1972, to appeal for understanding of the domestic political obstacles in Japan to accepting
China's terms.
It was in the talk with Furui that Zhou Enlai agreed to the Japanese demand that in
the joint communque Japan would not comment on the legal status of Taiwan but only
express respect to China's position that Taiwan was part of China, neither would the text
mention the termination of Japan-ROC treaty. By the end of the talk, however, the two
sides still could not reach agreement on the point of "the end of the state of war," but Zhou
told the Japanese delegation not to worry because he would use "good wisdom" to solve this
problem. Later when Tanaka visited China, the two sides quickly worked out a tactical
solution that the term of "end of abnormal state" would be used in the communique text.
441 For the text of the Zhou-Takeiri Meeting Memo during July 27-29, 1972, see Tian, Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi
Wenxianji, Vol. 2, pp. 89-96; Nitchti Kankei Kihon Shirydshu, pp. 410-418.
442 Furukawa, Nitchu Sengo Kankei-Shi, pp. 375-377.
Some suspected that Zhou was already prepared for concession even when he met Furui.443
After all, it was not his intention to waste time solving complictated legalistic problems when
Beijing was eager to form anti-Soviet strategic alignment with Tokyo.
So diplomatic normalization failed to bring a conclusive end to the sovereignty
controversy regarding Taiwan. The 1972 Sino-Japanese joint communique only adopted
China's first principle of restoring relations, "the PRC is the sole legitimate government
representing China," in its entirety while making only indirect reference to the other two
principles.44 Besides, the communique announced the termination of "the abnormal state of
affairs" rather than "the state of war" between the two countries because Japan insisted that
the later had been declared in the Japan-ROC treaty. Only in a press conference did Foreign
Minister Ohira Masayoshi state that "the Japanese government's stand is that as a result of
normalization with China the treaty ceased to be significant and came to an end," implying
that the treaty had been valid up to then.445
In fact, semi-official contacts between Taiwan and Japan carried on throughout the
post-normalization period. Immediately after the Joint Communique was announced, the
LDP's pro-Taiwan faction formed the Japan-ROC Parliamentarian League, which sent a
large delegation of as many as 74 incumbent and former Diet members to Taiwan in fall
1973. From then on, delegations of the League traveled to Taiwan on annual basis and
many influential conservative politicians visited Taiwan on various occasions, including ex-
prime ministers Sato and Kishi, former speakers of the House of Representative Ishii
Mitsujiro and Funada Naka, former vice president of LDP Shiina Etsuzaburo. Meanwhile,
high-ranking Taiwan officials were often invited to Japan, and Legislative Yuan, Control
Yuan and National Assembly Council of the Taiwan government all sent delegations to
443 Furukawa, Nitchti Sengo Kankei-Shi, pp. 379-390.
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Japan every year, let alone various semi-official organizations and institutions that served to
maintain intimate contacts between Japan and Taiwan.44
The lack of complete settlement of the legal status of Taiwan regime did not develop
into serious political problems because Beijing largely tolerated the semi-official Japan-
Taiwan contacts in the 1970s. The chief diplomat of Taiwan Economic and Cultural
Representative in Japan Ma Shuli testified that during the 12 years of his mission since 1973,
the Chinese government abhorred these contacts but did not exert such pressure that would
force Japan to reject entry visa of high-ranking Taiwan officials, a phenomenon that often
took place in the 1990s. 47 But such close Japan-Taiwan contacts nevertheless generated
mistrust between Japan and China and sowed the seeds for future disputes when the Taiwan
problem regained political salience in Chinese politics.
Another controversial issue that was temporarily set aside in the 1970s was the
territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. After the end of WWII, these islands
were administered as part of the Ryukyu Islands, including Okinawa, by the U.S.
government. When the 1971 Okinawa reversion agreement transferred to Japan the
administration of these islands, the PRC government protested the transfer and claimed its
sovereign right over these islands. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued an
official statement in March 1972 to rebut China's claim."448 But this issue was not even
included in the normalization negotiation as both sides were eager to establish diplomatic
relations. As Zhou Enlai told Takeiri in their meeting of July 1972, "there is no need to
mention the Diaoyu Islands. It does not count a problem of any sort compared to
recovering normal relations (between the two countries)." 449
During the negotiation of the PFT, island disputes were again brushed aside so that
strategic interests would get the priority. In 1974, Deng Xiaoping proposed three guidelines
for the treaty negotiation in a meeting with the delegation of the Japan-China Friendship
446 Kinkei Lin, Ume to Sakura: Sengo no Nikka Kankei (Plum and Cherty: PostwarJapan-ROC Relations) (Tokyo:
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Lianjing Chuban Shiye, 1997), Chapter 5.
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Association: 1) China would want to eliminate as early as possible all barriers to the
conclusion of PFT; 2) treaty negotiation can be started either after or at the same time with
the agreement on routine affairs; 3) it is better to shelve the sovereignty issue of the Diaoyu
Islands for the time being because settling the issue may take several years or more. It is the
first time that Beijing suggested to shelve the territorial issue, which was clearly motivated by
the desire to accelerate PFT negotiation.
Things were only slightly twisted in April 1978 when a fleet of more than 80 armed
Chinese fishing boats protested near the islands against some LDP politicians for using the
island dispute to derail peace treaty negotiation. The exact cause of this incident is still
unclear, but the two governments quickly agreed that it was merely "accidental occurrence"
and would not become problem for the treaty negotiation. After the PFT was signed, Deng
asked visiting LDP politician Suzuki Zenk6 to convey his proposal that China and Japan
may jointly explore the oil resources surrounding the disputed island without touching on
the sovereignty issue, and Japan is expected to contribute in the technological aspect.450
Thus, Beijing not only put away a controversial issue that could have potentially paralyzed
the newly established Sino-Japanese strategic alignment but also turned it into an area of
common interest and cooperation. But the problem was never resolved during this period
and later became of a point of bitter contention between the two countries.
Historical Burden BrushedAside
As mentioned above, the gap between the two countries' war narratives did not close
up in this period due to their continuing practice of historical mythmaking. Eager to secure
smooth political cooperation, however, the two sides were willing to trade less immediate
interests, including the need to resolve historical legacies. Instead of seizing the favorable
international environment to carry out joint history research and arrange serious war
restitution measures, they used diplomatic tactics to cover up mutual disagreement on war
historiography lest it hamper alignment formation. Therefore, the history problem, even
though remained unresolved, did not really obstruct their mutual national recognition.
Symbolic gestures of contrition were not rare in Japanese diplomacy toward China in
the 1970s. Even before becoming prime minister, Tanaka revealed his belief that Japan's
apology for the war was the foremost precondition for a breakthrough in Sino-Japanese
relationship. 451 During his visit to Beijing to sign the joint communique, he spoke of the
"unfortunate period" of bilateral history, over which he expressed "deep reflection."
Nevertheless, such an apology was too ambiguous to serve any good purpose in regard to
historical settlement because hedid not tell who caused the "unfortunate period" or use the
word "apology." Nor did Tokyo offered economic settlement of the historical account at
the time of diplomatic normalization. In fact, in his real thinking, Tanaka did not perceive
Japan's actions clearly as aggression. In a Diet session of February 1973, he evaded the
question whether the war with China was aggression:
"The fact that at one time Japan did send troops to the Chinese continent, that is a historical fact. On
this question, I am not in a position to mention in a straightforward manner whether, as you say, the
sending of troops was or was not aggression. This kind of evaluation is for historians of the future to
judge." 452
But Beijing was rather quick to accept Japanese superficial apology and concede
claims for war reparation in exchange for early diplomatic normalization. A quick Sino-
Japanese normalization was highly profitable to China in strategic terms, compared to which
settling historical account was considered secondary interest. So at the first of the three
meetings between Zhou Enlai and Takeiri in July 1972 that were actually the preparatory
talks before reaching the joint communique, China already offered to forgo war reparation
and shoveled the history problem out of the way.453
Conflict on the history issue did emerge during Tanaka's visit to Beijing in
September. According to an article by Tanaka published in 1984, the Chinese did raise the
question of war reparation in the negotiation right before the signing of joint communique,
which took the Japanese side by surprise. When Japanese chief negotiator Takashima
Masuro replied that this issue had been settled by the San Francisco Treaty, the Chinese side
450 "Vice Premier Deng's remarks to member of the House of Representative Suzuki Senko on China's
emulating Japanese modernization experience and jointly exploration of the Diaoyu Islands without involving
the sovereignty issue, May 31, 1979," in Tian, Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi WIenxianji, Vol. 2, pp. 266-267.
451 Tanaka made this point in his speech at a Diet hearing in March 1972. See Shigez6 Hayasaka, Seifika Tanaka
Kakuei (Tokyo: Shuei Sha, 1999), pp. 400-401.
452 Quoted in Wakamiya, The Postwar Conservative View ofAsia, p. 179; Yoshida, Nihonjin no Sensokan, pp. 138-140.
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was so outraged that it informed Japan that "if it is such a delegation, we would like it to go
home immediately." Takashima later also recollected that he made the statement that Japan
could only realize normalization with China in the framework of the San Francisco treaty
system that contained the Japan-ROC treaty. Because China never accepted the San
Francisco system and always condemned the Japan-ROC peace treaty, it viewed Takashima's
statement as an outright challenge to the PRC's international legitimacy. Zhou Enlai's
reaction was fierce - he called Takashim "legal bandit" (Fafei) - but it was the Japanese
reluctance to refute the legitimacy of the Taiwan regime completely rather than its refusal to
pay reparation that was the real cause of Chinese anger. In the end China agree to renounce
war reparation "for the sake of the friendship between the two nations," which was even a
softer statement than that in the Takeiri Memo, where China was to renounce "the rightfor
(emphasis added) war reparation claims."454
In another occasion, disagreement on the wording rather than substance of the
historiography arose in the diplomatic negotiation. Zhou took issue with the phrase that
Tanaka used at the welcome banquet, "Japan caused trouble to Chinese people," when he
referred to the war. China managed to have the joint communique include a more serious
expression that "Japan would express deep reflection for being responsible for inflicting
immense loss on the Chinese people through the war." Zhou then generously pointed out
right away that both the Chinese and Japanese people were traumatized during the war.455
The opportunity to reopen the issue of historical settlement did not come until the
late 1970s when the Ohira administration decided to extend low-interest yen loans to China.
Japanese economic aid was to some extent seen as compensation for the historical debts
Japan owed to China, but other political and economic interests were actually more
important in prompting Ohira's decision, which will be discussed in the following section.
Moreover, it was just a tacit agreement between the two governments while no official
statement was ever provided to establish explicit linkage between the aid programs and
Japanese aggression. Especially the Chinese public never considered that Japan had fulfilled
its responsibility to compensate Chinese victims. However, when Chinese popular demands
454 Akira Ishii, "Chfigoku ni Otta Mugen no Beish6 (The Infinite Compensation Owed to China)," Chfio
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for Japanese war reparation emerged in the later stage, the formal diplomatic documents that
the two governments hastily signed at this point became the insurmountable political and
legal hurdles to meeting these demands. From then on, they officially claimed that China
had waived all Chinese compensation claims to Japan in the 1972 joint communique.
Economic Cooperation
Economic Interaction Promoted by Strategic Interest
Once the international political environment turned favorable, Sino-Japanese
economic interaction also received a remarkable boost because past political restrictions on
economic interactions were removed rapidly. In July 1972, Minister of International Trade
and Industry Nakasone approved the use of export credits in the vinylon plant export to
China, lifting the official ban on export credits in China trade stated in Yoshida's letter to
Chiang Kai-shek in May 1964.456 Because the ban was originally introduced to set a clear
boundary between pure economic interaction and political links, the new decision clearly
indicated Japan's intention to expand both economic and political cooperation with China.
Following their diplomatic normalization, the two countries were able to develop
long-term, officially sanctioned trade ties that were never seen in postwar history. The first
inter-governmental trade agreement was signed in Beijing In January 1974. In February 1978
the two governments reached the Long Term Trade Agreement for guiding bilateral trade
from 1978 to 1985, which paved the political foundation for a robust economic relationship
between the two countries. As a result, the period of 1972-1981 saw an unprecedented
bilateral trade boom, with the absolute value increasing more than nine times. The prospect
of bilateral economic relations was so bright that a "China fever" swept the Japanese
business circle, which swiftly concluded four dozens of investment contracts with the
Chinese around 1978. 457
4ss Wang Taiping ed. XingThongguo Waijiao Wushinian, pp. 443-445.
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The structural imperatives also facilitated certain degree of strategic interdependence
in this period. As mentioned earlier, China was particularly interested in seeking Japanese
assistance to its defense buildup to counteract the Soviet threat. It is reported that a Chinese
team of machinery inspection handed to some prominent Japanese weapon production
companies in 1975 a list of modem weapons that China wished to purchase, including anti-
tank, air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles, tanks, fighter jets, anti-submarine patrol planes,
ground-based radars and communication facilities. China also showed great interest in
engaging close cooperation with Japanese space industry in the field of defense-related space
development. But these requests were given cold shoulder in Japan because transferring
weapons or military technology would violate Japan's official ban on weapon exports and
contradict the COCOM restrictions that remained applicable to Japan's trade with China.458
Since Japan was not the only source of weapons to China because the U.S. and West
European countries were also interested in becoming such suppliers. So China later shifted
its focus from obtaining Japanese weapons to introducing advanced Japanese technology in
industry, energy production, transportation and agriculture that would enhance China's
national defense capabilities in the long run. This new policy received positive response
from Japan, who considered economic aid to Chinese modernization program not only less
provocative to the Soviet Union than military aid but also conducive to Japan's own security
interest. In December 1979, Ohira visited China and extended the first Yen loan package
that was designated to assist Chinese energy industry and infrastructure improvement.45 9
Before leaving for Beijing, he made clear the strategic significance of Japanese economic aid
to China in a meeting with high-ranking officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
"By and large China has settled with the Hua-Deng (Hua Guofeng-Deng Xiaoping) system, although
one cannot say that domestic opposition to this system has completely disappeared. To the Hua-
Deng system, the future problem of stability will arise if the national goal of modernization is
frustrated. In terms of the interest of Western powers and Japan, (China's) pragmatic line of
advancing modernization is a good policy. In order to let China to continue the posture of adopting
the pragmatic line, our country will keep extending yen loans to China."460
The new economic relations not only brought to China advanced Japanese
technology and capital assistance much needed in modernization program, but also provided
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Japan with an opportunity to diversify its external sources of natural resources. After the
eruption of the oil crisis, Tokyo was determined to carry out an autonomous energy policy,
which stressed the diversification of oil imports. Assisting Chinese energy industry and
purchasing Chinese natural energy resources was made an important step of the so-called
"resource diplomacy," which was designed to reduce Japan's dependence on the Middle East
and major oil consortiums for its oil supply. Since the early 1970s Japan had been buying
Chinese crude oil produced onshore and later became directly involved in offshore oil
exploration projects in China, providing substantial technical and financial support.461 This
policy was welcomed in Beijing. After the Cultural Revolution, China was eager to obtain
advanced Western technology to accelerate industrial modernization, to pay for which it
needed hard currency that could be earned by selling natural resources. Oil export to Japan
in exchange for Japanese technology, plants and machinery was actually made the
centerpiece of the 1978 Long Term Trade Agreement.
Limits of Economic Interdependence
Remarkable expansion of bilateral economic interaction notwithstanding, positive
structural conditions did not bring about significant increase of bilateral economic
interdependence in a strategic sense. Considerable the discrepancy existed between the
levels of their economic dependence on one another. Trade with Japan already amounted to
over 17 percent of China's world trade before 1970, and rose to the level of about one
fourth of China's total trade by 1980. But China's share in Japan's total trade only grew in a
gradual fashion and never exceeded five percent throughout this period (See Chart 2).
In addition, mutual supply of strategically important goods was kept at a rather low
level so that a rupture of trade relationship at times of bilateral security conflict would not
cause major damage to their economy. Historically, Japan has heavily relied on overseas
supply for four categories of commodities including foodstuffs, crude and raw oils, coal, and
461 For a detailed treatment of Japanese involvement in China's oil development and oil trade between them in
the 1970s, see Chae-Jin Lee, China andJapan: New Economic Diplomagy (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institute Press,
1984), Chapter 3.
iron ores.462 China used to be a significant supplier of these commodities to Japan before
the war ended. By 1934, 33 percent of Japan's iron ore and 72 percent of pig iron was from
China, and Japan's import of coal from China, the bulk of which was high-grade coking coal,
amounted to 77 percent of its total coal import.463 After Sino-Japanese normalization, China
once again became a potential source of natural resources for Japan. But the breakdown of
Japan's import goods by country shows that its reliance on import from China for
foodstuffs, oil and coal was always lower than 5 percent during the 1970s, and China never
again supplied iron ore to Japan (See Table 7).
Chart 2: Shares of Sino-Japanese Trade in Each Other's Total Trade, 1970-1999
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As for China, the bulk of its imports from Japan comprised of machinery and other
industrial products, excluding any strategically important goods and technology, like
computer or military equipments. Although Japan filled most of China's plant and
technology contracts with foreign countries in the 1970s, bilateral cooperation in areas with
462 1976 data shows that Japanese dependence on such imported goods as crude oil, iron ore, wheat and cotton
was as high as over 96 percent. See Takashi Baba, "1985 Nen goro ni okeru Waga Kuni Shuyo Shigen no Saitei
Shoy6 Yunyury6 ni tsuite (Minimum Import Amounts of Main Resources Required for Japan in 1985)." Shin
Bo6ei Ronshfi (The Journal of National Defense) 7, No. 3 (January 1980). The situation has remained largely
unchanged up to the present day. According to 1999 data, Japan is 97 percent reliant on foreign coking coal,
99 percent on foreign crude oil. In fact, Japan is by far the world's largest importer of coal. See International
Energy Agency, Energy Statistics of OECD Countries 1998-1999, Coal Information 2000, and Energy Policies of IEA
Countries: 2001 Review.
463 Tucker, "American Policy Toward Sino-Japanese Trade in the Postwar Years," p. 185.
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military significance was virtually absent. The 1974 official trade agreement endorsed the
"most-favored nation (MFN) status" that was practiced by the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) member-states. But due to Japan's adherence to COCOM
restrictions in its China trade, the MFN treatment only extended to the areas of customs
duties, internal taxes, and customs rules, formalities, and procedures, but not to the "issue of
import and export licenses."464 Besides, China received Japanese ODA in the form of yen
loans under the conditions that yen loan programs were to be carried out in a way that
would not damage the interests of Japan's other important trade partners, and that Japanese
aid would not be used for military purposes.465
Table 7: China's Share in Japan's Total Imports of Important Natural Resources
(1972-99)
Foodstuffs Crude & Raw Oils Coal Iron Ore
1972 3.4 0 0 0
1975 2.3 3.8 0.5 0
1979 3.0 3.0 1.9 0
1985 6.0 6.4 3.5 0
1990 6.2 7.2 4.2 0
1995 7.0 5.1 6.9 0
1999 11.9 2.5 8.7 0
SOURCE: MITI, Tsutshd Hakusho (White Paper on International Trade, Japan), various years.
Various factors account for the limited fashion of bilateral economic relations. The
COCOM restrictions on Japanese trade with socialist countries was one reason, and the
above-mentioned Japanese fear of getting caught in Sino-Soviet conflict also stopped Tokyo
from extending bilateral economic cooperation to strategic areas. In addition, Japan was
concerned about external dependence on a narrow source of strategic materials.
Collaboration with China's energy industry was just one of the many Japanese efforts to
diversify the countries supplying Japan's natural resources, so that Japan's national economy
would not be put at mercy of certain energy suppliers. 466
464 Lee, China and Japan, p. 14. For the text of the 1974 trade agreement, see Tian, Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi
Wenxianji, Vol. 2, pp. 149-151; Nitchi Kankei Kihon Shiryoshu, 457-460.
465 Tanaka, Nitchi Kankei 1945-1990, p. 110.
466 Other energy development plans under consideration at the time included projects to develop North Sea oil
with Britain, to develop natural resources in Africa with France, and to cooperate with the Soviet Union in
exploring Siberia oil resources. See Gerald L. Curtis, "The Tyumen Oil Development Project and Japanese
Foreign Policy Decision-Making," in Robert A. Scalapino ed., The Foreign Poliy of Modern Japan (Berkeley:
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Still another important restraining factor in bilateral economic activities was bias in
people's thinking. Although their direct impact on bilateral economic interaction was still
mild during this stage, negative feelings derived from the unresolved history problem
potentially spoiled the atmosphere in which such interaction was carried out. The first
problem is the Chinese antipathy to the central-periphery relationship that had dominated
Sino-Japanese trade in the colonial era. In the 1950s-60s, China tolerated or even
encouraged such a trading style in order to maintain non-official channels of communication
with Japan when formal diplomatic links were lacking. After diplomatic normalization,
however, Chinese attitude changed. Since 1971, major Japanese trading corporations such as
Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Marubeni-lida and Ito-Chu that had largely refrained from doing business
with China in the past decided to expand to the market there. They were particularly
interested in China's commodity market and natural resources supply. While welcoming
them to participate in the new economic relationship, the representative of China
Committee for the Promotion of International Trade Liu Xiwen informed the Mitsubishi
delegation in late 1972 that China would not become a market for large quantity of
consumer goods or a country of natural resources supply, nor would China allow the entry
of foreign capital.467
To the Chinese, all three issues - foreign commodity dumping, resources drain,
foreign investment - were not merely the oppressive characteristics of imperialism but also
prominent symbols of China's humiliating history of foreign conquest and exploitation.
Small wonder that even though yearning for industrial modernization by introducing western
technology and capital, China did not legalize foreign investment until a new constitution
was promulgated in 1982. Such a policy was justified by both Leninist ideology and
nationalist sentiments. The fear of Japanese goods dumping remained low in the 1970s
because the bilateral trade volume was still small, not that China did not care about it. When
bilateral trading volume rapidly expanded in the 1980s, Chinese resentment about trade
deficit soared, as shown in the next chapter.
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University of California Press, 1977), pp. 148-154; Soeya, Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978, pp.
156-148.
467 Toshio Maeda, "Bei-So-Chfi to Nihon no Keizai Kankei: 1972 nen (Economic relations between US-USSR-
China and Japan: 1972), Kokub6 23, No. 1 (1974).
Signs of Chinese sense of historical entitlement that would severely twist bilateral
economic relations in the next period of time also emerged in the "honeymoon" period.
Many Chinese officials in charge of bilateral economic cooperation affairs felt that Japan
should make concessions in negotiating cooperation terms because of the war history.
Chae-jin Lee observed in his seminal study of the Baoshan steel project, a symbol of Sino-
Japanese economic cooperation from the late 1970s, that anti-Japanese bias was prevalent
among China's top economists and high-ranking economic bureaucrats. Whereas the
Chinese side was extremely sensitive to any signs of Japanese arrogance and dishonesty, the
Japan side tended to hold the newly opened up China to a high standard and was overly
critical of China's inconsistent economic policy or inefficient performance."" When China
unilaterally decided to postpone Baoshan Steel's second-phase construction and canceled all
the relevant contracts in late 1980, Japan responded with fury to what it saw as indication of
China's lack of respect to international business customs. Chinese officials then reacted with
equally bitter repulsion.
The Baoshan dispute was later settled with a funding package that Japanese
government put together to keep the project going. It was not a purely economically driven
settlement but was in part formulated under the pressure of Chinese sense of historical
entitlement after China renounced its war reparation claims." 9 While the major cause of the
Baoshan disturbance lied in the dramatic shrinking of foreign plant purchase following
China's readjustment of economic policy around 1980, the emotionally charged mutual
criticism in the course of the event left both sides psychologically bruised, setting an
ominous prelude to more serious conflicts in the next period.
Popular Relations
Diplomatic Normalization and Warming Up of Popular Relationship
Improvement of the structural environment was the main cause of the rising
warmness in popular relations. In Japan, the annual opinion polls conducted by the Office
468 Lee, China and Japan, p. 57, pp. 74-75.
469 Tanaka, Nitchiu Kankei 1945-1990, p. 114.
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of the Prime Minister shows that Japanese aversion to Communist China significantly
decreased in the 1970s while a feeling of closeness and affection for China flourished in its
place (see Chart 3). The increase of Japanese public feeling of closeness to China coincided
with the diminishing of perception of China threat. In a 1969 survey, China (15.60/0) was
rated as the second largest security threat to Japan closely behind the USSR (20.4%).470 But a
public survey done in April 1972 shows that the percentage of people who felt China (9%) a
most threatening country fell far behind that for the Soviet Union (34.3%) and even United
States (16.6%).471 Opinion data indicated that the Japanese public clearly viewed the U.S.
and China as standing on the same side of Japan and sharing the common interest of
checking the Soviet threat. Data about Chinese public opinion in the 1970s are still lacking,
but the fact that the intense government media attack at Japanese militarism quickly
disappeared once Japanese defense program was considered useful to balancing the Soviet
Union testified to the function of structural incentives.
Chart 3: Japanese Public Feeling of Closeness towards China, 1978-1999
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SOURCES: Yoron Chosa Nenkan (Opinion Polls Yearbook), various years.
The surge of popular friendship between the two nations was aided by the steady
increase of bilateral economic, scientific and cultural links. In the past the two governments
470 Yomiuri Shimbun survey on public perception of the U.S.-Japan alliance, June 1969, in Yoron Chdsa Nenkan,
1970, p. 492.
Feel Close to China
--- Feel Not Close to China
placed strict restrictions on societal contacts due to security concerns and their irreconcilable
opinions on the problem of national recognition. As soon as they normalized relations,
previous travel restrictions were scrapped and bilateral personnel exchanges increased
rapidly. Two types of grass-root exchange activities were worth noting. One was the
widespread youth exchange programs to promote mutual understanding of the younger
generation. In the form of "youth ships" or "youth wings," numerous locally initiated
groups of Japanese young people came to China by ships and airplanes and youth groups
organized by the Chinese government also paid return visits. The other type was the
program of friendship cities. By May 1980, friendly exchange relations had been established
between 15 pairs of sister cities.472 The most famous symbol of bilateral friendly ties i was
the two giant pandas that Chinese government gave to Japan after normalization to be
shown at the Ueno Zoo for the first time. The two pandas soon inspired a sensation
throughout Japan, reflected in the production of such big cultural hits as Miyazaki Hayato's
animation "Panda, Go Panda" (Pandakopanda). The Japanese enthusiasm about panda and
their affection about China associated with this gift were dubbed the "Panda Boom."
Another important symbol of free societal contacts, an agreement on civil aviation,
was also made possible after the political constraints of the Taiwan issue loosened. The
negotiation of the aviation agreement was formally started in spring 1973 but soon reached a
standstill as the Taiwan Lobby opposed tenaciously against the demotion of national airlines
of the ROC to a local company that could only operate in Japanese domestic airports. It was
until Ohira held personal consultations with Mao and Zhou in January 1974 and that an
agreement based on mutual compromise began to emerge. While China accepted the future
continuation of commercial flight routes between Japan and Taiwan, Japan stated "it was
important to avoid contradiction between this matter and the new Sino-Japanese relations,"
and promised to treat Japan-Taiwan flights as non-official exchanges and disapprove any
national signs on these flights.473 The agreement was finally signed in April 1974 and regular
exchange of commercial flights between Tokyo and Beijing began since September 29.
471 National survey on Japanese attitude toward the United States and China and approval rates of cabinet and
party by Japan Research Council of Public Opinion, April 1972, in Yoron Chosa Nenkan, 1973, p. 395.
472 National Headquarters of the Japan-China Friendship Association, Nitchzi Yuk6 Undo Shi, p. 186, pp. 222-
226.
473 See the excerpt of the speech of Japanese ambassador to China Ogawa Heishir6 after the signing of the civil
aviation agreement on April 19, see Furukawa, Nitchu Sengo Kankei-Shi, p. 401.
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Remaining Public Estrangement
Uncertainty nevertheless exists when one tries to assess the degree of amicableness
between the two nations during the "honeymoon" period. The shortage of opinion data on
the Chinese side constitutes much difficulty in determining whether ordinary Chinese people
indeed thought strategically or merely kept their true feeling to themselves in front of the
sweeping propaganda about the importance of anti-Soviet hegemonism campaign. What
was certain was that, despite many high-profile gestures of goodwill and the feverish air of
bilateral friendship, little efforts were made to foster deep mutual understanding in the
1970s. For one thing, direct, free access to each other's society was still not possible.
Published trip reports of those Japanese visitors to China during this period displayed
obvious traces of deliberate arrangements on the Chinese side insomuch the Japanese guests
would only see what Chinese government wanted them to see. Besides, although gradually
growing, the overall level of societal contacts was rather low in this period, lagging far
behind that between Japan and many other Asian neighbors (see Table 8). Ordinary Chinese
people had far less opportunities than Japanese people to have direct contacts with foreign
countries. So their warm feeling about Japan, if any, was largely built upon imagination and
effective government propaganda rather than personal judgment.
Table 8: Japan's societal contacts with Asian Neighbors
Year China Taiwan South Korea Indonesia
C visitors J visitors T visitors J visitors SK visitors J visitors I visitors J visitors to
to Japan to China to Japan to Taiwan to Japan to SK to Japan Indonesia
1972 994 8,052 47,536 204,939 85,757 180,220 6,543 15,895
1975 4,441 16,655 77,091 358,621 129,186 319,984 11,377 25,278
1977 2,266 23,445 74,525 482,832 46,803 447,519 14,652 42,794
1979 9,406 54,074 148,249 618,538 61,858 526,327 12,341 57,406
1980 15,328 71,473 217,087 584,641 67,919 428,008 17,310 62,098
SOUCE: Japan Ministry of Justice, Shunyfikoku Kanri Tdkei Nenpd (Annual Report of Immigration Statistics), various
years.
A more serious barrier to mutual understanding in this period was the lack of honest
dialogue between the two countries' historians on the bilateral war history. Narrowly
focusing on the practical interest of strategic alignment, the two governments covered up
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bilateral historiographic divergence with politicized historical myths at home and superficial
and hasty settlement of historical burden on the diplomatic stage. Negative public emotions
about the history were never eliminated but just temporarily suppressed by the
overwhelming friendship propaganda, which developed into widespread public cynicism
towards such propaganda in both countries in a later period.
SUMMARY
Table 9 summarizes the results of theory-testing against the history of Sino-Japanese
relations in the 1970s. In terms of the causes of historical myths, findings in this study
corroborate those of the previous period. In addition to the structural pressure for the two
countries to form a strategic alignment, the motivations of the ruling elites to strengthen
their domestic power should not be overlooked. Historical myths in this period did not
merely serve as justifications of national security policy but also played a significant role in
domestic politics.
As for the development of bilateral relations, while realist theory accounts for the
significant increase in their political and economic cooperation and conspicuous warm-up in
popular atmosphere, its predication of deep reconciliation falls short in reality. Other than
Japan's fear of being caught in the Sino-Soviet conflict if it drew too close to China and the
internal obstruction from the pro-Taiwan faction in Japan against tight relationship with
China, the war-related grievances and mistrust vis-a-vis Japan in China was an important
restraining factor in the reconciliation process. Unable to explain the dramatic change in
bilateral relations given the similar history-writing pattern from the previous period,
historical mythmaking theory still correctly predicts the relationship outcome to be in the
Shallow Reconciliation stage. Such a result suggests that, if driven by common security
interests, former enemy states can quickly turn around and form a collaborative relationship
even without eliminating their pernicious historical myths; but the failure to settle historical
debts would result in the lack of genuine mutual understanding and trust and prevent the
advent of deep reconciliation.
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Table 9: Theory-testing Summary (Sino-Japanese Relations 1972-1981)
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PREDICTIONS THEORY
(I) Realist Theory (II) Theory of OUTCOMES ASSESSMENT
Historical Mthmaking
Causes of National myths are merely National myths are shaped by Japanese conservative elites maintained war myths Theory II beter fits
Historical part of elite propaganda to a multitude of instrumental to enhance public support to the LDP government the evidence
Myths justify national security policy motivations including strategic and U.S.- Japan strategic collaboration;
goals, domestic political Chinese war myths were used to support
interests and ideological communist ideology and justify the newly formed
doctrines strategic alignment with Japan
Interstate Significant progress in No change in bilateral Shallow Reconciliation-Rapprochement Theory I better fits
Reconciliation reconciliation; reconciliation outcome; the relationship
Result change; Theory II isDeep Reconciliation as a Shallow Reconciliation as a more consistent with
result of positive structural result of Conflictual/Quasi- the relationship
conditions following Sino- Convergent narratives outcome
Soviet confrontation and Sino-
U.S. rapprochement
Indicators of 1: Lowered expectation of war - Theory I explains
Interstate No expectation of war Moderate expectation of war China was eager to form anti-Soviet strategic better the great
Reconcihation alignment with Japan, for which it accepted the U.S.- lessening of mutualbecause of common security because the historical Japan alliance and Japanese defense buildup; expectation of war;
Stage interest to counterbalance the narratives generated mistrust apan alliance and Japanese defense buildup; Theory II supports
Soviet threat but did not instigate Japanese elite felt compelled by the changing remaining Chinese
immediate confrontation pattern of U.S.-China-Soviet triangular relations to suspicion of Japan
develop political cooperation with China;
Bilateral security cooperation was still limited
because of Japanese fear of entrapment in future
Sino-Soviet conflicts and Chinese deep-rooted
suspicion of the danger of Japanese militarism
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Table 9 continued
Indicators of
Interstate
Reconciliation
Outcomes
2:
National recognition and full
settlement of sovereignty
controversies because of the
removal of pressure from bloc
leader and common security
interest
3:
Smooth economic interaction
and high strategic
interdependence because of
the need of mutual assistance
and the domination of
absolute gains concern
Harmonious popular feeling
due to the sense of solidarity
that generated by the common
security interest
Partial national recognition
because narratives did not
contain critical
land/resources/ethnic
disputes or raise historical
atonement as precondition for
normalization
Limited economic links with
frictions fed by negative
historical legacies
Simmering grievances and
mistrust derived from
historical memories should
lead to popular estrangement
but no request for direct
confrontation
Theory I explains
better the success of
normalization
negotiation
Partial national recognition -
Japan recognized China because the U.S. pressure
for Japan-Taiwan formal relations dissipated and the
security importance of Taiwan issue diminished after
Sino-U.S. rapprochement;
Sovereignty controversy remain unresolved because
of domestic political factors such as pro-Taiwan
faction in the LDP;
History burden was set aside for immediate
strategic gains and did not block normalization
Limited economic interaction -
Bilateral economic interaction grew fast because of
the lift of political constraints and their mutually
complementary economies;
Mutual economic dependence was asymmetric and
strategic interdependence low because of COCOM
restrictions, Japan's fear of provoking the Soviet
Union, and Chinese nationalist bias against foreign
economic influence and sense of historical
entitlement vis-i-vis Japan
Moderate public tension -
Popular feeling warmed up after normalization
because of the improvement of the structural
environment;
Estrangement remained because of the shortage of
comprehensive societal contacts and failure to
promote history dialogue
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Theory I explains
better the
development of
economic interaction;
Theory II explains the
limits in such
interaction
Theory I explains
better the
improvement of
popular atmosphere;
Theory II explains the
lack of true mutual
understanding and
trust
Chapter Five
Old Feud Comes Back:
Sino-Japanese Relations in the 1980s and 1990s
The 1980s and 1990s saw a sharp downturn in Sino-Japanese relations, where the
overall cordial atmosphere in the 1970s was replaced with frequent political disputes
between the two governments and simmering popular resentment, all typical features of the
"Shallow Reconciliation-Friction" stage of interstate reconciliation. This chapter applies the
two competing theories of reconciliation to this period to assess their relative explanatory
power. The congruence test suggests that historical mythmaking theory, which predicts a
decline in Sino-Japanese relations since the first half of the 1980s, offers a more useful
explanation than realist theory that predicts the decline would not occur until the end of the
decade. A close examination of the evolution of various aspects of the bilateral relationship
suggests that it was the negative emotional and perceptual forces generated from the sharply
widening gap the two countries' historical interpretations that mainly accounted for the
deterioration of bilateral reconciliation in the 1980s. In the post-Cold War era, despite the
lack of a major shift in bilateral power balance, realpolitik factors played a negative role in
bilateral relations, given the "rise of China" and assertive international strategies of both
countries. But the structurally rooted sense of uncertainty did not obscure the psychological
effect of historical mythmaking that exacerbated mutual perception of threat and stimulated
public opposition against diplomatic compromises at times of economic and political
disputes.
CAUSAL FACTORS AND PREDICTIONS
I. The International System: From A Stable Triangle to Uncertain Structure
In the 1980s, the U.S.-China-USSR strategic triangular relations were by and large
unchanged from the 1970s because the U.S. and China continued to collaborate on political
and security affairs to counterbalance the common Soviet threat. In the 1990s, however,
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with the demise of the Soviet Union and decline of traditional alliance politics, the
international system turned more complex and uncertain, prescribing neither clearly defined
concordance or discordance of strategic interests between China and other major powers.
Consequently, structural conditions for Sino-Japanese reconciliation were still positive in the
1980s but changed to a neutral state in the 1990s.
The 1980s: Continuing Sino-U.S. Strategic Alignment
In the first two to three years of the 1980s, Sino-U.S. relations experienced a low
tide. Before then, Beijing had complained about President Carter's "two-China" policy of
the U.S., reflected in the Taiwan Relations Act enacted in April 1979 that declared the U.S.
commitment to peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and the continuation of arms sales to
Taiwan, and the administration's contacts with Taiwan government officials. The stability of
Sino-U.S. relations was further challenged when Ronald Reagan, whose campaign statements
had vowed to pursue more official U.S.-Taiwan relations, entered office in January 1981. In
the ensuing bilateral negotiation, Beijing insisted that Washington should not only prevent
the sale of the advanced FX fighter jects to Taiwan but also curtail all other weapon sales,
and better to agree to a fixed date for terminating all arms sales to Taiwan. But these terms
were not acceptable to either the conservatives in the Congress or President's bureaucratic
lieutenants, such as National Security Adviser Richard Allen and Secretary of State George
Shultz.47 4 Shultz represented the pan-Asia faction, as opposed to the pro-China faction led
by his predecessor Alexander Haig, in the administration advocatig that American policy in
Asia should be reoriented to focus on the strategic importance of Japan in the anti-
Soviet global coalition, and that China's cooperation was valuable to the U.S. but not to the
extent that would warrant the sacrifice of other U.S. interests such as in Taiwan.475 The
Chinese side was so frustrated with the Reagan administration's Taiwan policy that it refused
to continue military exchanges or purchase American weapons and even threatened to
downgrade diplomatic relationship.
474 Robert S. Ross, Negotiating Cooperation: the United States and China, 1969-1989 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford
University Press, 1995), pp. 175-195; Harding, A Fragile Relationship, pp. 108-116; Mann, About Face, Chapter 6.
475 David Shambaugh, "Patterns of Interaction in Sino-American Relations," in Robinson and Shambaugh,
Chinese Foreign Poliy, p. 203; Tow, "China and the International Strategic System," p. 138; Mann, About Face, pp.
129-131.
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In the meantime, the Chinese strategic elites began to reassess international security
environment in light of the changing American-Soviet power balance. In a comprehensive
study done in 1982, international affairs specialist Huan Xiang and his colleagues drew the
conclusion that the Soviet threat to China had decreased and, given Reagan administration's
defense buildup and aggressive intervention in the Third World, the two superpowers now
posed an equally "hegemonic" threat to world peace. Unlike in the 1970s when it
encouraged active American policy to check the Soviet expansion, China now believed that
the strategic balance had begun to tilt towards the U.S. and worried that the increasingly
confrontational American policy would entangle China in Soviet-American disputes.4 76 So
China embarked on a quest for greater strategic autonomy in the triangular relations while
abandoning an unqualified pro-Western foreign policy. Formally endorsed at the 12th
Congress of the CCP in September 1982, the so-called "independent foreign policy" had a
trifocal approach of improving relations with Moscow, continuing good relations with
Washington but to avoid getting too close to it, and reaffirming solidarity with the Third
World.4 77 As a result, Sino-Soviet normalization talk resumed in October 1982, and bilateral
relations made "slow but steady progress" ever since then.478
However, the "independent foreign policy" was much less an immediate change of
international strategy than a rhetoric to express Beijing's unhappiness with Washington, as
well as to appease CCP hard-liners who resented the pro-Western bent of domestic
modernization and reform programs, which will be discussed later. China may have
envisioned a neural stance between the two superpowers eventually, but Chinese foreign
policy in the remainder of the 1980s could not be truly independent of the U.S. strategic
support because the Soviet Union remained the principal security threat to China. When
responding to Leonid Brezhnev's speech at Tashkent in March 1982 that offered an overture
of rapprochement to China, the General Secretary of CCP Hu Yaobang said China would
take "deeds, rather than words" as the real indicator of Soviet intentions. China particularly
demanded the removal of three obstacles - the massive Soviet military deployment in
476 David Shambaugh, "Patterns of Interaction in Sino-American Relations," p. 204; Harding, A Fragile
Relationship, pp. 121-123.
477 James Chieh Hsiung, "Introduction," in Hsiung ed., Beyond China's Independent Foreign Poliy: Challenge for the
U.S. and Its Asian allies (New York: Praeger, 1985), pp. 3-4.
478 Chi Su, "Sino-Soviet Relations of the 1980s: From Confrontation to Conciliation," in Samuel Kim, China
and the World: New Directions in Chinese Foreign Relations (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989).
209
Mongolia and along the Sino-Soviet border, Soviet support for Vietnam's occupation of
Cambodia, and Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan - as the precondition for any
improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. The responses of Brezhnev's successors by mid-
1980s that refused to address the three obstacles were rather disappointing to Beijing.479
Even when Gorbachev issued the Vladivostok speech in July 1986 that signaled the Soviet
intention to establish cooperative economic and political ties with the nations of Asia,
especially China, China still reacted with skepticism. In an interview with an American
journalist in September, Deng Xiaoping expressed cautious welcome to the speech and his
willingness to meet Gorbachev, pending the removal of the "three obstacles" in the bilateral
relations. 40
Military tensions between China and the Soviet Union indeed remained high in the
1980s. From 1983 to 1985, Hanoi's offensives in Cambodia supported by Moscow
provoked Sino-Vietnamese skirmish along their border. Meanwhile, the Soviet SS-20
missiles deployed in the Far East placed China within the range of Soviet nuclear attack and
Tu-16 bombers deployed in Cam Ranh Bay threatened the security of Southern China. So
the Soviet military threat to China did not abate but only worsened in the mid-1980s.481 In
fact, the Soviet security threat to China continued until 1988, when Gorbchev agreed to the
complete withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan in the Geneva accords, encouraged
Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia, and announced significant reduction of Soviet
military presence in the Far East and central Asia.
Such structural continuity in the most of the 1980s determines that China would not
sacrifice its strategic cooperation with Washington for the sake of rapprochement with
Moscow. When China and America successfully put aside the question of American arms
sales to Taiwan through a joint communique of August 1982 and addressed a few other
controversial issues around 1983, bilateral relations considerably warmed up. Bilateral
military cooperation particularly reached an unprecedented level. High-level consultations
among military and civilian officials from the two countries were held regularly, and the two
479 Harding, A Fragile Relationship, p. 123; Chi Shu, "Sino-Soviet Relations of the 1980s," p. 113.
480 "Replies to the American Correspondent Mike Wallace, September 2, 1986," Xiaoping Deng, Selected Works
ofDeng Xiaoping, 1982-1992, pp. 170-177.
481 Harding, A Fragile Relationship, pp. 164-165.
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military establishments also established working-level exchanges. Besides, the two countries
shared intelligence on Soviet military capabilities and the CIA even paid for Chinese military
goods to be conveniently supplied to the anti-Soviet resistance forces in Afghanistan. In
terms of arms transfer, in May1983 the Reagan administration loosened its controls on high-
technology exports to China and put China in an export control category that included many
of America's friends and allies. Since 1984 China was even made eligible for America's
Foreign Military Sales program, allowing it to buy sophisticated American weapons with the
federal government financing these purchases. Their cooperation in various aspects
developed so remarkably during the second half of the 1980s that it was considered the
"Golden Years" of Sino-American relationship. 482
1990s: Towards A Multipolar World
The Soviet collapse and American victory in the Gulf War at the beginning of the
1990s seemed to have transformed the international system from loose bipolarity to
unipolarity, where only America "possesses imposing strength in all categories of great
power capability." 483 But the U.S. failed since to instate a Pax Americana structure around
the world. Relations with Western allies turned more competitive because alliance politics
had atrophied and countries like Japan and Germany were making strides toward "normal
states" with great power capability. American relations with Russia and China could hardly
develop beyond a state of cautious, peaceful coexistence due to their disagreement on issues
like arms control, human rights, ethnic conflicts, and national unification issues. The
American-advocated new world order in the Asia-Pacific region was particularly
overshadowed by the "rise of China" as a result of China's phenomenal rate of economic
growth and continuous increase of defense budget. Besides, smaller states also expressed
their uneasiness to the American preponderance, such as in the occasion of the
Nonalignment Movement Meeting.48 4 So for a decade the scholarly mainstream of
international relations believed that American hegemony was ambiguous and held skepticism
482 Harding, A Fragile Relationship, p. 141, pp. 165-169; Mann, About Face, pp. 136-143.
483 Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," International Security 17,
No 4 (Spring 1993).
484 Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion," p. 275.
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to its durability. To them the international system seemed more like "uni-multipolarity" than
simple unipolarity, and some even predicted the rise of multipolarity in the near future.485
The great uncertainty in this process of systemic transition caused the lack of
consensus within individual states in answering some of the most consequential questions of
national security policy, such as "what are the essential national interests and goals," "where
would the threat come from," "who are the friends and foes of the state," and "what kind of
political and military remedies should the state take to obtain essential national goals."
Calculation of international power distribution could not provide clear-cut guidance to
national grand strategy. The sensational argument of "China threat" that emerged around
the mid-1990s, for example, was quite controversial because it was still in debate whether the
China's rise had challenged the status quo of global or regional balance of power. So the
focus of the question shifted from the measurement of national power to the evaluation of
states' intention, which was never an easy task for it tends to be subject to distortion by
inaccurate information, ambiguous interpretations, and even value judgment and emotions.
Of importance to states' foreign policy decisions in the 1990s was no longer so much the
international structure as non-structural forces embedded in domestic politics and societal
dynamics.
Predictions for Sino-Japanese Relations
Realist theory predicts defacto deep reconciliation between China and Japan through
the 1980s, just like in the 1970s, because the common Soviet threat still compelled them to
cooperate closely. However, when world power distribution was in flux and traditional
alliance declined after the end of the Cold War, structural conditions turned neutral, and the
security incentives that had promoted bilateral cooperation should decrease accordingly.
Therefore, realist theory should predict a downturn in bilateral relations in both the
485 See Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion;" Charles A. Kupchan, "After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional
Integration, and the Sources of A Stable Multipolarity," Interntional Security 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998); Barry R.
Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," International Security 21, No. 3
(Winter 1996/1997). An exception is William C. Wohlforth, who argues that the U.S. unipolarity is not only
unambiguous but also durable. See Wohlforth, "The Stability of A Unipolar World," International Security 24,
No. 1 (Summer 1999).
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intergovernmental and popular dimensions since the end of the 1980s. Moreover, the rise of
mutual suspicion and concerns about armed conflict should be directly caused by the
strategic judgment that new security menace after the demise of the Soviet Union came from
the power balance shift between themselves. Besides, bilateral disputes should become more
frequent and acrimonious because it was no longer necessary to compromise important
national interests in sovereignty rights in exchange for their alignment against the Soviet
threat and concerns about relative gains became more prominent in matters of economic
cooperation. Likewise, a negative change in popular feelings should arise as a result of a
widespread belief that the time for the two countries to unite against the Soviet Union had
ended and now the other country was posing a potential threat to their own critical national
interests.
II. Historical Mythmaking: Mixture of Conflictual and Combative Narratives
Since the 1980s national memory of both countries have entered a stage of
renegotiation and reconstruction. The mainstream national myths were challenged and
reshaped replaced by both top-down moves to adjust to the new political needs of the ruling
elites and bottom-up trends of the social groups and even individuals who try to project their
own political views through historical reinterpretation. While the Japanese conservative
elites managed to maintain their dominance in framing national collective memory, the grip
of communist historiography on Chinese public gradually became slackened. More and
more Chinese people have come to hold hateful emotions about the entire Japanese nation
rather than just the small military clique. With the Chinese narrative turning more combative
and Japanese domestic debate over war history interpretation evolving into a focal point of
international attention, the bilateral historiographic divergence actually grew more dramatic
and became an outstanding source of bilateral political disputes and tensions.
Old and New Myths in Chinese Historiography
Changing Political Environment
Since the beginning of the 1980s, pragmatic leaders such as Deng Xiaoping and his
proteges, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, gave primacy to modernization programs, the
success of which were largely hinged on a general strategy of reform and opening to the
West, including Japan. But these reform-oriented Chinese communist elites confronted
resistance from conservative old guards in the CCP who loathed indiscriminate emulation of
the Western model in economic and political realms. Economically, conservatives like Chen
Yun, Bo Yibo and Yao Yilin gained influence while carrying out drastic economic
readjustment at the end of the 1970s to curb the frenzied spree of foreign plant
importation.48 6 These leaders advocated more centrally planned economy, and opposed too
tight strategic collaboration with the West and excessive reliance on Western import goods,
technology, and investment. They were skeptical of reform principles of encouraging
enterprise autonomy, free market mechanisms and private sectors, especially when negative
side effects of reform and openness such as unemployment and inflation, commercialism,
and higher crime rate hit the society.4 87
Conservatives' criticism of the economic policies was still relatively moderate if
compared with their relentless attack on reform in the area of defense and ideology. For one
thing, Deng Xiaoping's action to modernize the PLA through budget cut and personnel
reduction, including forced retirement of older military officers, sparked bitter complaints
from senior military leaders that Deng's modernization program mistakenly emphasized
"pragmatism over ideology" and reduced the role and prestige of the PLA. 488 These military
leaders found political allies among party elders who blamed the reform leaders for their
486 Lee, China and Japan, pp. 51-52.
487 Among those most dissatisfied with the economic reform in the 1980s were many urban workers, who felt
that reforms had generated highly unequal opportunities for them, reflected in official corruption, widening
income disparity between workers in private and foreign-owned enterprises and those in state-owned
enterprises, and the rise of job insecurity after companies began to introduce layoff as a management means.
Another widely complained issue was inflation. The inflation rate jumped from 2.8 percent per year during
1978-84 to 12 percent during 1985-88. Although their material lives considerably improved since the reform
began, urban wage earners saw the price increase eating away a big part of their nominal income increase. A
1986 national sample shows that official corruption and inflation were the two issues that citizens were most
upset about. For more on the complicated social-economic consequences of economic reforms and the
dissatisfaction in Chinese urban society, see Andrew G. Walder, "Urban Industrial Workers: Some
Observations on the 1980s," in Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, State and Society in China: The Consequences of Reform
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).
488 Rose, Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations, pp. 72-77.
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laxity in ideological indoctrination that had given rise to increasingly widespread, dangerous
criticism of the party leadership and petition for political system reform. Since spring 1981,
the PLA and party elders waged several ideologically charged political campaigns against
outspoken intellectuals who sought political reform following the model of Western
democracy. Among them were the 1981-1982 attacks on "bourgeois liberalization"
embodied in the "wounded literature" that criticized the party's role in the Cultural
Revolution, the 1983-1984 campaign against capitalist "spiritual pollution," referring to the
demands of democratic elite to reinterpret the Maxist ideology to accommodate more liberal
ideas, and 1986-1987 renewed campaign against "bourgeois liberalization" detected in the
flourishing public discussions on the direct reform of political institutions.
To Chinese top leaders like Deng Xiaoping, unmistakable priority was placed on
reform policies that would reinvigorate national economy, modernize the army, and overhaul
the administrative institutions. But Deng also had to make compromises and tactical
retreats, especially on the political and ideological front, to appease the hard-liners and build
a broad support base for the general strategy of reform and openness to the West. In fact,
Deng repeatedly threw his support to the army and party elders in the above-mentioned
ideological campaigns and was willing to sacrifice his reformist associates, including Hu
Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, when necessary. These moves were not always taken
involuntarily because Deng himself was afraid that too much freedom in ideological debate
would instigate public demands for Western style democratic reform and undermine the
ruling power of the CCP. So Deng's reforms were characterized by Liu Binyan, a noted
dissident intellectual, as having a very long economic leg and a very short political leg.489
Deng's attitude to the West was also ambivalent. While accepting international
economic interdependence and emphasizing Western assistance to restoring China's former
greatness, he also insisted on preserving the national essence and autonomy vis-a-vis the
outside world, especially if Western political influence seemed to threaten the ruling
foundation of the CCP regime. Deng's unparalleled prestige within the party since the
beginning of the 1980s and his encompassing contacts and experiences all contributed to the
489 Merle Goldman, Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in China: Political Reform in the Deng Xiaoping Era (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 192.
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formation and prevalence of a new Chinese national identity. So an odd mixture of what
Michel Oksenberg and Allen Whiting call "confident nationalism" and "assertive
nationalism" emerged. The former acknowledged the importance of Western technology
and investment while the later depicted the Western powers as a negative out-group that
challenged the interests of the in-group, the Chinese nation.490 The xenophobic "us versus
them" theme in the second type of nationalism dominated the state propaganda in political
and cultural arenas, including official interpretation of national history. It was not only
useful to fend off domestic conservative criticism against the reform policy for being soft in
foreign relations. Because it the inseparability of the nation from the party and government,
the "assertive nationalism" also served to stimulate patriotic emotions among the general
public, defuse their resentments about the social-economic problems generated by economic
reform, and defeat societal demands for political reform.
In the 1990s, Deng and his successors continued to wrestle with the leftist
opposition within the party against the open door policy on the one hand,491 and the
tumbling government prestige among the public following the armed crackdown of June 4t
incident and mounting public complaints of social inequality, officials corruption, and failure
of social welfare policy. With the popularity of communist ideology in steady decline,
nationalism became the centerpiece of government propaganda for intra-party power
consolidation and public mobilization. The nationalism was more or less confident and
affirmative in economic sphere where China could boast its recent achievement with the aid
of international commercial links. But it remained rigid and assertive in ideological and
cultural domains not only because the government could not afford appearing weak to the
foreigners in the face of conservative resistance to open-door economic reform, but also for
purpose of diverting public resentment away from the communist regime to foreign
countries.
Related to the rise of "assertive nationalism" since the 1980s was a conspicuous
redefinition of the cross-strait relations. In the early Cold War years, Taiwan was a major
490 Michel Oksenberg, "China's Confident Nationalism," Foreign Affair 65, No. 3 (1987); Allen S. Whiting,
"Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy after Deng," The China Quarterly No. 142 (June 1995).
491 For a detailed study of the factional struggle within the CCP from the June 4th incident of 1989 to 1993, see
Whiting, "Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy after Deng."
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security problem to China because it threatened to invade the mainland with Western
support or simply served as the launching base of imperialist American military to contain
China. Such threat diminished since Sino-U.S. rapprochement, but in the 1980s the danger
of Taiwan independence and legalization of the cross-strait territorial separation increasingly
concerned China. To re-embrace Taiwan, a province ceded to Japan by an unequal treaty,
was now a question of national pride as the government propaganda geared up the nation
for a cause of cleaning foreign humiliation and restoring national glory. So since the early
1980s, the government tuned down the communist ideology of class struggle but stressed
national unification and revival, and dramatically departed from its previous harsh stance
towards the KMT. Deng Xiaoping approved the renovation of Chiang's old residence and
family graveyard in mainland China, Ye Jianying published "Nine Principles for Peaceful
Reunification" in 1981, and in July 1982 Liao Chengzhi sent an open letter to Chiang Ching-
kuo, the son of Chiang Kai-shek, appealing for the KMT and CCP to "jointly overcome
previous alienation and complete the great undertaking of national unification (Tong uan
Qianxian, Gonging Zuguo Tongyi Daye)." 492
National unification issue became even more pressing in the 1990s when the pro-
independence force, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), achieved great political
ascendance in Taiwan. Because the KMT still represented the anti-independence
constituencies in Taiwan, the mainland government and the KMT found common interest in
their struggle against the DPP. Now an important ally in the national unification cause, the
KMT was no longer treated as China's archenemy but received much more positive
evaluation from the mainland propaganda regarding its historical and present functions.
The Patriotism Education: Rehabilitate the KMT, Blame the Japanese
The rise of "assertive nationalism" and the change of Taiwan policy during this
period led to considerable reconstruction of Chinese war historiography. Generally
492 See Zhuwei Tie, iJao Cheng.hi Zhuan (The Biography ofLiao Chengzhi) (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1998), pp.
578-586; Rongde Li, Liao Chenzhi He Tade Y!iia (Piao Chenzhi and His Family) (Shenyang, Chunfeng Wenyi
Chubanshe, 1998), pp. 343-352.
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speaking, the new history no longer centered on the ideological and political conflict
between the communist CCP and capitalist KMT. Instead, the "defining fundamental
fissure" for Chinese national identity was now drawn between the Chinese nation and
foreign nations, especially those nations that had invaded and humiliated China in the past,
the most ferocious one being Japan. This was best reflected in the revival of patriotism
education that de-emphasized ideological indoctrination and highlighted China's national
struggle with Japan and Chinese suffering during the war.
Chinese patriotism education dates back to the "Five-Love Education" (WuaiJiaoyu)
- love the motherland, people, work, science, and public properties - promoted in schools
shortly after the PRC was founded. But the program was soon overshadowed by ideological
indoctrination when Mao Zengdong criticized in 1957 that young students seriously lacked
training in Marxist ideology and understanding of current political affairs. As "The Directive
on Educational Work" issued by the CCP Central Committee and State Council in
September 1959 pointed out, the fundamental policy of educational work was "to make
education serve the proletarian politics," which required all schools to carry out Marxist and
Leninist political education. The tradition of "Five-Love Education" was not formally
restored in school curriculum until the mid-1980s, when the State Education Commission
(SEC) ordered the curriculum reform of the "thoughts and politics" (Sixiang Zhengzhz)
subject. A policy document of the SEC of April 1990 further instructed that "(schools)
should place patriotism in an extremely prominent position" and should "integrate
patriotism education and education of the condition of our country with the education of
loving socialism and loving the CCP." 493
With nation-centered patriotism replacing class-based ideology to be the key
component of moral education, an education campaign using past history of resisting foreign
aggression swept Chinese schools. In late 1991, the State Administration of Radio, Film and
Television selected 140 movies on patriotism and revolutionary tradition to be shown to
school pupils nationwide.4 94 In 1995 and 1996, the SEC and cultural propaganda
493 For an overview of the government policy on patriotism education in Chinese schools since 1949, see
Weizhong Pu, et al eds. Aiguo Zhuyi Yu MinzuJingshen (Patriotism and National Spirit) (Beijing: Shehui Kexue
Wenxian Chubanshe, 2000), pp. 63-84.
494 Zhongguo Dianying Nianjian (China Film Yearbook), 1991, pp. 47-48.
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departments came up with a list of 100 patriotic songs, 100 patriotic books, and 100 bases of
patriotic education around the countries. 49' Not to mention the large quantity of
extracurricular reading materials on Chinese cultural traditions and moral concepts, and
national symbols, history and geography that were produced to meet the demand of the
campaign.
During this campaign, the Sino-Japanese war was always an indispensable source
material. No longer buried in the China's longtime struggle for national independence, the
war of resistance against Japan was singled out as the most important military and political
conflict in Chinese history not only for its unprecedented scale but also because in this war
"China could claim its first complete victory against foreign invaders." 496 This war was even
defined as the turning point of Chinese national fate from decline to resurrection for it was
credited for having paved the foundation for Chinese modernization.497
Noticeably, the new narrative gave considerable credit to the KMT's military
resistance. It still criticized Chiang's anti-communist attitude, but also stressed that he had
never given up resistance campaign against the Japanese and even claimed that the KMT and
CCP shared common interest in countering foreign aggressors and reviving China.
Textbooks published on the basis of the 1986 Teaching Guideline for the first time
introduced detailed treatment of the conventional military campaigns fought by the KMT-
led troops. They not only acknowledged the military significance of the KMT-fought
battles, such as the rare victory in the Taierzhuang Battle, but also lauded the patriotism and
courage of the Nationalist army, and even called a number of KMT generals who died in
these battles "martyrs," a phrase that used to be reserved for communists only.498
Meanwhile, war movies replaced negative stereotyping of noted KMT characters
such as Chiang with a more realistic approach, in feature films like Xian Shibian (Xi'an
495 Zhongguo Jiaoyu Nianjian (The Yearbook of Chinese Education), 1996, pp. 957-964; Zhongguo Jiaoyu Nianjian, 1997,
pp. 147-149.
496 See "Jiang Zeming's Speech at the Veterans' Symposium Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the
Victory in the War of Resistance against Japan, August 25, 1995," in Tian, Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji,
Vol. 2, p. 939.
497 Liu ed., Zhongguo Fuxing Shuniu: Kangri Zhangzheng de Banian, pp. 1-5.498MST 7, Vol 4; HST, Vol. 2.
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Incident) released in 1980, Xuezhan Taier!huang (The Sanguinary Battle of Taierzhuang) in
1986, and documentary films like Kangri Fenghuo (The Flames of War of Resistance against
Japan) in 1985. The movie Xuezhan Taierghuang particularly stood out as the first film made
in the mainland that directly broke the taboo on the subject of the Nationalist resistance
campaign. The directors testified that the production of this movie got strong support from
top party leaders and propaganda departments for it not only could stimulate Chinese
patriotism but also contribute to CCP-KMT cooperation in national unification cause.499
Official commemoration of the war also changed emphasis to stress the international
conflict between China and Japan rather than the internal conflict between the CCP and
KMT. A high-profile memorial institution, the War of Resistance Museum, was first opened
in the Beijing suburb of Wanping in 1987. While highly eulogizing the role of the CCP in
the anti-Japanese war, the exhibition also praised the Nationalist government for carrying
out "some effective policies relating to resistance to Japan and the establishment of reforms
in the political, economic, cultural and foreign relations fields." 500 Budgets were also
provided for local governments to build or refurbish memorial sites dedicated to major
battles fought by the KMT army, such as the memorial hall of Taierzhuang Battle, and the
tombs of KMT officers and soldiers killed during the war including Generals Tong Linge,
Zhang Zizhong and Zhao Dengyu.so1
Not only the KMT's contribution to the war victory but also Western aid to Chinese
war efforts was explicitly acknowledged. Textbooks in the 1990s commonly mentioned
American air raids of Japanese territories and the decisive role that the American nuclear
bombs played in imposing unconditional surrender on Japan. With the negative descriptions
of the KMT and U.S. governments both taken out from the official historiography, what was
emphatically deplored was only the "vicious Japanese imperialist aggressors." Not simply
condemning Japan's long-time aggressive ambition toward China as in the past narrative, the
new interpretation gave much emphasis to the atrocious war crimes committed by Japanese
499 " 'XueZhan Taierzhuang Daoyan Yishu Zhongjie (Summary of Director Art on Xuezhan Taierzhuang), Zhongguo
Dianying Nianjian (The Yearbook of Chinese Movie), 1987, pp. 3/12-3/16.
500 Mitter, "Behind the Scenes at the Museum," p. 284.
501 See "Yizhi, Jiuzhi, Jinian Sheshi (Ruins, Old Sites, and Memorial Facilities)," in Zhang Shaosi et al. Eds.,
Zhongguo Kangri Zhangzheng Dacidian (The Dictionary of Chinese War of Resistance against Japan) (Wuhan: Wuhan
Chubanshe, 1995).
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army in China. Since late 1980s, textbooks greatly expanded treatment on these crimes,
covering a more comprehensive range of crimes than before, providing vivid descriptions,
concrete figures, pictures of these crimes, and even naming individual villages or persons
victimized by Japanese atrocities.502
War movies made since the 1980s also shifted focus from praising Chinese
revolutionary heroism to disclosing Japanese brutality and Chinese suffering. For example, a
number of films made in this period were particularly dedicated to the Nanjing Massacre,
including the documentary film Nanjing Datusha (Nanjing Massacre) released in August 1982,
and feature films Tucheng Xuezheng (Bloody Testimony of Massacre in A Captured City) and
Nanjing Datusha (Nanjing Massacre) produced in 1987 and 1995 respectively. The Chinese
government also subsidized the production of a horror film around 1988, Hei Taiyang 731
(Black Sun 731), on the germ warfare conducted by the secret Japanese Unit 731 in
Manchuria during the war. Such a phenomenon was unthinkable in the past when
revolutionary heroism dominated propaganda and art works dealing with national suffering
were denounced as preaching defeatism or bourgeoisie humanitarianism. 50 3
At the same time, war commemoration in China brought Japanese brutality and
Chinese suffering to the center of collective war memory. An editorial published in People's
Daily on September 18, 1991 called the anniversary day of the Manchuria Incident "A Day of
National Humiliation."50 4 In his official statement on the 50th anniversary of the end of war,
Jiang Zemin gave exceptionally high figures of Chinese human casualties and economic cost
during the war, and called the crimes committed by Japanese aggressors as the most
barbarian and brutal in Chinese history.5 05
502 See MST 7, Vol 4; HST, Vol. 2.
503 Yijun Luo, "Fan Faxisi Dianying Fasilu (Reflecting on Anti-Fascism Movies)" and Hong Qi, "Shijie Fan
Faxisi Ticai Dianying Yantaohui Zai Nanjin Juxing" (Conference on World Anti-Fascism Movies Held in
Nanjing), in Zhongguo Dianying Nianjian (China Film Yearbook), (Beijing: Zhongguo Dianying Chuban She, 1996),
pp. 230-236, pp. 325-326.
504 "People's Daily Editorial: Self-respect, self-confidence, and Self-strengthening, in Commemorating the 60th
Anniversary of the 'September 18 Incident,' September 18, 1991," Tian, Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji, Vol.
2, p. 800.
505 See "Jiang Zeming's Speech at the Beijing Assembly Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Victory in
the War of Resistance against Japan and Anti-Fascism World War, September 3, 1995," in Tian, Zhanhou Zhongri
Guanxi Wenxianji, Vol. 2, p. 948.
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War museums commemorating Chinese suffering mushroomed across the country.
The Memorial for the Compatriot Victims in the Nanjing Massacre by the Japanese Invading
Troops was completed on August 15, 1985, the 40th anniversary of the end of the war. The
name of the building was in Deng Xiaoping's handwriting. On display are numerous
photographs, written documents, testimonies of survivors and witness, as well as human
skeletons of victims of the massacre. On the front wall inscribed "VICTIMS 300,000" - the
official Chinese estimate of killed victims - in Chinese, English, and Japanese. The ending
part of the exhibition indicates that this museum has been designated as an important site
for patriotic education for school children, youths, and military across the country. Besides
this grand memorial, smaller monuments were also erected at about 13 sites of Japanese
killings in Nanjing.50 6 In other places of the country, museums were constructed since the
1980s at various sites of Japanese atrocities, including the Museum of the Criminal Evidence
of Unit 731 Bacteria Troop built in 1985 in Haerbin, and the September 18 Historical
Museum in Shenyang that was originally built in 1991 as a broken calendar opening at the
page of September 18, 1931. When the Shenyang museum reopened in 1999 after
renovation, it added a bell inscribed by Jiang Zemin's handwriting "Never Forget National
Humiliation" (Wuwang Guochi).
Academics were also encouraged to conduct deeper investigations of Japanese
atrocities. The past two decades saw an unprecedented amount of academic works and
released government documents on Nanjing Massacre, as well as the holding of several
international academic symposiums on this historical event.50 7 Chinese research works on
Japanese war crimes now used a wide scope of materials including data of systematic surveys
and interviews with survivors and witness, as well as primary sources in English and
Japanese languages. New academic journals specialized in the study of the war, such as the
506 See "Yizhi, Jiuzhi, Jinian Sheshi;" Daqing Yang, "Contested History: The Nanjing Massacre in Postwar
Japan and China," in Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific Wars. Takashi Fujitani et al. eds. (Durham, N.C.: The
Duke University Press, 2001).
507 For examples, see Qinhua Rijun Nanjing Datusha Shigao (Historical Narratives on the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese
Military Invading China) (Nanjing: Jiangsu Guji Chubanshe, 1987); Chenshan Zhu ed., Qinhua Rijun Nanjing
Datusha Xincunzhe Zhengyanji (Testimonies of the Survivors of the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Military Invading China)
(Nanjing: Nanjing University Press, 1994); Chinese Second National Archives in Nanjing ed., Qinhua Rijun
Nanjing Datusha Dangan (Archives on the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Military Invading China) (Nanjing: Jiansu Guji
Chubanshe, 1997); Anji Chen ed., Qinhua Rijun Nanjing Datusha Shi Guoji Xueshu Yantaohui Lunwenji (The
Anthology of the International Symposium on the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Miktagy Invading China) (Hefei: Anhui
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influential Kangri Zhanzheng Yanjiu (The Journal of Studies of China's Resistance War Against
Japan) started in 1991, also made investigation of Japanese war atrocities as one of their
most important topics. In addition, provincial and municipal governments started digging
and compiling local history of war suffering.
Last but not the least, the change of tone in official historiography was soon echoed
throughout the society. The nonfiction work entitled The Great Nanjing Massacre by an army
writer, Xu Zhigeng, was one of the most successful bestsellers on the topic of Japanese war
atrocities. First coming out in December 1987 on the 50t anniversary of the massacre, the
book was sold 150,000 volumes in the first month and reprinted time and again afterwards
to meet the market demand. It was soon included in the reading list of patriotic education in
numerous factories, schools and army units, and also won many high prizes in national book
competition.5 "8 Since then, Japanese war atrocities became a hot topic of Chinese pop
culture. Numerous books for public consumption have been published on the subjec in the
past two decades, many of which were products of the initiatives of local government and
individual publishers and authors.
Victim Consciousness and Societal Challenge to Official Myths
The new focal point of Japanese brutality and Chinese miserable experiences during
the war in the official historiography since the 1980s gave rise to an outpouring of victim
consciousness among the Chinese public vis-a-vis Japan. While the governmentn
propaganda maintained the simultaneous victimization of Japanese ordinary people, the
general public preoccupied with Chinese suffering felt little sympathy for Japanese war
experiences and were disgusted with official slogans about Sino-Japanese friendship. They
blamed the official historiography for being still too restrained in telling the real terror of war
and going too far in stressing peace and humanitarian values that meant little to a deeply
traumatized nation. A movie critic angrily called the movie Nanjing Massacre a work of
Daxue Chubanshe, 1998). For a recent, comprehensive review of Chinese historiography on Nanjing
Massacre, see Daqing Yang, "Convergence or Divergence?"
508 Zhigeng Xu, Nanjin Datusha (The Great Nanjing Massacre) (Beijin, Jiefangjun Wenyi, 1987). The English
translation of the book came out in 1995. See Zhigeng Xu, Lest We Forget: Nanjing Massacre, 1937 (Beijing:
Chinese literature Press 1995).
pseudo-humanitarianism because it gave more attention to a Japanese female victim than
numerous Chinese victims and showed too few killing scenes to convey to audience the
barbarism of Japanese army. At a symposium on WWII movies held in Nanjing in 1995,
another critic scathingly asked why the Chinese film industry was so interested in telling
stories about Japanese orphans left in China but neglected to address Chinese orphans
whose parents were killed by Japanese army.509
The prevalence of victimhood in Chinese society brought into question a national
myth that the government had tried to maintain thus far, which is that Japanese militarists
are the enemy but Japanese people are our fellow victims and innocent. Chinese popular
understanding of the war history in this period well blurred the distinction between good
Japanese and bad Japanese. Bestselling books, internet chat rooms and other private
discussion forums on Japan and war history commonly ascribed the Japanese action of
aggression to the character and culture of the Japanese nation, including its narrow-minded
egoism, emperor worship, and bellicose Bushido, or the way of warriors. So they accused
the entire Japanese nation of being brutal, aggressive, and unrepentant."'s
Hence, parallel with the government endeavor to construct new myths and maintain
some old myths, a new type of memory representing the surging public cynicism against the
official historiography was emerging in Chinese society. Not only that the dual approach to
Japanese militarists and ordinary Japanese people lost its appeal among Chinese public, but
also some cultural elites made open bids for renegotiating national history and identity with
their own historical conception. One of the early controversial art works on the war was the
international acclaimed film Hong Gao Liang (Red Sorghum) based on a short novel by
famous writer Mo Yan and directed by Zhang Yimou, a leading member of the "Fifth
Generation" of Chinese filmmakers. Belonging to the post-Cultural Revolution generation
of literature elites, Mo were disgusted with rigid, politicized representation of historical
509 Yiming Li, "Lishi Zaixian yu Renmin Jiyi: Ping 'Nanjing Datusha' (Historical Recontruction and People's
Memories: comments about the movie 'Nanjing Massacre');" Hong Qi, "Shijie Fan Faxisi Ticai Dianying
Yantaohui Zai Nanjin Juxing," in China Film Yearbook 1996, pp. 267-269, 325.
510 For some exmaples of bestselling books with a sweeping anti-Japanese view, see Qiang Song et al., China
Can Say No (zhongguo keyi shuo bu) (Beijing: Chinese Joint Press of Industry and Commerce, May 1996);
idem., China Can Still Say No (zhongguo haishi nengshuo bu) (Beijing: Chinese Wenlian Press, October 1996);
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events and sought instead to uncover the embedded human emotions and desires. The key
characters in the novel were men and women working in a rural wine refinery, who "do not
consider themselves to be part of any organized fighting force, nor do they consider
themselves to be fighting on the side of righteousness ... For these fighters there is no PLA,
no Communist Party, no Chairman Mao. They fight to survive, they fight for their land,
their native soil (xiangtu). To be a hero is to fight the Japanese."'s1 Mo actually wrote the
novel based on orally transmitted stories in his hometown, so it was a ground-breaking work
conveying the private memories of the war in China that had always been alive but missing
from official propaganda. The very intention of the film to rid of excessive ideological and
political themes incurred simultaneously a barrage of grave criticism and wholehearted praise
from different Chinese film critics.
Hong Gao Liang was only one of many literature works produced in this period that
emphasizes ordinary people's life and reactions, which was the non-governmental aspect of
the war that had been ignored by the orthodoxy historiography. Examples include Riben
Guizi Laile (Here Come the Japanese Devils), a novel published in 1991 by Ye Zhaoyan, and
the trilogy on the war of resistance by novelist You Fengwei completed in mid-1990s.
Unlike previous propaganda that tended to portray Chinese people as brave and patriotic
warriors who always won the final victory no matter going through how much hardship,
these works centered on the harmless but often gullible, weak, ordinary Chinese people who
do not have the instinct to fight but embrace too much wishful thinking about foreign
invaders; when they do rise up to fight, they are often self-organized rather than having any
partisan leadership and do not necessarily have a national cause but only strive for the
survival of their own community.512
One of You's trilogy novels, Shengcun (Survival), was later made into a movie, Guizi
Laile, or Devils at Doorstep, by a vanguard Chinese film director, Jiang Wen.5 13 Adding his
Keqin Sun, Containing China (ezhi zhongguo) (China Yanshi Press, 1996); Jiwen Xiao et al., Riben: Yige Bukeng
Fuzui de Guojia Japan:A Country that Refuses to Admit Its Crimes) (Nanjing: Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe, 1998).
511 Peter Li, "War and Modernity in Chinese Military Fiction." Society 34, No. 5 (July/August 1997), p. 86.
512 Zhaoyan Ye, "Riben Guizi Laile (There come the Japanese Devils)," in Cai Hong Ling (Gathering Red Water
Chestnut) (Beijing: Huayi Chubanshe, 1993); Peifan Xu, ed. Cong 'Shengcun' dao 'Gui# Laile' (From Novel 'Survival'
to Film 'Devils at Doorstep') (Beijing: Beijing Chubanshe, 1999).
513 For some reasons yet to be disclosed, this movie has been banned in China so far.
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sarcastic touch, Jiang turned the movie into a farcical story that mocked the illusion held by a
group of Chinese villiagers about peaceful coexistence with Japanese invaders who had no
conscience but only greediness and barbarism. Like Mo and Ye'works, this movie also
touched on the sensitive issue of ordinary Chinese people's life under Japanese occupation,
including petty collaboration, human weakness, and everyday psychological suffering. The
following remarks of Jiang Wen stated in a media interview revealed his intention to advance
a competing historical outlook than the official one:
"I do not like to avoid sensitive questions. Actually, I think that only sensitive and controversial
questions can get to the heart of a problem. I am particularly interested in the relationship between
the aggressors and the victims, and the way that violence is nurtured. We tend to believe that violence
is nurtured by the aggressor, but is this the case? Could the victim also provide the seed for violence?
I am also interested in the relationship between human beings and war. Why do we make war even
though we claim we hate it?514
You and Jiang's works exemplify a society-based intellectual attempt to debunk the
half-century long official national myths about an honorable and triumphant war, and the
heroic image of the nation under the leadership of the CCP during the war. Their narratives
also sought to challenge the politicized historical view on the Japanese militarists/people
distinction and simple dichotomy between Chinese patriots and traitors. Concurring the
official historiography in transforming the national image from hero to victim, they differed
in that they did not solely blamed Chinese suffering on the perpetrators but also try to reveal
the natural, humanly reactions of the victims themselves in the face of foreign invasion.
Japanese Historiography in New Political Context
Japan's New Diplomacy and Self-Glorifiing Historical Myths
By 1981, Japan became the world's most important capital exporter, which ushered
in an era of so-called "Japanese subsidization of American hegemony."515 Having made
great success in its economic catch up with other Western powers, the Japanese government
sought to aggrandize Japan's international influence and prestige starting from the popular
leader Nakasone. He pointed out, "The first necessity is a change in our thinking. Having
514 Interview of Jiang Wen by Motion Pictures, 2000, at
http://www.filmfestivals.com/cannes_2000/official/guizi.htm
515 Robert Gilpin, The PoliticalEconomy ofInternational Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).
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'caught up,' we must now expect others to try to catch up with us. We must seek out a new
path for ourselves and open it up ourselves.""5 Although still framed around the axis of the
US-Japan alliance, Nakasone's internationalist diplomacy was on the premise that Japan
should no longer be a follower state but should take on more initiative and autonomy in
world and regional political affairs.
In support of the new diplomacy, Nakasone called for "a transformation of national
consciousness," the key task of which was to nurture national self-confidence and pride
commensurate with Japan's new role of international leader. In his view, the humiliating
defeat in WWII, seven years of foreign occupation, and Japan's long-time status as a junior
partner in the U.S.-Japan alliance stripped the postwar Japanese generation of a strong sense
of national purpose. So he advocated looking for spiritual inspiration in traditional culture
and national history.5 7' Nakasone's intention to reconstruct a positive national identity
through historical reinterpretation was manifest in his attitude toward the Yasukuni Shrine
issue. His predecessors never visited there in official capacity on August 15. But on August
14 of 1985, the Nakasone government issued a statement explicitly acknowledging the shrine
as the central national institution to mourn Japanese war dead. 1'" And on the next day he
worshipped at the shrine in official capacity. Shortly before the worship, Nakasone openly
expressed his disagreement with the Tokyo War Crimes Trial that he believed had "spread
throughout Japan a self-torturing belief that out country was to blame for everything." "I'm
against this." he proclaimed, "whatever happens, the state must continue to exist. It is the
people who inevitably either bask in glory or are exposed to disgrace, because they are the
people. Casting disgrace aside, advancing forward in the pursuit of glory - this is the essence
of the nation and of the people."' 519 For him, official worship at the shrine was an important
symbolic gesture to encourage the Japanese people to walk out of the shadow of the
disgraceful war and embrace a positive understanding of the history.
Nakasone's appeal to the Japanese people to "cast disgrace aside" did not ignore the
issue of Japanese war responsibility completely. Rather, he argued that some important
516 Quoted from Kenneth B. Pyle, The Japanese Question, pp. 90-91.
517 Pyle, The Japanese question, pp. 94-101.
518 Itagaki, Yasukuni Koshiki Sanhai no Sokatsu, pp. 123-127.
519 Wakamiya, The Postwar Conservative View ofAsia, p. 171.
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"political accounts" must be settled before Japan can embark on a new stage.520 It is because
he was one of those realistic Japanese politicians who first realized that Japan's quest for
economic and political leadership would never succeed if it did not make some direct
gestures of contrition to mitigate the high degree of suspicion still held by victim countries
of its past aggression. In fact, his apology diplomacy effectively helped patch up the Japan-
South Korean relations that had been troubled by the 1982 textbook controversy that will be
discussed later.521 He also spoke out at Diet sessions that the Sino-Japanese War was "a war
of aggression," a definite phrase that was first ever used by a Japanese prime minister.22
Nevertheless, Nakasone did not intend to carry out thorough settlement of historical
debts with other countries. What he opted for was more straightforward apologies to these
victim countries at open occasions, but once that was done, no further actions of historical
settlement were necessary. As he said in a newspaper interview in 1997, "we have been
apologizing, and the act of contrition has been performed. It is all over and done with."523
Therefore, despite these gestures of contrition, Nakasone's history policy did not differ
noticeably from previous administrations in regard to historical fact investigations or
substantial reparation programs for foreign war victims.
In the 1990s, diplomatical objectives continue to drive conservative efforts to
cultivate nationalist emotions among the public using historymaking tools. The focus now
was to mobilize public support to a more active policy on Japan's military involvement
overseas, which was triggered by the lack of international appreciation to Japan's generous
financial contribution to the Gulf War effort. Leaders and intellectuals felt imperative to
increase Japan's "international contribution (Kokusai Koken) " not only in monetary terms but
also with substantial logistic and personnel support if Japan were to win respect of the world
society. In the words of Ozawa Ichir6, an outspoken conservative politician, it was time for
520 Nakasone proposed to carry out a "general postwar settlement of political accounts" (Sengo Seiji Sdkessan) in
his inauguration speech in November 1982.
521 In his speech to welcome visiting South Korean president Chun Doohwan in September 1984, he admitted
the fact that "Japan caused great suffering to your country and your people during a certain period during this
century," expressed "deep regret for the wrongs done to you," and promised not to repeat these wrongs in the
future. This speech greatly pleased Chun and the Korean public, paving the way for broader economic and
political cooperation between the two countries.
522 Yoshida, Nihonjin no Sensdkan, pp. 169-170.
523 Wakamiya, The Postwar Conservative View ofAsia, p. 182.
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Japan to become a normal state that "evades no responsibility or duty in international
cooperation" to ensure world peace and stability.5 24 To this end, the conservative elites
pushed for a permanent seat in the U.N. Security Council, passed legislation on SDF
participation in international peacekeeping operations, and lobbied for constitutional
reinterpretion or even revision to obtain Japan's collective security rights. But they faced an
uphill battle to reach these objectives given the deep-rooted anti-militarism in Japanese
society that resisted the increased role of armed forces in case it would again threaten peace
and democracy in a way similar to that in the war history. So glossing over the past war of
aggression in historiography was needed in order to restore public trust in military
organization and win their support to the new Japanese policy of international activism.
Not only to serve foreign policy goals, self-glorifying historical myths are also useful
to salvage the falling prestige and power of the conservative force. Fierce factional struggle,
failing economy, and most importantly, rampant political corruption since the beginning of
the 1990s shook the legitimacy foundation of the conservative regime. The LDP suffered a
fiasco in the 1993 election and lost power for the first time since it was formed in 1955.
Although returning to office one year later, it now had to share power with a few small
parties in a coalition government. At the same time, cynicism towards party politics became
widespread, leading the voter turnout sharply down in both national and local elections in
the 1990s. It would have been difficult for the LDP to stay in power if it had not been the
fragmentation and incoherence of the political opposition. As the conservative government
was unable to implement any decisive reform of the ailing economic and political system it
had long promised, it had to resort to historymaking instrument to boost nationalistic morale
and divert public complaints to its policy.
So Japanese leaders in the 1990s to a large extent inherited Nakasone's tactics of
minimal admission and remorse to win international acceptance of Japanese power but
refraining from making unambiguous apology or responding to individual Asian victims'
demands for official compensation. During his visit to Singapore in May 1991, Prime
Minister Kaifu stated the intention to do self-reflection over Japan's actions that had caused
524 Ichir6 Ozawa, Nihon Kaizr Keikaku (BlueprintforA New Japan) (Tokyo: K6dansha, 1993), p. 104.
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suffering to Asian people since the beginning of the Pacific War. But it was Hosokawa
Morihiro of the newly formed Japan New Party who was the first prime minister after
Nakasone to use the phrase "a war of aggression" at his inaugural press conference in
August 1993. But this statement not only encountered vehement attacks from the LDP and
Nihon Izokukai but also was considered improper by his own coalition government. Later
Hosokawa had to change the wording to "acts of aggression" in his first general policy
speech. Besides, the Hosokawa administration foreclosed any possibility of official
reparation to foreign war victims by repeating the LDP's long-term position that all war
reparation issues had been resolved.525
In June 1994, Murayama Tomiichi, Japan's first socialist prime minister in 47 years,
came into power in a coalition with the LDP. On the 50th anniversary of the end of war,
Murayama issued an unprecedentedly straightforward apology. He admitted that "Japan's
colonial rule and aggression inflicted immense harm and suffering" upon other Asian
countries, "humbly acknowledge(d) these irrefutable facts of history," expressed "deep
remorse" and offered "an apology from the bottom of heart," and even hoped that "no such
mistake will ever be made in the future." However, his position was soon attacked by
conservative politicians, who prevailed in the drafting of the Diet resolution to
commemorate the 50' anniversary of the end of war. In the end, the resolution that was
supposed to bring an end to Japan's historical burden failed to articulate Japanese war
responsibility and express heart-felt repentance.5 26 So generally speaking, in this period
Japanese government offered apologies in small doses and often with elements of double-
dealing or considerable ambiguity.
As for war compensation to other Asian victims, Japan maintained the old position
that all war reparation issues had been solved in international or bilateral treaties with former
belligerent states. But this policy was shaken since the early 1990s when the "comfort
women" bombshell embrassed Japan in front of the world. Under enormous international
pressure, in August 1993 the Hosokawa administration announced the results of the official
525 Yoshida, Nihonjin no Sensokan, pp. 4-11; Wakamiya, The Postwar Conservative View ofAsia, p. 179.
526 See the text of "Resolution to Renew the Determination for Peace on the Basis of Lessons Learned from
History" and analysis of the text by John Dower in The Journal of the International Institute, the University of
Michigan (Fall 1995).
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investigation of the comfort women issue and Chief Cabinet Secretary K6no Yohei admitted
direct and indirect involvement of the Japanese government in the forced mobilization of
comfort women during the war. The Murayama administration established in 1995 the
Asian Women's Fund to compensate surviving comfort women in the name of Japanese
people rather than the government. So far Tokyo has refused to offer an official apology for
the comfort women issue or provide state compensation.5 27 The same position remained
unchanged when the government delt with lawsuits from victims of other Japanese war
crimes throughout the 1990s.
At the same time, the past two decades also saw a succession of "slips of tongue" by
Japanese politicians, in which they openly glorified Japanese aggression in Asia and
disproved any gestures of contrition that the government displayed publicly. Moreover,
many Japanese cabinet ministers and diet members visited the Yasukuni on every "end of
war day," and in July 1996 Hashimoto Ryutar6 resumed prime minister's worship nearly a
decade after Nakasone's last visit.
Japanese textbooks since the mid-1980s gradually increased coverage of the suffering
of other Asian countries during the war and, particularly since the 1990s, began to cover
Japanese atrocities, such as the Nanjing Massacre, and the conscription of Chinese and
Korean natives as soldiers, slave laborers and comfort women. Despite these postive
changes, Japanese publishers and textbook screening authority still made conspicuous efforts
to hide certain important truths about history. A close study of Japanese textbook treatment
of the Nanjing Massacre in the 1990s demonstrates that language was intentionally
manipulated to take Japanese soldiers out of the story as perpetrators, to shift the objects of
criticism from individual soldiers to the entire organization of the Japanese army or even the
incident itself, and to separate those who committed atrocities from the Japanese people so
that the majority of the Japanese nation can be spared moral and legal responsibility. In fact,
the old historical myth of military clique was still upheld in textbooks produced in the 1980s
527 A letter from the Prime Minister of Japan to express "heartfelt reflection" was also sent when the
compensation was delivered to individual victims, which is still qualitatively different from an open, official
apology. For more on the Asian Women's Fund, See Yasuaki Onuma, et al. eds., Tanfu'Mondai to AjiaJosei
Kikin ('Comfort Women'andAsian Women's Fund) (Tokyo: Toshindo Publishing Co., LTD., 1998).
and 1990s that "avoid forcing students to reflect on the personal responsibility of ordinary
Japanese citizens for various aspects of the war."5 28
Domestic and International Political Turmoil of apanese Historiographic Controversy
Although self-glorifying and whitewashing myths remained central in Japanese
mainstream historiography in the 1980s and 1990s, they nevertheless were exposed to
greater domestic and international scrutiny than ever before, which triggered waves of
political turmoil at home and abroad.
Two progressive trends in Japanese society called for reconstruction of national
collective memory as early as the 1970s. One was the surge of citizens' campaigns to record
war experiences of ordinary people, which was a departure from previous narratives that
only centered on the monarchy, military clique, and high-ranking bureaucrats. Included in
the new narratives was the memory of Allied air bombing of various localities, women's war
sufferings, and the dark, cruel war scenes remembered by Japanese military rank and file. A
representative of the new trend was the book Tdkyo Daikushzl (Tokyo Air Raid) first
published in 1971, which compiled reminiscences of ordinary Japanese people about that
tragic event.529
The articulation of ordinary people's war memories was closely related to the second
trend in the society that urged Japanese people to face up to Japan's role as a victimizer in
the past war vis-a-vis other Asian countries. Although many Japanese had long held guilt
feeling toward China based on their limited knowledge about the war, it was not until the
1970s that a great number of first-hand testimonies of Japanese war crimes appeared in
Japan. Most notably, journalist Honda Katsuichi published a series of articles in Asahi
Shimbun in 1971 that were later compiled into the famous book ChUgoku no Tabi (The Journey
in China). Based on his personal visits to many areas in China and interviews of surviving
Chinese victims, these articles were devoted to exposing Japanese army's war crimes in
528 Fish, "From The Manchurian Incident to Nagasaki in 20 Pages;" Christopher Barnard, "Isolating
Knowledge of the Unpleasant: The Rape of Nanking in Japanese High-school Textbooks," British Journal of
Sociology of Education 22, No. 4 (2001).
529 Katumoto Saotome, Tokyo Daikfishi (Tokyo Air Raid) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1998).
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China theater, including forced labor, biological warfare, Nanjing Massacre, and the "Three-
all" campaign. 530
Honda's articles sent a shock wave through the Japanese society. It was in this
context that the above-mentioned grass-root movement to tell ordinary people's war stories
began to record not just Japanese suffering but also admit Japanese war responsibility. From
mid-1970s to mid-1980s Sdkagakkai, a Buddhist organization, sponsored the publication of a
two-volume record of its members' war experiences, including many personal testimonies of
Japanese war crimes in China.5 31 A more influential narrative was the well-known "The
War" (Senso) series of readers' letters published in Asahi Shimbun between 1986-1987. Many
of them testified the aggressive and victimizing nature of the war by revealing Japanese
army's war atrocities.532 By the end of the 1980s, such activities of recording Japanese
private memories had developed into straightforward truth-telling campaigns that involved
testimonies of war experiences by not only Japanese people but also Asian victim nations. A
noted example was the Osaka-based Association of Remembering and Sympathizing with
the War Victims in the Asian Pacific Region (Ajia-taiheiyo Chiiki no Sensd Giseisha ni Omoi o
Hase, Kokoro ni KiZamu Shukai), which held public hearings on Japanese war atrocities
throughout East Asia and put out 12 volumes of these hearing records from 1988 to 1999.533
Not only facing domestic challenge, Japan's mainstream conservative historiography
also met unprecedented international attack since the 1980s. The 1982 textbook controversy
marked the beginning of open, frequent historiographic disputes between Japan and its
Asian neighbors. The incident started at the end of June when the Japanese media reported
that Mombusho instructed the change of language on the war history in school textbooks to
a more conservative tone in that year's textbook screening process. The most obvious
example often cited was the replacement of the term Shingyaku (invasion) by Shinshutsu
(advance) with regard to the Sino-Japanese war. Although subsequent investigations
discovered that the change from Shinyaku to Shinshutsu did not really take place that year and
530 Katsuichi Honda, Chugoku no Tabi (TheJourney in China) (Tokyo: Asahi Bunko, 1994).
531 Yoshida, Nihonjin no Sensdkan, pp. 154-157.
532 Asahi Shimbun Thematic Discussion Room, Sensd: Detsu to Namida de Tsuzutta Shogen (The War. Testimonies
Written with Blood and Tears) (Tokyo: Asahi Sonorama, 1987).
533 The Association on Remembering War Victims ed., "The Voices of Asia" book series (Tokyo: Toho
Shuppan), 1988-99.
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some original draft of textbooks had used the term Shinryaku, the media was right in pointing
out that Mombusho had been gradually strengthening the authorization system since the
"Biased Textbooks Campaign" first launched at the beginning of the 1980s.
Beijing did not respond to the Japanese media reports until nearly one month later,
when the official press launched a campaign criticizing Japanese textbooks and the Foreign
Ministry lodged formal protest to Japan. Beijing was soon joined by Seoul that also issued
protest in early August. Thus an initially domestic dispute escalated into a truly international
controversy. The incident was finally settled with Tokyo promise to revise those textbooks
in dispute and also to pay attention to criticisms from Asian countries in future Japanese
education and textbook authorization."34 The time lag between the initial outbreak of the
incident and the Chinese official response clearly suggested Beijing's intention to politicize
the history problem to boost public patriotism and appease the conservative faction within
the CCP. But unlike in the past that it always slighted or ignored Chinese historiographic
disagreements with Japan, during the 1982 incident Beijing sharply accused Japanese
historical myths of distorting history and raised outright demands for their rectification.
This also happened when China and Japan were strategically aligned against the Soviet
Union. It indicated a greater dominance of domestic political and ideological struggle than
international structural constraints in determining Chinese policy to Japan. From then on,
China maintained a firm position on the history issue, which led to more bilateral
historiographic clashes particularly surrounding the Yasukuni Shrine and history textbooks.
Besides pressure from foreign governments, since the early 1990s, new campaigns
led by non-governmental organizations in and outside Japan tried to push Japanese
government to address its war responsibility with legal and financial measures. Ever since a
group of Korean forced laborers stranded in the Soviet-occupied Sakhalin Island first filed a
class-action lawsuit against the Japanese government in August 1990, some 59 cases of this
kind had been submitted to Japanese courts by the end of 1999. Plaintiffs instituting these
lawsuits included the Allied prisoners of war, slave laborers, comfort women, victims of bio-
chemical warfare and financial exploitation who demanded Japanese government apology
534 For more on the process of the 1982 textbook controversy, see Rose, Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese
Relations, pp. 80-120
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and compensation, as well as Taiwanese and Korean soldiers of the imperial military who
appealed for relief and condolence payment.5 35 These campaigns reached a climax at the end
of the 1990s, with the International Citizen's Forum on War Crimes and Redress held in
December 1999 and the Women's International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan's Military
Sexual Slavery in December 2000. In both occasions, surviving foreign victims and families
of deceased victims of Japanese atrocities were joined by a large cohort of liberal politicians,
intellectuals and social activists across the world to stage political offensives against the
Japanese government. So now domestic opponents of the conservative historiography
combined their power with international critiques to compel re-negotiation of Japanese
collective national memory.
The domestic and international push to debunk myths of an honorable war and the
glorious image of Japanese military in the mainstream conservative historiography indeed
brought about a certain degree of victimizer consciousness and sense of collective
responsibility in Japanese society. But the new trend also provoked a neo-nationalist
backlash that challenged both the above-mentioned progressive historiography and the
mainstream conservative historiography. Since the 1980s, Japanese far-right elites fiercely
attacked the government's concession to foreign countries on the history issue, which they
condemned of spreading a masochistic historical view among Japan's young generation. For
example, upset with Nakasone's decision to cancel his official visit to the Yasukuni and
intervention in the second textbook incident in 1986, an ultra-nationalist LDP politician,
Minister of Education Fujio Masayuki, published a provocative article in popular journal
Bungei Shunju trying to justify Japanese annexation of Korea.5 36 Also, in protest to the
inclusion of Japanese war atrocities in authorized textbooks during this period, right-wingers
tried to advance a self-glorifying view of history by organizing symposiums, publishing
cartoons and popular readings, and even compiling competing textbooks of their own. A
recent example was the controversial New History Textbook (Atarashii Rekishii Ky~kasho)
that a neo-nationalist organization, the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform
535 Details on Asian requests for individual war compensations can be found in the conference proceedings and
supplementary materials distributed at the International Citizen's Forum on War Crimes and Redress, Tokyo,
December 19, 1999, which include a tabulated summary of these lawsuits by Yoshibumi Tawara, "Sengo
Hosh6 Saiban Ichilanhy6."
536 Wakamiya, The Postwar Conservative View ofAsia, p. 200.
235
(Atarashii Rekishi Kyokasho 0 Tsukuru Kai), compiled and pushed through the textbook
authorization in 2001.537
Rather than accepting the Pacific War View of History that the war was wrong and
Japan was the victim of the war, this trend of neo-nationalist historiography took a more
radical position that fundamentally disagreed with the aggressive nature of the war. Such a
view already existed in the 1960s when people like Hayashi Fusao spoke out to justify
Japan's part in the war.538 The view was revived in the 1980s, especially when revisionist
assessment of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial flourished in Japan. Neo-nationalists called the
trial as nothing but victor's justice and claimed that Japan should not be singled out for
punishment because other Western countries had done the same thing.53 9 Such right-wing
backlash exerted great pressure on the government to retreat from a limited acceptance of
the progressive historiography. Textbooks approved in year 2000 markedly deleted or
watered down descriptions of military atrocities.5 40 Many of these changes were caused by
the so-called "voluntary restraint" of textbook publishers during the textbook screening
process, which was actually the result of political coercion by Mombusho and the Office of
the Prime Minister.5 4 1
Predictions for Sino-Japanese Relations
To sum up, the new changes in Chinese and Japanese history-making patterns in the
1980s and 1990s turned their war narratives far more divergent than ever before. On the
one hand, bilateral convergence on certain historical view was greatly undermined. It is true
that both Japanese and Chinese governments still agreed on the aggressive nature of the war
and maintained the old "myth of clique" about the issue of war responsibility. But public
537 "Group to Create a New History Textbook Says: 'Annexation of Korea Was Necessary'," The Asahi
Shimbun (on line), September 13, 2000; "Japan's Refusal to Revise Textbooks Angers Neighbors," The New
York Times, July 10, 2001; "Japanese State Approves Disputed Textbook," The New York Times, August 9,
2001. For more on the neo-nationalist view of history and activities of the Japanese Society for History
Textbook Reform, see Gavan McCormack, "The Japanese Movement to 'Correct' History," in Hein and
Selden, Censoring History.
538 Hayashi Fusao, Dait6a Sensd Kdteiron (Affirming the Greater East Asian War) (Tokyo: Bancho Shobo, 1964).
539 Yasuaki Onuma, Tokyd Saiban kara Sengo Sekirin no Shiso e, pp. 17-66.
540 Asahi Shimbun, September 10, 2000; Asahi Shimbun, April 5, 2001.
541 Yoshifumi Tawara, "Junior High School History Textbooks: Whiter 'Comfort Women' and the 'Nanking
Massare'," Sekai (The World), November 2000.
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support to such interpretation of the war history began to crumble. In Japan, the
progressive view of history urged the ordinary Japanese people to admit their individual
responsibility in victimizing other Asian people while the neo-nationalist historiography
denied the aggressive nature of the war. In China, the general public no longer subscribed to
the government position that differentiated good Japanese and bad Japanese but held a
negative image of the entire Japanese nation. On the other hand, bilateral divergence on
Japanese war crimes, Chinese victimization and the role of Japanese military during the war
became more pronounced than ever before. Therefore, the war historiography of the two
countries in this period mixed conflictual narratives in official propaganda and combative
narratives in private memories, especially among the Chinese public.
According to historical mythmaking theory, the greater historiographic divergence
since the 1980s should worsen the relationship to the stage of Shallow Reconciliation-
Friction because the mechanisms of intentions and emotions should work to a more
negative direction. First of all, the increasingly internationalized, politicized disputes
surrounding the history issue highlighted the lack of contrition in Japanese historiography,
which would intensify Chinese suspicion that Japan had the hidden ambition to exploit
China by force once again in the future. Meanwhile, the seemingly never-ending Chinese
complaints about history and demands for contrition should cause Japanese concern about
possible Chinese policy of historical retribution toward Japan. So Chinese and Japanese
expectation of war between them would heightened significantly, though it should fall short
of predicting immediate armed conflict because the mainstream historical views of both
countries still did not call for total bilateral confrontation.
Second, Chinese emotions of grievances towards Japan's lack of remorse and
Japanese emotions of disgust and resentment about Chinese historical self-indulgence and
scathing criticism of Japan should rise high, which would directly poison popular feelings
toward each other nation. Ordinary people should be more vocal in expressing their mutual
antipathy, although they should refrain from spontaneous actions of confrontation because
of both government suppression and absence of immediate foreign threat to their personal
interest. The negative emotions between the two nations should also encourage hard-line
government policies towards each other country because elite perception of negative
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intention and mounting public pressure would prevent governments from engaging close
mutual cooperation and making necessary compromise in areas of disagreement. So friction
concerning sovereignty rights should come to the surface in this period regardless of their
strategic implications because these issues were often intertwined with nationalistic historical
myths and concessions were often political costly. Similarly, economic interdependence
should still fail to match the level of potential mutual interests, and the high degree of
mutual distrust and public resentments should create more pronounced and damaging
disputes in commercial relations.
EXPLANING THE OUTCOME: TEST OF REALIST THEORY
Test of realist theory against the history of Sino-Japanese relations of the 1980s and
1990s produces mixed results. On the one hand, the theory proves a weak explanation for
both the general outcome and evolution process of bilateral relations in the 1980s. While
the structural conditions were still positive as in the 1970s and bilateral balance of power was
short of major shift, Sino-Japanese relationship did not develop to deep reconciliation as the
theory predicts but deteriorated from "Shallow Reconciliation-Rapprochement" to the stage
of "Shallow Reconciliation-Friction." Chinese suspicion of Japanese military defense
programs and popular animosity toward Japan were on the rise since the early 1980s, and
Japanese poplar feeling of closeness to China also began to decline since mid-1980s, a few
years before the real impact of the Soviet readjustment of global strategy reached Japan. The
continuity of international structure also fails to explain the sudden intensification of
controversies on sovereignty rights and economic frictions that often escalated into serious
bilateral political disputes.
On the other hand, realist theory is by and large correct in predicting that the
dissipation of the Soviet threat from the end of the 1980s and the shift of the Cold War
alliance structure to an uncertain multipolar world would correlate with a Shallow-
Reconciliation type of Sino-Japanese relations. Process-tracing of this period, however,
suggests that international power structure considerably contributed to but unlikely solely
determined the worsening of bilateral relations. A 5-6 year time lag exists between the
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disappearance of the Soviet threat and the rise of the perception of China threat in Japanese
strategic circle and the considerable toughening of Japanese economic policy to China. And
the fast-paced military buildup in China and Japanese activism in regional security affairs in
the 1990s did not really alter the power balance between the two countries. So the test
suggests that, in the neutral structural environment of the post-Cold War era where neither a
common threat nor fundamental strategic clash existed between two countries, it was not
just power distribution but also mutual perception of intention based on non-structural
factors that shaped states' foreign policy calculations.
I. Moderate/Heightened Expectation of War
The 1980s
In the 1980s, Sino-Japanese solidarity in security matter did not sustain and suspicion
and feeling of uncertainty considerably arose between the two countries. First, since mid-
1982 China de-emphasized the theme of "anti-hegemonism" alignment in bilateral
cooperation. The three new principles for bilateral relations that Premier Zhao Ziyang
proposed during his visit to Japan in May and June were short of strategic denotation -
peace and friendship, equality and mutual benefit, and long-term stability. In September
when Prime Minister Suzuki came to Beijing to commemorate the 10h anniversary of Sino-
Japanese PFT, Zhao stressed the three principles along with the "independent foreign
policy" without even mentioning the anti-hegemonism issue that triggered most controversy
during the PFT negotiation process. 54 2
Not only the rhetoric about bilateral strategic collaboration underwent noticeable
cooldown, but also their already limited military cooperation was further scaled back. Since
the second half of 1982, the number of groups of Japanese military personnel visiting China
decreased sharply.543 When Nakasone proposed to the visiting general secretary of the CCP,
Hu Yaobang, in November 1983 that the two countries should exchange information and
jointly press the Soviet Union to reduce numbers of SS-20 missiles deployed in the Far East,
542 For texts of Zhao Ziyang's remarks on Sino-Japanese relations from May to September 1982, see Tian,
Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji, Vol. 2, pp. 346-352, pp. 382-394.
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he received no response from the China side."44 The two countries did not start to hold
security talks at the Director-General level of foreign ministry until 1993, when exchange
channels were necessary to mitigate tension between them regarding defense affairs.5 45
Meanwhile, Chinese official statements conspicuously retracted support for the U.S.-
Japan alliance. In late 1982 two Chinese Polibureau members told Japanese politicians that
"China has never opposed nor supported the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty."5 46 Besides,
different from its previous positive attitude toward the strengthening of Japanese SDF,
Beijing now openly expressed concerns over the prospect of a militarily strong Japan with
offensive weapons. In February 1983, shortly after Nakasone stated in his trip to
Washington that Japan's weapon export ban was not applicable to its ally the U.S. and that
Japan should serve as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" and strengthen military cooperation
with the U.S., Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian told the special envoy of Nakasone the
following message: "As an independent, sovereign state, Japan is entitled to maintain an
armed force for defense against external threats. But such an armed force should be
defense-oriented and of appropriate size, so it would not constitute a threat to its friendly
neighbors."5 47 Since then, China increasingly questioned the necessity and intention of
Japanese defense buildup programs. When the Nakasone administration announced the
decision to break the one percent GNP ceiling for annual defense spending in FY 1987,
Chinese media responded with a flurry of warnings that Japan may be seeking the status of a
military great power.48
Chinese security concern about Japan could not be explained by the global power
structure because for the most part of the 1980s that the Soviet Union remained a powerful
threat for both China and Japan, and Sino-American strategic collaboration continued to be
tight. Neither was it warranted by any major shift in Sino-Japanese power balance. When
543 Glaubitz, "Japan," p. 231.
544 Cheng, "China's Japan Policy in the 1980s," p. 96.
545 Sino-Japanese official security talk was upgraded to vice-ministerial level in 2002. Beijing Xinhua, FBIS,
March 19, 2002.
546 Cheng, "China's Japan Policy in the 1980s," p. 96.
547 "Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian's Remarks to Special Envoy Susumu Nikaid6, February 18-19, 1983," in
Tian, Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji, Vol. 2, pp. 408-409; Joachim Glaubitz, "Japan," p. 231.
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the Nakasone administration advocated active sea-lane defense and broke the one percent
GDP limit of military budget, his main purpose was to establish a symbolic image of Japan
as a normal state with international stature as well as to show strategic solidarity with the
United State. Japanese military capabilities only increased incrementally in the 1980s and
were particularly restrained in offensive weapons or strategic power projection. This is not
only because military manpower and equipment are extraordinarily expensive in Japan but
also due to the fact that various domestic and international constraints on Japanese defense
policy-making have determined the incremental nature of Japan's defense buildup
throughout the postwar period.5 49
This is not to dispute the Japanese superiority vis-a-vis the PLA in naval and air
defense power, if not in ground power, but it did not first emerged in the 1980s but had
taken hold by the late 1970s. At that time, the American retrenchment in Asia after the
Nixon Doctrine forced Japan to share more self-defense burden and Japanese economic
miracle permitted fast increase of defense spending even below the one percent GDP
ceiling. Under the U.S. pressure to upgrade its sea and air defense capabilities, the Miki
Cabinet decided at the end of 1976 to acquire F-15 interceptor aircraft. Then in 1978 the
Japanese government formulated the Mid-Term Planning Estimate that planed to procure 77
F-15s, 37 P-3Cs antisubmarine patrol aircraft and many escort and minesweeping ships,
submarines, and antisubmarine and minesweeping helicopters. In the year of 1978 alone
Japan ordered 23 F-15s and 8 P-3Cs.550 So by the time Nakasone became prime minister
and actively pushed for national defense upgrading, the air and naval power Japanese SDF
had well exceeded that of the PLA.
The 1990s
548 Jun Yasuda, "Boei Yosanan 'Tai GNP Hi 1% Tobatu' ni Taisuru Chugokugawa no Hanno (China's
Reaction against FY 1987 Japan's Defense Budget 'Surpassing the One Percent of GNP Defense Spending
Limit')," Shin B6ei Ronsh5i 15, No. 1,June 1987, p. 97.
549 On the incremental nature of Japanese defense budget growth and emphasis on defensive strategy, see
Joseph P. Keddell, The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures (Armonk, N.Y.; London,
England: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), Chapter 1; Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture
of Anti-Militarism", International Security 17, No.4 (Spring 1993), pp. 126-127.
550 Keddell, The Politics of Defense in Japan, pp. 67-70.
Japan strategic elites began in the 1980s to study Chinese program of military
modernization with acute interest, but did not perceive any major increase of China threat.55s
The dissipation of the common Soviet threat by the end of the 1980s also did not seem to
have brought about immediate deterioration in Japanese strategic perception of China. To
the contrary, in the first few years after the June 4fi incident of 1989, Japanese concerns
about China's expanding military capabilities and uncertain intention were temporarily
moderated. A Japanese strategic expert observed in late 1990 that China's national security
focus had gone beyond pure military arena to the goals of cementing domestic stability and
steady economic growth.52 Another defense analyst argued that the PLA was particularly
weak in naval power and it did not possess the capabilities for overseas campaign because
strengthening the navy would take time; so in terms of possible China threat to Japan he
opined that such threat was more likely to be in the form of large-scale refugee exodus rather
than military attack.55 3 This is because, even though the bipolar structure that mandated
Chinese strategic cooperation with the Western bloc had collapsed, it was not replaced by a
clearly defined power distribution system where each country could easily locate its strategic
adversaries. In fact the structural conditions stayed neutral and China and Japan did not
suddenly develop conflicting strategic interests.
It was only until 1994 that Japan began to demonstrate anxiety toward the prospect
of the "rise of China," mainly triggered by China's rapid economic growth and aggressive
military upgrading programs. Chinese GDP achieved double-digit growth each year in 1992
and 1993, and Chinese military spending increased over 20 percent from 1990 to 1993 even
551 Most Japanese military analysts admitted in the 1980s that Chinese budgetary priority had shifted from
defense spending to domestic economic reinvigoration, and generally refrained from speculating the impact of
Chinese military modernization on Japan's national security. But the fact that many of them tended to discuss
this in the context of China's closer relationship with the USSR implied greater uncertainty they felt towards
Chinese military trend than in the 1970s. For some examples of Japanese military analysis articles on Chinese
military modernization in the 1980s, see Akira Ichimiya, "Chfigoku no Kokubo Seisaku (The Defense Policy of
China)," Shin B6ei Ronshu 8, No. 1 (June 1980); Shigeo Hiramatsu, "Daigoki Zenjindai Daisankai Kaigi kara
Mita Chfigoku no Gunji Mondai (Chinese Military Problems Viewed from the Third Session of the Fifth
National People's Congress)," Shin B6ei Ronshui 8, No. 4 (March 1981); Koichir6 Takahashi, "Saikin no
Chiigoku GunjiJosei to Taibei Taiso Kankei (China's Recent Military Affairs and Foreign Policy to the U.S.
and the Soviet Union)," Shin B6ei Ronshf 10, No. 1 (Jun 1982); Shigeo Hiramatsu, "Saikin no Chiigoku Gunji
Jij6 kara Chugokugun no Heiryoku Hyakuman Sakugen (On One Million Reduction of the Chinese Armed
Forces - Recent Chinese Military Affairs)," Shin B6ei Ronshfi 13, No. 1 (July 1985).
552 Nasaaki Kasahara, "Chuigoku ni totte Atarashii Anzen Hosho (China's New Security Concept)," Shin B6ei
Ronshii, 18, No. 3 (December 1990), p. 47.
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by a conservative standard.554 In the same period the PLA also purchased up to $2 billion
worth of Russian weapons, including 100 A300 SAM missiles and 26 advanced Su-27 fighter
aircraft.55s In addition, China conducted four nuclear tests in 1992-1993, the test of May
1992 being its largest underground test ever since.55 6 But recent studies have shown that the
seemingly phenomenal rise of China has been short of challenging the status quo of global
balance of power or catching up Japanese superiority in either economic prowess or air and
naval power vis-ai-vis China.5 57
Nevertheless, Tokyo openly criticized Chinese military modernization program since
1994. When visiting China in March, Prime Minister Hosokawa formally demanded self-
restraint in nuclear test programs. Japan even suspended grant assistance to China in 1995
upon its new nuclear weapon tests that year. This action had profound implication because
it was the first time that Japan leveled unilateral economic sanction against China.558 In the
meantime, an explicit sense of China threat gradually took shape, particularly held by
Japanese defense establishment but also shared by many high-ranking officials and
politicians. Yuken Hironaka, then director of the Institute of Defense Research, argued in a
1994 article that China's military power and its marked progress towards modernization
constituted one of the three unstable factors in the security of East Asia and Pacific
553 Katsuichi Sugiyama, "Kyokuto no Gunji Josei to Kyoi no Yoso (Military Situations in Far East and Aspects
of Threats)," Shin B6ei Ronshfil8, No. 2 (September 1990), pp. 38-39.
554 Denny Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asian Security," International Security 19,
No. 1 (Summer 1994); Richard Betts, '"Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the
Cold War," International Security 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/1994), p. 23.
5s5 Michael G. Gallagher, "China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea," International Security 19, No.1
(Summer 1994).
556 For data on China's nuclear tests between 1964-1996, see the website of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)
at http://www.nti.org/db/china/testlist.htm
557 For some recent studies that cautioned of over-estimation of Chinese economic and military power, see
Kenneth W. Allen, et al., China 's Air Force Enters the 21st Century (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1995); John W.
Lewis and Litai Xue, "China's Search for A Modem Air Force," International Security 24, No. 1, Summer
1999); Andrew Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New
York: W.W. Norton, 1997); Gordon G. Chang, The Coming Collapse of China (New York: Random House, 2001).
For an analysis of Japanese security confidence in the face of the rise of China, see Kenneth B. Pyle and Eric
Heginbotham, "Japan," in Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L.Friedberg eds., StrategicAsia 2001-02: Power and
Purpose (Seattle, WA: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2001), pp. 97-99.
558 Yoshihide Soeya, "Kokusai Seiji no Naka no Nitchfi Kankei," Kokusai Mondai 454, No. 1 (1998), p. 53;
Michael Green and Benjamin Self, "Japan's Changing China Policy: From Commercial Liberalism to Reluctant
Realism," Survival 38, No.2 (Summer 1996), pp. 36-37. The real first time Japanese economic sanction against
China was applied after June 4 incident of 1989 in concerted action with other western countries.
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Region.559 An influential work that well summarized the military reasons for Japanese
perception of China threat, Chugoku Gunjiron (On China's Military) was published in April
1994. In this systematic study of Chinese military organization, doctrines and weapon
programs, former uniformed officer and current research fellow of the Institute of Defense
Research Kayahara Ikuo argued that perception of Chinese military threat to Japan's national
security and the regional stability of Asia was caused by China's lack of transparency in
military spending, assertive naval strategy, and unrestrained arms export.5 60
China also became disturbed by Japan's potential military threat, but not so much
because of the disappearance of the Soviet threat or Japanese defense buildup but due to
Japan's surging enthusiasm in playing a greater role in regional security affairs. Japan began
in 1990 legislative efforts to enable its participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations and
succeeded in sending SDF units overseas since the 1992 peacekeeping mission to Cambodia.
These provoked repeated warnings from Chinese official media that urged caution and self-
restraint in Japanese political decision to sending its troops abroad. Since the mid-1990s,
Chinese concerns over Japan's external actions concentrated on its military involvement in
future cross-Taiwan Strait conflict. The reconfirmation of U.S.-Japan alliance since 1996
failed to exclude explicitly Taiwan from the Far East region where contingencies of
instability would invoke collective security commitments of the alliance. So China was afraid
of the possibility that Japanese military may intervene if China used force to prevent Taiwan
independence.5 61 An influential Japan expert, Liu Jiangyong, pointed out in 1997 that the
readjusted collective security arrangement of the U.S.-Japan alliance allowed Japan to
interfere with regional conflicts with military means, which signaled a profound change of
nature of the alliance into an organization of "international police in Asia-Pacific region" to
establish joint hegemony in this region.5 62
559 Yuken Hironaka, "Toajia Taiheiyo Chiiki no Anzen Hosho ni Tsuite (On the Security of East Asia and the
Pacific Region)," Shin B6ei Ronshfi 21, No. 4 (March 1994).
560 Ikuo Kayahara, Chugoku Gunjiron (On China's Miktary) (Tokyo: Ashishobo, 1994).
561 For Chinese perception of threat from the recast U.S.-Japan alliance, see Thomas Christensen, "China, the
U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," International Security 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999).
562 Jiangyong Liu, "Zhongri Guanxi de Tiaozheng he Fazhan (Readjustment and Development of Sino-
Japanese Relations)," in Zhang, Yunling ed., Zhuanbian Zhong de Zhongmeiri Guanxi (Sino-U.S.-Japanese Relations in
Change) (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1997).
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While China became worried about Japanese military involvement in future cross-
strait crisis, Japan was also alerted by China's willingness to use force externally that would
disturb regional stability and compromise Japan's national security interest. Japan reacted to
China's missile exercises in the Taiwan Strait between 1995 and 196 with poignant anxiety.
In June 1995, Chairman of the Joint Staff General Tetsuya Nishimoto openly expressed
Japan's concern to China over its missile exercises surrounding Taiwan.5 63 Another Japanese
defense analyst even bluntly calls Chinese actions in Taiwan Strait as "undisguised military
coercion," an expression that was only used for describing Soviet threat in the Cold War
564years.
The examination of Chinese and Japanese strategic perception in the 1990s suggests
that some realpolitik factors like military budget increase and foreign policy assertiveness
indeed contributed to a heightened mutual expectation of future conflict. But the outcome
did not completely match two more crucial structural factors - the timing of global power
structure change and the state of dyadic power balance. If realist theory does not provide a
sufficient explanation, there must exist some non-structural factors that also functioned
simultaneously with power factors to worsen mutual threat perception.
II. Sovereignty Rights Disputes
Similar to the test of the first indicator, common security interest between China and
Japan in the 1980s did not facilitate their accommodation on questions of sovereignty rights,
particularly the Taiwan issue. The K6karyo Case erupting in 1987 brought the controversy
over the international status of Taiwan into open light. A small and old student dormitory,
Kokary6 was purchased by Taiwan in 1952 but known as a dormitory occupied by pro-
Beijing students. Taiwan tried to evict these students from the dormitory through lawsuit
since 1967, but the Kyoto Lower Court in 1977 rejected Taiwan's demand on the ground
that its ownership should be transferred to PRC after the Sino-Japan normalization. In 1986
563 Green and Self "Japan's Changing China Policy," p. 36.
564 Shigekatsu Kondo, "Reisen Shuketsugo no Amerika no Toajia Anzenhosho Senryaku: Taiwan Kaikyo Kiki
to Taigai Senryaku ga Naiho suru 'Mujun' o Megutte (U.S. Security Strategy toward East Asia in the Post-Cold
War Era: The Lessons of the Taiwan Straits Crisis and the Condiction in U.S. Engagement Policy)." Shin Boei
Ronshfi 24, No. 4 (March 1997), p. 27.
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and 1987 respectively, however, the Kyoto Lower Court and Osaka High Court reversed
that verdict from the viewpoint of international law that non-diplomatic assets should
belong to the previous government even in a case of switch of diplomatic recognition from
one country to another. A bitter war of words then broke out between Beijing and Tokyo,
which lasted for about one year. It was no longer possible to pretend that the problem of
partial national recognition between the two countries since the 1972 normalization would
not compromise their formal relationship565
In the 1990s intense friction over the question of Taiwan was rekindled, first by the
1994 Asian Games incident and then by the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis. 566 Chinese worry
about foreign military intervention in Taiwan Strait was particularly aroused by the 1997 new
defense guidelines of the US-Japan alliance. Chinese concern was that that Japan might
assist American military intervention in future crises over Taiwan independence, which had
been exacerbated since Japan and the US launched joint development of the Theater Missile
Defense (TMD) system.567
Island disputes also resurfaced in the 1990s, evolving into a source of major bilateral
friction. In 1990 the right-wing Japan Youth Federation (JYF) petitioned to the Japanese
government to recognize the lighthouse on the islands that it erected in 1978 and went back
to repair it in 1989. Reports that the petition was likely to be grant soon provoked a
standoff between Taiwan fishing boats and Japanese navy, as well as anti-Japanese
demonstrations in Taiwan and Hong Kong. The crisis again ended with an agreement
between the Japanese and PRC governments to shelve the issue.
565 Hidenori Ijiri, "Sino-Japanese Controversy since the 1972 Diplomatic Normalization." In Howe, China and
Japan.
566 On September 12, 1994, the Japanese government issued visa for Hsu Li-The, vice-president of Taiwan's
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Asian Games Incident. The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis took place as a result of surging Sino-US tension over
Washington's granting visa for Taiwan president Lee Teng-hui in May 1995 and culminated in Chinese missile
exercises targeted near Taiwan in March 1996. For a detailed recount of the crisis, see Robert Ross, "The
1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force." International Security 25,
No. 2 (Fall 2000).
567 Thomas Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," pp.65-66 ;
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But problem quickly arose when the Chinese NPC passed the Territorial Sea Law in
1992 that included the islands in Chinese territorial waters. Prime minister Hashimoto
responded in May 1996 that the islands were sovereign Japanese territories and announced
the decision to extend Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to cover them. At this
juncture, the JYF returned to the islands in September to repair the lighthouse, triggering a
month-long crisis involving protests in mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. After the
1996 crisis, both Japanese and Chinese governments have maintained their sovereignty
claims over the islands. Since then tensions continued to simmer in the waters surrounding
these islands, where protesters from Hong Kong, Taiwan and even mainland were often
reported to confront the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency.
Sovereignty disputes in the 1980s contradict the realist predication that the need for
strategic cooperation to balance the common Soviet threat would compel the two countries
to put away their disagreements in other issue areas. But the persistence of such disputes in
the 1990s matches the prediction that the removal of the common Soviet threat would
reduce the structural incentives for the two countries to reach compromise on various
political and economic issues.
Yet the intensity of these disputes over sovereignty rights was still puzzling, given
that these issues lack strategic importance. On the question of Taiwan, after the PRC was
admitted into the U.N. as the sole legitimate representative of China and the U.S. pulled out
troops from Taiwan as well as pledged the "One China" policy in the 1970s, the legal status
of Taiwan was no longer a matter of national survival for China. Similarly, those islands
disputed by the two sides are merely barren and windswept rocks that lack significant
economic or strategic significance. Reports about potential oil reserves near the Senkaku
Islands appeared since the late 1960s, but hard evidence of oil has yet to be found. As the
US Geological Survey has stated, "the prospects for recoverable oil in the Diaoyutai
(Senkaku Islands) and the East China Sea areas are much poorer than that for the South
China Sea."5 68 Not only that these issues were not crucially important to their national
568 Keith Robinson, "Assessment of Undiscovered Conventionally Recoverable Petrolem Resources in
Offshore Tertiary Basins of the PRC," US Geological Survey Open File Report 84-329. Denver, US Geological
Survey, 1984. Cited in Phil Deans, "The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Dispute: The Unwanted Controversy," Kent
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interest, but that too much competition over them may threaten the security of the sea lines
of communications (SLOCs) that were indispensable to both countries whose economies
healthy were heavily dependent on foreign trade through these lines. Realist balance of
power theory cannot explain the high degree of bilateral political tension in areas of
convergent national security interest.
III. Troubled Economic Interaction
The 1980s
It was in the 1980s that economic modernization surpassed the long held goal of
struggling with international superpowers to become China's top national priority. Deng
Xiaoping pointed out in September 1982 that "economic development is at the core" of the
three major tasks for the Chinese people in the following decade."69 The shift of national
agenda shifted increased the importance of cooperation with Western countries, especially
the neighbor country Japan, from which China could obtain the much needed financial aid,
advanced technology, and management skills. Hu Yaobang's report at the 12t National
Congress of the CCP in September 1982 and Zhao Ziyang's government working report to
the 6* plenary of the NPC in June 1983 both reaffirmed the three principles of Sino-
Japanese relations that Zhao proposed in June 1982- peace and friendship, equality an
mutual benefit, and long-term stability - that indicated the government emphasis on
relationship with Japan despite the recent textbook controversy."sv
As the general tone of Sino-Japanese friendship and cooperation was set, economic
interaction quickly expanded in the first half of the 1980s. Prime Ministers Suzuki and
Nakasone each brought to Beijing a generous yen loan package in 1982 and 1984
respectively, which were dedicated to a number of grand projects of infrastructure
construction and energy production. Through these projects, Japanese fund and advanced
Papers in Politics and International Relations (UK, University of Kent at Canterbury, 1996) URL:
http:// www.ukc.ac.uk/1politics/publications /journals/kentpapers/deans.html
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569 "Opening Speech at the Twelfth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, September 1, 1982."
In Deng, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 1982-1992, p. 15.
570 Tanaka, Nitchui Kankei 1945-1990, pp. 126-129.
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technology were transferred to China. Chinese personnel also began to arrive in Japan to
receive technical training in such fields as transportation, business management, agriculture
and forestry, and health and medical care. Bilateral trade increase was particularly
remarkable, with the absolute volume doubling in only three years from 1982 to 1985.
Besides, a tax agreement was signed at the 3rd bilateral cabinet meeting in 1983. It is the first
foreign tax agreement that China ever signed with a foreign country, which cleared the
problem of double taxation on firms doing business in the other country and improved the
environment for Japanese direct investment in China.57'
However the harmony in bilateral economic relationship was both superficial and
temporary. Several problems accompanying the interaction crippled Chinese enthusiasm for
deeper cooperation with Japan. One was that bilateral trade continued to be of grossly
disproportionate importance to the two economies. While Japan trade counted for
approximately 20 percent of China's total foreign trade during this period, China's share of
Japan's total trade rarely exceeded 10 percent. The Chinese felt uneasy about this
asymmetry. When meeting with former British Prime Minister Edward Heath in April 1985,
Deng complained that Japan's share in China's total foreign trade was too high and
expressed willingness to diversify commercial ties with European countries.5 72 At a time
when the two countries still faced the common Soviet threat and economic cooperation with
Japan was crucial to China's national power increase, such Chinese concern about excessive
dependence on Japan was hard to explain from a realist perspective.
Equally puzzling to realist observers was China's high sensitivity to negative relative
gains in the bilateral commercial interaction even though it delivered to China great
economic benefit. One source of Chinese concern was its huge trade deficit vis-a-vis Japan,
which reached its peak in 1985 and almost caught up with China's total export to Japan.
Chinese trade deficit actually increased persistently ever since normalization (see Table 10),
but did not become a political issue the until mid-1980s when Beijing began to criticize Japan
for its lack of response to the skyrocketing trade deficit. At the 4th bilateral cabinet meeting
571 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Waga Gaik~ no Kinkyo (The Recent State ofJapan's Diplomag), 1984, p. 86;
Tanaka, Nitchfi Kankei 1945-1990, p. 129.
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in July 1985, the head of Chinese delegation Gu Mu emphasized that China's trade deficit
was "a major obstacle to normal development of bilateral relationship," and demanded
active Japanese policy to remedy the trade imbalance, promote direct investment and expand
technology transfer to China."573 Chinese officials also repeatedly threatened to cut imports
from Japan if Tokyo failed to open its market to Chinese goods. For example, then vice
minister of the State Economic Commission Zhu Rongji warned Japanese business leaders
in February 1987 that "economic relations between the two countries will not grow unless
the Chinese trade deficit with Japan declines." Since the mid-1980s, China took conspicuous
steps to diversify the suppliers of imported goods including the U.S. and West Europe so as
to both mollify trade deficit with Japan and curtail dependence on Japanese goods.5 74
Table 10: Sino-Japanese Trade, 1972-2000
Sino-Japanese Trade Growth Rate of Sino- Trade Balance
($1,000) Japanese Trade (%) for China
1972 1,100,035 -117,805
1975 3,789,653 240 -727,501
1980 9,401,709 150 -754,961
1985 18,960,130 100 -5994,760
1990 23,199,280 20 907,755
1995 57,853,150 150 1399,147
1997 63,535,450 10 20157,060
1998 57,189,980 -10 16980,260
1999 66,551,970 16 19653,670
2000 85,453,842 28 24,777,650
SOURCE: MITI, Tstisho Hakusho
Another problem was the Chinese accusation that Japan was only interested in
selling finished products but rather reluctant to increase capital investment and technology
transfer to China. The Chinese also complained that Japanese goods exported to China were
not first-class stuff and oftentimes of even shoddy quality. All these economic problems
were accorded political importance and sometimes even led to serious strains in bilateral
relations. In a rather controversial conversation with a K6meito leader in June 1987, Deng
Xiaoping raised the problems of trade deficit and Japan's passive attitude to transfer
advanced technology to China, admonished Japan to provide more assistance to Chinese
573 Tanaka, Nitchu Kankei 1945-1990, pp. 135-137.
574 Whiting, China Eyes Japan, pp. 104-105.
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economic development in view of the war history.57 5 This conversation sparked resentful
responses from Japanese officials that escalated into a serious diplomatic dispute.
On the heel of this dispute followed the "Toshiba Incident," where the Japanese
government stopped the Toshiba Machine Company, which had violated CoCom rules when
transferring militarily related technology to the Soviet Union, from exporting civil machines
to China, only to vindicate Chinese complaints about Japanese delay in technology transfer.
To make things worse, college students staged demonstrations in several Chinese cities in
1985-1987 to protest Japanese militarism and renewed "economic invasion" to China,
mainly referring to Japanese dumping of cheap commodities in Chinese market. This
pattern of economic problems damaging bilateral political relations would have been avoided
if strategic interests remained the dominant factor shaping their mutual policies as in the
previous decade.
The 1990s
Chinese complaints about trade deficit and inadequate technology transfer were
muted in the 1990s when trade balance shifted to favor China rather than Japan and leading
Japanese companies introduced many high-tech projects to China. Now it was Japan who
was sensitive to relative gains in economic interdependence with China. But like the
Japanese concern about Chinese military capabilities which did not arise immediately after
the end of the Cold War, Japanese faith in commercial liberalism to China was not
superceded by what Michael Green and Benjamin Self call "reluctant Realism" until the mid-
1990s.5 76 Only then did the Japanese side become intolerant of China's aggressive exports to
Japan, wary of industrial "hollow-out" and damage to domestic job market due to surging
FDI in China, and reluctant to maintain high level of ODA to China. The years since 1995
saw Japanese adopted a tough position on economic diplomacy to China, cutting down
ODA amount, pressing for the appreciation of Chinese currency RMB, and even imposing
575 For excerpts of this conversation, see Nitchti Kankei Kihon Shiyodshu, p. 707; Tian, Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi
Wenxianji, Vol. 2, pp. 643-644.
576 Green and Self, "Japan's Changing China Policy," pp. 49-50.
emergency tariffs on some Chinese agricultural products, none of which were ever seen
before in postwar bilateral relations. 77
The five-to-six years of time lag between the end of the common Soviet threat and
the rise of acute Japanese policy change on economic cooperation with China indicates a
weak causal link from international structural change to bilateral economic friction.
Alternative explanations are needed to account for the turnaround of Japanese attitude. One
such explanation is the asymmetric growth of Chinese and Japanese economies in the 1990s.
The Japanese bubble economy of the late 1980s failed in 1990, but the negative impact of
effect was not immediately felt because the GDP growth continued to grow with the
propping up by government spending. But the budget deficit grew so high in 1996 that
pressure for "fiscal reform" soared. Once the public spending was scaled back since then,
the economy soon lost steam, sagging to sub-1 percent GDP growth rate.5 78 The flagging
Japanese economy stood in contrast to the vibrant Chinese economy that still maintained a
remarkable seven to eight percent of annual growth in the second half of the 1990s since the
double-digit growth period ended in 1995. Years of recession and financial crisis may have
seriously dampened Japan's enthusiasm to provide China with economic aid and
accommodate Chinese aggressiveness in expanding export.5 79" But one need not overstate
this "jealousy factor" because Chinese economy has been far from catching up with Japan
despite its fast growth and its importance in global economy remained low compared to that
of Japan.
Another explanation for the toughening of Japanese economic policy to China,
especially on economic aid, since the mid-1990s has to do with Japan's increasing concern
about the diversion of Japanese aid to military use that would help increase Chinese defense
capability and eventually shift bilateral balance of power in the long run. Among those
577 In this trade dispute case that took place in 2001, China levied 100 percent extra tariffs on imports of
automobiles, mobile phones and air-conditioners from Japan in a retaliatory action against Japan's import
restrictions on Chinese agricultural products, pushing the two countries to the verge of a trade war, which was
only called off by an inter-government settlement in November. See "China vs. Japan: A Phony Trade War,"
BusinessWeek Online (http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/01_28/b3740141.htm), July 9,
2001; Asahi Shimbun, November 9, 2001.
578 Richard Katz, Japan, the System that Soured: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese Economic Miracle (Armonk, N.Y.: M.
E. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 231-232.
79 "Japan Starts Picking on China," The Economist, February 10, 2001.
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strategic elites who advocated reduction of economic aid to China, some people argued that
Japanese fund may had been directly used on military spending while others worried that
some of the projects that the Japanese government had helped construct were for "military-
civilian dual use," such as the optical fiber cable projects that could also be used to build
advanced communication networks within the Chinese military. Still other concerns
centered on the role of Japanese aid in boosting China's overall national power that could be
easily converted to military capabilities when needed. For example, it was suggested that the
railroads, airports and highways paid by Japanese money would enable China to move
around troops rapidly in wartime, and the energy production projects that Japan helped build
in desolate areas with harsh natural conditions but rich mineral resources would allow China
to process these resources for defense purpose at low cost.580
Facing growing opposition in Japan to continue economic aid to China, Tokyo
began to prepare major readjustment of the ODA policy at the beginning of year 2000. In
May Foreign Minister K6no told visiting Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan that Japan
would be "reviewing" its economic aid to China, citing high growth in the Chinese economy
as the reason.5 "' The Japanese Foreign Ministry set up an advisory panel to make
recommendations, based on which the Ministry was scheduled to compile ODA guidelines
on China by the end of the year.5 82 But even before the panel reached a conclusion,
tensions between the two countries soared with media reports on Chinese maritime
incursion to Japan's EEZ. It was reported that Chinese research vessels had conducted
operations without the required permission inside Japan's EEZ 30 times in 1999 and another
17 times up to early August of 2000. So in his visit to Beijing in late August, K6no
complained bluntly that Japan considered China's actions at sea aggressive behaviors and
threatened to withhold further economic aid to China.5 83
580 For some examples making the links between Japanese aid and Chinese military power, see Shigeo
Hiramatsu, "Chuigokogun o Tsuyoku suru ODA (The ODA that is Helping China's Military Buildup)," Seiron
(November 2000); Hisahiko Okazaki and Yoshihisa Komori, "'No' to Ieru Nitchfi Kankei ni Mukeru: Saraba
'Koto/Shazai Gaiko' (Towards A Sino-Japanese Relations that Gapan) Can Say 'No': Farewell to
'Kowtow/Apology Diplomacy')," Shokun No. 8 (1999), pp. 70-71.
581 "Review of Japan's Economic Aid Casts Pall on Japan-China Tie," Tokyo Kyodo, May 10, 2000, in FBIS
report.
582 "Japan Sets up Panel to Review ODA to China," Tokyo Kyodo, July 17, 2000, in FBIS report; "Japan RE-
Examines Policy Directing Aid Flow to China," Wall Street Journal, July 27, 2000.
583 "Despite Tensions, China and Japan Reaffirm Ties," New York Times, August 30, 2000; "Japan and China
Eye Each Other Warily - As Usual," The Economist, September 2, 2000.
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Distrust of China touched off by the incident of research vessels was indeed strong,
especially within the ruling LDP. Keizo Takemi, a LDP member of the upper house, stated:
"In the waters off Boso Peninsula, an intelligence-gathering vessel reversed course and
swung its antenna around, gathering intelligence. Near such bases as Hyakuri and Yokosuka
they are gathering intelligence relating to our defense functions for the capital, which are the
backbone of Japan's security. This sort of thing shouldn't occur between two countries
whose leaders affirmed their friendly partnership two years ago. Japan values Sino-Japanese
cooperation and takes care to avoid unnecessary confrontation, but no matter how you look
at it, Japan is the only one cooperating. Isn't this hgemonism on China's part?" Another
member of the lower house and chairman of the LDP Foreign Affairs Division, Yasuhisa
Shiozaki, spoke out that "The importance of Japan's relationship with China is well
known...As a country, however, there should be an integrity, philosophy, and logic to aid.
We need the understanding of the people, who are the original owners of the tax money.
Chinese ships are entering our waters at will; their naval vessels have cruised around Japan.
It's the same as if the Japanese people are under attack. We should not have such a
relationship."5 84
Criticism of China was so intense since August that consensus quickly emerged
within the Japanese government on not whether economic aid to China would be cut back
but how much. It was reported in December that LDP Policy Research Council Chairman
Shizuka Kamei called for cutting Japan's total ODA budget by 30 percent because he
believed that continuing to provide aid to China would mean that Japan was indirectly
helping China build up its military s585 It was only due to the strong objection from the
Foreign Ministry that the Japanese government proved a much less drastic 10 percent cut in
Japan's foreign aid in 2002 fiscal year. Meanwhile, the Plan on Economic Cooperation with
China compiled by the Foreign Ministry in October 2001 stipulated that the government
would determine the amount of low-interest yen loans on an annual basis, rather than giving
584 Takuro Noguchi, "Is ODA to China Japan's 'Insurance'? Pros and Cons of Continuing Aid to China,"
AERA, October 9, 2000, in FBIS report.
585 "ODA Getting the Review It Needs," The Daily Yomiuri, December 12, 2000; "LDP's Kamei Says Japan
Should Reconsider ODA as Diplomatic Tool," Asahi Shimbun (online), March 1, 2001.
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a lump-sum package covering several years, and it would not take past aid to China as a
given amount but instead work out the sum by adding up each individual project.5 86
These new policy changes indicated that the hawkish opinion on China policy had
gained upper hand in the Japanese government, which led to not only considerable cutback
of economic aid to China but also stricter terms on which such aid is to be extended to
China. This analysis suggests that China's military buildup program and assertive behaviors
in surrounding areas since the early 1990s indeed constituted an important cause of Japanese
policy change in economic affairs to China.
IV. Popular Animosity
Like the other indicators of bilateral reconciliation development, the evolution of
bilateral popular feelings did not seem to be shaped by the international structural change.
For one thing, the advent of popular estrangement between the two nations and the
prevalence of simmering resentment among Chinese public about Japan began in the early
1980s, long before the end of the Cold War. The widespread Chinese student
demonstration between 1985 and 1987 against "reviving Japanese militarism" and
"economic invasions" marked the beginning of public venting of bitter emotions against
Japan and dissolving of the fagade of "Sino-Japanese Friendship" long held by the official
propaganda. Since then mass demonstration became a routine domestic and diplomatic
concern on anniversary days of Sino-Japanese war. Besides, Chinese public sentiments
tended to associate Japanese current policy with its past aggression and, if unchecked, would
have burst into mass protests every time when bilateral disputes occur, such as in the student
demonstrations in the 1980s and island disputes in the 1990s. Besides anti-Japan protests,
societal demands for Japanese official apology and war reparation, as well as grass-roots
campaigns demanding Japanese government compensation to individual Chinese war victims
emerged since the early 1990s.5 87
586 For the Japanese text of the plan, see http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/kuni/china._h.html
587 "Students Demand Japanese War Reparation," FBIS China Daily Report, September 24, 1996; "Indemnity
Claims during Emperor's Visit Discouraged," FBIS China Daily Report, October 2, 1992.
As far as Japanese popular sentiments are concerned, the percentage of Japanese
people who felt close to China gradually decreased since 1986. Mid-1980s was also the
watershed in Japanese public trust in China began to decline. (See Chart 3 of Chapter 4 and
Chart 4). Can this be explained by reduced Japanese feeling of solidarity towards China
when the common Soviet threat seemed to be in retreat after Gorbachev took power? The
answer is a negative one. Since coming to office in March 1985, Gorbachev took a radically
new course in foreign policy that was aimed at reducing East-West security dilemma and
revitalizing the sick national economy through arms control agreements, mutual reduction of
military spending, and strategic retrenchment from the third world. But the subsequent
American-Soviet strategic negotiation did not go smoothly and the Soviet military
intervention in Afghanistan continued. The first real breakthrough did not come until
December 1987 when Gorbachev and Reagan signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces (INF) Treaty. And Soviet military pressure on Far East began to ease up in 1988
with its pullout from Afghanistan and Mongolia.
As far as Japan was concerned, it watched on the warming up of American-Soviet
relations since Gorbachev with much suspicion and distrust. Gilbert Rozman's study of
Japanese elite and public perception of the Soviet Union during 1985-1991 shows that,
except for the minority left, the political mainstream and general public still treated the
Soviet Union as an evil, dangerous state and viewed its conciliatory moves such as the INF
with a high degree of skepticism and mistrust until early 1988. The Asabi Shimbun held a
multinational poll at the end of 1987 that asked a question about whether the Soviets could
be trusted. The Japanese trust level (34%) fell much lower than that of the West Germans
(73%), English (66%0/), and Americans (51%). There was also a huge gap in the "mutual
sympathy rate" that the Japanese (17%) and Soviets (88%) had toward each other, as well as
in their mutual antipathetic feelings (47.4% of Japanese toward the Soviets and 2.4% of
Soviets to Japan) and friendship feelings (60.2% of Japanese say unfriendly and 9.1% say
friendly, as opposed to 63.2% Soviets who say friendly and 23.4% say unfriendly), as shown
in a joint poll done by Kyodo News Service and Tass. In the meantime, bilateral relations
were still mired in tension due to the lack of breakthrough in territorial negotiation, the 1987
Toshiba Incident, and the remaining of heavy Soviet military deployment in the Far East,
including the medium range SS-20 nuclear missiles that could reach Japan. Japanese public
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opinion about the Soviet Union only slightly improved in late 1988. s88 So the deterioration
of Japanese opinions about China did not correlate with an increase in positive feelings
about the Soviet Union.
Chart 4: Level of Japanese Public Trust of China, 1979-1993
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SOURCES: Yoron Chosa Nenkan, various years.
The second, and more significant downturn in Japanese public opinion about China
occurred after the violent crackdown of the June 4th democratic movement in1989, when
there appeared a profound Japanese disenchantment with China's promise of social stability
and political democracy. But in the early 1990s, Japanese public perception of security threat
from China was still well below that from the Soviet Union and even the United States. For
example, a Yomiuri Shimbun poll in 1991 shows that only eight percent of Japanese
respondents felt threat from China, compared to 24 percent who felt threat from the U.S.
and 21.8 percent from the Soviet Union; another poll by iji Tsushinsha in 1994 indicates that
the country that Japanese pubic feared most was North Korea (60.2%), followed by Russia
(35.4%) and the U.S. (16.4%), while China trailed rather low at only 6.5%.589
588 Gilbert Rozman, Japan's Response to the Gorbachev Era, 1985-1991: A Rising Superpower Views A Declining One
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 98-135.
589 Yomiuri national opinion survey, June 1991, See Yoron Chodsa Nenkan, 1992, p. 508; Jiji Tsushinsha national
survey, February 1994, in Yoron Chosa Nenkan, 1994, p. 519.
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In the second half of the 1990s Japanese public perception of China threat soared
(See Charts 5). Besides, both nations felt that the other country was a major military threat,
if not an immediate or most dangerous threat. In the above-mentioned opinion poll by
Asahi Shimbun and the Chinese People's University in 1997, 54 percent of Chinese
respondents chose the United States to be the biggest military threat, next to which were
Japan (21%) and Russia (3%); as for the Japanese respondents, 29 percent chose North
Korea, followed by the U.S. (19%) and China (18%/0). 5 9o
Chart 5: Japanese Perception of China Threat, 1972-1998
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EXPLANING THE OUTCOME:
TEST OF THE HISTORICAL MYTHMAKING THEORY
Historical mythmaking theory provides a fairly persuasive explanation for bilateral
relations in this period. It is because the increase in bilateral historiographic divergence as a
result of the mutually conflictual/combative war narratives of the two countries since the 1980s
coincided with the deterioration of bilateral reconciliation from the sub-stage of
"Rapprochement" to "Friction" of the Shallow Reconciliation stage. Not only the
covariance pattern but also process-tracing results prove that historical mythmaking
performed a significant role in shaping Sino-Japanese relations throughout the 1980s and
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590 Asahi Shimbun, September 22, 1997.
I Perception of Threat from China
1990s. The bilateral historiographic clash greatly heightened expectation of conflict through
the mechanism of intention and stimulated mutual popular animosity through the
mechanism of emotions. Regarding bilateral sovereignty controversies and economic
friction, the two mechanisms not only exacerbated mutual negative perception but also
increased domestic pressure against government compromise, which precluded quick,
smooth settlement of these issues and significantly strained bilateral relations.
The Mechanism of Intention and the Heightened Expectation of War
The widening gap between the two countries in their historical interpretation of their
past considerably stimulated their mutual perception of negative intention at both inter-
governmental and societal levels. The Chinese side denounced Japanese amnesia about its
past aggression as both a major cause and indicator of a potential political trend to revive
militaristic defense and foreign policies. As for the Japanes, because of their disagreement
with Chinese interpretation of the war history, they found China's historical argument
unacceptable and suspected that China was using history as a political tool to bully Japan in
international affairs.
China: Japanese Unrepentance and Remilitarization Trend
As we know, Chinese official media during the 1982 textbook controversy
conspicuously associated Japanese historical attitude with the danger of its militarist revival.
The PLA Daily editorialized in August that those Japanese conservative politicians who
supported textbook distortion of history were following a militarist logic.591 Another
editorial published in September's Hongqi (Red Flag), the communist party's mouthpiece,
warned of the danger of militarist revival in light of the Japanese textbook distortion
incident.5 92 As discussed above, the unexpected harshness of Chinese media campaign in
1982 was the result of political manipulation, but analysis of Chinese strategic perception of
Japan since then shows that open debate on war history interpretation between the two
591 "Jiefangjun Bao Editorial on Being Cautious of Militarist Logic, August 3, 1982," Tian, Zhanhou Zhongri
Guanxi Wenxianji, Vol. 2, pp. 357-358.
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countries to a large extent spurred Chinese fear about Japanese remilitarization. Unlike in
the previous three postwar decades where Japanese war amnesia and self-glorifying
discourses went unnoticed in China, with the eruption of 1982 textbook controversy it
became a routine that the history issue would be treated as an important factor whenever
observations of Japan's current political situation and forecast of its future trend were made.
Chinese intellectuals' first cut on war historiography pointed to the negative impact
that Japan's lack of contrition may have on its national self-image, particularly among the
younger generation who had no direct experience of the war. Wen Jieruo, a famous Chinese
writer, once reported her unpleasant encounter with some Japanese youth at a discussion
forum in 1985 following the showing of a revisionist documentary film on the Tokyo War
Crimes Trial. While older Japanese audience commented that Japan's war in Asia ought to
be condemned because of its destructive effect in many countries, several young people
agreed with the film's interpretation that tried to normalize Japan's aggression and blame the
tribunal for being unfair on Japan. Wen therefore expressed her deep concern that the
young Japanese were being subject to the similar kind of nationalistic brainwashing as that in
the prewar period and failed to form a correct understanding of the nation's role of
oppressor in modern history of Asia.593
Wen's concern was shared by many Chinese experts of international affairs, who
were particularly worried about the international implication of Japan's historical amnesia.
To China's Japan watchers, the belief that Japan did nothing wrong in the past and need not
feel guilty towards Asian victim countries would induce the young Japanese to act arrogantly
in the world and develop a sense of national superiority, especially vis-a-vis other Asian
countries, which was often seen in militarist Japan in the 1930s and 1940s. In their view, if
the truth of Japan's aggression history was not passed on to the younger generation, as time
went by more and more Japanese people would accept pernicious historical myths and once
again embrace militaristic international strategy. For example, He Fang, former director of
the Institute of International Studies affiliated with the Chinese Foreign Ministry, warned
592 "Hongqi Editorial on Being on Guard against Japanese Militarist Revival, September 1982," in Tian, Zhanhou
Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji, vol. 2, pp. 371-375.593 Jieruo Wen, "Yingpian 'Dongjing Shenpan' Ji Qita (Film 'Tokyo Trial' and More)," Riben Wenti (Japan
Studies) No. 3 (1986).
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that "the erroneous opinions of the right-wing revisionist historiography could poison the
mind of the Japanese youth and inflame chauvinist sentiments which, if not constrained, may
lead young people down the road of evil and cast a shadow over Sino-Japanese relations."5 94
Elsewhere He Fang further spelt out the casual link between Japanese arrogance and
dangerous foreign policy:
"There has been a flood of great-nation chauvinist sentiments, personified by the denial of
responsibility for the aggressive war, reversion of historical verdict, and even revival of the old dream
of 'Japanese Empire,' such as to think that Japan is superior and look down upon other countries
especially Asian neighbors, and to be extremely overbearing owing to great wealth...This trend, if
allowed to continue, will not only hamper Sino-Japanese friendship and peace in Asia and damage
Japan's international image, but also bring Japan down the road of militarism, the danger of which has
been testified in the past."595
In this context, the fact that Japan's pursuit of greater international influence since
Nakasone came to power was accompanied by conservative efforts to deny or whitewash the
country's history of aggression was particularly worrisome. Many Chinese strategic elites
believed that what was driving Japan's new internationalist policy was the "neo-statism" (Xin
Guojia Zhuyz) or "great-nation chauvinism" (Daguo Zhuyi) ideologies, which would lead to
aggressive Japanese defense buildup and military activism in international affairs.5 96 It is true
that some analysts admitted that Japan's defense policy readjustment was in part the product
of American pressure, its current military capability was still not qualified for a great military
power, and to remilitarize Japan would meet various domestic and international constraining
forces.597 In the meantime, however, they felt extremely uneasy about the Japanese
conservative attempt to shatter postwar political framework that had served as a brake on
Japanese remilitarization trend, such as trying to revise the peace constitution, calling for
greater political influence of the emperor, and seeking the permanent membership in the
U.N. security council as well as the removal of the U.N. enemy state clause. In fact, in the
eyes of Chinese strategic elites, the rise of neo-nationalist historiography, challenge to the
594 Fang He, "Zhengque Duidai Lishi (To Treat History Right)," Riben Wenti No. 5 (1986), p. 3. For some
examples of articles making similar arguments, see Xinzu Gao, "'Nanjing Datusha' de Shishi Burong Mosha
(Historical Facts about Nanjing Massacre Not to be Denied)," Riben Wenti, No. 4 (1986).
595 Fang He, "Zhongri Guanxi yu Yazhou Heping (Sino-Japanese Relations and Peace in Asia)," Riben Wenti
No. 4 (1987), p. 6.
596 Yimin Song, "Zhanhou Riben Minzu Zhuyi Sichao Chuxi (A Preliminary Examination of Postwar Japanese
Nationalist Thoughts)," Riben Wenti No. 2 (1987).597 Junfeng Pan, "Riben Hui Chengwei Junshi Daguo Ma? (Can Japan Become A Military Great Power?),"
Riben Wenti No. 2 (1986), pp.13-16; Jiangyong Liu, "Lun Riben Duiwai Zhanlue de Fazhan (A Study of the
Evolution of Japanese External Strategy)," Riben Wenti No. 1 (1986), p. 8.
peace constitution, and the move toward more active defense were all interrelated, signifying
Japanese desire for great power status or even the revival of militarism.59"
The widespread mistrust among Chinese strategic elites about Japanese strategic
motive very likely prompted the change of Chinese official attitude to Japanese defense
program. Although never specifying how Japan would make all the constraining forces go
away and realize remilitarization, Chinese strategic elite did suggest a possible scenario that
the Japanese may gradually strengthen its military capability beyond the need for defense
purpose and achieve de facto remilitarization.5 "99 So Beijing replaced its tacit tolerance and
even positive encouragement with a cautious attitude to Japanese defense upgrading. In
September 1983, Chinese foreign minister Wu Xueqian told his Japanese counterpart that
China would support Japan's self-defense efforts provided that its military capabilities
"would not exceed the levels Japan needs."600 After the Nakasone administration announced
the decision to break the one percent GNP ceiling for annual defense, Wu Xueqian told
visiting secretary general of Liberal Democratic Party Takeshida Noboru in January that
"people of Asian neighboring countries are afraid of Japan's becoming a military great
power," and demanded that Japanese government should set certain limit for defense
buildup and take surrounding countries' feelings into consideration.6 01 Likewise, Japanese
military's participation in overseas peacekeeping operations and domestic political attempt
on revising Article 9 of the constitution have often triggered warnings from Chinese strategic
analysts that Japan was opting for becoming a political power free to intervene in regional
affairs with military forces.602
In a similar vein, Beijing held an ambiguous attitude toward the U.S.-Japan alliance
during this period. First troubled by the U.S. burden-sharing pressure for Japan to adopt
598 See Chaolun Shi, "Xiandai Ribenren de Tianhuangguan ji 'Xiangzheng' Tianhuangzhi Wenti (Modern
Japanese Views about the Emperor and the Issue of 'Symbolic' Monarchy," Riben Wenti No. 4 (1987); Feng
Wan, "Youguan Junguo Zhuyi, Riben Junguo Zhuyi de Jige Wenti (A Few Questions Regarding Militarism and
Japanese Militarism)," Riben Wenti No. 6 (1987), p. 14.
599 Junfeng Pan, "Riben Hui Chengwei Junshi Daguo Ma?" p. 17; Feng Wan, "Youguan Junguo Zhuyi, Riben
Junguo Zhuyi de Jige Wenti," p. 14.
60 Joseph Y. S. Cheng, "China's Japan Policy in the 1980s," p. 97.
601 Yasuda, "Boei Yosanan 'Tai GNP Hi 1% Tobatu' ni Taisuru Chugokugawa no Hanno," p. 97.
602 For example, see Zhang Dalin, "On Japan's PKO Bill," Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (International Studies) No. 2
(1992); Jie Liu, "Postwar Japanese Thoughts on Constitutional Revision," Waiguo Wenti Yanjiu (Foreign
Problem Research) No. 1 (1995).
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active, autonomous defense by the mid-1980s, at the beginning of the 1990s China worried
that increasing U.S.-Japan economic friction would erode the political basis of their alliance
that was already wearing thin after the collapse of the common Soviet threat. If the alliance
was severely weakened or dismantled, it would mean the destruction of another important
constraint on Japanese remilitarization. A military analyst predicted that the alliance would
not last long and regional stability may be compromised as a result.60 3 Another Japan expert
warned that the day when Japan said "no" to the United States would be the time when
Japan became a political and military giant.60 4
However, following the reaffirmation of U.S.-Japan alliance around 1996, Chinese
worry about a too loose alliance declined while the fear that the alliance is too tight increased
dramatically. One leading advocate of the new opinion, Liu Jiangyong, rebutted the belief
that Japan would become a great military power only when the U.S.-Japan alliance
disintegrated. He argued that the alliance may be a "cork in the bottle" preventing Japan
from developing nuclear weapons, but it was also serving as an "egg shell" encouraging
Japanese upgrade of high-tech and conventional military capability' so Japan actually used
the alliance as a good cover for its military buildup programs. Liu even drew a comparison
between Japan's policy of active defense of its surrounding waters, sea-lane security and
overseas Japanese nationals since 1996 with the history in the 1930s and 1940s and warned
that history may replay for Japan invaded Russia and China with the excuse to defend these
interests.60 s Another military analyst even bluntly pointed out that Japan allowed the U.S. to
station troops in its territory in exchange for U.S. support for Japan's expansion to Southern
Pacific and Indian Ocean, an evil plot reminiscent of its attempt to build "the Greater East
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" in the wartime. 606
603 Yunzhong Yang, "Rimei Maodun de Jihua jiqi dui Guoji Guanxi de Yingxiang (The Escalation ofJapan-US
conflict and Its Impact on International Relations)," Yatai Yanjiu (Asia-Pacific Studies) No. 3 (1992).
604 Zhongying Pang, "Guanyu Xingcheng zhong de Dongya Anquan Zhixu yu Jingji de Ruogan Sikao (Some
Thoughts on the Evolving Security Order and Economy in East Asia)," Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (World
Economy and Politics) No. 3 (1994).
605 Jiangyong Liu, et al., "1996-1997 Report of the Situation in Japan," in Study Report on International Situation
(Beijing, Chinese Strategy and Management Society, 1997). For more on the transition of Chinese strategic
perception of the U.S.-Japan alliance in 1996-7, see Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the
Security Dilemma in East Asia,"pp. 58-64.
606 Yaqing Li, "What Is Japan Doing Southward?" lianchuan Zhishi (Knowledge of Naval and Merchant Ships)
No. 6 (1997).
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Chinese criticism of Japanese policies in connection with the war history since the
1980s seemingly resembles its media bashing of reviving Japanese militarism in the 1960s for
purely instrumental purposes. But major differences exist. In the 1960s the Chinese
government did not really care about how history was remembered in Japan but only to cite
history to put pressure on Japan in the hope of influencing its policy to China. And Chinese
media campaigns were turned on and off in accordance with the belief/disbelief that Tokyo
was carrying out an aggressively anti-China policy. Since the 1980s, however, Chinese media
and strategic elite showed serious concerns about Japanese historical myths themselves. The
logic is not "because Japan did bad things in the past, it will do it again," but "because of its
historical amnesia and lack of contrition about its bad behaviors in the past, Japan may do it
again." Such concerns were deeply embedded in Chinese strategic thinking and did not go
away when bilateral relations were relatively smooth. And China usually demanded not only
restraints in Japanese national strategies but also sincere contrition and serious reform of
history education.
Mistrust of Japan was not limited to Chinese strategic elite but also widespread
among the general public. There was a common impulse among ordinary Chinese people to
condemn Japanese unrepentance about the war history and jump to the conclusion about
Japan's evil ambition. A 1996 Chinese best-selling book that created a sensation in China,
China that Can Say No, conveyed such a clear message that Japan was not trustworthy because
of its wrong attitude toward its past aggression and urged Japan to exercise self-restraint in
revising constitution, building up defense capabilities, and seeking the permanent
membership in the UN Security Council. The book even made it an eye-catching headline
that "in some sense, to do nothing is exactly Japan's contribution to the world!"'07
The authors' argument was actually shared by a great proportion of Chinese people.
In a large-scale opinion poll conducted among Chinese young people with average age
around 25 across the country by China Youth Daily in December 1996, such a question was
posed to the respondents: "Japan has not done genuine introspection about the past even 50
years after the end of the WWII. Under such circumstances, do you agree that Japan should
become a permanent member of the UN Security Council?" Nearly 95 percent of the
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respondents said they disagreed. A similarly majority of respondents showed sensitivity to
Japan's assertive international strategy: 75 percent expressed objection to the dispatch of
Japanese SDF troops abroad for U.N. peace-keeping missions, and 89.5 percent said they
were worried that Japan would capitalize on such opportunities to move toward a military
power.608
Japan: Historiographic Gap and Japanese Fear of An Assertive China
From the mid-1990s, Japanese strategic elites often considered Chinese nuclear
weapon development, military modernization programs and naval activities in surrounding
waters as sources of a potential China threat. The Chinese refusal to take self-restraint in
above areas and improve military transparency particularly frustrated the Japanese side.
When Tokyo presses on Beijing over these matters, however, it was often dismayed by
China's claim of historical entitlement because of its past suffering at the hand of Japanese
aggressors. From the Chinese perspective, as a former oppressor of the Chinese nation who
had yet to come to terms with its past crimes, Japan had no right to complain about China's
national defense efforts to fend off foreign invasions. For example, when Japan protested
Chinese nuclear tests in 1995 by freezing grant aid to China, Chinese foreign ministry
spokesman responded that Japan should "understand the sentiment of the Chinese people
especially on the occasion of the 50 anniversary of the end of the WWII" and urged Japan
to reflect on its wartime atrocities rather than criticizing others.6 "9
However, Japan found such Chinese argument based on the war history
unacceptable. According to Japanese neo-nationalist view of the war history, Japan did not
do anything exceptionally bad in China compared to what other major imperialist powers did
in the early 2 0 th century and Japan had already made more apologies than necessary. A
moderate and probably more widely held view admitted Japanese aggression and agreed with
the necessity to settle past account, but it treated current issues like nuclear tests as separate
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from history and advocated a firm Japanese policy on these issues.610 Both the views of
denying Japanese war responsibility and dismissing that Japan's past behavior had anything
to do with its present image in the world rejected the validity of Chinese sense of historical
entitlement in defense policy. To them, Japanese national interest calculation, as well as the
institutional and ideological constraints on military spending and overseas activities would
suffice to prevent Japan from going back to the militarist era, so Chinese persistent warning
against the resurgence of Japanese militarism had no realistic basis.6"
If China's insistence on its own military buildup and criticism of Japanese militarist
revival were not justifiable in the historical and present context, many Japanese believed that
the Chinese excessively indulgence themselves in the past history. Others held a cynical
belief that Chinese argument only showed Beijing's manipulation of history to seek practical
gains or a deliberate disguise of its international ambition. For example, the 1984 annual
report of the Research Institute for Peace and Security speculates that "there is a resurgence
of patriotism in China and it may be that the Chinese leadership has chosen to criticize
militarism in an effort to demonstrate that they are not completely siding with Japan."612
Another argument goes that China used history to apply pressure on Japan for concessions
on economic aid and Taiwan policy, which will be discussed in later sections. Perhaps
Japan's biggest resentment of Chinese instrumental use of history was that by seizing the
morally high ground and reducing Japan to a "special country" that was indebted to China,
China tried to put Japan in a subordinate position in bilateral relationship. For example, an
expert on international affairs voiced the following criticism of Chinese historical argument:
"Although ordinary Japanese people have deeply understood the nation's negative legacy vis-a-vis
China, the way China raises the issue of 'historical consciousness' often tries to make generalization
out of exceptional cases, which sometimes makes people feel that China tries to interfere with Japan's
internal affairs. Moreover, one begins to suspect that China is using the issue of 'historical
consciousness' as a diplomatic means to impose an upper-and-lower relations on Sino-Japanese
relations and mold Japanese public acceptance that Japan should be submissive to China."613
610 For an example of this opinion of pressing for Chinese concession on military issues while accepting
Japanese war responsibility to a non-masochist extent, see Jitsur6 Terashima, "Nichibeichu Toraianguru
Kuraishisu o Do Seigo Suru ka (How to Check Japan-US-China Triangular Crisis)," Chiio K6ron No. 8 (1996).
611 Hisahiko Okazaki and Shinichi Kitaoka, "Nihon Gaik6 Machiukeru Shiren (Trials Awaiting Japan's
Diplomacy)," Chfio K6ron No. 2 (1992), pp. 82-86.612 Asian Security 1984, Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo, p. 85.
613 Nobuo Miyamoto, '"Nichi-bei-chii-ro' Shijus6 no Fu Ky6wa On (A Disharmonious Note in the Japan-US-
China-Russia Quartet)," Chu6 K6ron No. 2 (1998), p. 145.
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It was exactly the fear of Japanese humiliating "Kneeling-down Diplomacy" (Dogeta
Gaiko) or "Tribute Diplomacy" (Cbokd Gaiko) that triggered some of the strongest
objections in Japan against Emperor Akihito's visit to China in 1992 and his issuing clear
apology during the visit.61 4 Many Japanese were also frustrated that China cited history to
turn down Japanese application for the permanent membership of the U.N. Security Council
and blew the whistle on Japanese militarism whenever Japan tried to send its military
overseas as international contribution. All these Chinese actions convinced them of China's
insensitivity to Japan's national pride and deliberate effort to deny Japan of a greater role in
the new world order.
Overall, like the way it caused Chinese resentment of Japanese arrogance, the
bilateral memory divergence also brought about a strong disapproval in Japan of Chinese
approach to international affair. In Japanese perception, China was developing a dangerous
nationalist trend that tended to place the interest of other countries secondary to that of the
"Greater China Nation." Although it would still be far-fetched to think that China would
come after Japan in a revanchist move right away, many Japanese elites were afraid that
China would grow more assertive in foreign and defense policies while ignoring the rightful
interest of Japan. So China was seen to have assumed the role of Japan's principal rival in
the region despite the lack of a major shift in bilateral power balance and fundamental
conflict of interest between them.
The Mechanism of Emotions and Popular Animosity
Acrimonious controversies on war memories directly led to negative emotions
toward one another nation. While the Chinese people felt bitter about their suffering and
the lack of genuine Japanese atonement for its war guilt, the majority of Japanese people
rejected Chinese grievances because they believed themselves as innocent war victims and
Japan had displayed enough contrition for its past aggression. So the Japanese were greatly
frustrated when the Chinese demanded reparation for individuals and even held deep
614 Mineo Nakajima, "Tenno Hochfi to Nihon Gaik6 (The Emperor's Visit to China and Japan's Foreign
Policy)," Chu6 K6ron No. 9 (1992).
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Japanese contrition as the preconditions for improvement in bilateral relations. As a result,
feeling of animosity to Japan permeated the Chinese society, whereas disgust and resentment
about China spread among the Japanese public, causing a downward spiral of popular
relations between the two countries.
Chinese Historical Grievances
Chinese public grievances stemming from bilateral historiographic divergence played
a significant role in shaping negative Chinese popular feeling about Japan. First of all,
painful recollections of Japanese war crimes and Chinese people's suffering was commonly
invoked when ordinary Chinese people were asked to describe the national image of Japan,
thanks to the prevalence of victim consciousness in China since the 1980s. The first
outburst of popular repugnance to Japan came between 1985 and 1987 when Chinese
university students staged demonstrations in Beijing and many other big cities protesting the
resurgence of Japanese militarism signaled by Nakasone's official visit to the Yasukuni, In
the 1990s, the image of the Japanese nation among Chinese youth remained overshadowed
by harrowing memories of the past. The above-mentioned public survey of 1996 by the
China Youth Daily crystallized this phenomenon. When asked if they would think of
"Japanese imperialist atrocities in China" upon seeing Japanese national flag, 76.4 percent
reponsdents said "yes" and another 20 percent said sometimes they would. Another
question asked what the word "Japan" would most likely invoke in their mind, the three
most selected choices were Nanjing Massacre (83.9 percent), "Japanese devils" and war of
resistance against Japan (81.3 percent), and Bushido (58.1 /).615
The emotional focus in Chinese perception of Japan was not only limited to the
younger generation but also widespread among the general Chinese public. According to a
joint public-opinion survey done by Yomiuri Shimbun and Gallop in September 1999, when
asked what would be called to mind if they hear the word "Japan," 39.2 percent of all
Chinese respondents gave the answer of "war of aggression/war of resistance against Japan,"
615 China Youth Daily, February 15, 1997.
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which topped the list of all choices; besides, another about 15 percent respondents gave
answers like Nanjing Massacre, barbarism, militarism, hatred, all closely related to the war.6 6'
Another evidence of the impact of memory difference on public feeling was the
widespread conviction among Chinese people that Japan had not done sincere, thorough
soul-searching regarding its past aggression. The student demonstration of the mid-1 980s
were in a big part provoked by the two textbook incidents of 1982 and 1986 and Nakasone's
official worship at the Yasukuni in 1985, which all appeared to Chinese students that Japan
remained unrepentant about history and might again become a aggressor in the future. In a
questionnaire survey carried out on the campus of Beijing Aerospace University in 1997,
over 80 percent of all respondents worried that Japan had not conducted conscientious self-
examination but connived at the right-wing view of history.617 In a recent Sino-Japanese
joint opinion poll conducted in 2002, about 64.5 percent of Chinese respondents said they
did not feel friendly toward Japan, as opposed to only 25 percent who felt very friendly or
somewhat friendly. When the former group was asked why they did not feel friendly, nearly
80 percent of them picked the choice "because I think Japan does not do self-reflect on the
history of its aggression against China and lacks a correct view of history."6 18
The Chinese people were resentful about Japan not only for its whitewashing of the
aggression history in textbooks and public commemoration, but also because of its lack of
sincere efforts of restitution, particularly material compensation. The emergence of Chinese
popular demand for war reparation is particularly noteworthy because the Chinese
government never showed real interest in obtaining Japanese reparation and officially the
issue was already settled at the time of diplomatic normalization. In the past, public
dissatisfaction about the reparation issue was suppressed due to the strategic interest of Sino-
Japanese cooperation. But since the outbreak of bilateral historiographic conflict in the early
1980s, public sentiments towards Japan have changed dramatically and people began to
express disagreement with the government position in open occasions. A dissident journal
run by overseas Chinese students, Zhongguo Zhi Chun (China Spring), published an article in
1987 by an influential political dissident, Fang Lizhi, on Sino-Japanese relations. Actually
616 Yomiuri Shimbun, September 30, 1999.
617 Daxue Sheng, July 10, 1997, in FBIS-CHI, October 14, 1997.
written in November 1981 when Fang visited Kyodo and Hiroshima, the article was only
published in China Spring and reprinted in Chuo Koron in 1987. The following criticism of
the Chinese government regarding its domestic and foreign policies, including the policy on
the question of war reparation, probably made it too controversial to appear in the tightly
censored Chinese media:
"For some reason or other, I felt that Chinese people's heart is way too kind. At home we even
believe the faint, empty smile of a tyrant, and externally we even believe the mere hypocrisy of those
who brandishes the big stick of power... After the war, Japan ought to pay China war reparation in
hundreds of billions of dollars, but with the consent of Premier (the debt) was completely canceled by
one single stroke of writing. The premier's consideration was correct, and it also showed the good
and kind character of the Chinese people. However, we should not be fooled repeatedly by (other's)
empty smile and hypocrisy just because we are inherently good and kind."'619
If in the 1980s Chinese elites like Fang Lizhi could only insinuate their disapproval of
the government decision to renounce official claims to Japanese war reparation, since the
1990s they openly expressed sympathy to Chinese war victims and some of them even
organized grass-roots campaigns to seek compensation from Japan. This dramatic change
was directly triggered by the international stir after three former "comfort women" from
South Korea filed lawsuit against the Japanese government in 1991. Around 1991-1992
Chinese people from various social strata formed a number of groups demanding war
compensation, and activists of the redress movement began to appeal at the NPC for change
of government policy.
The movement soon spread to university campuses and reached a climax shortly
before Emperor Akihiko's visit to Beijing in October 1992. In mid-September, a graduate
student research group distributed around 1,000 questionnaires on Sino-Japanese relations to
students and young teachers at Beijing University, People's University, and Beijing Normal
University. Some 58.6 percent of respondents in the survey said the 1972 bilateral
agreement dropping war compensation claims damaged Chinese interests, 89.1 percent of
the total respondents supported raising compensation claims. Regarding Japanese apologies,
some 93.7 percent said the Emperor Hirohito bore full or some responsibility for Japanese
war crimes, and 67.6 percent demanded a formal apology from Emperor Akihito when he
visited China. About a week after the poll was conducted, university students in Beijing
618 Tokyo Shimbun, September 22, 2002.
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launched a citywide petition movement collecting signatures and students representatives
attempted to deliver an open letter to the Japanese Embassy demanding emperor's public
apology for war crimes and reasonable war reparations. 62 0
The redress movement resonated so much among not only the general public but
also government officials that it prompted the Chinese government to circulate a red-
letterheaded document among cadres at the departmental and army level on the eve of the
National Day, warning them "not to raise, encourage others to raise, and support any
attempt to claim indemnity against Japan as the Japanese emperor is about to visit China." 621
However, the government discouragement did not stop the redress movement from gaining
more public support. Even periodicals sponsored by government think tanks began to
publish articles sympathetic to individual demands for Japanese reparation.622 As time went
by, the domestic and international atmospheres turned so much in favor of war redress
movement that it became difficult for the government to suppress these claims from its own
people. So official restrictions on individual compensation claims gradually wound down.
In March 1995, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen remarked that individual claims of war
compensation to Japan were the rights of Chinese people, which the Chinese government
will neither obstruct nor intervene. 623 With the government permission and generous
support from both domestic and foreign legal experts and social activists, Chinese war
victims filed numerous lawsuits in Japanese courts in the second half of the 1990s. 6 24
619 Lizhi Fang, "Nihonjin no Seizai no Sensokan ni Tsuite (Regarding the Latent War View of the Japanese
People)," Chfio Ktron No. 8 (1987), p. 176.
620 "Students Demand Japanese War Reparation," Tokyo Kyodo, September 23, 1992; "Student Campaign for
Japanese War Reparations," Hong Kong AFP, September 24, 1992, in FBIS-CHI.
621 "Indemnity Claims During Emperor's Visit Discouraged," Hong Kong Ming Pao, October 2, 1992, in
FBIS-CHI.
622 For some examples of Chinese scholars of international affairs in government think-tanks giving their
support to the non-governmental activities in many Asian countries to demand Japanese compensation and
even directly urging the lifting of official ban on such activities in China, see Biqing Zhang, "Riben Jiejue dui
Wo Minjian Peichang Wenti Ciqi Shi Ye (The Time Is Right for Japan to Settle the Problem of Non-
governmental Compensation with China)," Riben Wenti Ziliao (Materials of Japanese Affairs) (internal
circulation) No. 5 (1994); Weijiu Jiang, "Yanzhou Geguo Erzhan Shouhaizhe Peichang Susong Fenqi de Fenxi
(An Analysis of the Mushrooming of Compensation Lawsuits Filed by World War II Victims of Various Asian
Countries)," Dangdai Yatai (Contemporary Asia-Pacifc Studies) No. 4 (1995).
623 Ping An, "Riben Qiye de Zhanzhen Zeren ji Minjian Peichang Wenti (The War Responsibility of Japanese
Firms and the Problem of Individual Claims of War Compensation)," Kangri Zhanzhen Yanjiu (the Journal of
Studies of China's Resistance War Against Japan) No. 3 (1998), p. 194.
624 "Experts Advise Chinese WWII Laborers to File Class Action," People's Daily Online
(http://english.peopledaily.com.cn), January 15, 2002; "The Hanaoka Incident: Corporate Compensation for
Therefore, towards the end of the 1990s, it became a national consensus that Japan was
indebted to China and China should put more pressure on Japan for its contrition.
Japanese Rejection of Chinese Grievances and Sense of Frustration
In contrast to Chinese bitter feeling about the war history, the Japanese people
remembered the war as a miserable experience for the Japanese nation itself while Japan's
wrongdoings to other Asian people were largely filtered out of their historical memory. In
an opinion poll conducted by NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute shortly before
the 40 anniversary of the end of the war, Japanese respondents were asked to tell what they
usually talked about when the subject of the Sino-Japanese War or Pacific War were brought
up. The most selected answers, including "shortage of food and other goods" (51.6%),
"atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki" (47.1%), "the misery of war" (37.60/0), and
"experience of (allied) air raids" (2 4 .2 %), were experiences either exclusive to the Japanese or
related to the distress of war in general. Topics involving Japan's war crimes or other
nations' suffering, such as "the brutality of Japanese military" (24 .3%0/), "war responsibility of
the leadership" (14.2%), war responsibility of Japanese citizens" (5.6%) and "the sacrifices of
other nations" (9.50/0), received much less attention.62 5
With regard to Japan's war responsibility, while the majority of Japanese people
admitted that Japan launched a war of aggression, they also accepted various excuses that
would minimize the guilt of the nation or prove their personal innocence. A public survey in
1983 is particularly revealing. On the one hand, 51.4 percent of respondents said the fifty
years from 1894-1895 Sino-Japanese war to the Pacific War was a history of Japanese
aggression against Asian neighboring countries, and 82.5 percent also believed that Japanese
people should do self-reflection on Japan's wrongdoings to Koreans and Chinese since the
Meiji era. On the other hand, when asked if Japan, short in resource supply, had no better
choice than military advance to other countries to ensure its own survival, 44.8 percent of
respondents said "yes," compared to 38.7 percent who said "no." Abd 45.5 percent
Forced Labor," Sekai 684 (February 2001); Joseph Kahn, "Shouting the Pain From Japan's Germ Attacks,"
New York Times, November 23, 2002.
625 "Survey on the Society and People's Life in Postwar 40 Years" by the NHK Broadcasting Culture Research
Institute, July 1985, in Yoron ChdsaNenkan, 1986, p. 564.
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thought that the Pacific War accelerated the liberation of Asian countries from the yoke of
Europeans and Americans, with only 25.1 percent disagreeing. Moreover, 36.3 percent of
respondents believed that ordinary Japanese people were innocent because they were duped
by the militarists, and another 17.6 percent believed that Japan fought the war for self-
defense and peace in Asia so whether Japanese people were the victim or victimizer should
not become a question, compared to 29.5 percent who acknowledged that the majority of
Japanese people acted as the victimizer because they collaborated with the militarists during
the war.626
Focusing on Japan's own victimhood while accepting only limited responsibility for
oppressing other Asian countries, Japanese historical myths diminished the desire of
ordinary Japanese people to offer contrition in wider scope and greater depth. For example,
in a conversation published in the popular magazine Chuo Kdron in 1995, two scholars of
international affair tried to normalize Japan's war of aggression by arguing that it was not an
unusual war but one of many wars in world history and Japan should not be singled out for
blame; they also stressed that the issue of war reparation had been long concluded by
postwar peace treaties, so it was just a matter of course for Japan to refuse providing
compensation to individual war victims as no precedents ever existed.627
Such a view was widely shared among Japanese public. More people now came to
believe that for the kind of wrongdoings the country had done in the past, Japan should
offer some contrition but not too much. In a 1992 survey, whereas about 35 percent
respondents wished that the emperor had expressed unambiguous apology or said
something close to apology during his 1991 trip to Southeast Asia, 43.4 percent respondents
said it was just fine for the emperor to limit his war-related remarks to Japan's determination
626 "Survey on Japanese People's View of Peace" by NHK Broadcasting and Public Opinion Research Institute,
October 1982, in Yoron Chdsa Nenkan, 1983, pp. 575-576.
627 Takashi Ito and Seizabur5 Sato, "Ano Senso to wa nani datta no ka (What actually was that war)," Chilo
K6ron No.1 (1995). An attempt was also made in this conservation to water down Japan's responsibility, such
as to argue that nobody could be innocent under the war circumstance, Japan was actually less evil than
Germany because the Japanese militarists never contemplated systematic genocide, and the Soviet Union was
also worse than Japan because they attacked Japan in violation of their non-aggression pact, took the northern
islands, and enslaved large number of Japanese in Siberia.
to exist as a peace state without repeating the misery of war, and another 6.7 percent said
that neither apology nor any mention of the war was necessary.62 8
Even to some people with a stronger sense of obligation for Japan to redress its war
guilt, Japan had offered considerable constrition and further apologies or compensation to
individual war victims was neither necessary nor reasonable because more problems would
be created than solved. For example, while admitting that Japan was indeed obligated to
apologize to Asian victim countries for its past aggression and colonization, Kitaoka
Shinichi, a political scientist at the University of Tokyo nevertheless pointed out Japanese
leaders had made a number of substantial gestures of apologies, including remarks of regret
made by Kishi in his 1957 visit to Southeast Asia and Tanaka before the signing of 1972
Sino-Japanese joint communique. He found the option of individual compensation
undesirable because it would disturb the long established legal framework of postwar
settlement and also open up a Pandora's Box of endless claims from various parts of the
Asian-Pacific region. So the best way to redress the war, according to him, was to encourage
clearer explication of individual war responsibility through objective historic research.629
Therefore, many ordinary Japanese people felt sorry about what Japan had done to
China in the past war, but not to extent that would call for substantial measures of
restitution in addition to the superficial and limited efforts by Japanese government.
Meanwhile, the majority of Japanese public rejected the Chinese argument that these
measures should be the single most important precondition for constructing bilateral
cooperation and friendship in the present day. According to the joint public-opinion poll
conducted by Asahi Shimbun and the Chinese People's University in September 1997, the
majority of both Japanese (58%) and Chinese (86%) public considered Japan had not
provided China with adequate compensation for what it had done in the past war. However,
regarding what the Japanese government policy should be devoted to regarding the past
history, 74 percent of Chinese respondents picked "heartfelt apology," "monetary
compensation" or "enhancing history education," with only 20 percent chose "constructing
a new cooperative relationship unconstrained by the past." This makes a stark contrast to
628 National survey by Jiji Tsushisha, January 1992, in Yoron Chosa Nenkan, 1992, p. 569.
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the Japanese respondents, 61 percent of whom picked the last choices, while only 35 percent
chose one of the first three.630
With the significant gap between their perception of how the past plays in the
present, the Japanese public reacted to history-related bilateral disputes very differently form
the Chinese. Such Japanese actions as textbook distortion or prime minister's shrine
worship that the Chinese found absolutely outrageous were considered no big deal by a lot
of Japanese, who often felt the Chinese had thrown much more blame on Japan than it
deserved. For example, a public survey right after the 1982 textbook controversy asked
respondents if they agreed with the Chinese accusation that Mombusho's attempt to change
the term "invasion" to "advance" in textbook treatment of the war indicated a danger of
militarist revival, only 9.1 percent fully agreed that danger was big, with 36 percent believing
in some degree of danger and another 39.1 percent refuting any danger of this kind.63 1
Similar Japanese attitude of defiance could be seen in their acceptance of Nakasone's shrine
worship in 1985 in the midst of fierce Chinese criticism. Polling data show that half of the
respondents thought the worship was good, and only 23 percent found it questionable. 632
The result of the contrasting opinions about the history issue between the two
nations was an overall downward spiral of mutual popular emotions. While the Chinese
protested the lack of Japanese contrition with ever-growing bitterness, the Japanese were fed
up with the seemingly endless Chinese criticism. Allen Whiting argues that the decline in
favorable Japanese attitude to China between June 1985 and October 1986 after a steady
improvement of such attitude in the previous five years was evident of Japanese resentment
to the anti-Japanese student demonstrations and Beijing's Japan bashing campaign. 633
Such an "action-reaction syndrome" again set in following Jiang Zemin's landmark
six-day trip to Tokyo in November 1998. The first visit to Japan by a PRC president and
629 Shinichi Kitaoka, "Rekishi no Kensh6 to Kojin no Sekinin (Historical Investigation and Individual
Responsibility)," Chfio K6ron No. 8 (1995).
630 Asahi Shimbun, September 22, 1997.
631 Yomiuri National Survey, September 1982, in Yoron Chdsa Nenkan, 1983, p. 542.
632 "Survey on News Reports, Politics of the Nakasone Cabinet, 'Hi no Maru, Kimigayo"' by Asahi Shimbun,
October 1985, in Yoron Chsa Nenkan, 1986, p. 492.
633 Whiting, China Eyes Japan, p. 196.
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meant to celebrate the 20 anniversary of the signing of the PFT, it was nevertheless marred
by bitter contention over the history issue. During the visit, Jiang harshly criticized Japan's
wartime history and demanded Japanese remembrance and contrition in a number of
occasions, from the summit meeting with Prime Minister Obuchi, meetings with Japanese
politicians and friendship organizations, speeches at Japanese universities, and even to the
formal banquet given by Emperor Akihito.
Some speculated that Jiang spoke so ardently about the war because of personal
experience, especially that his foster father died in the resistance campaign. A more
persuasive explanation was that Jiang was venting his anger at Japan's position in the
diplomatic negotiation prior to the trip. While it had just signed a joint declaration with
South Korean president Kim Dae-jung in October that included a formal apology, Japan was
only willing to give China verbal but not written apology, citing the phrase of "deep
remorse" used in the 1972 Joint Communique and Emperor Akihito's remarks in his 1992
visit to China as evidence that apology to China had been done.634 A Japanese diplomat
revealed that the Japan-ROK Joint Declaration was largely the result of Kim's initiative that
South Korea would promise to put an end to issues of the past if Japan was willing to extend
a written apology; but the Chinese government refused to offer a similar statement as Kim
did, which sparked the fear that Japan would remain in the shadow of history even if it made
a written apology this time.635 This testimony drives home the contrasting historical
perspectives of the two countries: the Chinese side was angry about Japan's lack of
contrition, something that was long past due, the Japanese side was dismayed by the
prospect of perennial Chinese manipulation of history to exert pressure on Japan.
Jiang's tough attitude enraged many Japanese in and outside the government, who
found him lacking basic diplomatic etiquette for openly expressing disproval of Japan even
when he was there as a state guest. A professor of international affairs at Ky6rin University
in Tokyo, Takubo Tadae, lashed out that "Jiang Zemin failed to discern even the minimal
634 For the text of the Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Declaration in English, see
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/korea/joint9810.html
635 Interview in March 2001 with a Japanese diplomat who worked at the Seoul Embassy and took part in the
negotiation of Japanese-South Korean Joint Declaration before Kim's visit to Tokyo. Also see Soichir6
Tahara, "President Jiang Zemin's Visit to Japan Heightens Anti-China Emotions; Did Prime Minister Obuchi
Speak out Clearly?" Shfikan Asahi (December 18, 1998).
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level of diplomatic decorum and persistently maintained an attitude which could only be
categorized as that of a 'slob'."636 Jiang's visit touched off so much resentment in Japan that
Naoto Kan, head of the Democratic Party of Japan, was reported to call it "a failure."63
Japanese public perception of bilateral relations also cooled down considerably following
Jiang's visit. While 45.6 percent of respondents in a poll done by the Japanese government
in October 1997 thought that the relationship had been going well, compared to 44.3
percent who thought the reverse, a survey by the same organization in November 1998
shows that the figures changed to 41.5 percent and 47.9 percent respectively.638 Another
opinion survey held in Japan in August 1999 shows considerable public dissatisfaction with
Chinese government's way of handling the history problem. In this Yomiuiru Shimbun-
sponsored poll, out of a number of policy recommendations for the Chinese government to
take in order to improve bilateral relations, the most selected choice is to "put an end to the
'history problem' with Japan" (34.8%), second to which was the choice, "eliminate illegal
immigration to Japan" (24.80/%)0)639
Societal Contacts Fail to Bring About Deep Mutual Understanding
It is true that mutual contacts boomed in these two decades, with Japanese visitors to
China expanding about 20 times and Chinese visitors to Japan increasing 17 times (see Chart
6). The number of Japanese visitors to mainland China grew especially fast, surpassing the
number of those going to Hong Kong in 1997 to make mainland China the second largest
destination of Japanese visitors in Asia, only topped by South Korea.
636 Tadae Takubo, "Come to Think of It, Jiang Zemin Is Indeed Rude!" Shokun (February 1999).
637 Tahara, "President Jiang Zemin's Visit to Japan Heightens Anti-China Emotions; Did Prime Minister
Obuchi Speak out Clearly?"
638 Yoron Chsa Nenkan, 1998 & 1999.
639 Yomiuri national survey, August 1999, in Yoron Ch6sa Nenkan,, 2000, p. 492.
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Chart 6: China-Japan Mutual Contacts, 1972-1999
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However rapidly increasing, Sino-Japanese societal contacts in this period are not yet
comprehensive. First of all, the two societies interacted in an asymmetric pattern, with far
more Japanese people than Chinese people able to visit the other country. Besides high
travel cost that was beyond the means of many ordinary Chinese, visa restrictions placed by
the Japanese Government was another major impediment to a substantial increase of
Chinese tourists. The cause was the Japanese fear that some Chinese would illegally stay in
Japan once they come. Moreover, the Ministry of Justice even long prohibited Chinese
tourists from entering Japan on a tour package organized by travel agencies."4 The problem
of excessive Japanese restrictions existed in other aspects of bilateral exchanges. The
number of Chinese Kenshuisei, or students of technical training, rose rapidly since 1984 when
Japan adopted a welcome policy. Still there are many complaints about the complicated
application procedures required by the Japanese side. Tokyo was reluctant to relax
regulations for fear of encouraging illegal stay, despite the fact that those who stayed in
64o The ban was finally lifted in September 2000, but with the extra regulations that Japanese travel agencies
involved would receive bad evaluation if they fail to follow the rule of calling names whenever a tour group
stops or even "lose" their group members. In fact, all members of the first Chinese tourist group went through
strict background check in China and came to Japan with the Chinese government guaranteeing that no one
would "disappear" during the trip. Asahi Shimbun, August 24, 2000.
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Japan illegally did not surpass one percent of total Chinese Kenshisei coming to Japan during
1989-1996.64 1
Financial constraints also hampered comprehensive development of societal
contacts. Because of the great wealth gap between the two countries, many exchange
programs solely depended on the financial resources of Japanese sponsors. When Japanese
economy sagged, budget for these programs also contracted. Besides, non-governmental
organizations sponsoring training programs to promote Sino-Japanese friendship had no
stable income but only relied on donations to finance their activities. So those Chinese who
were interested in going to Japan had to compete for limited resources and opportunities.
Before Chinese per capita income becomes comparable to that of the Japanese, it is hard for
the two nations to conduct exchanges on an equal, free basis. So far the majority of Chinese
people still depend on official media for a limited access to information about Japan.
Other limitations on bilateral contacts lied in the policy of the Chinese government.
China did not begin to send students to Japan until 1978, and for many years since then only
sent middle-aged personnel on official fund while prohibiting anyone from attending foreign
schools on private fund. This restriction was eased in 1985, and finally from the early 1990s
ordinary Chinese citizens were allowed to travel abroad for either official or private
purposes. But that does not mean that Chinese people now could interact freely with
foreigners. An outstanding problem with China's external exchange programs was the
absence of truly non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In many exchange programs
conveying Chinese government messages by the Chinese participants substituted free
communication of opinions and information that would have better facilitated mutual
understanding and sense of closeness.
Perhaps the most critical shortfall of the bilateral exchange programs in this period
was their failure to promote joint history research regarding the war history. The 1982
textbook controversy triggered a number of joint history research and education exchange
activities among historians of East Asian countries, mostly conducted by non-official or
641 Satoshi Amako and Shigeto Sonoda eds., Nitchft K6~yu no Shihanseki (A Quarter Century of Sino-Japanese
Exchanges) (Tokyo: Toyo Keizei Shinposha, 1998), pp. 97-98.
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semi-official organizations. One example is the Symposium of East Asia History Education
sponsored by the Association of Comparative History and Comparative History Education
(ACHCHE), a non-governmental organization of Japanese liberal academics. Held once
every five years since 1984, the symposium convened four times by the end of 1990s where
historians and history educators from Japan, China, South Korea and, since the third
conference in 1994, North Korea, Vietnam and Taiwan, were invited to address the question
of bridging the narrative gap between one's national history and a shared Asian history.
However, discussions at these conferences were not really framed to enable joint
investigation of specific historical incidents or to reach concrete recommendations on
textbook improvement, but tended to cover more broad topics ranging from introducing
history education system of each country to examining the history of modern imperialism
and comparing Asian historiography with Western perspective on modern history. 642
The program that directly involved bilateral textbook discussion was the exchanges
held between China Education Union (CEU) and the left-wing JTU. Exchanges between
these two organizations begun since the mid-1950s and returned to an active state since 1978
after more than a decade of suspension during the Cultural Revolution. Since the eruption
of the textbook controversy, the focus of the program shifted from class visits and teachers'
meeting to examination of each other's history textbooks. 643 In addition, since 1988 Chinese
historians at the Institute of Curriculum and Teaching Materials Research of the PEP and
Japan's International Society for Educational Information (ISEI) made joint textbook
surveys and textbook translation efforts, and both Japanese historians of the History
Educationalist Conference of Japan and ACHCHE sent delegates since 1985 to the annual
meeting of the Association of Chinese History Education."44
642 For brief reviews of the four conferences by ACHCHE, see Rekishigaku Kenkyai (Journal of Historical
Studies), No. 2 of 1990, No.3 of 1995, and No. 8 of 2000. Presentations and discussions in the first three
conferences have been published by 2000. See ACHCHE ed. Jikokushi to Sekaishi (NationalHistogy and World
History) (Tokyo: Horupu Shuppan, 1985); Ajia no ¶Kinda' to Rekishi Ky6iku (Asia's Modern Time' and History
Education) (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1991); Kurosen to Nissei Sens6 (Black Ship and the First Sino-Japanese War) (Tokyo,
Miraisha, 1996).
643 For a recent report of the exchange program between CEU and JTU, see Rokur6 Hitaka, Nihon to Chrigoku:
Wakamono-tachi no Rekishi Ninshiki (apan and China: The Historical Views of the Youth) (Tokyo: Nasunokisha, 1995).
644 Hongzhi Wang, "Zhongri Lishi Jiaokeshu de Jiaoliu (Sino-Japanese History Textbook Exchange)," Lishi
Jiaoxue No.1 (1999).
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In most of these activities, however, genuine mutual critiques of textbook content
were still lacking. Because they were set up mainly in response to the rise of Japanese neo-
nationalist view, these exchange programs often provided Chinese historians and progressive
Japanese historians with a venue to attack Japan's textbook distortion and evasion of war
responsibility. In contrast, criticism or self-criticism of historical myths in Chinese textbooks
was much more lenient, focusing more on the narratives of ancient history rather than
modern history. Moreover, fear of breaking political taboos at home prevented historians
from engaging in unreserved, honest discussions about the war history. Some Japanese
historians who took part in history dialogue with China lamented that their Chinese
counterparts were not speaking their mind when they insisted on China's official view that
only the Japanese military was responsible for the war while ordinary Japanese people were
innocent victims themselves.645 A textbook exchange program organized by the JTU in the
early 1990s with Chinese historians even had to be suspended because the Chinese side
found it hard to accept the Japanese progressive historiography that acknowledged war
responsibility of not only the military clique but also individual Japanese citizens.646
In fact, the desire to protect the authority of such national myths as the military
clique and national victimhood to a large extent accounted for the lack of government
enthusiasm on both sides to support genuine historicans' dialogues. The Japanese sponsors
of most of the exchange programs were independent NGOs, with the exception of only a
few that received some financial subsidy from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, such as the
ISEI. It was only until the Socialist Prime Minister Murayama took power in 1994 that
Japan began official sponsorship of research cooperation with Asian historians regarding the
history of Japanese aggression and colonialism. Under the umbrella program called "Peace
and Friendship Exchange Plan," several research institutions were established, such as the
645 Japanese historian Sakai Toshiki made such comments in his presentation on history textbook exchange
activities between Chinese, Japanese and Korean scholars at an international academic conference held in April
1995. For Chinese translation of his speech, see Sakai Toshiki, "Zhongguo Ying Zhuyi Riben Minzhong de
Zhanzheng Zhiren (China Should Pay Attention to the War Responsibility of Japanese People)," Tansuo Yu
Zhengming (Exploration and Contentions) No.7 (1995).
646 Iinterview with Japanese historian Kimijima Kazuhiko, October 25, 2000.
Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, Center for Chinese History Research, and Center
for Japan-South Korean Historical Records.647
But the Japanese proposals appeared unattractive to the Chinese side, which believed
that the first and foremost solution to the bilateral history disputes was for the Japanese side
to recognize the responsibility for invading China and make more soul-searching efforts
while re-examining the war history or forming shared historiography based on joint research
was not really necessary. The Chinese side even explicitly stated that it was not yet the right
time for joint history research and China would only offer assistance if the topic was about
Japanese self-reflection. Following this policy, Chinese official research institutions gave the
Japanese a cold shoulder. It is reported that a secret directive was issued in the fall of 1995
by the CCP Propaganda Department, State Education Commission (SEC) and Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) to ban cooperation by Chinese research institutes or
scholars with research projects sponsored by Japan's Center for Chinese History Research.
Officially, the Chinese government also informed Japan that "free exchanges with Chinese
research institutes or scholars are not acceptable," while at the same time it requested the
Japanese side to provide financial assistance to scholars of both countries who would
conduct their research separately and exchange opinions only via the CASS. Up to 1998, the
Chinese government still demanded the Japanese side not to recognize the establishment of
independent research institutions with Japanese fund or the participation of Chinese scholars
in any research projects initiated in Japan.648
Interaction between the Mechanisms of Intention and Emotions:
Historical Entitlement and Bilateral Disputes
In Sino-Japanese relations, human emotions did not simply serve as a vent for
people's feelings but also had significant political consequences. The Chinese bitter
emotions about their war suffering directly gave rise to a strong sense of entitlement to a
glorious cause of national revival and to compromise by foreign countries on issues deemed
647 For Prime Minister Murayma's remarks in 1994 and the mandate of the "Peace and Friendship Exchange
Plan" formulated in the aftermath of Murayama's remarks, see the information provided by the Japanese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs at http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/taisen/
648 Amako and Sonoda eds, Nitchu Kdtyu no Shihanseki, pp. 122-126.
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important to this cause, including sovereignty rights and national economic development.
Japan's failure to comply with Chinese expectation would be immediately linked to its lack of
repentance for past crimes, reinforcing the negative perception of Japanese intention. From
the Japanese perspective, however, yielding to Chinese demands in all bilateral disputes was
unacceptable. Most Japanese disagreed with the Chinese view that Japanese concessions in
present bilateral relations were obligated as some kind of payback to China for the historical
debts. They often view Chinese expectation of Japanese concessions on sovereignty rights
and economic interests as manifestation of China's international assertiveness and malicious
intent to interfere with Japan's internal affairs or even dwarf its international stature.
Not only nurturing negative mutual perception of intention, the Chinese sense of
historical entitlement and Japanese repudiation of it also underlined the uncompromising
policies of both sides at times of bilateral disputes. The governments were reluctant to take
a conciliatory stance to each other side's actions perceived to have stemmed from evil
intentions, and they also faced strong public pressure against any policy of "selling out"
national interest. Consequently, bilateral frictions tended to be not only frequent but also
acrimonious and damaging, and were easily accorded with great political importance to
inflict heavy blow on overall bilateral relations.
Sovereignty Disputes
China: Say No to Japanese Harmful Intention
Mobilized by the aggressive campaign of patriotic history education mixing myths of
victimhood and national accomplishments, the Chinese nation since the 1980s was keen on
recovering "lost territories" due to unequal treaties with imperialist powers, such as Hong
Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, as symbols of national resurrection. Ceded to Japan by the 1895
Sino-Japanese Treaty of Shimonoseki and never reincorporated to China even after Japan's
defeat in 1945, Taiwan in particular was a present, bitter reminder of China's "century of
humiliation." So unification with Taiwan was now a question of national pride and self-
esteem to China. Since the early 1980s, the government stepped up domestic propaganda on
the significance of this objective. It even included "the return of Taiwan to the motherland"
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as one of the three major tasks for the nation to perform in the 1980s and continuted to
treat it as a national priority in the 1990s. 649
Little surprising that since the 1980s China closely monitored Taiwan's non-official
contacts with foreign countries and frequently took issue with those countries that attempted
to upgrade such contacts to the political level. In March 1982 the Chinese Foreign Ministry
sent a memo to all foreign embassies in Beijing stating China's resolute opposition to any
foreign countries that acknowledged the establishment in their country of Taiwan
institutions with official character - such as trade representatives, intelligence offices or
science and technology liaison offices - or the conduct of official contacts with Taiwan.
And a further statement to foreign embassies was issued in June 1983, which requested their
rejection of visa application by the above-mentioned liaison offices of Taiwan.6 50 Here
history makes a perfect irony: like the Nationalist government did in the 1950s and 1960s, it
was now the Communist government that went out of its way to oppose international
recognition of the other regime.
Policy flexibility was particularly limited when problems regarding Taiwan arose
between China and Japan. It is because China held Japan fully responsible for Taiwan's
original severance from the motherland and partially so for the continuation of the territorial
division in the early Cold War years. As President Jiang Zemin told Ku Chen-fu, Chairman
of the Strait Exchange Foundation of Taiwan, in their talks in October 1998 that "the idea
of using Taiwan as an unsinkable aircraft was first contrived by Japan (through its fifty years
of occupation) and taken over by the United States. It can be said that it was initially Japan
who put Taiwan in its current position, and it was the United States which has maintained
it." What Jiang tried to convey here was his belief that Japan had a lot to do with the present
chasm between China and Taiwan.6 "' So China felt it was Japan's duty to assist Chinese
649 Deng Xiaoping laid out the three major tasks in a speech at a meeting of cadres called by the Central
Committee of the CCP on January 16, 1980. The other two major tasks were opposition to hegemonism and
economic modernization. See "The Present Situation and the Tasks Before Us." In Xiaoping Deng, Selected
Works of Deng Xiaoping, 1975-1982, pp. 224-225.
650 Akira Ishii, "'Mitsu no Chfigoku' to 'Hitotsu no Soren' ('Three Chinas' and 'One Soviet Union')." Chfio
K6ron No. 11 (1982), p. 144; Lin, Ume to Sakura, pp. 637-638.
651 "Daily Reports Jiang Zemin Has 'Anti-Japanese Sentiment'," Sankei Shimbun, December 9, 1998, FBIS.
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cause of national reunification. Japan's actions contradictory to this expectation were viewed
with considerable suspicion.
Recall that the Chinese government largely tolerated semi-official Japan-Taiwan links
in the 1970s, but since the 1980s it made a dramatic policy turn and began oppose the
escalation of Japan's political contacts with Taiwan in the name of commercial and cultural
exchanges. An early trigger of Chinese open criticism of such contacts was a Japanese
delegation to Taiwan in July 1982 led by conservative politician Esaki Masumi, who went in
the capacity of the special envoy of LDP president. This visit coincided with the climax of
the Sino-Japanese textbook controversy. In light of the Japan's problematic historical views,
its actions with regard to Taiwan, the former colony of Japan, looked ever more suspicious.
A People's Daily editorial on July 23 leveled trenchant criticism on the use of the term "two
states" in the talk between the Ezaki mission and Taiwanese officials. 65 2
In the following two decades, Tokyo's political contacts with Taipei and ambiguous
attitude to China's sovereignty claim over Taiwan constantly incurred Chinese criticism. It
was not uncommon for Chinese strategic analysts to cite Japan's policy to Taiwan as one
clear indicator of its "great-nation chauvinism" or even the revival of militarism. Nakasone's
nationalist campaign of "postwar political settlement" and the rise of the rightist historical
view in the Japanese society simply vindicated to them Japanese imperialist ambitions to
Taiwan. He Fang argued that people who refused to admit Japan's aggression of China were
exactly those who designed the active diplomacy to Taiwan and tried to create de facto
separation of Taiwan from mainland China.653 Another analyst, having attacked Japanese
prettification of its history of aggression history, official worship at the Yasukuni Shrine,
defense spending increase and memorial activities in honor of Chiang Kai-shek, commented
that "under such circumstances, victim countries and people of the Japanese militarist
aggression could not help feeling strongly resentful as well as becoming vigilant against
Japanese ambition in playing a greater role in world affairs."65 4
652 "What is Esaki trying to do in Taiwan?" in People's Daily, July 23, 1982. Cited in Ishii, "'Mitsu no Chfigoku'
to 'Hitotsu no Soren'," p. 145.
653 Fang He, "Zhongri Guanxi yu Yazhou Heping," p. 5.654 Louren Xi, "Dui Riben Cong 'Jingji Daguo' Zouxiang 'Zhengzhi Daguo' Wenti de Tantao (Exploring the
Question of Japan's Moving from An Economic Great Power to Political Great Power)," Guoji Wenti Yanjiu
(International Studies) No. 4 (1987), p. 37.
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Beijing's exceptionally harsh reaction to the seemingly trivial K6karyo incident was
indicative of the close linkage between the history problem and Chinese suspicion about
Japan's malign intention regarding Taiwan. After the verdict favoring the Taiwan side was
delivered on February 26, 1987, Chinese press continuously attacked the Japanese
government for months and several Chinese leaders spoke out that Japanese action was
tantamount to shirking its historical responsibility to China. State President Li Xiannian told
JSP leaders in March that "Japan should not touch wounds of others and the one for China
was the Taiwan problem," implying that the scar left by Japan's aggression had not healed.
However, it was Deng Xiaoping who explicitly invoked the subject of Japanese
militarist revival in connection with the Kokaryo case at a meeting with the pro-China
Japanese parliamentarian Utsunomiya Tokuma on May 5. Attack on Japan was further
escalated when People's Daily again tried to make a historical argument in an editorial on June
4. It claimed that Kokaryo was China's national property purchased with the fund obtained
by selling off those capital and materials that Japanese military plundered from China.
Therefore, the article vowed Chinese vigilance, "due to historical reasons," (emphasis is author's)
on any Japanese actions in violation of the past international arrangements on Taiwan's
status since the 1943 Cairo Declaration. On the same day, Deng Xiaoping made the afore-
mentioned controversial statement that urged Japan to change its attitude on the Taiwan
issue, economic aid to China and K6karyo case, citing Japan's historical debts to China.655 It
is this statement that spurred a diplomatic row between the two sides.
One may try to argue alternatively that the Chinese government was not genuinely
concerned that Japanese historical myths would fuel its ambition to Taiwan but just used
history as a tactical tool to bargain for Japan's reducing its support to Taipei. For this
argument to prove persuasive, one should find that the history issue was more often brought
up at times of serious disputes regarding Taiwan, when Beijing needed more political
leverage vis-a-vis Japan, than times absent of such incidents. Also the historical thesis
should be conveyed in such a way that it can easily reach the Japanese audience. But the
evidence one found is only partially consistent with these predictions. One cannot rule out
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the possibility that the Chinese government used the history issue to dramatize disputes on
Taiwan so that it could maximize pressure on Japan for its concessions. Chinese official
media and government leaders tended to bring up Japan's aggression history when disputes
over the Taiwan issue occurred, such the Kokaryo case, the 1994 Asian Games incident, and
Lee Teng-hui's visit to Japan in 2001, in all cases of which the message was clearly
transmitted to the Japanese government.
On the other hand, however, Chinese experts of international affairs commonly
made the linkage between Japanese historical attitude with its Taiwan policy, in both eventful
and relatively tranquil years.65 6 Besides, their works were published in domestic academic or
policy-oriented journals meant to influence Chinese intellectuals and policymakers rather
than the Japanese government. Because the historical argument first appeared in the works
of Chinese strategic elites in 1987, it is possible that the government instrumental use of
history in the Kokaryo incident had an impact on their perception of Japan's relationship
with Taiwan. Still, they persistently advanced the argument in journals with no clear
propaganda function and their writings also generated important feedback for the
government policymaking. These facts suggest that the historical factor could have
independent political effect, even if it was originally introduced with instrumental purpose.
Besides elite perception of negative Japanese intention, public pressure also
contributed to China's firm position on questions of sovereignty rights. It is because the
sense of historical mission for national reunification instilled in the population by patriotic
propaganda was so strong that it constituted an important pillar of national cohesion. The
government could secure more public support by taking a steadfast policy but would face
legitimacy crisis once it showed any signs of compromise.6 ' Especially if the transgressor
655 For Li's remarks, see Tanaka, Nitchti Kankei 1945-1990, p. 157; for Deng's remarks to Utsunomiya on May 5,
see Tian, Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji, Vol. 2, p. 642, for the People's Daily editorial, see Tian, Zhanhou
Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji, Vol. 2, pp. 635-637.
656 For some examples of many articles making the historical argument about the Taiwan issue, see Shuiwang
Li, et al., "Xian Jieduan Tairi Guanxi Pouxi (Analyzing the Present Taiwan-Japan Relations)," Riben Xuekan
(Japan Studies) No. 5 (1992); Jiangyong Liu, "'Maguan Tiaoyue' Bainian Hou de Ritai Guanxi (The Japan-
Taiwan relations A Hundred Years after the 'Shimonoski Treaty')," Riben Xuekan (Japan Studies) No. 6 (1995);
Yunzhong Yang, "Ritai Guanxi Jinru Zhongshi Zhenzhi Jiaowang de Xinjieduan (Japan-Taiwan Relations
Entering A New Stage of Emphasizing Political Contacts)," Riben Xuankan (Japan Studies) No. 3 (1996).
657 On the key importance of the Taiwan issue to the CCP's regime legitimacy, see Christensen, "Chinese
Realpolitik," pp. 45-46.
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was Japan, given the depth of emotions of grievances in Chinese public towards Japan,
conciliatory policy appearing spineless to Japan was out of the question. Such public
opposition against compromise could be sensed in Deng Xiaoping's remarks to a visiting
Japan K6meito Party politician on June 4, 1987, which explained that "(the Kokary6) case
had caused strong repercussion among the Chinese public, especially the young people, (in
light of which) the Chinese side must deal discreetly with it lest the people should object (to
the result)."658 Considering the widespread anti-Japanese student demonstrations that had
taken place since 1985, Deng's words were not a mere bluff.
Ironically, while interested in manipulating nationalist sentiments at home to either
shore up regime legitimacy or score in diplomatic negotiation with Japan, the Chinese
government was also afraid of excessive public animosity against Japan turning into criticism
against the government itself, which was the case in the May 4 movement of 1919 and Xi'an
Incident in 1936.659 So at times of disputes between China and Japan, the government had
to stick to a non-conciliatory policy to Japan in order to mollify public anger while at the
same time going out of its way to prevent massive public protests by forceful measures.
If public emotions functioned in the background of Chinese policymaking regarding
Taiwan, they took the front stage in territorial disputes with Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku
Islands, which considerably limited government policy choices. In the first Diaoyu dispute
of 1990, it was reported on September 29 that Japan's Maritime Safety Agency was ready to
grant official recognition of the lighthouse built by the right-wing Japan Youth Federation
(YF). Beijing did not respond until October 18, when a Foreign Ministry spokesman
condemned the recognition of the lighthouse as a violation of China's sovereignty and
demanded Japanese government intervention to restrain the JYF. While both reiterated their
sovereignty claims over the islands in the following diplomatic exchanges, they also showed
willingness to restore the status quo. Japan's chief cabinet secretary cited Deng Xiaoping's
1978 statement that the sovereignty question over the islands should be settled by a later
658 Tanaka, Nitchu Kankei 1945-1990, p. 159.
659 In the Xi'an Incident of December 1936, student demonstration in Xi'an attacking Chiang Kai-shek's non-
resistant policy to Japan prompted Generals Zhang Xueliang and Yang Huchengof the KMT to detain Chiang
and forced him to ally with the communists to fight the Japanese. The Chinese government fear of anti-
Japanese nationalism turning to anti-government movement is pointed out by Christensen in "China, the U.S.-
Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," pp. 54-55.
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generation and the Chinese vice Foreign Minister appealed for joint development of the
area's resources. So both sides applied restrained diplomacy and in about two weeks they
reached agreement to drop the dispute.
But such a quick settlement provoked immediate criticism in Hong Kong press that
Chinese response to sovereignty violation was "weak and inadequate" and amounted to
concessions to or even "appeasement" of Japan. In the mainland, the government tightened
security measures on university campuses and banned anti-Japanese demonstrations, but
students still expressed their anger toward the Japanese through Western media. Not only
so, the public turned their back on the Chinese government as well, blaming it for being too
soft on Japan and wrongly suppressing public patriotic sentiments: "'Is there any patriotism
to speak of when they don't even want the territory?' 'Diplomacy is diplomacy and public
opinion is public opinion. Why can't the public express its opinion?' 'This only proves that
this country is not the people's country."' It was also suspected that the government
intended to sacrifice Chinese territory for economic benefit. Pamphlets were distributed in
Beijing with such titles as "We Want the Diaoyu Islands, Not Yen," and anti-CCP posters
were put out by students unhappy with government handling of the island dispute.660
Therefore, Chinese government paid a high domestic political price for its
accommodative policy in the 1990 dispute. The pressing requirement for the government to
toughen its position on territorial issues to soothe anti-government sentiments at home was
very likely behind the major shift in China's territorial sea policy in the early 1990s. China
declared its territorial sea of 12 nm from the straight baseline in 1958. But it was until
February 1992 that China enacted the Territorial Sea Law. This law stipulates Chinese
sovereignty rights over the disputed Diaoyu Islands. 661 This was a noticeable departure from
Deng Xiaoping's policy in the 1970s to shelf the sovereignty issue of the islands and a
660 Erica Strecker Downs and Philip C. Saunders, "Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the
Diaoyu Islands," International Security 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/1999), pp. 129-131.
661 For China's Declaration on Territorial Sea, 4 September, 1958 and The Law on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone of the People's Republic of China promulgated on 25 February, 1992, see Office of Policy,
Law and Regulation, State Oceanic Administration ed., Collection of the Sea Laws and Regulations of the People's
Republic of China (Beijing: Ocean Press, 1998). For a historical review of Chinese legislation on territorial sea,
see Keyuan Zou, "Joint Fishery Management in the East China Sea: Recent Sino-Japanese Endeavors towards
Sustainability," presented at the Conference on Contemporary China-Japan Relations: Conflict and
Cooperation, East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, August 2002.
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particularly assertive move at a time when Beijing was trying to create a harmonious
atmosphere in honor of the 20th anniversary of diplomatic normalization with Japan.
To make things more complicated, China ratified the U.N. Law of the Sea
Convention (UNLOSC) in May 1996, enabling it to claim a 200nm exclusive economic zone
(EEZ). To avoid a direct provocation, the EEZ excluded Taiwan and Senkaku/Diaoyu
islands. But on July 20 the Japanese government ratified the UNLOSC as well, declaring a
200 nm EEZ that included Diaoyu islands. These legal moves set the stage for a new round
of bilateral territorial dispute, in which the power of public emotions brought more
turbulence and damage to bilateral relations than last time. First, five days after Japan
ratified the UNLOSC, the JYF again applied to the Maritime Safety Agency for official
recognition of a new lighthouse they erected on the island about two weeks ago. While the
official decision was still pending, Prime Minister Hashimoto visited the Yasukuni on July
29, which sparked widespread outrage in China. In addition, the "patriotic education"
campaign that Chinese government launched to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the
victory of war of resistance against Japan had just freshened up people's memories about
Japanese war crimes. So by the time another Japanese nationalist group, the Senkaku Islands
Defense Association, visited the islands on August 18 to plant the Japanese flag, the anti-
Japanese public sentiments in China had reached the boiling point.
Shortly after Japanese Foreign Minister Ikeda denied the existence of a territorial
issue between China and Japan during a visit to Hong Kong on August 28, nationalist
groups in the mainland published an open letter to Jiang Zemin and the leaders of the
Central Military Commission demanding them to send warships to dismantle the lighthouse
on the islands.662 Beijing realized if it failed to act sternly this time, the political cost would
be much more severe than the 1990 dispute. Chinese official media began to denounce
Japanese war amnesia and rise of militarist sentiments in connection to the recent Shrine
visit and island disputes, and stressed that no give-up on sovereignty rights would be
possible over the islands.6 63 At a press conference in early September, Foreign Ministry
662 "Civilian Group Wants Troops Sent to Diaoyu Islands," Hong Kong AFP, September 1, 1996, in FBIS-CHI
reports.
663 For some examples of Chinese media blasting of Japan, see "Column on Japanese militarism, 'Silence of a
Larger Power," China Daily, August 28, 1996; "PRC: Spokesman: Japan Lacks 'Right Understanding' of
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spokesperson Shen Guofang declared that Japanese loans would not affect China's
sovereignty claim over Diaoyu: "Japanese loans to China will benefit bilateral trade and
economic cooperation. Nonetheless, the Chinese government offers no room for
compromise and will take whatever action necessary to safeguard China's territorial integrity
and sovereignty." 664
Chinese military also took a clearly tough stance. Its leaders repeatedly vowed to
make no concessions and even stated that "there will be no new Li Hongzhang (who signed
the Shimonoseki Treaty) and the Li Hongzhang era has ended." 665 Although the PLA
warships were not sent to the islands, the Chinese military took an unusually confrontational
step, which was to dispatch troops from the Shenyang Military Zone to maneuvers from
September 13-14, where they practiced seizing and defending hypothetical offshore islands
in Liaoning Province.666
Nevertheless, both governments intended to end the dispute soon lest it do more
damage to bilateral relations. In their meeting on September 24, Qian Qichen and Ikeda
stated each side's sovereignty claim but agreed to place bilateral good relation above their
dispute. But the surging public emotions prevented a quick diplomatic settlement. Mass
signature campaign raged in Hong Kong trying to prevent soft Chinese policy on the matter,
and mainland Chinese students also threatened to take to the street to stage anti-Japanese
demonstration. Things went wild especially after a Hong Kong nationalist, David Chan,
drowned when trying to swim to the islands on September 26. Subsequently, Chinese
citizens in mainland also sent numerous petition letters to People's Daily and the PLA Daily,
demanding resolute action by the central government to defend the islands.667 Public
criticism of soft government policy again appeared, this time joined by more high-ranking
officials and famed intellectuals. Still banning public demonstration as it did in 1990, Beijing
this time negotiated fircely with Tokyo on the crackdown of Japanese rightist organizations.
History," Hong Kong AFP, August 29, 1996; "PRC: Renmin Ribao Warns Japan about Diaoyu," August 30,
1996; "PRC: Commentary on Threat of Japanese Militarism," China Daily, September 6, 1996, in FBIS-CHI
reports.
664 "Chinese Foreign Ministry News Briefings," Beijing Review, September 23-29, 1996.
665 "Military Source Reports 'Tough' Attitude on Diaoyutais," Hong Kong Ming Pao, October 21, 1996, in
FBIS report.
666 Downs and Saunders, "Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism," p. 134.
And it was reported that the Nanjing Military Region and the East Sea Fleet sent more than
10 advanced warplanes and naval vessels in late September to cruise past and fly over the
Diaoyu Islands to demonstrate China's military strength and its resolve to defend Chinese
territory."" The crisis did not subside until the Japanese police raided the headquarters of
the JYF and arrested its advisor on weapon charges one week after Chan's death and Tokyo
announced that it had no intention to recognize the JYF lighthouse.
Japan: Resentment of China's Arrogance and Public Resistance to Government Concession
Because the mainstream historiography in Japan minimized its war responsibility vis-
a-vis Asian victim countries, it seemed a far-fetched notion to the Japanese public that China
was entitled to Japanese concessions on sovereignty issues just because Japan was the main
oppressor of China in the past. Instead, China's obsession with national unification and
territorial integrity was viewed as signs of Chinese ethno-centrism and international
assertiveness.
Therefore, the promulgation of Chinese Territorial Sea Law in 1992 seemed an
abrupt, presumptuous move to Japan. Japanese strategic elites were particularly alarmed by
the law's authorizing the military to repel foreign ships invading Chinese territorial sea with
force. They also watched with wary a series of Chinese policies other than the law, including
the government report to the 7' NPC Plenary in 1992 that planed to strengthen Chinese
maritime defense, the vow by Chinese naval commander in chief to engage the intense
struggle for maritime interests "for the sake of Chinese national resurrection," and the
escalation of China's conflict with some Southeast Asian countries in the disputed South
China Sea.669 A Japanese defense expert suggested that "Chinese naval build-up entwined
with territorial problems" had threatened regional security and created tension with its
neighboring countries including Japan.67 0 Another widely shared opinion among Japanese
667 Downs and Saunders, "Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism," p. 137.
668 "PLA Said to Make Show of Force off Diaoyutais," Hong Kong Sing Tao Jih Pao, October 10, 1996, FBIS.
669 Shigekatsu Kondo, "Reisengo no Ajia-Taiheiyo Chiiki no Anzen Hosho wo Ika ni Kakubo Suru ka (How
We Assure the Security of Asia Pacific Region in the Post-Cold War Era)," Shin B6ei Ronshfi 20, No.1 (1992),
p. 69.
670Kunio Kotaki, "Nichibei Taito no Gijitsu Koryu wo Mezashite (Aiming And Equal Defense-Technology
Exchange between Japan and U.S.)," Shin B6ei Ronshfi 20, No. 4 (1993), p. 41.
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strategists argued that some Chinese leaders cherished a "Greater-China mentality" (Chzka
Shiso), the desire to unify the country and recover the glorious empire it had in the ancient
history. So the shift in Chinese maritime strategy and its actions of coercion in the Taiwan
Strait were illustrative of Chinese willingness to fulfill this goal through the use of force,
which would lead to extreme Chinese pride, policies of high pressure and even territorial
expansionism vis-i-vis Japan and other Asian countries.67'
Still more castigation of Chinese arrogance stemmed from a strong impression
among many Japanese people that Chinese demands on Japan were often made without
trying to understand the concrete conditions in Japan. In the Kokaryo case, China protested
to Tokyo regardless its explanation on the Japanese democratic principle of "separation of
three powers." After China refuted that the case was not a legal but a political problem
between the two countries and kept escalating the pressure, one official of the Japanese
Foreign Ministry, apparently frustrated with what he saw as Chinese overbearing attitude,
openly called Deng "a man above the clouds" and said "anyone who gets old becomes hard-
headed." 672 Beijing immediately condemned it as a personal insult of Chinese leaders.
Chinese anger was mostly smoothed over when the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
made formal apology on June 16 and the two sides decided to move ahead with the
scheduled ministerial meeting in Beijing on June 26-28. But the aftershock of the incident
was still quite disturbing. On June 25, a monument erected by the Japan-China Friendship
Association in Kyodo in 1984 inscribed with a poem by Zhou Enlai was found splashed
with red paint, and handbills left at the monument accused China of interfering with Japan's
domestic affairs and vowed to "smash" the upcoming bilateral ministerial meeting. It
reminded of Japanese public resentment with government "low posture" in handling
disputes with China.673
671 For some examples of Japanese strategic analyses along this line of argument, see Shigeo Hiramatsu,
"Chugoku Kaigun to 'Chiiku Sekai' no Saik6 (Chinese Naval Force and the Revival of 'Sinocentrism')," Shin
Boei Ronshfi 20, No. 3 (1992); Kiichi Saeki, "Reisengo no Ajia-Taiheiyo no Anzen Hosho (The Security of the
Asia-Pacific Region in the Post-Cold War Era)," Shin Bbei Ronshu 21, No. 3 (1993), p. 10; Nobuno Miyamoto,
"Chufro no Senryaku teki no Ky6ch6 wa Doko Made Susumu Ka (How Far Will Sino-Soviet Strategic
Cooperation Go)," Chfio K6ron No. 7 (1996), p. 139.
672 Ijiri, "Sino-Japanese Controversy since the 1972 Diplomatic Normalization," p. 74.
673 "Kyoto Monument to Zhou Enlai 'Desecrated'," Tokyo Kyodo, June 25, 1987, FBIS China report.
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In the 1990s, Japanese tactical retreats under Chinese pressure on sovereign issues
provoked strong domestic criticism of a "kowtow diplomacy" to China. In the 1994 Asian
Games Incident, there was immense undercurrent in Japan that prevented government's
yielding to China's demand of not allowing high-ranking Taiwan officials to attend the
opening ceremony. Chinese pressure was called imprudent interference with Japan's internal
affairs because, after all, things like whether to issue entry visa to whoever foreign visitors
was the legal right of any sovereign state. As for territorial disputes, pressure from the
general public also served to prevent a conciliatory Japanese policy. According to an opinion
poll by Jiji Tsushisha shortly after the crisis in 1996, 45.6 percent of respondents thought
government attitude concerning territorial problems was lukewarm and weak-kneed,
compared to 26.8 percent who thought the status quo was fine and only 7 percent who
believed that Japan should make concessions. The same poll also shows that 50.7 percent of
respondents said the government should conduct tenacious negotiation regarding the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, while only 16.6 percent supported joint exploitation with China
and 3.6 percent thought Japan should give up the islands.674
Economic Friction
China: Japanese Economic Invasion and Insult in Economic Aid
Objectively speaking, problems in bilateral economic interaction were usually the
result of a combination of structural factors, policy errors, and operational deficiency on
both sides. The cause of the trade imbalance in favor of Japan in the 1980s was to a large
extent rooted in the inherent inequality of exchange between primary products and
manufactured goods entailed by the structural difference of the two economies. But the
problem was certainly exacerbated around the mid-1980s by China's overheated demands
for foreign products, Japanese trade barriers to foreign exports, and by China's lack of
quality control, failure to ensure timely delivery and update product designs, and disorderly
pricing, distribution and service systems.
674 National Survey by Jiji Tsushinsha in November 1996, see Yoron Chdsa Nenkan, 1997, p. 562. Another poll
conducted byJiji Tsushinha in December 1997 yielded similar results. See Yoron Ch6sa Nenkan, 1998, p. 573-74.
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Likewise, the causes of stagnating Japanese technology transfer and capital
investment to China were manifold. In the 1980s, the Cold War export control regime
against communist countries, COCOM, was still in reign, which rendered the transfer of
many high-tech products and facilities to China impossible. With regard to less politically
sensitive areas, Chinese expectation of the most sophisticated technology was often regarded
unrealistic by the Japanese counterparts, who were more bound by considerations of
applicability, cost calculation and payment means during the process of technology transfer.
Japanese direct investment was kept low in the 1980s because of both the problematic
investment environment in China and its failure to recognize the interest of foreign investors
in seeking profit. It was until 1986 when widespread complaints among foreign
businessmen prompted Chinese leaders Deng Xiaoping and Gu Mu to admit publicly that
foreign investment should not only benefit the Chinese but also meet the goals of foreign
investors to "make real money."675 Similarly complicated was the problem about Japanese
goods sold on Chinese market. It sometimes was caused by negligence in quality check
when Japanese exporters were overwhelmed by the flood of orders, but could also have
stemmed from the low purchasing power or overall technical conditions in China that made
exports of most sophisticated and expensive products to China unattractive.
The multifaceted origins of bilateral economic problems made the difficulty in
determining the overall responsibility for these problems. But the Chinese had a rather
strong penchant among the Chinese to blame the Japanese side for all the problems between
them, with the exception of a small number of economic experts who would admit, mostly
in private conversations, that the Chinese side was also at fault to some degree. Such a
biased attitude could not be solely understood as a negotiation tactics because it was widely
shared by not just high-ranking government officials directly involved in bargaining with
Japan but also the vast majority of Chinese people. Behind it was still the intractable
Chinese sense of historical entitlement on Japan. Having devastated China's national
economy by its brutal aggression and rapacious exploitation in the past, Japan was now
expected to provide generous assistance to the cause of Chinese economic modernization.
Besides, Japanese economic aid to China was understood by both sides as disguised war
675 Whiting, China Eyes Japan, p. 110 and p. 112.
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reparation, so the self-interest of Japanese businessmen in providing the aid should be all but
secondary to Chinese interest. When Chinese expectation was not met, they reacted with a
mixture of resentment, suspicion, and even outrage.
The most telling evidence of Chinese tendency to associate the current economic
relationship with Japan's historical debt to China was Deng Xiaoping's remarks on June 4,
1987 that sparked a rare rebuke by Japanese diplomats discussed above. After pointing out
the dissatisfying aspects in Sino-Japanese economic relations, including China's trade deficit
and Japan's inactiveness in transferring technology, Deng went on to bring the past into the
present:
"If viewed in light of the history Japan ought to do much more in order to help China's development.
Frankly speaking, among all the countries in the world I think Japan is the one that is most indebted
to China. At the time of Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization we did not raise the demand for war
reparation, which was a policy decision made with the consideration that both China and Japan were
great nations close to each other and the decision would be good to our long-term interest. From the
Japanese perspective that values reason, I think Japan should contribute even more to assist China's
development. To be honest I have resentment in this respect." 676
This is about the first time that a Chinese leader directly brought up the war
reparation issue in connection with the demand for Japanese economic assistance, but it was
widely considered as reflecting the real thinking of Chinese people since the 1980s that
Japanese aid was well deserved because of the war history.677 Not only the government but
also ordinary Chinese people frequently criticized Japanese intention to use China as a
market of cheap commodities and to hold back Chinese technological development pace.
Dissatisfaction with Japan's economic role in China was particularly concentrated on
imported Japanese goods (Ribuo). A common belief was that "Japan exports first-class
products to Europe and the United States, reserves second-class products for its own
consumption, and sells third-class goods to China." 678 In the eyes of many Chinese, it was
Japanese contempt for China that led them to sell shoddy goods to the Chinese market.
Besides, unbridled import of a large quantity of Japanese goods was seen as a serious threat
to domestic manufacturers, causing the shutdown of Chinese factories and rise of
unemployment rate. Students also suspected that the flooding of Chinese market by
676 For the major points of Deng's remarks on June 4, 1987, see Tian, Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji, Vol. 2,
pp. 643-644, and Nitchat Kankei Kihon Shiryoshu, p. 707.
677 Akira Ishii, "Chfigoku ni Otta Mugen no Beish6," p. 165.
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Japanese goods was their renewed attempt for "economic invasion" to China just like in the
past when Japanese imperialists tried to take over exclusive control of Chinese market and
resources. So one of the demands raised by student demonstrations in mid-1980s was to
boycott Rihuo, an act to emulate the anti-Japanese mass movement in the 1930s.67"
In the 1990s the trade imbalance turned favorable to China and Japanese investment
and technology transfer also increased, but Chinese mistrust of Japan in the economic realm
persisted. Despite its enthusiastic seeking of Japanese direct investment, Chinese
government still checked the political credential of Japanese companies and did not hesitate
to interfere to create difficulty for those considered "unfriendly" companies to do business
in China.6" ° And it is common for Chinese people to stereotype Japanese businessmen as
being greedy, shrewd, and selfish. In the China Youth Daily poll of 1996, 96.3 percent of
respondents believed that the Japanese capital investment in China was to occupy market
and seek profit, 50.7 percent thought it was to control China economically, and 45.3 percent
thought it was to dump outmoded facilities, with only 9.5 percent believed it was to help
Chinese economic development.681
Bitter emotions about the war history not only stimulated negative Chinese
perception about Japanese intention in economic interaction but also generated profound
policy ramifications. Anti-Japanese student demonstrations rising one after another from
1985 to 1987 had direct impact on Chinese position in negotiating trade deficit with Japan.
It was a typical phenomenon during these demonstrations that students frequently shifted
the target of their condemnation from the "Japanese economic aggression" to "those in
power" who took advantage of economic reform to augment private interests at the expense
of the welfare of the populace. In order to placate the anti-government sentiments among
the students and ward off their demand for democracy as a fundamental solution to social-
economic problems, the government had to give in to their pressure to some extent
678 This is an argument frequently appearing Chinese best-selling books. See Song Qiang et al., China That Can
Say No, p. 114.
679 Slogans are from wall posters made by students during the anti-Japanese demonstrations in 1985. Cited in
Tanaka, Nitchu Kankei 1945-1990, pp. 143-144.
680 Sugita Toshiaki "Foreign Investment and Its Subsequent Withdraw," JETRO Newsletter 3, No.128 (1997),
pp. 19-20.
681 China Youth Daily, February 15, 1997.
regarding economic relations with Japan. Like in island disputes, the Chinese government
confirmed that student actions were well-intentioned while urging students to take restraint
and show consideration for national interest in general. Meanwhile, the government
proclaimed an uncompromising position that China would not countenance continuation of
the immense trade deficit with Japan and demanded immediate action of Tokyo.
Still doubts exist that the public pressure in China might not have imposed an
unintended policy on the Chinese government but actually played into the hand of the
government who had been looking for a bargaining chip against Japan. But studies of
Chinese public opinions indicate that student demonstrations in the mid-1980s were
spontaneous movement with genuine anti-Japanese emotions. Furthermore, public outrage
against Japan very likely exacerbated the ideological cleavage in the government between the
liberal faction and conservative old guards. In light of the Chinese enthusiasm in the first
few years of the 1980s in recruiting Japan as a major economic partner in Chinese
modernization, the abrupt shift to harsh policy to Japan in the mid-1980s would not have
been possible if public pressure had not changed the balance of power between the liberal
faction represented by Hu Yaobang and its conservative opponents.
Having staked his political career heavily in a harmonious Sino-Japanese relations
and even developed an intimate, personal friendship with Nakasone, Hu's leadership in the
party suffered a severe setback when the Chinese public reacted vehemently to Nakasone's
shrine visit in 1985. Nakasone reportedly told Japanese press later that he cancelled the plan
to worship at Yasukuni the next year because of the clear risk of provoking more Chinese
criticism of being used by conservative forces in China who sought to bring down Hu.682
When Tokyo announced the decision of no Nakasone's visit to the shrine in 1986, Hu
immediately welcomed it as "a wise decision."6s3 In fact, party conservatives had already
682 According to this 1991 interview of Nakasone, Nakasone asked Inayama Yoshihiro, then president of the
Federation of Economic Organizations, to consult with Hu in Beijing whether he could continue to visit the
shrine. Inayama was told by someone close to Hu that "resuming the visits will have an undesirable effect, so
make sure that Nakasone does not go." Nakasone says, "From about that time, reports began to reach us that
Hu was in a precarious situation... That person came to see Inayama out of concern that my continuing to
worship at Yasukuni Shrine regardless of these warnings would be risky for Hu and people close to him
because of relations with conservatives... Under the circumstances, it was better to give up, so I decided to
stop worshipping at Yasukuni." Cited in Wakamiya, The Postwar Conservative View ofAsia, p. 176.
683 Tanaka, Nitchtr Kankei 1945-1990, p. 152.
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attacked Hu's liberal propensity regarding his political reform programs. The public
challenge to the pro-Japan policy that he had spearheaded rendered him even more
politically vulnerable. When anti-Japanese students demonstrations recurred in January
1987, Hu was forced to accept the responsibility for these demonstrations. Although the
deeper cause of the oust of Hu lied more in ideological struggles, the raging student
demonstrations and widespread public resentments toward Japan did play an important role
in undermining the power base of Hu, who otherwise would have stayed a good chance of
sticking to a more conciliatory approach to bilateral economic friction.
In other cases when Japan seemed to condition the aid program on political
demands more directly, the Chinese rejected it as naked insult to Chinese national pride and
even a policy of economic coercion. A telling example is Beijing's response to Japanese
protest against Chinese nuclear weapon testing. Japan had expressed displeasure about
Chinese nuclear tests since 1994, but it was not able to extract compromise from China
through economic aid negotiation. As Yasuaki Tanizaki, director of the Foreign Ministry's
loan-aid division, testified, "We told the Chinese repeatedly during the aid talks that we were
concerned about their nuclear test program and about other issues such as arms exports and
human rights. But they said they didn't want to link aid negotiations with politics." 684
Following China's nuclear test in May 1995, the Japanese Diet passed a resolution in August
protesting the test and Japanese government suspended grant assistance to Beijing that year,
which meant a loss of $75 million to China. This prompted Chinese Foreign Ministry to
make the following statement that drew a linkage between the past and present:
"We deeply regret the Japanese government's decision to freeze most grant aid to China for the
remainder of the 1995 fiscal year...This year marks the 50 th anniversary of the world's victory in the
anti-fascist war and China's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. The Japanese
government should engage in deep introspection of previous war crimes and conscientiously draw
lessons from history. Instead, the Japanese government is attempting to create a major issue
concerning China's nuclear testing program. Therefore, one cannot help to wonder about the true
political motives of their move, a move that could very possibly be detrimental to the sound
development of Sino-Japanese relations. 685
In the same month Primier Li Peng again suggested during a meeting with members
of the Sino-Japanese Economic Cooperation Association that Japanese economic aid was
684 "Eager to Please: Tokyo sets aside own rules in China aid package," Far Eastern Economic Review, January
26, 1995.
685 "New Briefings by the Chinese Foreign Ministry," Beijing Review, 18-24 September 1995, p. 9.
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not just a gift for China because it also boosted Japanese economy and, even if considered as
a form of war compensation, Japanese loans could never fully compensate for the great
losses to China inflicted by the Japanese militarists in the invasion. So he admonished Japan
not to "make a fuss over China's nuclear tests and use economic means to exert pressure on
China.""68 6 Meanwhile, little evidence shows that China's policy of nuclear weapon
modernization was swayed by Japan's punitive economic policy. China went on to do two
more tests in June and July of 1996 despite continued Japanese suspension of grand aid and
the ongoing negotiations on the fourth yen loan package for 1996-1998. Although Beijing
probably had made the basic decision to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in late
1995, Foreign Minister spokesman kept on issuing statements rebutting Japanese official
protests until shortly before the declaration of unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, so as
to convey the message that China could be both reasonable and flexible but economic
coercion simply would not work for China.687
Japan: Chinese Ungratefulness and Tactics of Extortion
The rationale of Japanese economic aid to China was understood very differently in
Japan than in China. To the Japanese, providing aid was part of the economic diplomacy to
attain certain national interests, with little difference from any other types of government
policy. As discussed in the previous chapter, Japanese government initial decision to extend
ODA to China was mainly driven by the strategic goal of promoting the strength of the anti-
Soviet camp and the overall economic interest of Japan itself. While the immediate strategic
implications had dissipated with the end of the Cold War, economic aid to China was still
needed as a useful Japanese foreign policy tool to foster political harmony with a powerful
neighbor and ensure access to China's vast market and rich natural and human resources.
Guilt feeling did function to some degree in Japanese decision-making, especially in agreeing
to provide aid to China on more favorable terms than any other developing countries, but it
686 "Japan: Big Fuss Over Nuclear Tests," Beijing Review, 16-22 October 1995, p. 22.687 Johnston's study of Chinese policy shift with regard to CTBT around mid-1990s shows that it was not
Chinese fear of foreign sanctions but rather decision makers' sensitivity to China's image and status as a
"responsible" major power that was a critical driver in their decision to sign onto the treaty. See Alastair I.
Johnston, "The Social Effects of International Institutions on Domestic (Foreign Policy) Actors?" in Daniel W.
Drezner, Locating the ProperAuthorities: The Interaction of Domestic and International Institutions (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 2003).
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did not amount to the subordination of Japan's self-interest to moral obligations. Therefore,
in contrast to the Chinese perception of Japanese economic aid as paying back its due, the
Japanese expected the application of economic diplomacy a give-and-take process between
two countries both seeking their own national interest.
Japan's understanding of economic aid to China in a rational, realpolitik sense led to
its intolerance of China's seemingly endless quibbling of Japan despite the profuse flow of
Japanese capital and technology to China. Many Japanese were irked by China's showing
little gratitude for Japan's economic assistance. An article published in Chuo Koron in March
2000 began with a scathing sentence of criticism: "Over the Past 20 years, Japan has
committed 6 trillion yen in aid to China, but Japan and the Japanese people are still seen as
villains in Chinese society." The author, journalist Komori Yoshihisa, complained Chinese
government "has not made any attempt to tell its own people" about Japanese aid to many
major construction projects, and even in those rare Chinese reports that did mention
Japanese ODA, it was usually suggested to be part of a cooperative "joint effort."6 88
What irritated the Japanese even more was China's drawing the linkage between the
present bilateral economic relations with the past history of Sino-Japanese war, which they
believed was an artificial notion used by the Chinese side to extort economic gains from
Japan without expending anything in return. Such doubt about Chinese purposeful use of
history seemed to be confirmed by Deng Xiaoping's remarks of June 1987 on the war
reparation issue in connection with Japanese economic assistance. This statement was
understood as China's attempt to utilize its previous renouncement of war reparation to
demand for infinite amount of reparation payment now, or even to use the war reparation
issue to extract Japanese concessions in all aspects of bilateral relations.6" In 1995 Jiang
Zemin again reminded Murayama that "China adopted an extremely generous attitude to the
question of war reparation claims at the time of bilateral diplomatic normalization," and
Premier Li Peng's made the above-mentioned remark claiming that Japanese economic aid
to China that the later was simply no match for China's loss inflicted by Japan during the
past aggression. Because Chinese leaders' renewed invocation of the war reparation issue
6 s8 Yoshihisa Komori, "Japan's China Aid Policy Is Mistaken," Chfo K6ron No. 3 (2000).
689 Ishii, "Chfigoku ni Otta Mugen no Beish5," p. 165.
coincided with Japanese suspension of grant aid in response to China's new nuclear tests,
Japanese resentments against Chinese strategy of historical extortion loomed large.690
The divergent perceptions of the nature of economic aid and the accompanying
emotions of mistrust and grievances poised the Japanese side to adopt an increasingly tough
position on bilateral economic affairs. A conspicuous indication was the emergence since
late 1990s of Japanese official complaints to China for its failure to publicize about Japanese
ODA. Apparently upset about the situation, the Japanese embassy in Beijing began
appealing directly to Chinese mass media for better coverage and inviting Chinese reporters
to Japan to take a closer look at Japanese ODA programs to China. The embassy also
expressed the wish to the Chinese government that Japan would like a frank "expression of
appreciation" for its economic aid.6 91 To step up pressure on China, during his visit to
Beijing in August 2000 Japanese Foreign Minister K6no Y6hei directly told his host about
Tokyo's displeasure with the lack of Chinese public awareness of Japanese ODA programs.
Japan's effort to push more Chinese PR work in this respect seemed to have
achieved some effects. In March 1999 two newspapers with nationwide circulations referred
to "financial assistance from Japan" when reporting about a new inter-governmental
agreement on Japanese grant to China, which was unprecedented in 20 years. Another step
of Chinese concession was its holding of a "20 th Anniversary Party to Commemorate the
Results of Japan's Economic Cooperation" on October 9, 2000.692 Nevertheless, Chinese
concessions came rather grudgingly. According to Komori, some prominent Chinese
newspapers like People's Daily still stuck to the expression of "joint cooperation" when
referring to aid from Japan, and others failed to mention it at all; meanwhile, coverage on
financial assistance from the Japan Export Bank,693 which was called by some as Japan's
second ODA program, was nonexistent in China.694 In some cases when the Chinese
government did try to smooth things over upon Japanese complaints, it took care to
690 Seki Tomoda, "Taichii Zenryaku Sairy6 no Shinario Saiaku no Shinario (The Best and Worse Senarios of
Strategy to China)," Chiio K6ron No. 12 (1995), pp. 56-57.
691 Komori, "Japan's China Aid Policy Is Mistaken."
692 Komori, "Japan's China Aid Policy Is Mistaken;" "PRC to Hold Party in October in Beijing to Show
Appreciation for Japan's ODA," Sankei Shimbun, September 7, 2000, in FBIS report.
693 Japan Export Bank merged with the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund in October 1999 to become the
Japan Bank for International Cooperation.
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admonish Japan to remember history and not to exploit Chinese conciliatory gestures. For
example, in his address to Japanese reporters shortly before his visit to Japan in October
2000, Premier Zhu Rongji, while praising the role played by Japanese assistance in China's
economic construction and admitting that the PR efforts of his government had been
inadequate regarding this issue, went on to remind Japan that "special history problem is
involved in the aid programs and they do not benefit the Chinese side only.""69
Beijing's reservation of this kind was unlikely to satisfy Tokyo, so the later continued
to complain. The LDP secretary general Yamazaki Taku said in his trip to Southeast Asia in
August 2001 that "I am sure that people in this region were grateful (to Japan) but China is
different, where Japanese ODA had not been understood well by the people."696 Meanwhile,
domestic opposition to a conciliatory policy to Japan also prevented the Chinese
government from making substantial concessions. After Kono's visit a Chinese translation
of Japanese newspaper articles on the visit appeared on the internet, which reported that
"Beijing softened its stance due to pressure from the foreign minister." As result, the
Chinese Foreign Ministry received complaints from the public calling Foreign Minister Tang
Jiaxuan "a traitor who gives way to Japan."'6 9 Similar complaints were directed to Premier
Zhu Rongji when he tuned down the history charge during his visit to Japan.
Imposing political conditions on economic aid was another major step of the
Japanese government to toughen economic policy to China. In 1992, Japan introduced the
ODA charter in 1992 that required the government to review aid towards countries that had
problems in four areas: human rights, environment, arms exports and development of
weapons of mass destruction. The charter was invoked in 1995 to justify the freezing of
grant program to China. This economic sanction lasted for two years and was supported by
the majority of public opinion. In a poll conducted by Asahi Shimbun in October 1995, 90
percent of respondents said they felt angry about recent Chinese and French nuclear tests,
and when asked how they thought about the government decision to freeze part of
694 Komori, "Japan's China Aid Policy Is Mistaken."
695 Asahi Shimbun, October 9, 2000.
696 Asahi Shimbun, August 23, 2001.
697 "Release on Internet of Translated Version of Japanese Articles Annoys Beijing," Sankei Shimbun,
September 7, 2000.
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economic aid to China, 45 percent replied that the policy was desirable, 44 percent
complained it was too soft, and only 3 percent said the policy was too harsh on China.6 98
As discussed above, Japanese attempt to win Chinese concessions with economic
means met with staunch resistance from China, who seemed willing to sacrifice economic
interests for political needs or symbolic national pride. Still Japan was so unhappy about
China that it was determined to end some favorable terms of economic aid to China and
attach political strings to the aid permanently. In negotiating the fourth yen loan package,
Tokyo tried to replace the thus far multi-year aid program with a system of settling aid
commitments annually. As a former senior Japanese diplomat said, "the practice of
committing aid to China over a period of several years, rather than for one year at time,
means the Chinese can do anything they like once a new program has been agreed." With
China's opposition, the two sides compromised on a five-year plan in which the amount of
fund was specified only for the first three years from 1996 to 1998 while that for the next
two years would be decided based on further study. And Tokyo made it clear that this
would be the last multi-year aid program to China.699
Less sure at the time was whether the amount of ODA fund to China should be
reduced as a clear expression of Japanese displeasure with China. Since Jiang's problematic
visit to Japan in 1998, however, a hawkish perspective regarding aid policy arose among
Japanese strategic elites. This view fundamentally departed from the previous rationale of
economic aid to China, which was that it was no longer in Japan's interest to help build a
powerful and prosperous China. One of the major causes of this view was that many
Japanese were deeply frustrated with China's sticking to its bold military buildup programs
despite repeated Japanese protest and using history as a political tool to force its terms on
Japan on every important bilateral issue. In their eyes, the ungrateful, overbearing and
manipulative China was simply untrustworthy because it would override Japanese national
interest whenever needed. As an article published in Sankei Shimbun in May 2000 argued, "In
the first place, many Japanese people question why Japan, which is suffering from a fiscal
698 "Survey on Chinese and French Nuclear tests, gun-possessing society, the U.S.-Japan alliance and problem
of military bases" by Asahi Shimbun, October 1995, in Yoron Chdsa Nenkan, 1996, p. 495.
699 "Eager to Please: Tokyo sets aside own rules in China aid package," Far Eastern Economic Review, January
26, 1995.
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deficit, should give as much as 150 billion yen of the people's precious tax money and public
funds each year to China, a major military power. It is quite natural to be skeptical about
why China, which continues to build up its nuclear weapons and long-range missiles and
purchase cutting-edge destroyers and fighter planes, keeps on condemning Japanese policies,
from defense to education, and persists on giving economic aid to developing countries,
should be the foremost recipient of Japanese aid."700 So to the hawks on China policy, the
continuation of large quantity of aid to China was both "kowtow diplomacy" that humiliates
Japan's national pride and a self-defeating strategic policy.
SUMMARY
Summary of theory-testing results for this period (see Table 11) shows that domestic
political needs to promote an "assertive nationalism" tor replace communist ideology as the
main spirtitual tool to enhance regime legitimacy and facilitate social mobilization figured
significantly behind Chinese official campaign to encourage victim consciousness and other-
maligning national myths regarding the war history. In Japan, the goals of both
consolidating power at home and advancing the internationalist diplomacy externally
motivated conservative elites to perpetuate self-glorifying and self-whitewashing myths. But
mainstream war narratives in both countries met with serious challenges from civil groups
and even individuals embracing various political and ideological agendas, which aggravated
bilateral historiographic clash and brought such clash to greater international attention. In
the meantime, despite their prospering commercial links and societal contacts, the two sides
failed to bridge the gap between their war memories through deep-going historians' dialogue
or measures of historical restitution, largely due to domestic political constraints. So bilateral
relations in this period attest to advantage of historical mythmaking theory over realist
theory in tracing the rise of their historiographic disputes.
700 "ODA to China: Bold Review Based on Guidelines Necessary," Sankei Shimbun, May 12, 2000.
Moreover, historical mythmaking theory rightly predictions that Sino-Japanese
relations would deteriorate from the early 1980s and a state of Shallow Reconciliation-
Friction would last through the entire period. The realist prediction that the two countries
would maintain deep reconciliation until the common Soviet threat disappeared at the end of
the 1980s is not consistent with the reality. The development of the four indicators of
reconciliation stage in the 1980s indicates that they were predominantly driven by the
mechanisms of intention and emotions embedded in historical mythmaking theory.
However, in the 1990s mutual expectation of war and bilateral economic and political
relations were jointly determined by these two mechanisms, the sense of strategic uncertainty
after the Cold War, and both countries' active military buildup and assertive international
strategy. Since Chinese and Japanese attitude to one another worsened either much earlier
or 5-6 years after the end of the Cold War, and their military buildup programs or uneven
economic growth did not really upset bilateral power balance, pure realpolitik factors alone
would not have been sufficient to bring out the specifics of the reconciliation outcomes.
Last but not least, this period of Sino-Japanese relations reveals both the
instrumental and independent functions of ideas in international relations. On the one hand,
governments created and purveyed national myths in a politically purposeful way and they
sometimes applied history card in diplomatic negotiation extract concessions from the other
side. On the other hand, however, negative emotions and perception of intention arising
from sharp disagreement on the war history interpretation were genuinely held by general
public and also widely shared within the elite circle; they could not be turned off at will when
bilateral disputes ended and government agenda shifted. So there existed a fundamental
dilemma between the official desire to manipulate history interpretation for practical political
needs and the fear of inability to control the resultant enormous public agitation that would
serious constrain government policy choices. Historical myths act as a double-edged sword
in international relations: they serve as well as harm their creators.
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Table 11: Theory-testing Summary (Sino-Japanese Relations 1982-2000)
PREDICTIONS THEORY
(I) Realist Theory (II) Theory of OUTCOMES ASSESSMENT
Historical Mythmaking
Causes of National myths are merely National myths are shaped by Japanese conservative elites used war myths to Theory II better fits
Historical part of elite propaganda to a multitude of instrumental mobilize public support to internationalist diplomacy the evidence
Myths justify national security policy motivations including strategic and shore up the prestige and power of the
goals, domestic political conservative ruling class;
interests and ideological Chinese war myths were used to support the
doctrines "assertive nationalism" that could justify economic
reform in the face of conservative opposition and
mitigate anti-government sentiments and demands
for democracy from the society
Interstate Deep Reconciliation in the Major decline of relationship Major decline of relationship between 1982-1986; Theory I fits theI lievidence in theReconciliation 1980s resulted from the between 1982-1986 when Shallow Reconciliation-Friction throughout the 1990s;
Result positive structural conditions; bilateral historiographic 1980s and 1990s Theo II better
Major decline of relationship divergence significantly explains the timing
at the end of the 1980s when widened; of relationship
the common Soviet threat Shallow Reconciliation- change and the
dissipated; Friction throughout the period relationship outcome
Shallow Reconciliation in the as a result of the of the whole period
1990s because of the neutral combative/conflictual war
structural conditions narratives
Indicators of 1: Moderate/heightened Heightened Chinese expectation of war Theory I partially
Interstate No expectation of war in the expectation of war throughout throughout the period, not because of a major shift explains Japan's
Reconciaton 980s because of common the period because the of bilateral power balance or end of the Cold War, perception of China1980s becauses of common in the 1990s;Stage security interest against the mechanism of intention but mistrust of Japan due to its historical amnesia; Theory II supportssecurity interest t should generate a higher Theory II supports
Soviet threat; should generate a higher Heightened Japanese expectation of war since the China' perception
Heightened expectation of mid-1990s to some extent because of China's rapid throughout the
war in the 1990s because of economic growth and military modernization period and partially
the end of CW and concern programs, but also due to its rejection of China's Japan's perception in
about bilateral power balance historical justification of its international the 1990s
shift assertiveness and use of history card to bully Japan
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Table 11 continued
2:
Full settlement of sovereignty
controversies in the 1980s
because of common security
interest;
Sovereignty rights disputes in
the 1990s caused by the end of
CW and the strategic
importance of these issues
Smooth economic interaction
and high strategic
interdependence in the 1980s
due to common security
interest;
Economic friction and
political interference in
economic affairs in the 1990s
because of the end of CW and
concern about bilateral power
balance shift with the rise of
China
4:
Harmonious popular in the
1980s feeling due to common
security interest;
Popular animosity in the
1990s due to the end of CW
and concerns about balance of
power shift
Sovereignty disputes
throughout the period, caused
the mechanisms of intention
and emotions when
historiographic conflict
worsens
Limited level of strategic
interdependence and
economic frictions and
throughout the period, caused
by the mechanisms of
intention and emotions when
historiographic conflict
worsens
Popular animosity throughout
the period, caused by
grievances through
mechanism of emotions when
bilateral historiographic
divergence widens
Sovereignty rights disputes throughout the period
not because of the strategic importance of these
issues but due to the Chinese sense of historical
entitlement and Japanese rejection of it, which
generated deep mutual suspicion of harmful
intention and mounting public pressure against
conciliatory government position on these issues
Economic friction and/or politicization of
economic affairs throughout the period;
China's confrontational attitude since the 1980s and
Japan's toughening of ODA policy since the mid-
1990s to China were the result of the Chinese sense
of historical entitlement and Japanese rejection of it,
which generated deep mutual suspicion of harmful
intention and mounting public pressure against
conciliatory government position on these issues;
Japan's attitude change in the 1990s was also caused
by concerns about Chinese military modernization
and the misuse of Japanese economic aid for military
purpose
Chinese bitterness about Japan throughout the
period due to their grievances toward Japanese
historical amnesia and lack of war redress measures,
and the absence of historians' dialogue;
Japanese popular feeling about China decline in
mid-1980s and in mid-1990s caused by their
rejection of Chinese grievances and frustration over
China's use of history card; decline in 1989 due to
June 4
Theory I is consistent
with the outcome of
sovereignty disputes in
the 1990s;
Theory II explains
better both the
process and outcome
of such disputes
throughout the period
Theory I fits the
general outcome in the
1990s and partially
explains Japanese
policy change;
Theory II fits the
general outcome and
explains Chinese
attitude throughout
the period, and
partially explains
Japanese policy change
in the 1990s
Theory II better fits
both the process and
outcome of popular
relations throughout
the period
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Chapter Six
When East Meets the West:
Postwar (West) German-Polish Reconciliation
Germany and Poland, two neighboring countries in East-Central Europe, had a
history of enduring, traumatic conflicts ever since the 18th century, which culminated on
September 1, 1939 when the unprovoked German attack on Poland launched the immensely
destructive World War II. After the war, the danger of military confrontation continued to
haunt West Germany and Poland as they were separately allied with the US and USSR.
However insurmountable the historical and structural hurdles seemed to be, the (West)
German-Polish reconciliation process progressed ostensibly since the early 1970s and
approached the stage of deep reconciliation in the 1990s. I argue that German-Polish
reconciliation to a significant extent can be attributed to the institutional measures of
historical settlement including German restitution and bilateral historians' cooperation
beginning from the 1970s. Endorsed at a time when the systemic conditions turned
favorable, these efforts created mutual understanding and trust that cushioned the impact of
negative international conditions in the 1980s and paved the way for the eventual
reconciliation between the unified Germany and Poland after the Cold War.
This chapter begins with an introduction of the historical background of German-
Polish relations. The next section briefly outlines the four phases of postwar (West)
Germany's foreign policy and it reconciliation process with Poland. Subsequent sections will
apply realist and historical mythmaking theories to each phase and assess their relative
explanatory power.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
For centuries Poland was caught both geographically and politically between its two
powerful neighbors, Prussia/Germany and Russia/the USSR, at the hands of whom the
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Polish nation endured the most devastating and humiliating national trauma in its history.7 01
The three partitions of Poland by Prussia, Russia and Austria from 1772 to 1795 reduced the
once great European power into non-existence. Napoleon Bonaparte's victories brought a
partial and ephemeral restoration of Polish national statehood. But with Bonaparte's defeat,
the three partitioners soon regained the Polish land lost in the struggle with him, and the two
Polish uprisings in 1830-31 and 1863-64 against the heavy-handed rule by the Tsarist Russia
were ruthlessly repressed. Poles were deprived of not only national independence but also
the right to use Polish language in public affairs and teach Polish literature and history in
schools, especially in Prussian and Russian held areas.
After WWI, the Treaty of Versailles brought the rebirth of the Polish state. But the
territorial ambition of its Slavic neighbor, now called the Soviet Union, did not relent. The
Polish-Soviet War broke out in 1920 and ended with a significant Polish victory. However,
the twenty years of inter-war period was only "a brief interlude in the over-all stream of
stateless" for Poland.702 On the eve of WWII, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, just like
their political predecessors, conspired to wipe out Poland from the map. The notorious
secret protocol attached to the Treaty of Non-aggression between Nazi Germany and the
USSR, or Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, "set the price the USSR charged for its benign
neutrality in the forthcoming war - Bessarabia, Estonia, Latvia, and the better part of
Poland, up to and including half of its capital Warsaw."70 3 This pact ended Hitler's haunting
fear of a two-front war. On September 17, less than three weeks after Hitler invaded Poland
and when the situation of Warsaw was precarious, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov declared
that the Polish Government had ceased to exist and ordered the Red Army to move west to
occupy Eastern Poland.704 So Poland was once again carve up: its western territories were
annexed into Germany, eastern area into the Soviet Union, and the central part became a
German protectorate named the General Gouvernement.
701 Unless specially indicated, the following review of Polish history in this section draws upon Norman Davies,
God's Playground. A History of Poland (New York: Columbia University Press Davies, 1982).
702 Davies, God's Playground, p. 6.703 Jan Tomasz Gross, Revolution from Abroad: the Soviet Conquest of Poland's Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 9. For the text of the treaty and the secrete protocols attached
to the treaty, see General Sikorski Historical Institute, Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations, 1939-1945 (DPSR)
(London: Heinemann, 1961), Vol.1, p. 40.704 Martin Gilbert, The Second World War. A Complete History (New York: H. Holt, 1989), p. 9.
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German atrocities committed in the invasion and occupation of Poland were
horrendous.7'" Over six million Polish citizens were killed, which amounted to 22.2 percent
of the total Polish population living under the German occupation, much higher than the
death rate of the next two countries on the tragic list, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, who
lost about 10 percent and 4 percent of their populations respectively. Polish Jews were the
worst victims of German aggression. Hitler's racial extermination campaign involving the
concentration, isolation, and eventual annihilation of Jews largely took place in Poland. Half
of Polish deaths were Jews, who perished in the Jewish ghettos, concentration camps, and
prisons, together with millions of Jews deported from other European countries conquered
by German forces. Poles were also subject to a variety of brutalities, including mass
execution, slave labor, live medical experiments on human beings, and daily terror and
political persecution. Millions of people were forced to resettle in the General
Gouvernement from the areas incorporated into the Reich. The Nazis systematically
destroyed or looted Poland's valuable books, objects of art and documents, as well as
exploited Polish natural resources for German war effort in such an extremely greedy
fashion that by the end of the war Poland had been literally ravaged. To make things worse,
Nazi Germany attempted to exterminate the Polish leadership stratum, massacred or
deported the intelligentsia, banned publications and art performances in Polish language, and
minimized the education opportunities for Poles. The goal of this policy was to turn Poles
to a people of semiliterate and permanently end the existence of the Polish national identity.
Compared to the German invasion, the Soviet military conquest of eastern Poland
seemed less damaging because it lasted only two weeks and incurred relatively small
casualties (fewer than 3,000). The Red Army's use of violence during the occupation was in
most cases selective as it mainly target Polish officers, policemen, and landowners in order to
root out the ruling apparatus of the old Polish regime.706 But Soviet atrocities could be no
less appalling than those of the Germans, especially in the first two years of the war when
the Soviets killed many more people than the Nazis did, before the later's systemic mass
705 For further details on German victimization of Poland during World War II, see Jan T. Gross, Poksh Society
under German Occupation; W. adys aw Wszeb6r Kulski, Germany and Poland:from War to Peaceful Relations (Syracuse:
Syracuse University Press, 1976), Chapter 2; G*6wna Komisja Badania Zbrodni Niemieckich w Polsce, German
Crimes in Poland (New York: Howard Fertig, 1982).
706 Gross, J. T., Revolutionfrom Abroad, p. 42.
annihilation of Jews began. Most notorious Soviet atrocities include the Kaytn Forest
Massacre in spring 1940 - 5,000 Polish POWs were murdered and another 10,000 missing -
and the killing of as many as 100,000 people during the evacuation of prisons in the Western
Ukraine and Western Belorussia during June and July 1941. 707
Therefore, while the German action of Holocaust carried out largely on Polish land
has no parallel in human history, the long-term, ruthless Tsarist and later Soviet aggression
made this "Slavic brother" the second major perpetrator of Poland. Together the two
neighbors posed the gravest threat to Polish national survival. It was this experience of dual
victimization that led to considerable emotional and political paradox when Poland had to
choose sides between the two in the postwar era.
PERIODIZATION OF POSTWAR (WEST) GERMAN-POLISH RELATIONS
The postwar (West) German-Polish reconciliation process has gone through four
phases. Phase One, from the end of WWII till the mid-1960s, was the stage of Non-
Reconciliation. The structural conditions were negative because West Germany and Poland
were allied to the U.S. and U.S.S.R. separately, which locked the two states into the East-
West confrontation. During this period, the Christian Democratic government of West
Germany headed by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer carried out Westpolitik in foreign policy,
which hinged such top national priorities as security, unification and economic revival on the
strategic alliance with the Western bloc. To the Eastern bloc countries like Poland,
Adenauer adopted a confrontational stance, refusing to make any compromise but only
desired to impose Bonn's terms on them when the Western alliance achieved absolute
superiority over the East. To make things worse, the dominant historical narratives of the
707 For a comparison of Poland's suffering in the German and Soviet occupation zones, see "Epilogue," in
Gross, Revolution from Abroad. Gross's conclusion is that "if we measure the victimization of Polish citizens in
terms of loss of life, of sufferings inflicted by forced resettlement, and of materials losses through confiscation
and fiscal measures, the Soviet actions, relatively speaking, would prove far more injurious than those of the
Nazis." (P. 226) "And yet, despite the overwhelming suffering, the Soviet occupation was somehow less
oppressive in its atmosphere and style than that of the Nazis... what was lacking under the Soviet occupation
was the sense of pervasive discriminatory contempt, the CUbermensch airs, so forcefully projected by the
Germans." (P. 230).
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two states were combative against each other, which aggravated the strategic barriers to
reconciliation.
From the late 1960s, the Social Democratic government led by Willy Brandt initiated
Ostpolitik and ushered in the second phase of reconciliation with Poland that fits in the stage
of Shallow Reconciliation. The focus of the new Ostpolitik, different from Germany's
traditional strategy of Eastern expanasion, was to improve relations with the Soviet bloc
countries, including Poland, in order to foster inter-German contacts and pave the way for
eventual German unification. Aided by the overall East-West Detente, West Germany and
Poland were able to settle border dispute and the legal status of East Germany through the
1970 Warsaw Treaty. Still the Cold War did not end and Polish foreign policy was not free
from the Soviet control, which set the upper limit for the improvement of German-Polish
relations. It was from this phase that the two countries commenced history education
dialogue, enabled by not only their diplomatic normalization but also West Germany's
politics of reconciliation and the liberalization of the history profession in communist
Poland.
Phase Three emerged in the beginning of the 1980s till the last few years of the Cold
War. On the one hand, with the dissipation of detente, the diplomatic reorientation of the
Helmut Kohl administration to commit to a tight alliance with the West, and the Polish
government's crackdown on the Solidarity movement that espoused Western liberal values,
the two states were once again alienated politically. On the other hand, the Social
Democratic party, now becoming the opposition party, carried out a shadow Eastern policy
to foster friendship with Poland and other Soviet allies, and from 1984 the Kohl government
also resumed dialogue and cooperation with these countries in the spirit of Ostpolitik. In
addition, bilateral historiographic divergence shrank in this phase, thanks to the
unprecedentedly open debate in West Germany on war memory, the liberalization of Polish
history-writing propelled by the Solidarity revolution, and the continuation of bilateral
textbook cooperation. The progress in the regard of historical settlement greatly mitigated
the escalated structural pressure. The two countries maintained a "Shallow Reconciliation"
type of relations in most of this period.
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The 1990s was the fourth phase of German-Polish reconciliation. The uncertain
structural setting after the end of the Cold War exerted an indeterminate impact on their
relations. Nevertheless, the two countries permanently settled their territorial disputes,
institutionalized security and economic cooperation, and developed a sense of closeness and
mutual trust at the popular level, all characteristics of the stage of Deep Reconciliation.
Two major driving forces contributed to such remarkable reconciliation progress.
The first pertained to the Germany's immediate goal of achieving reunification and the long-
term desire to neutralize the neighbor countries' mistrust of a unified Germany and attain a
secure external environment in Europe. For this reason, Germany did not seek dominance
in Europe through its power advantage, but opted for a multilateral, institutional approach
to foreign affairs that closely tied German national interests with the integration and
cooperation among European countries, including those in Eastern Europe. The second
driving force was the increasing convergence of their national memories, due to the de-
mythification trend in each country's national historiography, and the comprehensive
bilateral exchange programs and historian's dialogue. Not only diminishing mutual threat
perception and popular grievances, their shared memory of bilateral relations also gradually
extended to include a common European history, creating a sense of European community
between the two countries.
PHASE ONE: 1945 TO THE MID-1960s
During Phase One, the two states had no formal diplomatic relations, and their
commercial and societal exchange activities were kept at a minimal level. Fear of imminent
war and popular animosity toward each other country were prevalent. The main cause of
the outright mutual hostility lied in the big power struggle for spheres of influence starting
from the end of WWII and intensifying during the Cold War. In the meantime, international
structural constraints and domestic political needs motivated ostensible practices of
historical mythmaking in both countries, giving rise to squarely divergent historical
interpretations about their past conflicts. The combative narratives the two countries held
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about their past conflicts functioned as an aggravating factor in stifling any momentum of
bilateral reconciliation.
I. International Structure, Heightened Expectation of Bilateral Conflict, and
National Non-Recognition
As we know, Sino-Japanese confrontation in the early Cold War years was not so
much driven by the clash of their own security needs as by the power struggle between the
two strategic blocs that they were separately allied to. But West German-Polish security
dilemma in Phase One was caused by both inter-bloc tension and the outstanding disputes
between themselves, the later being the product of the former. First, the relationship
between the two former enemy states was overshadowed by the East-West military
confrontation in Europe. Second, the two countries had conflicting national interests in
border disputes and the question of German division. These two issues directly set them
against one another, creating a high expectation of bilateral conflict and prevented their
mutual cognition of national existence and territorial sovereignty.
Inter-bloc Military Standoff
By the end of WWII, Red Army occupation of Eastern Europe had placed countries
like Poland under Soviet control while western allied forces took over the western part of
Germany. With the Cold War "Iron Curtain" descending in the late 1940s in Europe, the
temporary division of occupation zones was turned into a fault line between the Soviet and
American power blocs. Falling on the opposite sides of the fence, West Germany and
Poland were antagonistic to one another not only politically but also militarily because they
both constituted an integral part of the defense system of their respective alliances. Thus the
security dilemma between the superpowers directly translated into tension between the two
countries.
Poland was the most important Soviet ally in Eastern Europe in terms of its physical
characteristics and military contribution to the bloc defense. Because of its vast land mass
and position right on the lines of transportation and communication linking the Soviet
homeland with Soviet Forces in East Germany, Poland was a key component of the East
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European buffer zone for the defense of the Soviet heartland. Besides serving defensive
purposes, Eastern Europe also constituted the launching ground for the Eastern bloc's rapid
military offensives against Western Europe. To that end, the Soviet Union pushed for rapid
military build up of these countries, and Poland in particular was turned into an armed camp.
Its military was the largest in the region and assumed an indispensable role in the Soviet
blitzkrieg strategy against Western Europe. Polish military was also Stalinized to the greatest
extent among all Soviet allies. Not only Soviet style internal organization, training patterns,
and doctrinal systems were indiscriminately imported, but also all important posts in the
military, including the defense minister, chief of the general staff, and high-ranking
commanders, were held by Polish nationals who had served in the Red Army as Soviet
citizens in the past.708 Poland's active role in the Soviet-led defense system made it the most
formidable military opponent in Europe, next to the Soviet Union itself, of the Western
bloc.
In light of the military threat from the Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe,
the United States also begun to prop up its own allies. In the late 1940s, Washington
formulated a two-pronged policy of boosting Western European strength and unity, with the
Marshall Plan mainly addressing the economic weakness and political instability of the region
and NATO being the chief military remedy to its security vulnerability. The decision to
form a military alliance between the US and Western Europe was directly triggered by the
struggle over Germany. Driven by the fear of a revived German threat through unification
of the western zones and its integration with Western Europe, Stalin took a drastic action on
June 24, 1948 to blockade West Berlin. But his provocation backfired because Western
airlift succeeded in keeping Berlin well supplied and Western countries discarded hesitation
and mutual disagreements regarding their military alliance. Within weeks of the signing of
the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949, the Berlin crisis ended.
From its establishment, NATO was open for the eventual participation of Germany.
Germany was strategically important first because it was one of the five centers of industrial
708 For the significance of Poland's armed forces to the Soviet military strategy in Europe, see Andrzej
Korbonski, "Soviet Policy toward Poland," and A. Ross Johnson, "The Warsaw Pact: Soviet Military Policy in
Eastern Europe," in Sarah Meiklejohn Terry ed., Soviet Poi'6 in Eastern Europe (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1984).
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and military power that, according to George Kennan, the West could not let fall to hostile
hands. Germany could also provide the necessary defense space for Western Europe.
Given the lessons of WWII and the military balance in postwar Europe, it was widely
understood that NATO's East front would be indefensible in the face of Soviet Blitzkrieg
and the defenders would have to engage in tactical retreats that cushion enemy assault and
buy time for preparing counterattack. Bringing Germany into NATO would stretch the
defense line far to the east and add great advantage to Western security both spatially and
temporally.709
Since the end of the 1940s both the U.S. and Britain encouraged German
rearmament and military integration with the West. The US push for Germany rearmament
stepped up first during the Korean War and then after Eisenhower decided to reduce
American ground forces in Europe and let European forces fill the gap. Although
concerned about a possible resurgence of German militarism, France too desired to draw
Germany into an integrated Western defense system. But when France's plan to build a
European Defense Community (EDC) was defeated in French parliament, Germany's
NATO membership was inevitable. West Germany became a formal member of NATO on
May 6, 1955. Shortly afterwards, twelve German divisions were created as an important part
of the forward defense strategy of the Western alliance. 710
The immediate reaction of the Eastern bloc to West Germany's inclusion in NATO
was to conclude the Warsaw Pact on May 14. Poland was a member of the Pact from the
day of its founding. Thus Poland and West Germany became the bridgeheads of their
respective multilateral security alliances, vigilant against possible attack from one another and
actively preparing for a war in case of such attack. Such inter-bloc security dilemma imposed
a great danger of imminent war on the bilateral relations.
709 Stanford M. Lyman, NATO and Germany: A Study in the Sociology ofSupranational Relations (Fayetteville:
University of Arkansas Press, 1995), p. 84.
710 For the history of Germany rearmament and Western integration from late 1940s to early 1950s, see F. Roy
Willis, France, Germany, and the New Europe, 1945-1967; James McAllister, No Exit: America and the German
Problem, 1943-1954 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002); Lyman, NATO and Germany, Chapter 2 & 3.
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The Dispute of the Oder-Neisse Line
The national interests of West Germany also directly clashed over the frontier issue,
which drove the two countries to even tighter integration with their respective strategic bloc.
The wartime great power design to carve out postwar spheres of influence sowed the seeds
of German-Polish frontier disputes. Partially to weaken the German power and partially to
create a pro-Soviet communist regime in Poland, Stalin presented a compensation theory at
the Yalta Conference demanding Soviet annexation of Eastern Poland up to the Curzon
Line and German compensation for Poland's loss with its territories east to the Oder-Neisse
line. His proposal on eastern Polish border was soon accepted by other allied powers as it
had already been a fait accompli, but the western border became a point of international
contention. Winston Churchill fought most strenuously against the Oder-Neisse line for
fear of Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe and even the whole continent. Roosevelt and
his successor Truman had similar suspicion, but it was superceded by their desire to maintain
a good relationship with the USSR at least before the war ended. After Churchill's
government fell, the three delegations finally agreed on a joint communique at Potsdam that
approved the Soviet demand. But the communique also stated that "the final delimitation of
the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement," suggesting that the
tripartite agreement on the Oder-Neisse line was not a permanent settlement.71
The border issue drove a deep wedge between West Germany and Poland. For
more than two decades the Bonn government rejected the Oder-Neisse Line as the final
Eastern Germany frontier, a position supported by the U.S., Britain, and France.712 Also the
dreadful expulsion of 8.5 million Germans from former Polish and annexed German
territories stimulated mounting grievances among the expellees, who then exerted heavy
influence on bilateral relations. So the German threat that the Soviets sold to the Poles
when proposing the compensation theory became a self-fulfilling prophecy. Postwar
Poland's worst fear was that Western powers would support West Germany's use of force to
711 On the great power settlement of the postwar German-Polish frontiers at wartime meetings, see Kulski,
Germany and Poland, Chapter 3.
712 The French position on the issue of Germany's frontiers fluctuated from the end of the war until 1959,
when de Gaulle became the president and made a dramatic turnaround to announce that he favors the
establishment of a unified Germany that would remain within its present frontiers. See Kulski, Germany and
Poland, pp. 90-94.
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challenge the postwar territorial status quo in Europe, which was vindicated when NATO
included West Germany with the endorsement of its foreign policy goal to recovering the
lost eastern territories.
Its fear of German revanchist territorial claims forced Poland to depend on the
security alliance with the USSR. The following excerpt from the Warsaw Pact clearly
indicates that Germany was the chief imaginary enemy with whom Poland and other East
European countries perceived a major war was likely:
Taking into consideration at the same time the situation obtaining in Europe as the result of
ratification of the Paris agreements, which provide for the formation of a new military
grouping in the shape of the "Western European Union" together with a remilitarised
Western Germany, and for the integration of Western Germany in the North Atlantic bloc,
which increases the threat of another war and creates a menace to the national security of
the peaceloving states. 713
Poland's primary grand strategy since the late 1940s, to integrate its army with the
Soviet military and preserve a balance of forces in Central Europe, was intended to
communicate to West Germany the message that any territorial encroachment would
be intolerably expensive for both the FRG and the US.714 Therefore, both for
protecting the interest of the entire Eastern bloc and for preserving its own
sovereignty rights, Poland braced itself for war with West Germany.
The German Question
The West German-Polish frontier dispute prevented mutual respect of territorial
integrity, an important aspect of national recognition. Another major obstacle to their
national recognition was the division of Germany, the so-called German Question. While
Poland endorsed a two-German policy, the Adenauer government of West Germany refused
to accept the legitimacy of East Germany. Their refusing to compromise on German
Question ruled out bilateral diplomatic normalization for as long as twenty years.
713 From the text of "The Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, May
14, 1955," in Internet Modern History Sourcebook at
http: //www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1955warsawpact.html
714 Richard K. Herrmann, "Comparing World Views in East Europe: Contemporary Polish Perceptions," in
Ronald H. Linden ed., The Foreign Policies of East Europe: New Approaches (New York, N.Y.: Praeger, 1980), p. 83.
Postwar German Question also had its genesis in great power struggle. The Yalta
Conference drew up the blueprint for divided occupation of Germany by the four powers,
the US, the USSR, Great Britain, and France. Soon after the war, fundamental clashes
occurred between Stalin and Western leaders on political and economic policies in their
respective zones. Berlin Blockade in particular repelled any Western hopes about German
unity in the near future and prompted them to fuse the three western occupation zones into
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in July 1948.
In the East, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was established in October
1949 by the communist leader Walter Ulbricht in the Soviet occupation zone. Warsaw
quickly sent in a letter of congratulations two days after the creation of an East German
state. Due to its victimization in the long history of relations with Germany, it was Poland's
unspeakable wish to keep Germany divided and weak once Germany after the war. In
particular, the danger of German territorial revanchism would be effectively curbed if a
socialist East Germany dependent on the recognition and support of the Soviet bloc existed
on Poland's western border. On July 16, 1950, East Germany and Poland then signed a
boundary treaty in G6rlitz. The preamble of the treaty stated that the frontier issue had been
settled at Potsdam, and Article One specified that the Oder-Neisse line constituted their
state border. The utility of recognizing the GDR in perpetuating German division and
preserving the territorial status quo was manifest in the following remarks of the First
Secretary of the PUWP Wladyslaw Gomulka in his interview with the London Times in
February 1958:
"It would not be a misfortune if Germany continued to be divided still for sometime to come... Let
us assume that unified Germany should become a great military power, armed with nuclear weapons.
It would become a great European power... Certain people there (West Germany) do not conceal
their claims to our Western Territories. Taking this into account, we must view the problem of
unification of Germany more cautiously than the western countries."715
In light of the two-German policy practiced by the Eastern bloc, one possible way to
solve German Question was for the FRG to stay neutral between the two superpowers.
Moscow first presented this choice to Bonn in 1952 in the so-called Stalin Notes, which
offered German unification in return for its strategic neutrality. In 1955, the Soviet
government made another overture to the Federal Republic, alluding to the linkage between
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normalization and "the restoration of the unity of a German democratic state.""716 The
Soviet offers aroused anxiety in the U.S., who was fearful of the revival of German "seesaw
politics" of Weimar tradition. John Foster Dulles once emphasized the importance of "tying
Germany organically into the West Community so as to diminish the danger that over time a
resurgent German nationalism might trade neutrality for reunification with the view of
seizing the controlling position between East and West."717
If viewed in the historical context, however, the strategy of staying neutral in
exchange for unification was untenable. To West German elites like Konrad Adenauer, the
worst nightmare was "Potsdam," where the fate of Germany was determined by other
powers without its consent.71 Caught right between the East and West, a neutral Germany
would likely be again deprived of a say in future trans-bloc bargaining that may further
dismember Germany or annex its land. Instead of accommodating with the East,
Adenauer's goal of attaining German unification was tied to western integration.
Collaboration with the West may not secure German unification immediately, but would
shore up German national defense to balance the Eastern military threat at the FRG's
doorstep. It was also hoped that Germany and the entire Western world would eventually
become so much more powerful than the East that it could force Moscow to assent to the
absorption of the GDR by the FRG. This is Adenauer's "policy of strength." As he told
the Bundestag in February 1952, "We may regain Berlin and the German East only through a
united Europe."7 19
Adenauer's "policy of strength" precluded any compromise with the Eastern bloc on
the GDR's international legitimacy. During his visit to Moscow in September 1955,
Adenauer agreed to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR. But he also sent two
letters to Soviet Prime Minister reminding that diplomatic normalization would neither
modify the status of the FRG as the legal representative of all German people nor suggest
715 Kulski, Germany and Poland, pp. 96-97.
716 Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (New York: Random House, 1993),
pp. 49-50. The quote is from p. 50.
717 Quoted in Hans-Jiirgen Grabbe, "Konrad Adenauer, John Foster Dullues, and West German-American
Relations," in Richard H. Immerman, John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1990), p. 121.
718 Garton Ash, In Europe's Name, p. 49; Hans-Jurgen Grabbe, "Konrad Adenauer, John Foster Dulles, and
West German-American Relations," p. 113.
719 Kulski, Germany and Poland, pp. 105-106.
German acceptance of the present frontiers. At the end of the 1955, the FRG government
declared the Hallstein Doctrine, named after the then Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
that it would rupture diplomatic relations with a third state that were to recognize the GDR.
As the Soviet ties with the GDR were still tolerated because Moscow was one of the four
great powers whose consent was necessary to achieving German unification, the obvious
targets of the Hallstein doctrine were the Eastern European states. On June 28, 1956,
Bonn's Foreign Minister, Heinrich von Brentano, reconfirmed that his government had no
intention to establish diplomatic relations with the East European states and would not
recognize the GDR and the present frontiers.7 20
Thus the conflicting approaches of Bonn and Warsaw to German Question created
an insurmountable political barrier to their mutual recognition. Two opportunities for
diplomatic normalization arose in Phase One, but both were doomed to fail by the Cold War
structural constraints. The first opportunity emerged in the aftermath of the 1956 crisis in
Soviet-Polish relations. After defeating the Stalinist faction in the Polish communist party,
Gomulka expressed in June 1957 the wish to establish diplomatic relations with West
Germany without any preconditions. But the Adenauer government refused to deal with
Poland by citing the Hallstein Doctrine. Receiving no positive responses, the Polish attitude
soon stiffened and once again demanded the FRG's recognition of the new frontier before
normalization.72' This was hardly a lost chance for their reconciliation because Adenauer
never wavered on his conviction that western integration was the best means to gain national
unity, and the Gomulka government was still under tight Soviet watch and did not enjoy full
diplomatic autonomy. Viewed with hindsight, the late 1950s was an unlike time when the
two sides would suddenly embrace each other in the absence of fundamental changes in the
Cold War strategic context.
New hopes for bilateral rapprochement emerged following the "the hour of great
disillusionment" when Western allies failed to respond harshly toward the erection of Berlin
Wall by the Soviet Union and East Germany in 1961. The conservative Christian
Democratic Union (CDU) became divided between the "Gaullists" who adhered to
720 Kulski, Germany and Poland, pp. 109-111.
721 Kulski, Germany and Poland, p. 112.
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Adenauer's of policy of strength and the "Atlanticists" represented by Gerhard Schroeder
who stressed the importance of detente with the East.22 Being the foreign minister in the
Erhard government from 1963 to 1966, Schroeder developed a "policy of movement" to the
Eastern bloc without requiring a quid pro quo, as opposed to previous theory of
"maintained tensions."7 23 In line with this policy, Schroeder established West German trade
missions in Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria as the first step to establish official,
friendly contacts with its eastern neighbors. But this policy retained a number of rigid,
Adenauer-era premises such as that West Germany was part of the West strategic
community, the Federal Republic must represent all German nation, and postwar frontier
status quo with Poland would not be recognized. These terms were totally unacceptable to
the Eastern bloc. Poland particularly refused to enter into any political agreement with the
FRG without first settling their territorial dispute.7 24
To make things worse, the Erhard-Schroeder government tried to improve closer
relations with the dissident Soviet allies, Romania and Czechoslovakia, while bypassing the
GDR, Poland, and in effect also the USSR. This approach was retained by the succeeding
Kiesinger-Brandt government of the Grand Coalition. Moscow was so irritated by the
West's disrespect of its sphere of influence that it used violent measures at Prague Spring in
1968 to crush any deviation by its satellite states. What was also crushed then was the hope
to realize West German-Polish rapprochement through the "policy of movement."
II. International Structural Polarization and Minimal Bilateral Economic Ties
Cold War East-West confrontation in Europe was the main cause of the minimal
level of economic interaction between West Germany and Poland in Phase One. Each state
obtained the capital and technological assistance from its bloc leader for national
722 Clay Clemens, Reluctant Realists: The Christian Democrats and West German Ostpolitik (Durham: Duke University
Press, 1989), pp. 41-47.
723 The Adenauer government had insisted that any move towards relaxing tensions with Eastern European
states must be matched by moves towards German reunification. This is the theory of "maintained tensions."
See Lawrence L. Whetten, Germany's Ostpolitik: Relations between the Federal Republic and the Warsaw Pact Countries
(London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 12.
724 Even the conciliatory "peace note" that the Erhard-Schroder government proposed in March 1966 included
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reconstruction and modernization agenda, in exchange for which they had to comply with
the inter-bloc export restrictions. The combination of their heavy dependence on
superpowers and the East-West economic warfare greatly constrained bilateral economic
interactions.
Traditionally, Poland's commercial relations with Western Europe, especially West
Germany, were far prosperous than those with Russia and Eastern Europe. According to
trade statistics in 1937, only 1.5 percent of Poland's total imports were from the USSR and
the Baltic republics, and 6.0 percent from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania
combined. However, Germany alone provided 14.5 percent of imported goods in Poland,
and another 41.9 percent were from the rest of Europe.7 25 After WWII, such close
economic ties between Poland and the West were expected to sustain. As predicted by a
report published by the newly established Organization for European Economic
Cooperation in December 1948, around 1952-1953 when the Marshall Plan was scheduled to
end, trade between Eastern and Western Europe would reach approximately 80 percent of
the exports and 73 percent of the imports of the 1938 level.726
However, the subsequent East-West trade fell far short of the expected volume and
even declined from the 1947 level, mainly due to the rising hostility between the two
superpowers. First of all, the US-Soviet Cold War denied Poland of access to Western
economic aid and forced it to defend more on Soviet assistance. Offering massive economic
assistance to help Europe out of chaos and starvation, the US-led Marshall Plan was
supposed to be open to all of Europe. But soon after the first planning meeting of Marshall
Plan in July 1947, Stalin decided to withdraw. He feared that a large influx of US dollars into
the Soviet sphere of influence would increase its economic dependence on the West, and
that the shipment of raw materials from East back to the West would damage Soviet
strategic interests. The USSR also dragged out Poland and Czechoslovakia, who would have
stayed in the program because of their traditional economic ties with the West. Meanwhile,
few in the American government ever believed that Stalin would accept the offer and, even if
725 Zbigniew M. Fallenbuchl, East-West Technology Transfer Study ofPoland, 1971-1980 (Paris: Organisation for
Economic Co-operation, 1983), p. 9.
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he had chosen otherwise, the Congress would not have funded a program that included the
USSR.727
To compete with the Marshall Plan, Moscow proposed a Molotov Plan for Eastern
Europe, which later evolved into the Soviet-sponsored economic grouping known as the
Council for Economic Mutual Assistance. Because Poland was a prime candidate for the
Marshall Plan, it deserved a special compensatory gesture from the USSR. The Polish-Soviet
Trade Treaty signed in January 1948 provided for their cooperation worth two million rubles
over four years.728 Subsequently, the overall Polish foreign economic policy was subject to
the intra-bloc coordination to enhance the self-sufficiency of the Eastern bloc and reduce its
strategic vulnerability to the West. As a result, the direction of Poland's foreign trade shifted
dramatically. Trade data in Table 12 indicate that from the early 1950s to 1970 Poland's
imports from the USSR and East Europe combined were always two to three times as many
as those from the rest of Europe.
Table 12: Ratios of Poland's Imports from Major Trade Partners, 1937-1970
Year The USSR East Europe Other European Countries
1937 0.03 0.11 1
1947 0.57 0.18 1
1954 1.73 1.41 1
1955 1.39 1.11 1
1960 1.48 1.32 1
1965 1.75 1.70 1
1970 1.98 1.46 1
SOURCE: Fallenbuchl, East-West Technology Transfer, United Nations Yearbook of International Trade Statistics,
various years.
The economic autarky of the Soviet bloc was not entirely self-imposed, as most
communist leaders including Stalin himself appreciated the importance of Western exports,
especially advanced technologies, to their countries' industrial modernization. The Western
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policy of trade embargo policy also contributed to the East-West mutual economic isolation.
In order to maintain its power superiority vis-a-vis the USSR, the U.S. decided around 1947-
48 to instate restrictions on exports to Eastern bloc states. Export restrictions escalated
after the outbreak of the Korean War, leading to the pass of the Mutual Defense Assistance
Control Act of 1951 (the Battle Act) that prohibited all military, economic, and financial U.S.
aid to any nation that permitted delivery of military goods to "any nation or combination of
nations threatening the security of the United States." 729 The Battle Act was obviously
targeted at the USSR and its socialist allies. In the meantime, in November 1949 the
American government orchestrated the establishment of CoCom, the Coordinating
Committee, which was an institutional framework to coordinate joint embargo of strategic
goods to the Eastern bloc.
The US-led embargo policy was not popular among its West European allies. These
countries considered export restrictions, especially on non-military commodities,
economically and politically irrational as it would hurt the West almost as much as the East.
Nevertheless, they had to cooperate in the embargo because their foreign trade had been
linked to the supply of US aid.730 West Germany was particularly vulnerable to the US
pressure because it had yet to regain full sovereignty when the policy was introduced. Unlike
other Western European countries where export control followed a non-binding
"gentlemen's agreement" with the US, West Germany's foreign trade was subject to direct
supervision of the three Western occupying powers. West German export control actually
followed the American Positive List, which was longer and more severe than the general
European CoCom list. West Germany was also desperately in need of American aid because
its economy had been devastated by the war and now faced the enormous challenge of
absorbing millions of refugees from the Eastern territories. From 1945-1955, West
Germany was the third largest recipient of the US grants and credits, after the UK and
France.731 Such aid not only helped revive its economy but also ensured the very survival of
729 Adler-Karlsson, Western Economic Warfare 1947-1967, p. 27.
730 For Attitudes in Western Europe to the embargo policy, see Adler-Karlsson, Western Economic Warfare 1947-
1967, Chapter 4.
731 Susan Stern, "The Marshall Plan 1947-1997: A German View," Germany Info (http://www.germany-
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326
the West German state. Bonn could not afford damaging its relationship with Washington
by developing trade with the Eastern bloc.
The introduction of joint Western embargo effectively reduced East-West trade.
Although the embargo lists were revised after 1954 to allow export of some less strategically
important goods to the East, both the CoCom and Battle Act remained effective throughout
this period.732 In response to the Western embargo, the Soviet bloc implemented its own
export control, sharply reducing export of strategic goods to the West. Though without a
former institution like the CoCom, the counter embargo was well coordinated among the
communist states.733 As a result, the communist bloc turned even more autarkic and further
isolated economically from the West. West German-Polish trade was badly affected by such
an inter-bloc economic warfare.
III. Penetration of Societal Relations by Structural Pressure
West German-Polish popular relations during this period were marked by a high
degree of mistrust and animosity. In a public survey done by the Institut fur Demoskopie
Allenbach in September 1959, 36 percent of German respondents held "mainly negative
attitude" toward Poland, compared to 24 percent who had positive attitude. Another poll
show that in the eyes of most West Germans, the Russians and Poles were "deceitful" and
"unreliable," "unpredictable," as well as "brutal" and "treacherous." 734 Meanwhile, the West
Germans were extremely pessimistic about Polish perception of themselves. In a West
German poll in 1959, 49 percent responded that "the Poles have nothing good to say about
the Germans," compared to only 12 percent who believed that the Poles had a positive
attitude towards Germans and "would be prepared to live in friendship with us."735 Most
West Germans also abhorred close political ties between the two countries. Throughout
Phase One the USSR and Poland were at the bottom of the list of countries that West
German public would like their government to cooperate with. 736
732 Adler-Karlsson, Western Economic Warfare 1947-1967, pp. 155-157.
733 Adler-Karlsson, Western Economic Warfare 1947-1967, pp. 81-82.
734 Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and Erich Peter Neumann, The Germans: Public Opinion Polls 1947-1966
(Allensbach, Bonn: Verlag fiir Demoskopie, 1967), p. 555, p. 568.
735 Noelle-Neumann and Neumann, The Germans, pp. 567-568.
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Such negative popular perception of one another nation was directly shaped by the
Cold War inter-bloc security dilemma. One clear indicator of the penetration of public
opinion by international structural pressure was the common concern among West German
public about the danger of war in a polarized world.737 Public polls conducted in 1954 and
1956 demonstrate that most West Germans did not believe that in the long run Western
democracies and Communism in the East could live together in peace. Polls in the early part
of the 1960s similarly showed that more people were "constantly afraid of another war" than
those who could "look calmly to the future."738 A number of public surveys taken in
different years during this period suggest that the West Germans who felt threatened by the
USSR consistently outnumbered those who felt otherwise, and less people believed that the
Soviets had "the good will to seek a reconciliation with the West" than those who did not
believe so.739
The fear about communist threat deeply entrenched in West German society
explains the overwhelming public support to Adenauer's policy of western integration. In
each of the three polls conducted in 1950, 1954 and 1965, the percentage of respondents
who would "side with the West in the present world conflict" well surpassed those who
would "side with East" or stay neutral.'"4 The U.S. always topped the list of countries that
the public believed would be "Germany's best friend," and was the country that West
Germany should "seek the closest possible cooperation" with.741
The decisive impact of structural conditions on bilateral popular relations was also
revealed in the uncompromising attitude of the West German public on such questions as
the legal status of East Germany and the Eastern frontiers. Most people oppose any
suggestion of recognizing an East German state and found Soviet attempt to conclude a
737 Analysis here will focus on the West German society. Data of Polish public surveys during this period are
lacking, and they could be very unreliable even if they do exist. Yet because of the tight state control over
education and propaganda institutions in Communist Poland in the 1950s and 1960s, Polish public opinions
ought to have been brought into greater consistence than those in West German with the state policy of
strategic confrontation with countries of the opposing bloc.
738 Noelle-Neumann and Neumann, The Germans, p. 598, p. 605.
739 Noelle-Neumann and Neumann, The Germans, pp. 553-554.
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separate peace treaty with East Germany objectionable.742 There was widespread public
support to the government policy of stonewalling vis-a-vis East European countries that had
recognized East Germany. The strongest expression of public determination to regain
eastern territories was reflected in a poll done in April 1952. When asked what West
Germany should do in response to Russian promise of German unity on the condition of
renouncing the claim to the regions beyond the Oder-Neisse line, 55 percent respondents
said the government should negotiate with Russians but "on no account should we forgo the
regions east of the Oder-Neisse line," and another 20 percent insisted on getting the
territories back before negotiating for national unity, with only 9 percent willing to trade
eastern territories with the unity of Germany.7 43
The East-West standoff in Europe not only generated imminent threat perception
and widespread objection to mutual compromise among the pubic but also dampened
societal exchange activities that would have been conducive to mutual understanding and
trust at the popular level. Bilateral personnel exchanges in Phase One were rather scarce.
Tourism data of Poland in Table 13 indicate that the number of tourists coming from West
Germany lagged far behind that from Socialist countries, and increased much slower than
the later.
Table 13: Foreign Tourists to Poland, 1960-1970 (in thousands)
Year FRG GDR USSR Czechoslovakia
1960 11.4 37.5 22.9 51.8
1965 26.6 330.6 148.2 355.8
1968 22.9 525.6 278.4 467.5
1969 25.7 542.6 319.2 643.0
1970 36 539 335 489
SOURCE: Concise Statistical Yearbook ofPoland (Warsaw: Central Statistical Office of the Polish People's
Republic), various years.
IV. Historical Mythmaking and Intensified Bilateral Tension
The desire of ruling elites to use history to serve both strategic and domestic political
needs led to rampant historical mythmaking in both countries in Phase One. West German
742 Noelle-Neumann and Neumann, The Germans, pp. 467-468.
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conservative government led by Adenauer purveyed myths that promoted amnesia about
Nazi atrocities against other nations while emphasizing German suffering from the Nazis as
well as Soviet bloc countries who took Germany's territories and expelled millions of
Germans. The Polish Communist regime also manipulated national history of external
conflicts to highlight Polish national victimhood and identify Germany as the chief
perpetrator, but covered up Soviet acts of oppression against Poland. Consequently,
national collective memories of the two countries were dominated by combative narratives,
which aggravated mutual perception of hostile intention and exacerbated emotions of
grievances and disgust in people-to-people relations.
HistoricalAmnesia in Adenauer's Germany
German conservative elites had a high stake in national history-making in this period.
First of all, to conservative leaders the German fiasco in the war and the denazification
campaign, including war crimes trials, purges and reeducation programs carried out by the
occupying powers, had been spreading a "defeatist mood" among West Germans and
sapping the national morale.744 They believed that forcing the Germans to face the Nazi past
would only undermine a fragile popular psyche or provoke anti-West nationalism in
Germany. 745 So there was an urgent need to rebuild national confidence based on a positive
self-evaluation through history-making.
Electoral politics was another important factor shaping the conservative
historiography of Germany's Nazi past. Those politicians who had past association with
Nazism were eager to shake off the historical stigma so that they could reenter the social and
power hierarchy in postwar Germany. Besides, there was a powerful conservative
constituency in the 1950s, most of which opposed the postwar territorial status quo and
cried for revenge against the Poles for their expulsion of German nationals from the eastern
territories. Considering themselves as the victims of Hilter or Eastern European countries,
743 Noelle-Neumann and Neumann, The Germans, p. 470.
744 For a detailed study of the denazification campaign in Germany by Western allies, see James F. Tent, Mission
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the conservative voters found the idea of admitting Germany's role of oppressor to other
nations absolutely repugnant. The umbrella organization of the different regional groups of
refugees and expellees, the Federation of Expellees, stood out to be the staunchest opponent
to a forthright historiography on the Nazi past. Claiming three million members at the
beginning of the 1960s, the organization constituted the power base of the Bavaria Christian
Democratic Union, the right wing of the CDU. In order to win over the conservative
constituency, Adenauer opted for encouraging public amnesia about Germany's criminal
history.7 46
Adenauer's foreign policy of western integration, Westbindung, also required de-
emphasis on Nazi crimes and individual war responsibility in war narratives. He maintained
that military alliance and economic integration with the West could counter the Soviet threat
and regain for Germany the status of an equal power with other West countries. He also
believed that Westbindung could help Germany accomplish democratic revolution by
replacing the collectivist and statist tradition of German conservatism with a type of
Western-oriented, Catholic-influenced ideology containing a liberal and individualist view of
the relationship of the state to the individual.7 47 So Adenauer tried to shift the focus of
national psyche from self-reflection on Germany's past guilt to the Cold War strategy of
containment. He blamed the allied denazification campaign in Germany as excessive and
had "created a very unfavorable atmosphere" for German rearmament. 748 If Germany
continued to be chastised for its past history, it would only encourage Cold War defeatism
and diminish Germany's will to resist the Soviet pressure. So he insisted that West
Germany's integration into the Western alliance could not succeed unless the allies forgot
and forgave Nazi crimes.
The above political interests drove West German conservative elites to gloss over
Germany's past wrongdoings. During Phase One, they propagated and institutionalized a
mythified interpretation of the war history that was marked by general amnesia of Nazi
crimes against other nations, perception of Germans themselves as victims, and a sharp
746 Herf, Divided Memogy, p. 226.
747 Herf, Divided memogy, pp. 212-216.
748 Herf, Divided memogy, p. 270.
contrast between conciliation with the Western allies and an unrepentant attitude toward the
Eastern Bloc countries.
First, the Adenauer government constructed the myth of "good Germans and bad
Germans" to minimize Germany's war responsibility. Although openly acknowledging the
burdens and obligations of the Nazi past, Adenauer rejected the notion held by the left-wing
Social Democrats (SPD) that the entire German nation should bear collective responsibility
if not collective guilt for the Nazi crimes. Rather, he argued that the vast majority of
Germans were innocent victims of a small number of Nazi leaders who corrupted "the
German name" with shame.749 He spoke of the Wehrmacht soldiers in an honorable
manner, without referring to their complicity in the race war in the East and the Holocaust.
He also tried to exonerate the war responsibility of German big capital, who was the postwar
political ally of the conservative CDU.
In line with its narrow definition of German war responsibility, the government took
actions to end the allied denazification programs and pardon German war criminals.
Adenauer emotionally opposed the prolonged war crime trials and repeatedly appealed for
forgiveness and mercy rather than justice to German war criminals.750 Internationally, he
demanded the release of convicted war criminals held by the Allies. Fearful that German
frustration with the war criminal issue might lead to the nation's reluctance to engage in
rearmament and western integration, the Western allies yielded. By 1958, except for a
handful of the original Nuremberg defendants held in Spandau and fewer than thirty "war-
condemned" Germans held in Holland, France, Belgium, and Italy, all other German war
criminals had been pardoned and freed."' Domestically, the Bundestag passed two amnesty
laws at the end of 1949 and in summer 1954, absolved tens of thousands of Nazi
perpetrators and ended all further legal measures to nail down individual responsibility for
Nazi crimes.752 Besides, Bundestag legislations around 1951 also rehabilitated public officials
dismissed both during the Third Reich on political or racial grounds and in the course of
749 Herf, Divided memogy, p. 212, p. 218.
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postwar denazification. So numerous former Nazi sympathizers that had been purged by
the Allies were restored to official and professional positions.753 These legislations de-
legitimized the prosecution of Nazi crimes and provided the legal foundation on a federal
level for German historical amnesia.
In addition to whitewashing German war guilt war commemorative rituals sponsored
by the government encouraged ordinary German people to think of themselves as war
victims rather than perpetrators. Adenauer delivered his first postwar public statement in
Cologne, a city that had been devastated by Allied air raid, to emphasize the subject of
German suffering.754 According to him, the miserable experiences of Germans both during
and after the war, such as the forced expulsion of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and
the Soviet Union, the allied occupation of Germany, and Germany's division, formed the
basis of German victimization.75 5 So in another open statement issued in Cologne in 1946,
Adenauer supported the proposal for a memorial day "for the victims of war." Included in
his category of "victims of war" were German soldiers, German POWs, and expellees.75 6
From 1952, a "national day of mourning" was established to commemorate German war
victims. Conspicuously absent from official war commemoration during this period,
however, were memorial rituals on the day of Germany's surrender and at the sites of
concentration camps and other Nazi atrocities.
German war restitutions during this period were limited to victims in western-
supported countries. In 1952 it signed the Luxembourg agreement with the state of Israel
that obliged West Germany to pay reparation to Jewish survivors of Holocaust, a move very
much driven by strategic considerations. Adenauer cited the "political power of Jews" in
influencing the U.S. decision-making of extending foreign credits to West Germany and
even shaping the general trend of the U.S. occupation policy. Washington also pressed
Bonn to compensate Israel in order to convince domestic public opinion about the merit of
integrating Germany with the West. Therefore, "restitution was part of the price of West
753 Frei, Adenauer's Germany and the Naz Past, Chapter 3.
754 Herf, DividedMemogy, pp. 212-213.
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German entry into the Western alliance." By 1971, the FRG government had paid about
40.4 billion German marks to Jewish survivors as reparation.757 On the contrary, West
Germany showed no contrition to those Soviet bloc countries who suffered tremendous
damages from Nazi Germany. The FRG government embraced the right-wing argument
that Poles and Soviets were perpetrators because of their postwar expulsion of German
compatriots, but did not mention that frontier alteration would not have happened if Hitler
had not initiated an aggressive war that was generally supported by ordinary Germans at the
time.7"8 By juxtaposing the Communist policies with Nazi crimes, the Adenauer government
easily wrote off Germany's debt owed to the numerous victims in the East.
The German society was not completely devoid of competing historical narratives
during this period. Ever since the end of war the Social Democrats strove tenaciously to
pursue both the legal and moral responsibility of the German nation and advocated for
educating the young generation with historical truth. They argued that only an honest
historical memory could prevent Germany from suffering another catastrophe caused by
pernicious nationalism and lay down solid ground for German democracy. But the above-
mentioned historical myths prevailed, due to the CDU's long-time control of state power
and the political weight of the large conservative constituency. As a result, the coverage of
National Socialism in West German history textbooks was seriously inadequate, particularly
regarding the persecution of the Jews, the Holocaust, and the horrendous German
occupation in the East.7s' Instead, educational programs tended to perpetuate the traditional
image of the Poles as an inferior nation, and taught German youths that Germany was
entitled to the right of recovering the lost territories from Poland, and.760
Poland's Selective Tradition
Poland's national history was also manipulated by the communist elites during this
period to bolster the political legitimacy of the Soviet-backed communist regime and justify
Soviet transgression of Poland's sovereignty rights. The first postwar government in Poland,
334
757 Herf, DividedMemory, p. 288.
758 Kulski, Germany and Poland, p. 88.
759 Calvert, Germany's Na!i Past.
760 Kulski, Germany and Poland, p. 89.
known in the West as the "Lublin Committee," was established in Lublin 1944 and later
became the core of the provisional government in Poland. Externally, it must compete with
the Polish-Government-in-Exile based in London supported by the Western powers. At
home, Communist movement had been so weak that it could never have won any open
competition with bourgeois parties without Soviet military dominance in postwar Poland.
Moreover, the Stalinist faction of Polish communism was challenged by the indigenous
communists headed by Gomulka. So the postwar communist regime in Poland was rather
fragile and depended on Soviet support for its own survival. Even when Gomulka ascended
to top leadership in 1956, Warsaw refrained from defying Moscow because it feared the
military superiority of the Red Army. The Gomulka regime continued to defer to Soviet
control of its foreign policy, even though it was given limited autonomy to build the "Polish
Road to Socialism" at home.
In addition to the problem of regime legitimacy, national security needs also
warranted Poland's submission to the USSR. Historically, Poland had deep-seated mistrust
and fear vis-i-vis Germany. Although Germany was positively crushed during WWII, its
past experience of resurrecting from ash and initiating aggressive wars again and again
frightened Poland. The territorial dispute with Germany was another reason for fear of
Germany. The onset of the Cold War promoted Western power to withdraw their support
to the new German-Polish frontiers stipulated at the Potsdam Conference. Since only
Moscow supported Poland's boundary with Germany, the fear of the threat of German
territorial revanchism compelled Warsaw to adhere to the military alliance with Moscow.
In order to meet these pressing domestic political and international strategic needs,
Polish communist elites constructed the official historiography in a fashion of what
Raymond Williams called a "selective tradition," where "certain meanings and practices are
selected for emphasis and certain other meanings and practices are neglected or excluded."76'
Certain parts of Polish national history were emphatically presented as "the tradition" or
"the significant past," including Poland's suffering at the hands of West Germans and its
ideological solidarity with the USSR and GDR, while others such as these socialist countries'
761 Raymond Williams, "Hegemony and the Selective Tradition," in Suzanne De Castell et al., Language,
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victimization of Poland and the Poles' own responsibility for the suffering of the Jews were
covered up.
First of all, from 1948 to 1956, the history profession in Poland was subjected to
direct Soviet intervention. The Polish government replaced the prewar Polish Academy of
Learning with the Soviet-style Polish Academy of Sciences that exercised state control over
all research institutions and universities, including the Institute of History. Moscow also
issued detailed prescriptions for writing new school and university textbooks, and delivered
lectures to Polish university professors and school teachers on Soviet historiography. Such
strong Soviet influence led to the authority of historical materialism in Poland, a
historiographic paradigm stressing class struggle as the motive force of change and
proclaiming human history as a predestined march toward socialism. So the Polish official
historiography depicted Russia/USSR as Poland's unfailing friend, while leaving out its
history of aggression against Poland. The Stalinized Polish historiography also tried to
justify the communist monopoly of power at home and external alliance with the Soviet bloc
by obliterating all non-communist political traditions in Poland and its Western cultural
connections.762
Besides the Marxist ideological overtone, another dominant theme of the official
memory was the Polish victimhood. Polish nationalism since the 19' century had been
strongly inspired by a romantic messianism that embraced a mythical interpretation of heroic
defeat and martyrdom spirit. The Poles were peculiarly fond of celebrating national
humiliation as a unique way to stimulate patriotic emotions. The "cult of national
martyrdom" gave the Poles a feeling of moral superiority and sense of innocence in all past
traumas.763 Communist elites adopted the old myth of national victimization, with a selective
focus on West Germany as the chief perpetrator. Polish historians documented, with
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minute acerbity, the horrors of German occupation.7 64 Young Poles were brought up
believing that patriotism meant hatred of the Germans. Meanwhile, Polish resistance against
Nazi occupation was emphasized and even exaggerated. One important foundation of
communist regime legitimacy was the communist-led resistance campaign during the war.
Although other political forces made up the bulk of resistance activities, the communists
claimed themselves to be the bravest anti-German soldiers.
Polish historiography was so preoccupied with a sense of self-pity and self-
righteousness that historians were never allowed to touch on those historical events that
might tarnish the innocent, glorious image of the Poles. Taboo topics of this kind included
Polish anti-Semitism, Poles' complicity in the Holocaust, their collaboration with Germans
under the occupation, and the postwar deportation of German nationals.
Combative Narratives and Negative Emotions/Intentions
The above-described elite historical mythmaking in West Germany and Poland
resulted in mutually combative historical narratives. Because their myths stressed the victim
experience of their own nation and refused to acknowledge the sufferings of the other side,
extremely negative emotions about each other country prevailed in both societies. The Poles
were bitter about the historical injustices that they had suffered at the hands of the Germans
and were further aggrieved at West Germany's refusal to atone for their suffering. The West
Germans held equally poignant grievances to the Poles for they seized German territories,
expelled millions of Germans, and tried to perpetuate German division by recognizing the
East German state. Such negative emotions were targeted not at a selected group but the
entire population of the other nation. For Polish people, the whole German nation was
"brutal, powerful, cold, and ruthless;" West Germans thought Poland was an ill-natured
nation and viewed all Poles with disdain.765
763 For analysis of the romantic tradition of Polish nationalism, see Andrzej Walicki, "The Three Traditions in
Polish Patriotism," in Stanislaw Gomulka and Antony Polonsky, Polish Paradoxes (London; New York:
Routledge, 1990), pp. 30-33; Gross, Polish Sociey under German Occupation, pp. 4-9.
764 Garton Ash, In Europe's Name, p. 220.
765 Markovits and Reich, The German Predicament, pp. 109-110.
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Accompanying the negative public stereotypes was the strong perception of hostile
intention of each other country. Bonn's rejection of the postwar territorial status quo fuel
the Polish panic about renewed armed conflict with West Germany. The lack of West
German contrition for the Nazi past exacerbated the fear of the Poles, who believed that an
unrepentant Germany would launch aggression again without moral reservation. But to the
West Germans, the Polish suspicion of German revanchism was groundless because the
FRG was a democratic, morally impeccable state that would never repeat the treacherous
policy of Nazi Germany. Instead of acknowledging Poland's security concern, the public
thought their territorial claims were completely legitimate and ascribed Polish objection to
the aggressive policy of the communist country against the democratic FRG.
Such historically derived emotions and perceptions did not create but mainly
intensify and escalate the security dilemma imposed by the East-West systemic
confrontation. They tended to increase public support to the hostile policies of their
governments that had been shaped by the Cold War structure, such as political and
economic isolation and a non-compromising stance over the frontier issues. The function of
historical mythmaking practice in West Germany and Poland in Phase One was not
independent of the international system but only served to amplify systemic tensions and
conflicts that impeded bilateral reconciliation.
PHASE TWO: THE LATE 1960s TO THE LATE 1970s
Relations between West Germany and Poland improved considerably during this
period. The fear of imminent militarized conflict considerably abated and normal diplomatic
ties were established on the basis of partial mutual recognition of essential sovereignty rights.
They also developed commercial relations and personnel contacts at much greater scale than
before. Such significant headway in bilateral reconciliation can be attributed to both the
positive change in the international system and the domestically sprung momentum towards
reconciliation through measures of historical settlement. Externally, the East-West detente
greatly reduced the danger of war between countries from the two blocs as well as facilitated
their political and economic contacts. Internally, the trend of political liberalization in West
338
__ _ ___~
Germany and Poland brought the decline of national mythmaking and wider appreciation of
the importance of historical responsibility and reconciliation. West Germany adopted
serious policies of restitution and historians of the two countries conducted regular dialogues
regarding the content of their history textbooks, which contributed to both inter-
governmental and popular reconciliation.
I. Positive Structural Conditions for West German-Polish Rapprochement
From the late 1960s to mid-1970s, a turn toward relaxation of tensions was
introduced into inter-bloc politics. East-West Detente, as the period is often called, was a
peculiar stage of the Cold War resulted from the U.S. relative decline in wealth and power
vis-a-vis the USSR and the Soviet split with its Chinese ally. Both superpowers felt the need
for a more stable world order where the risk of large-scale armed conflicts, especially nuclear
war, would be diminished through negotiations. Inter-bloc agreements reached during
detente on arms control and confidence-building measures, albeit limited in many ways,
effectively moderated the expectation of war between members of the two blocs, including
West Germany and Poland. Detente provided a favorable international setting for the Willy
Brandt government to carry out a more open-minded and flexible type of Osipolitik, which
sought to foster inter-Germany contacts through a modus vivendi with Moscow and its
Eastern European allies, something unthinkable prior to the advent of detente. So detente
created the necessary structural condition for the West German-Polish political
rapprochement, economic contacts, and improvement of popular ties.
Ditente and Moderated Risk of Military Clash
A major characteristic of the detente era was the dominance of political negotiation
rather than confrontation in East-West relations. The "pilot ship of negotiation" was the
American-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), which started in late 1969 and led
to the signing of SALT I agreements in May 1972. An important part of the agreements was
the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that limited the development of ballistic missile
defense, a critical area of strategic arms competition. The SALT I agreements also included
measures to upgrade and better maintain the Washington-Moscow direct communication
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link to strengthen crisis prevention and management. Taken all together, the SALT
negotiation of the early 1970s contributed to the acceptance of concepts of parity, equal
security, and strategic stability by the Americans and the Soviets.
As the superpower tensions mitigated, the risk of military conflicts in Europe also
declined. Two symbols of the progress in European stability were the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and Mutual Balanced Force Reduction
(MBFR). At the Nixon-Brezhnev summit meeting in May 1972 that marked an important
milestone of detente, the two superpowers not only concluded the SALT I agreements but
also agreed to proceed on a European security conference. About two years of negotiations
among the thirty-five participants resulted in the Final Act of July 1975 that declared ten
principles on interstate relations, including no threat or use of force, respect for national
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and peaceful settlement of disputes. The Final Act also
included agreements on confidence-building measures that would require advance
notification of large military exercise. The CSCE agreements strengthened the climate of
non-aggression and peaceful coexistence between Eastern and Western European
countries.766
The issue of conventional force reduction was on the agenda of regional stability
before detente. An official study group led by a West German general Heusinger started to
submit reports in 1965, advocating the negotiation with the Soviet bloc for mutual reduction
of the force level in Central Europe.767 The NATO Council adopted the Harmel Report in
1967 that had much in common with the Heusinger reports. Still, it was the May 1972
summit meeting that galvanized the MBFR process. Although the first stage of the MBFR
talks till mid-1970s did not lead to any solid agreements, the very existence of the negotiation
displayed the intention of both sides to dampen the prospects of armed conflict in Central
Europe.
766 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp. 527-528.
767 Christoph Bluth, "The Origins of MBFR: West German policy priorities and conventional arms control," at
http: //www.leeds.ac.uk/mbfr.doc
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While these broad negotiations on arms control and overall principles of regional
stability moderated the inter-bloc military stalemate, a number of specific agreements directly
eased the security dilemma surrounding Germany. Of most significance to Germany's
security was the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin signed by the four occupying powers.
The general atmosphere of detente enabled a smooth resolution of the problem of Berlin,
which had been a powder keg for East-West crises in postwar Europe. The Soviets agreed
to guarantee unimpeded traffic to and from West Berlin and granted de facto recognition of
the existing ties between West Berlin and the FRG, while the Western powers accepted de
facto East German control of East Berlin and refraining from treating West Berlin as a
territory of the FRG.
In parallel with the negotiation of the Berlin Agreement were West German-Soviet
security talks. During the preliminary SALT session at the end of 1969, West German
Secretary of State Egon Bahr and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko resumed
bilateral negotiations in Moscow, which led to the signing of Moscow Treaty in August 1970.
The treaty was only the first of a series of bilateral agreements that West Germany
concluded with the Soviet bloc countries under detente, including the Warsaw Treaty with
Poland in December 1970, the FRG-GDR Basic Treaty in December 1972, and the Treaty
on Mutual Relations between FRG and Czechoslovakia in December 1973. All these treaties
stipulated renunciation of threat or use of force in settling disputes and the inviolability of
national frontiers. They mollified the pressing security concerns of individual bloc members
and to a large degree dispelled their imminent expectation of external military confrontation.
Willy Brant's Ostpolitik and Partial Settlement of Sovereign~ y Questions
After Willy Brandt became the head of the SPD-FDP (Liberal Party) coalition
government in 1969, he and his prot6ge adopted a new Ostpolitik, defined as a policy towards
the Soviet Union and its allied states in East and East Central Europe.7 68 The central
concern of Ostpolitik was two-folded, to enhance West Germany's national security and to
address the German Question. Previously, Bonn's rigid policy to attain unification only
through integration with the West actually insulated West Germany from East Germany.
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The worst scenario that Brandt wanted to forestall was the intensification of two German
national consciousness as time went. When detente substantially alleviated inter-bloc
confrontation, Brandt found it a golden opportunity to stake out a more independent,
flexible policy to the East. The new policy was oriented to advancing political, economic,
cultural and social contacts with the Soviet Union and East European countries, including
East Germany. It would not only improve West Germany's security environment but also
draw the two Germanys close to one another and foster a common German identity.
Although more open-minded than the Adenauer era, West Germany's Ostpolitik in
the 1970s was still carried out within the structural limit of the Cold War. Detente was by no
means the end of the Cold War and superpowers were still suspicious of each other's
infiltration of their own spheres of influence. Brandt was aware of the concern of Western
powers that West Germany's active Eastern policy might lead to its "Finlandization" and the
resurgence of German nationalism.769 While seeking to expand Bonn's diplomatic horizon
to the East, Brandt maintained the commitment to Western integration. So Ostpolitik must
proceed in parallel with Westpolitik to convince the Western bloc that improving the
relationship between West Germany and the Eastern bloc states was consistent with the
strategic interests of the West.
Not only stressing ties with the West, Brandt also respected the Cold War political
and territorial realities in Europe, in which the East bloc had a crucial stake. As discussed
earlier, the attempt by two post-Adenauer German governments to approach Soviet allies
but bypass the Soviet Union and Poland failed miserably. This fiasco taught Willy Brandt
and his protege a lesson that a solution to the German Question would be untenable if it
failed to address the fundamental security concerns of the East bloc. It was clear to Bonn
that a headway in German-German relations would have to go hand-in-hand with diplomatic
normalization with the USSR and its other East European allies.
768 Ash, In Europe's Name, p. 35.
769 For the Soviet and American concerns that closer cooperation between the FRG and the Eastern states
would weaken their respective alliances, see M. E. Sarotte, Dealing with the Devik East Germany, Ditente, and
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Brandt's Ostpolitik agenda was to achieve rapprochement with the USSR, then to
normalize relationship with Poland, and finally negotiate with East Germany.770 In order to
open the gate to closer German-German relations and prepare for the unification in the long
run, Bonn assured Moscow that its diplomacy to East Germany would not compromise the
crucial interests of the Soviet bloc countries. In the Moscow Treaty, the FRG also
recognized the inviolability of all postwar European boundaries, including the Oder-Neisse
line and the inter-German border, and promised to make no territorial claims against third
countries. The text of the treaty did not mention German unity and, by mentioning the
GDR by name, gave Bonn's first official acknowledgement of East Germany. The German
guarantee to respect the European status quo was recapitulated in the Warsaw Treaty
between West Germany and Poland. At the same time, the Brandt government claimed that
the treaty did not affect its eventual goal of national unification. German Foreign Minister
Walter Scheel delivered to his Soviet counterpart Gromyko the "Letter on German Unity"
stating that the Moscow Treaty "does not conflict with the political objective of the Federal
Republic of Germany to work for a state of peace in Europe in which the German nation
will recover its unity in free self-determination."'' 771
Thus far, West German-Polish disputes on sovereignty rights were only partially
settled the Moscow Treaty nor Warsaw Treaty provided only a provisional solution, and
neither of them was peace settlements by the standard of international law. In a
memorandum that it submitted to the Bundestag in December 1971, the Brandt government
claimed that the FRG recognized the Oder-Neisse line on its own behalf and only for the
duration of its existence, suggesting that the frontier question would be reopened when
Germany became unified. The Polish government rejected the German interpretation and
reiterated the Potsdam Agreement had permanently fixed the western frontier of Poland.772
Despite their disagreement, the treaty structure in the early 1970s temporarily set aside
sovereignty disputes between West Germany and Poland and removed the largest obstacle
to their diplomatic normalization.
770 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp. 125-126.
771 Jain, Germany, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1949-1991, p. 87.
772 Kulski, Germany and Poland, pp. 192-195.
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In return for Bonn's bold departure from its previous position on the status of the
GDR and the eastern frontier, the Soviet bloc offered greater tolerance of inter-German
contacts. The negotiation of the Four Power ambassadorial talks on a Berlin settlement took
place at the same time as those of the Moscow Treaty and Warsaw Treaty, but the former
only gained momentum after the later were signed. Also the Berlin Agreement came into
effect only in June 1972, after the Bundestag ratified the Moscow Treaty and Warsaw Treaty in
May 1972. Immediately after the treaty ratification, the FRG and GDR began their talks on
normalization of relations, which led to the signing of the Basic Treaty about seven months
later. Soviet pressure was critical to force the reluctant GDR government to accept the
FRG's links with West Berlin. These progresses in German-German relationship would not
have been possible had Bonn not made substantial concessions on sovereignty issues.
Moderated Economic Interaction under Detente
Ostpolitik succeeded in improving the FRG's relationship with the Eastern bloc states
because it not only satisfied their essential security interests but also delivered handsome
economic benefits, especially to Poland. The legitimacy of the Polish communist regime had
plunged since the 1960s because it failed to bring about the promised national economic
self-sufficiency and improvement of standard of living. The fast-growing party bureaucracy
and crony politics only exacerbated public disgust of the government. In addition, neo-
Stalinist influence reemerged after the fall of Krushcheve in 1964 and affected politics in
Poland, where the government tightened censorship in cultural affairs. This authoritarian
trend seriously alienated liberal-minded people in Poland. The confluence of all these
negative factors resulted in strikes, protests, and demonstration across the country, including
three major crises in 1968, 1970, and 1976. The food crisis in December 1970 even forced
Gomulka to step down from power.773
The hope of restoring regime legitimacy now became heavily dependent on the
government's ability to achieve better economic performance. To this end the Polish
government sought economic and technological aid from the West. Even before his
downfall, Gomulka had desired to obtain from West Germany the market access, credits and
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know-how that the USSR had been less and less able to provide because of its own
economic difficulty. In his meeting with Brandt to conclude the Warsaw Treaty, Gomulka
asked for a large, ten-year credit package, in exchange for which he offer to renounce
Poland's compensation claims to the FRG for war damages.774 The FRG government
responded positively to the Polish request because it believed that economic relationship
could reduce the political and security tension with its Eastern neighbors. In October 1970,
the governments of the FRG and Poland concluded a bilateral trade agreement. Four years
later they signed a ten-year Agreement on the Development of Economic, Industrial and
Technical Cooperation that provided a framework for bilateral economic cooperation in
various dimensions.
While the Cold War structure no longer hindered bilateral economic interactions as
much as before, the obstacles now mainly came from the right-wing forces in West
Germany, particularly the expellees organizations, who had felt betrayed by Brandt's
concession on the frontier issue. They now demand the government to condition economic
aid on Poland's agreement to increase the emigration of ethnic Germans to West Germany.
The Polish authority was reluctant to relax its emigration policy for fear of both losing
skilled manpower and inviting criticism from neo-Stalinists within Poland. It was until
August 1975 when Gomulka and Brandt's successors, Edward Gierek and Chancellor
Schmidt, met at the CSCE that the two countries partially resolved the thorny issue of
German emigration. In this so-called "cash for people deal," Poland agreed to allow
120,000-125,000 ethnic Germans to emigrate to the FRG over four years, in return for
which it would receive DM1 billion credit at a low interest rate and a one-time financial
settlement of pension and accident claims in the amount of DM1.3 billion.775
Another breakthrough in bilateral economic diplomacy came in 1976, when Gierek
made the first visit to the FRG by a Polish First Secretary since 1945. This visit resulted in a
five-year economic agreement promising to expand bilateral exchange of raw materials and
energy. Besides, the two governments also signed a Program of Cooperation between the
German Chambers of Commerce and Industry and the Polish Chamber of Foreign Trade
773 Davies, God's Playground, Vol. 2, pp. 588-591.
774Jain, Germany, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1949-1991, p. 77.
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and fourteen contracts between Polish state-owned enterprises and German companies and
banks. Based on these contracts and those similar ones signed in the late 1970s, West
German banks extended sizable loans and financial credits to some large Polish industrial
projects.7 6
These official agreements quickly boosted bilateral economic ties. Trade increase
accelerated after 1972. By the end of the 1970s, the absolute value of West German-Polish
trade was about seven times larger than a decade ago (Chart 7). Although trade with the
Eastern bloc was never a significant part of its total foreign trade, certain industrial sectors in
the FRG were heavily reliant on such trade. For example, in the mid-1970s the East
absorbed about 20 percent of the exports of the iron and steel exports industry in West
Germany.'77 For Poland, economic cooperation with the FRG was even more important.
From 1973, the FRG overtook all its Eastern European allies including Czechoslovakia and
East Germany to become Poland's second largest trade partner, next to the Soviet Union.
Chart 7: German-Polish Trade Relations, 1953-1999
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The people-to-people relationship between West Germany and Poland also
improved substantially during this period. It is reported that the images of the Eastern
European countries in West Germany in the early 1970s were unprecedentedly positive.778
Polish popular perception of West Germany also improved during the same period. One
important reason was that detente and Brandt's Ostpolitik enabled partial settlement of the
frontier issue and the problem of ethnic Germans in Poland, the two thorniest issues that
had poisoned mutual popular perception.
In the past the Polish communist government had used the frontier issue to sell to
the public a self-fulfilling prophecy about German revanchism. But the dramatic turnaround
of German policy on the frontier issue greatly assuaged Polish fear of German revanchism, if
not completely dispelled it. In West Germany, public obsession with the lost German
Eastern territories also abated. Surveys done by Der Spiegelbetween October 1969 and
December 1970 reported fast decrease of expellee reluctance to recognize the Oder-Neisse
Line. The rest of the West German population was even more willing to accept the
territorial status quo than the expellees. Polling data in 1967 and 1968 show that more than
half of German respondents considered the Eastern territories were lost forever.779 The
victory of the social liberal coalition in the ratification battle of the Moscow Treaty and
Warsaw Treaty further demonstrated that the majority of the national population supported
Ostpolitik and reconciliation with the Eastern bloc countries even if this meant relinquishing
territorial claims.
As for the problem of ethnic Germans in Poland, another outstanding source of
German antipathy toward the Poles, the 1975 "cash for people deal" provided a first-step
solution. At the last minute before the deal was held up for Bundestag ratification, the
Schmidt government squeezed further concession from Warsaw that other ethnic Germans
would also be allowed to leave even after the four-year limit.780 Although still defending its
778 Eduard Miihle, Germany and the European East in the Twentieth Century (Oxford ; New York, Berg, 2003), p.
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77 Kulski, Germany and Poland, pp. 136-137; Harry K. Rosenthal, German and Pole: National Conflict and Modern
Myth (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1976), p. 144.
780 Jain, Germany, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1949-199 1, pp. 122-123.
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postwar expulsion of Germans as a justified policy, Warsaw did make substantial efforts to
address a great part of German grievances toward Poland.
Another factor that contributed to the positive trend in German-Polish popular
relationship was the increase of bilateral societal contacts, also a product of detente and West
Germany's Ostpolitik. The social liberal government in West Germany considered all-
European ties conductive to deepening inter-bloc detente, gradually influencing the political
behaviors of Eastern countries, and very importantly, facilitating the growth of all-German
contacts.781 At the same time, Warsaw welcomed limited expansion of such contacts. The
government wanted to appease domestic political dissidents by relaxing restrictions on
people-to-people interactions with Western countries. Contacts with the West was a means
to increase Poland's political autonomy from the Soviet Union.
Government encouragement greatly stimulated bilateral cultural and societal
contacts. When signing a series of agreements on economic cooperation in 1976, the two
governments also concluded a cultural agreement and promised to continue their efforts for
"more comprehensive knowledge and mutual understanding." 782 In terms of personnel
exchange, German tourist visits to Poland increased three times in 1971-1974, far exceeding
the French to be the largest group of Western visitors to this country. By 1974, annual
tourist traffic from West Germany reached 220,000, compared to 36,000 in 1970.783
II. Trend of Historical Settlement as A Driving Force for Reconciliation
The thaw in the West German-Polish relationship need not be completely accredited
to the systemic incentives generated by detente. Another important driving force for
bilateral reconciliation was the trend of historical settlement, which was relatively
independent of detente. Emerged in the mid-1960s, this trend had three interconnected
components. First was the rise of politics of reconciliation as the moral dimension of
German Ostpolitik that promoted bilateral rapprochement through institutional measures of
781 Garton Ash, In Europe's Name, pp. 267-268.
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restitution. The second was the gradual decline of historical mythmaking in both countries.
The third was the West German-Polish historians' dialogue in an effort to develop a shared
memory of the war history.
West German Politics of Reconciliation and Inter-governmentalArrangements of Restitution
In Adenauer years, Bonn made restitution to Israel and Western countries as a part
of its Westpolitik - to assure its Western allies of a peaceful, democratic Germany and
obtain their support for German unification. By the mid-1960s German politics of
reconciliation began to extend to the East. The new agenda was first set by the Evangelical
Church of Germany. In October 1965, the church published a letter, encouraging the FRG
government to formally renounce the eastern territories and called up the Germans and
Poles to begin a process of healing through dialogue.784 On November 18, Polish bishops
wrote back in a remarkably cordial and conciliatory tone. In the letter the Polish bishops
pointed out dark periods in bilateral relations, including the brutal invasion and occupation
of Poland by the Teutonic Knights in ancient history and the Nazis in WWII, in addition to
those periods of cooperation between the two churches and two nations in the past. As for
the frontier issue, while emphasizing that the Oder-Neisse Line was a matter of Poland's
existence and the expulsion of Germans was one of the bitter consequences of Germany's
war, the letter nevertheless implicitly acknowledged Polish responsibility for the sufferings of
German refugees and expellees. The Polish bishops said: "Let us try to forget! No
polemics, no more Cold War... We forgive and we ask you also to forgive." The German
bishops then replied on December 5, conceding Germany's responsibility for the horrible
experiences of the Polish nation during the war. "We, too, ask to forget, yes, we ask to
forgive," the German letter said.785
The exchange of letters between German and Polish churches represented eager
voices in the two societies advocate to address bilateral historical legacies and rebuilding a
normal relationship. While the bishops' proposal was mainly inspired by Christian teaching
of leniency and love, Brandt and like-minded politicians in the SPD embraced a
784 Ann L. Phillips, "The Politics of Reconciliation, p. 70; Whetten, Germany's Ostpolitik, p. 16.
785 Kulski, Germany and Poland, pp. 133-135; Garton, In Europe's Name, p. 299.
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reconciliation program as part of their Ostpolitik. Acknowledging Germany's past crimes was
essential to rebuilding trust and normalizing relations with East European countries, which
could facilitate inter-German connections, improve West Germany's security environment,
and bring direct economic benefit. As Brandt said in his Government declaration in 1969,
"We want to be a nation (Volk) of good neighbors." In his farewell statement in 1982,
Schmidt also summarized the foreign policy of the social-liberal coalition that it "has, with its
treaty- and reconciliation-policy towards the eastern neighbors, created the second pillar, the
necessary addition (to Adenauer's Western ties) for peaceful neighborliness in all
directions."786
In addition to fulfilling diplomatic goals, however, Brandt's foreign policy to the East
had an important ideological and moral dimension. Contrary to Adenauer who tried to
prettify national image by downplaying Nazi crimes, Brandt believed that one of the central
pillars of postwar German national identity, democracy, would not be truly upheld until the
nation came to terms with its past.787 Besides his advocacy for democracy, Brandt was a rare
world leader in the Cold War who "recognize(s) morality as a political force."788 In his
speech on 20 January 1989 in honor of Brandt, Federal President Richard von Weizsaicker
made the following statement about Brandt's emphasis on morality in politics:
You have achieved something quite rare in politics: In your person you have overcome the
tension between power and morality. There is no political responsibility without power.
Morality without power does not solve any problems. It merely becomes ideology and
condemns rather than helps. Power without morality is a dead-end street, because it finds no
trust. You have found trust and used it."789
Owing to his genuine care about German national identity and morality, Brandt's
politics of reconciliation was not a tactical move but embodied sincere contrition. He made
unequivocal apology for Nazi crimes to Poland. In his official visit to Poland in December
1970, Brandt fell to his knees as he laid a wreath at the memorial for the Jews murdered in
1943 by SS units in the Warsaw Ghetto. With the entire world watching, Brandt's action
sent a message to the Polish nation that Germans wished to offer their heartfelt repentance.
Not only with symbolic gestures, the Brandt government also used financial means to atone
350
786 Garton, In Europe's Name, p. 300.
787 Herf, Divided Memogy, p. 344/
788 Garton, In Europe's Name, p. 299.
___
for the Nazi crimes. The Warsaw Treaty that Brandt signed during this visit committed the
FRG government to provide more than DM1 billion to pay for the pensions of Polish
victims of Nazi occupation.
Unlike the Japanese LDP leaders who made some ambiguous apology to China at
the time of diplomatic normalization and later claimed to be done with it, German SPD
politicians made long-lasting efforts to express remorse and pursue the issue of war
responsibility. Having pushed through the Bundestag the five-year extension of the statute of
limitations on prosecuting crimes of the Nazi era in 1965, the SPD continued to fight for
further investigations and trials of Nazi crimes. As a result, the Bundestag voted in 1969 to
extend the statute to thirty years, and in 1979 finally abolished the statute of limitations on
crimes of murder and genocide.79
In terms of war commemoration, Schmidt was the first West German chancellor to
deliver a speech at Auschwitz-Birkenau, a prime symbol of Nazi genocidal crimes, in
November 1977 to memorialize the sufferings of the Polish nation in the war. He said, "the
crime of Nazi fascism and the guilt of the German Reich under Hitler's leadership are at the
basis of our responsibility. We Germans of today are not guilty as individual persons, but we
must bear the political legacy of those who were guilty. That is our responsibility." He
made it clear that German contrition was the foundation for German-Polish reconciliation.
"We know one thing, however: the path to reconciliation cannot avoid Auschwitz, but the
path to mutual understanding must not and cannot end here in Auswitz," said Schmidt.
One year later, Schmidt made another forthright speech regarding the Nazi persecution on
the 4 0th anniversary of the anti-Jewish pogrom. He gave a detailed description of Nazi
crimes committed on that day, criticized the ordinary Germans who failed to protest the
crimes, and urged the younger generation to face the history in case the same thing
happened again.791
789 This speech excerpt is available at the website (http://www.bwbs.de/Brandt E/111.html) of the Willy
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Evidently, these statements of West German leaders laid out who (the German
nation) was responsible for what wrongdoings (Nazi crimes) to whom (the Poles and the
Jews), expressed sorrow and remorse, as well as promised not to repeat the wrongdoings.
Enunciated in public occasions, these statements qualified for complete apology that is
essential to historical settlement between a perpetrator and a victim state. Coupled with
other restitution measures, the German official apology greatly mollified Polish public
grievances. Although Poles' distrust of Germany could not be immediately swept away, they
generally came to believe in Brandt's personal integrity and responded to his Osipolitik with
warmth. Since 1969 the Polish mass media conceded that there existed reasonable men
among West German Social Democrats and Free Democrats (FDP) with whom Poles could
peacefully coexist. So German politics of reconciliation improved the image of the Germans
among Polish people.7 92
The Decline of National Mythmaking in West Germany and Poland
During Phase Two, war historiography in both countries experienced a gradual
process of reconstruction, mainly due to internal political changes. In West Germany, public
debate on war memory opened up since the early 1960s, over which the SPD gained
increasing influence. At the same time, German education system underwent significant
reform that not only introduced pluralistic elements to the education institutions but also
increased textbook coverage of the Nazi history. In Poland, limited political liberalization
since the late 1960s relaxed ideological constraints on public discourse and provided more
space for liberal intellectuals to present their own interpretations of national history.
The Bundestag debates about the statute of limitations, or Ver/dhmrngsdebatten, ushered
in an era of active public discussions in West Germany about the Nazi past. By the end of
the 1950s the country faced a difficult problem that thousands of suspects of Nazi crimes
could escape prosecution when the fifteen-year statute of limitations expired. In the first
Verqdhrungsdebatten held in 1960, SPD politicians led the initiative to extend/eliminate the
statue. They argued that the "mountain of guilt and havoc" obliged the German nation to a
moral cause of rehabilitating the victims by bringing the criminals to justice. But this
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proposal met steadfast opposition from the right-wing members in the CDU/CSU and even
the FDP, who insisted that further trials would damage national honor and gave the world
an impression that Germany is a nation of murderers.7 93 In the end, the SPD proposal was
rejected at the Bundestag.
However, the issue of statute of limitations was suddenly put under the spotlight in
1961 when the Israeli government held the sensational open trial of Nazi criminal Adolf
Eichmann. Against the backdrop of growing domestic and international attention to the
judicial failure in West Germany, three new rounds of Vejidhrungsdebatten took place in 1965,
1969, and 1979, and led to the eventual abolishing of the statute. These debates increasingly
incorporated the memory of the Nazi past to West German public consciousness. As time
went by, more and more German people agreed with the SPD on the issue of German war
responsibility. True that by the end of the 1970s a national consensus on Germany's war
responsibility had yet to take hold and biases against Eastern European victim countries
remained strong. But the spirit of reconciliation preached by the left had captured the
imagination of the German public.
Parallel to the parliamentary debates on the judicial issues, the German political circle
deliberated over another important institution shaping national collective memory, the
educational system. Since the early 1960s, criticism of German history textbooks from the
domestic political left and international society mounted. The meeting of educational
officials from all German states (Lander) in January 1960 to discuss revising the teaching of
the Nazi history in schools marked the beginning of history education reform.7 94 More
substantial reforms were initiated in the late 1960s in the state of Hessen and taken up by
other German states as well. These reforms aimed at democratizing the decision-making
process of educational policy and content, increasing the coverage of Nazi Germany in
school curricula, and de-emphasizing nationalistic education themes. 795 They contributed to
the noticeable improvement of German textbook representation of the Nazi history in the
1970s. According to a comprehensive comparison of German secondary school textbooks
793 Herf, DividedMemogy, pp. 338-339.
794 Calvert, Germany's Naýi Past, p. 1.
795 Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, "Identity and Transnationalization in German School Textbooks," in Hein,Censoring Histogy, p. 142.
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published in the 1950s-60s and in the 1970s-early 1980s for college-bound students, the later
editions provided more details on Nazi crimes.7 96
The practice of historical mythmaking also declined in communist Poland, although
to a lesser extent than in West Germany. 7" Since Gomulka took power in the late 1950s, a
more relaxed domestic political environment enabled a partial restoration of professional
ethics to the history discipline. Some historians began to question the biases in the official
historiography, and advanced competing interpretations of Polish national history. This
trend continued into the 1960s and 1970s. Historians used the opportunity to liberalize the
profession and encourage plural views, and reaffirm academic standards of objectivity and
rigorous research of historical materials. As a result, the dominance of official Marxist
historiography in Polish national collective memory eroded during this period. One obvious
sign was the change that the Polish Historical Association made to its statues in 1979 to stop
treating Marxism as the sole recognized method of scholarship.
During the 1970s, historians no longer confined their liberal opinions to specialized
conferences and publications of small circulations, but tried to disseminate them widely in
the society, such as through school education. The Catholic historian Bohdan Cywinski
published a pamphlet in 1979 titled "Poisoned Humanistic Studies," attacking the outright
falsifications in Polish textbooks about post-1918 national history and calling for youth self-
education to counter the influence of official historiography. Meanwhile, the non-
governmental Association of Academic Courses, also known as the "Flying University,"
gathered prominent historians with various schools of thought to offer lectures on Polish
history in major university cities.
The liberalization of Polish historiography in this period had many limitations. The
government was still able to manipulate education content through state censorship.
Moreover, although historians sought to uncover the "full truth" of Polish history, such
796 This investigation found that there were still some areas of insufficient coverage, such as on the Warsaw
Ghetto and the German occupation policies in Poland. Nevertheless, the progressive penchant of German
textbooks in this period was evident. See Calvert, Germany's Nai Past, pp. 176-187.
797 The following analysis of Polish historiographic changes draws from the Valkenier, "The Rise and Decline
of Official Marxist Historiography in Poland, 1945-1983," pp. 664-671.
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sensitive topics like Katyn Massacre and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact remained taboos in
public discourses. Besides, Polish historians in general failed to reflect on the Poles' own
historical responsibility in Polish-Jewish relations. As one student of Polish historiography
comments, in this period "(the representation of) the history of recent times remained at
worst a travesty of truth, and at best a sadly truncated version."'7 98 Nevertheless, the
relatively relaxed official control of historiography and reinvigoration of the history
profession in Poland reduced the ideological and political obstacles for Polish historians to
communicate with their Western counterparts. This prepared the intellectual and societal
foundation for the path-breaking program of West German-Polish textbook cooperation
starting in this period.
West German-Polish Textbook Cooperation
While the domestic political trends unleashed a process of reconstructing national
collective memory, the bilateral textbook cooperation pushed this process in the direction of
attaining greater convergence.7 99 German historians' first appeal to Poland for joint history
research came in March 1956, when a Germany history teacher, in cooperation with exiled
Polish historians and the Braunschweig-based Georg-Eckert Institute for International
Textbook Research first established in 1951 under the auspices of the German Commission
for UNESCO, published his critiques of the inadequate, biased description of Poland in
German history textbooks. Polish historians actually reacted positively to German
historians. But the Warsaw Pact's intervention of the Hungarian Revolution in November
1956 suddenly tightened Poland's relationship with the West and dashed the hope for
bilateral historians' dialogue.
Since the late 1960s, the German-Polish relationship warmed up against the
backdrop of detente and Ostpolitik, but the gap between the two countries' historical
memories was quite striking. Even the letters of Polish and German bishops in 1965
betrayed their contrasting opinions of German historical atrocities in Poland, the Eastern
798 Valkenier, "The Rise and Decline of Official Marxist Historiography in Poland, 1945-1983," p. 670.
799 The following history of West German-Polish textbook cooperation is drawn upon an in-depth study on
this subject by Takahiro Kondo (Kokusai Rekishi Ky6kasho Taiwa, Chapters 2-3) and the information available at
the official website of the Georg-Eckert Institute (http://www.gei.de/english/indexl.shtml).
frontier, and the postwar expulsion of Germans from East Europe. So people realized that
promoting a common understanding of their past traumatic conflict, in addition to other
forms of cooperation, would strengthened bilateral reconciliation. In the fall of 1970, the
German and Polish delegations to the UNESCO General Conference in Paris met and
formally founded the German-Polish Textbook Commission. In February 1972, an 11-
member German delegation led by historian Georg Eckert arrived in Warsaw and received
an enthusiastic welcome from the Polish Academy of Sciences. This meeting inaugurated
bilateral textbook dialogue.
Co-financed by the governments of the SPD-run West German Lander, the
Textbook Commission was operated by professional historians and largely independent of
governmental influence, especially on the West German side. Ever since 1972, historians of
the two countries met roughly twice a year, in Warsaw and Braunschweig alternately, to
discuss coverage of German-Polish relations in their history and geography textbooks. The
first major accomplishment of these meetings was the publication of the famous
"Recommendations on History and Geography Textbooks in the Federal Republic of
German and the People's Republic of Poland" ("Recommendations" hereafter) in April
1976. The "Recommendations" included 26 topics ranging from the Teutonic Knights in
the ancient history, to the three partitions of Poland in the 18th century and Polish nation's
struggle for independence, Nazi occupation and Polish resistance movement, and such
contemporary events as the postwar territorial alterations, and migration of ethnic Germans.
The interpretation offered in the "Recommendations" not only looked straight into the acts
of injustice done by the one nation to the other but also explored the historical
consciousness at the time that justified these acts.
The initial responses to the "Recommendations" in West Germany were uneven.
The bilateral cultural agreement signed in 1976 did promise to take into consideration the
"Recommendations" in writing their school textbooks. But this promise by the federal
government did not have a binding effect on the Lander who were responsible for their own
curriculum matters. In fact, as soon as it started, the textbook cooperation project suffered
fierce attacks from the conservative opposition party CDU/CSU and the expellee
organizations. The Munich-based right-wing paper Deutsche National-Zeitung even denounced
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the German historians participating in the dialogue as the "complicities of Pan-Slavist
agitation" and "masochists of the nation." Other conservatives criticized the dialogue was a
politically driven "textbook diplomacy" sacrificing historical truth for the sake of
reconciliation with Poland. Because the SPD supported the dialogue and a few key figures
of the Textbook Commission such as Georg Eckert were SPD members, criticism of the
dialogue became part of the conservatives' power struggle with the liberals. The
conservative offensive culminated in the publication in 1978 of the "Alternative
Recommendations for the Treatment of German-Polish History in Textbooks," authored by
an German expert on East German History, Professor Josef Joachim Menzel at Mainz
University.80o Responding to all the 26 topics covered in the "Recommendations," Menzel's
report was a counterproposal that tried to whitewash Germany's historical responsibility
while blaming Poland for postwar German sufferings in the expulsion and territorial loss.
Predictably, the attitude polarization between the left and right led to contrasting
policies across different Lander. Such CDU/CSU-controlled Lander as Schleswig-Holstein,
Bayern, and Baden-Wiirttemberg were critical of the "Recommendations," whereas Lander
governed by the SPD, including North Rhine-Westphalia, Hamburg, Bremen, Hessen, and
West Berlin, endorsed the "Recommendations" as the guidelines for textbook authorization
and the reference for classroom teaching. West Berlin even invited Polish historians to
participate in its own symposium of joint textbook research.
Toward the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, however, the West
German debates on textbook cooperation tipped to favor the left. Conservative-dominated
Lander also began to express understanding of and respect to the endeavor of the Textbook
Commission. Niedersachsen where the Georg-Eckert Institute is located basically refrained
from repudiating the significance of the project, and even distributed the
"Recommendations within the state in 1978, albeit accompanied by a note warning that the
historical views in the document remained controversial. Another CDU Lander Rheinland-
Pfalz distributed both the "Recommendations" and Menzel's report to all secondary schools
800 Von Karlheinz Lau, "Durchbruch zum Diskurs: Drei Jahrzehnte Deutsch-Polnische Schulbuchkommission
(Breakthrough to Discussion: Three Decades of German-Polish Schoolbook Commission)," Das OstpreuBen
/ Landsmannschaft Ostpreufen e.V./28 (uli 2001). Available at http://www.webarchiv-
server.de/pin/archivO1/3001obl4.htm
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in the state. The government of Saarland also stated its willingness to fulfill the spirit of the
Recommendations in history education. Even the state of Bayern, whose earlier attitude to
the textbook cooperation was the harshest, now permitted the "Recommendations" to be
held by schools as one types of teaching materials.
Evidence of the impact of the "Recommendations" on the West German textbook
content was compelling. According to a 1982 assessment done by the Georg-Eckert
Institute of 13 editions of history textbooks used across different Lander, the coverage of
Poland reached the level of other major European countries such as France, and showed the
tendency to further expand. Also, more than 90 percent of the changes in the textbook
coverage of Polish history were made in the direction advised by the "Recommendations,"
clearly suggesting that West German textbook authors and publishers had incorporated the
Recommendations into textbook production. Because of the improvement of textbook
content, ordinary German people no longer felt indifferent to Poland as they did in the
Adenauer era, and the Weimar myth that the Poles were lazy, incompetent, and disgraceful
lost currency.8 01
The West German-Polish Textbook Cooperation contributed to the advent of
historiographic convergence between the two enemy states. It is not to say that such
convergence at the time was already complete or solid. Some critics of the project was right
in saying that West German historians could not have a free dialogue with historians from
the communist Poland. Due to the Cold War constraints and the Polish government
pressure, the "Recommendations" failed to include such sensitive topics as the secret
protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and Kaytn Massacre. Nevertheless, the Textbook
Commission never purported the "Recommendations" to be the final product of their work,
and treated these topics as the subject for future dialogue. It would take the upheaval of the
Solidarity movement and the end of the Cold War to bring Poland's suffering at the hands
of the Soviets into the German-Polish shared memory.
801 On the decline of the Weimar myth about the Poles in West Germany the 1960s ad 1970s, see Rosenthal,
German and Pole, Chapter 5.
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In conclusion, in the 1970s West Germany and Poland were still distant from
reaching true and deep reconciliation, due to the strict limits set by Cold War bloc politics.
But the political normalization legitimized and boosted bilateral contacts, and a largely
relaxed domestic political setting contributed to the inception of historical settlement of past
trauma at the societal level. Absent of these efforts, the two states would not have sustained
mutual contacts when the Cold War tension escalated in the 1980s, neither would they have
quickly moved to deep reconciliation in the early 1990s once the structural pressure
dissipated.80 2
PHASE THREE: THE 1980s
West German-Polish reconciliation faced severe systemic challenge during this
period when the renewed tension between the superpowers compelled the two countries
into tighter political and military collaboration with their respective alliances. Chancellor
Helmut Kohl of the conservative CDU/CSU adjusted West German foreign policy to
refocus on strategic commitment to the West, while Brezhnev, following the Polish crisis of
Solidarity, also brought more pressure to bear on Poland and other Eastern European
countries to stay the course of socialism. The Cold War imperatives particularly threatened
to once again pit West Germany and Poland against each other.
Despite the negative structural conditions, the framework of bilateral reconciliation
sustained in this period. Mutual national recognition and agreement on territorial status quo
continued to hold, and economic interactions and societal contacts also grew steadily.
Popular relations suffered from mutual mistrust and alienation, but did not return to the
militant hostility in the early Cold War years. Three factors accounted for the resilience of
West German-Polish reconciliation. First, Kohl's westward reorientation of foreign policy
was to some extent offset by the liberal opposition to push for continued contacts with the
East. Second, even the Kohl government itself adhered to the politics of reconciliation with
Poland that had taken deep root in West Germany during the detente years. Thirdly,
historians of the two countries persisted in their efforts to build shared memory through
802 To be sure, Czechoslovakia's cold response to German politics of reconciliation in the 1970s caused the
difficulty in German-Czech reconciliation in the 1990s, which had no foundation to build on but had to start
joint textbook research. The conflict between their historical narratives further abated, due
to the emergence of West German national consensus on war responsibility after heated
domestic debates, and the dramatic reform of Polish history profession after the Solidarity.
Such a robust trend of historiographic convergence, combined with the legacy of Brandt'
Osipolitik, effectively mitigated the repercussions of the new Cold War in West German-
Polish relations.
I. New Structural Obstacles to German-Polish Reconciliation
The US-Soviet "Second Cold War"
Detente was in decline from the middle to late 1970s, thanks to the escalation of
superpower competition in Africa and the Middle East. What marked the collapse of
detente was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, which prompted the U.S. to quit all
cooperative contacts and negotiations with the USSR and shelve the ratification of SALT II
indefinitely.8 03 By the time when Ronald Reagan took office in January 1981, Washington
and Moscow had been back to sharp antagonism. Adopting a hard line policy of
containment, Reagan also revived the hostile rhetoric of the early Cold War period, ushering
in the era of "second Cold War." He denounced the Soviet Union as an "evil empire," and
called for a "global campaign for democracy" and "freedom" to roll back the Marxist-
Leninist influence in the world. He also strongly opposed making any compromise with the
Soviets and assailed the conciliatory American policy during the d6tente years. "D6tente,"
he said, had been "a one-way street that the Soviet Union has used to pursue its own
aims." 804
The end of d6tente unleashed a new arms race between the two superpowers, for
both were trying to build up their military strength to prevent each other from attaining
strategic superiority. From the late 1970s, the USSR began to strengthen its strategic nuclear
forces aimed at American forward bases and other Western targets on the Eurasian
out all from scratch. See Phillips, "The Politics of Reconciliation, p. 72.
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804 Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994), pp. 8-11.
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periphery. Crying for a growing Soviet threat because of the "relentless Soviet military
buildup," the Carter administration responded by extensive investment on strategic
counterforce capabilities. Ronald Reagan was even more determined to pursue a policy of
peace through strength, and launched the largest peacetime military buildup in American
history.
Reagan's aggressive defense spending left Moscow with no doubt that he was
pursuing a policy of military superiority, which "worsens and complicates the international
situation and creates the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war." To meet the challenge,
Soviet military leaders vowed to invigorate the Soviet Union's own military programs.
"Under conditions of heightened aggressiveness by imperialism our party is showing great
vigilance and is doing everything necessary to strengthen the defense capability of the
country," said Viktor Grishin, a hard-line Poliburo member. s"' Brezhnev's successor, Yuri
Andropov, said that "peace cannot be obtained from the imperialists by begging for it. It can
be upheld only by relying on the invincible might of the Soviet armed forces."80 6
Euromissiles and Security Conflict between West Germany and the East
The deteriorating structural conditions as a result of the US-Soviet "Second Cold
War" exerted negative pressure on West German-Polish relations in a number of ways.
First, the issue of Euromissile deployment, a product of the renewed East-West
confrontation, dramatically heightened the fear of military conflict in Europe. In the late
1970s, the Soviet Union beef up its theater nuclear forces (TNF) to countervail the threat of
the US nuclear delivery forces in Europe. From 1976, it began deployment of the new SS-
20s carrying MIRVed nuclear warheads to replace the existing intermediate-range ballistic
missiles in Europe. These Soviet nuclear forces gravely alarmed West Germany. As
Chancellor Schmidt warned in a 1977 speech, 'Without weapon parity, hence without
theatre weapons, the Western world's security is in danger." s0 7
805 This remark was made in November 1982. Quoted from Garthoff, The Great Transition, p. 83.
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In response to the Soviet TNF buildup and trying to address the security needs of
allies, NATO decided in 1979 on a "double track" plan to deploy 572 Pershing II missiles in
West Europe, the so-called Euromissiles, coupled with a second track of arms control
negotiations with Moscow. Moscow who accused the Euromissile plan of trying "to upset
the balance of forces in Europe and to attempt to secure military superiority for the NATO
bloc" because these missiles were capable of reaching targets deep in Soviet territories.
Because the majority of Euromissiles were to be installed in West Germany, the Schmidt
government much preferred the second track than the first track that would subject the FRG
to heavy Soviet political and military pressure. Although Schmidt's "shuttle diplomacy"
between Moscow and Washington persuaded the Soviets and Americans to agree to
continue negotiation efforts, he was unable to have them accept each other's terms. As a
scholar of German diplomacy lamented, "while Schmidt succeeded in bringing those horses
to the water, he could not make them drink."""80 8
Not surprisingly, the US-Soviet TNF arms limitation talks from November 1980 to
November 1983 did not produce any meaning results before they broke off. West Germany
had no other choice but to rely on the NATO defense system for its security. The Bundestag
approved the deployment of the Euromissiles in May 1981, which formally began from
December 1983. At the same time, the Soviet deployment of SS-20s continued. By
September 1983, 351 SS-20s targeting on West Europe had been installed.809 A good part of
these missiles were based in Eastern European countries. The introduction of new, highly
destructive weapon systems by both strategic blocs raised the specter of nuclear war in
Europe and dramatically aggravated the security dilemma between West Germany and its
Eastern neighbors.
Trend ofAlienation: the Polish Crisis and Kohl's Westpolitik
In the face of deteriorating US-Soviet relations, the Schmidt government still tried to
maintain a "mini-European-detente," by continuing a good relationship with the Eastern
808 Richard Lowenthal, "The German Question Transformed," Foreign Affairs 63 (1984/85).
809 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 943.
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European neighbors.81 Absent of superpower cooperation, however, the FRG's unilateral
effort was unable to salvage detente. Two major events in the early 1980s embodied the
effect of East-West confrontation to alienate West Germany and Poland. The first was the
eruption of the Solidarity in Poland and the international repercussions of the martial law
enforced by the Polish military leader Jaruzelski to crack down Solidarity. The second was
the significant reorientation of West German foreign policy under the new leadership of
Helmut Kohl.
The trigger of the Polish crisis was a series of strikes in protest of food shortages and
other forms of economic hardships that workers faced everyday, including the heroic strike
at the Lenin Shipyards of Gdansk in the summer of 1980. Since then, the nationwide labor
unrest gravitated to a united, political movement with far-reaching demands for labor reform
and greater civil rights. The charismatic leader of the Gdansk strike, Lech Walesa, was
elected as the chairman of a free national trade union, or Solidarity. Having attracted a
membership of about one fourth of Polish population and received explicit support from
Pope John Paul II and the Catholic Church, Solidarity posed a formidable challenge to the
communist regime.81
The rise of Solidarity also threatened Soviet Union's vested interest in East Europe.
Moscow was afraid that the fall of communism in Poland would cause a "domino effect" of
democratic movement in Eastern Europe and shatter the foundation of the socialist alliance.
For Western countries, the greatest fear was the Soviet military intervention to Poland, just
like what happened in East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968.
Kremlin indeed contemplated the use of outside forces to put down Solidarity. At a Soviet
Poliburo session in January 1981, Defense Minister Dmitrii Ustinov said, "We need to
constantly keep pressure on the Polish leadership and constantly keep checking on them.
We intend to hold manoeuvres in Poland in March. It seems to me that we should
somehow bolster these exercises to make it clear that we have forces ready to act."812
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It was under the shadow of the Soviet power that General Jaruzelski acted on
December 13, 1981 to quell Solidarity with a martial law. The Reagan administration angrily
imposed economic sanctions against both Warsaw and Moscow, and demanded its
European allies to follow suit. Western countries including the FRG answered the call and
cancelled planned meetings to help Warsaw with its huge hard-currency debt, although they
did not join the U.S. in its sanctions against Moscow. Moscow reacted to Western sanctions
with condemnation. It also discouraged the economic and social ties between West
Germany and Eastern Europe. Thus, when Bonn extended a DM1 billion credit to East
Germany at a low interest rate, Moscow accused Bonn of using "economic levers and
political contacts" to interfere in the internal affairs of East Germany."13
To be sure, Bonn's economic sanction against Poland after the martial law was half-
hearted. Schmidt and his cohort believed that a Poland in chaos and bankruptcy would
disrupt the East-West power balance and induce war.8 14 Moreover, he wrote in a memoir in
the late 1980s that he was afraid that harsh reactions on the Bonn side to the martial law
would "supply the communist propagandists in Warsaw with argument against the alleged
'German revanchism'."8' 5 On December 15, soon after martial law was in place, West
German Economic Minister Lambsdorff stated, "we have helped Poland up to now and we
will do so again in 1982." But there were serious limitations on Bonn's diplomacy to Poland.
Schmidt was under direct pressure from Regan not to respond to Polish appeal for
economic aid. Although Bonn and Warsaw managed to sign a rescheduling agreement for
Poland's interest payments on commercial loans in April 1982, without the U.S. blessing,
multilateral negotiation on rescheduling interest payments for state credits was out of the
question, not to mention any fresh German credits to Poland.816
Schmidt's ambivalent reactions to the Polish situation offended both the Polish
government and workers. Warsaw castigated Bonn's economic sanction and its foot-
dragging in providing Poland with the much needed financial assistance. Anti-German
813 Jain, Germany, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1949-1991, p. 197.
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propaganda flared up again in Poland. The Polish government also joined the Soviet Union
in condemning Bonn's credit to East Germany. The Soviet and Polish obstruction forced
Honecker to cancel his planned visits to the FRG in 1983 and again in 1984.817 At the same
time, Bonn's accommodating attitude to the Polish government alienated the Polish society.
Although sympathetic to the workers, Bonn did not want to destabilize Poland by any
official contacts with Solidarity. Whether it confirmed the Polish anti-German propaganda
in the eyes of the Poles was unclear, but Bonn's focus on the communist state brought them
disillusion about the democratic West Germany.8'"
If the international politics in the aftermath of Solidarity crackdown pulled Poland
away from West Germany, the readjustment of German foreign policy in Kohl era also
prevented West Germany from drawing too close to Poland. In October 1982, and the
victorious Helmut Kohl became the new chancellor, which position he would keep until
1998. A leader of the CDU/CSU party, Kohl devoted to steer the FRG back to the track of
West-centralism that his party had long adhered to. Specifically, he spelt out three pillars of
the new Westpolitik. First was to stress Bonn's alliance with the U.S. and reaffirm its
commitment to the TNF defense strategy of NATO. Second was to reassert Bonn's
embrace of the Western integration and the resultant European Community. The last was to
reemphasize Germany's goal of national unity, which had been somewhat downplayed
during the detente years in order to soothe the East bloc countries.819
All three policy priorities of the Kohl government were offensive to the Soviet bloc.
Bonn's move to deploy Euromissiles in 1983 despite domestic opposition and Soviet protest
only added insult to injury. West German-Soviet relationship quickly turned sour. From
1984 Soviet propaganda once again stepped up assault on the revanchist, neo-Nazi, neo-
fascist trends in German politics. As Moscow's interest in maintaining political dialogue
with Bonn tapered off, constraints on Bonn's contacts with Eastern European countries
increased. In that year, visits by leaders of East Germany and Bulgaria, Honecker and
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Zhivkov, to the FRG had to been cancelled, so was West German foreign minister Hans-
Dietrich Genscher's planned trip to Poland.8 20
II. Domestic Moderating Factors
The above analysis suggests that the end of superpower detente generated great
structural obstacles to West German-Polish reconciliation. However in decline if compared
to Phase II, bilateral relationship in the 1980s did not really go back to the situation of Phase
I: inter-governmental ties and territorial agreements established in the 1970s sustained,
bilateral trade quickly recovered from 1984 after the 1982-83 setback due to the economic
sanction, and mutual feelings among the public did not downgrade to the rigid mutual
stereotypes. Some domestic factors moderated the damage of the "second Cold War" to the
relationship. They included the liberal and leftist opposition in West Germany, Kohl's
refocusing on relationship with the East from 1984, and the reliance of the Polish
government on German economic assistance.
The SPD's "Second Ostpolitik "
The SPD lost the driver's seat of German foreign policy to the CDU/CSU after its
government collapsed in October 1982. While in opposition, the SPD carried out a shadow
Eastern policy in order to preserve detente within the scope of Europe, which they called "a
second phase of detente policy," or a "second Ostpolitik."
Egon Bahr, one of the original architects of Btandt's Ostpolitik, spearheaded the
new strategic thinking of the party. In 1981 he proposed a bold notion of "common
security" between the East and West. It argued that in the face of growing East-West
tension, the Europeans ought to stake out their own, autonomous policies and refused to
become "relative vassals of the superpowers." Acknowledging Western integration as a
major cornerstone of the FRG's foreign policy, the new strategy also advocated West
Germany's special responsibility to build security partnership with the East Bloc countries.
The aim was "to create, on the basis of a security partnership of the existing alliances, a
820Jain, Germany, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1949-1991, pp. 196-197.
European peace order which overcomes the blocs."8 21 Egon Bahr's new thinking was first
endorsed as the new international strategy of the party at the 1983 Cologne party conference,
when the party overwhelmingly rejected the deployment of Euromissiles by a vote of 400 to
14.' 22 Later it was formally canonized in the "Government Programme 1987-1990" prepared
for the SPD's campaign for the 1987 federal election.
The SPD did not stop at making policy rhetoric but tried to fulfill it by carrying out
interactions with political actors in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. First of all,
leading figures of the party formed joint working groups with the ruling communist parties
in the Soviet bloc on economic, environmental, confidence-building, and arms control
issues. The SPD's direct contacts with the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) were
particularly eye-catching. First set up in March 1984, a joint working group of the two
parties held regular talks on security issues, which eventually resulted in a joint proposal in
July 1988 for a "zone of trust and security." 823
In addition to the party-to-party contacts, SPD politicians frequently held policy talks
with Eastern European communist leaders. The most influential events are Brandt's
meetings with Gorbachev, Honecker, and Jaruzelski. In May 1985, Brandt visited Moscow
and discussed with Gorbachev on a wide range of issues concerning the current situation in
the world and Europe.824 The Brandt-Gorbachev summit talk was significant in that it was
the first meeting that this reformist Soviet leader had with a Western statesman after rising
to the top party spot in March 1985."' 825 After that, Brandt visited East Germany and met
with Honecker in September.
Two months after his visit to East Germany, Brandt made another significant trip,
this time to the most important European ally of Moscow, Poland. Intended to
commemorate the 15th anniversary of the Warsaw Treaty, Brandt's visit to Poland was
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welcomed warmly by the government and received prominent coverage in Warsaw media.
Brandt reconfirmed the permanence of the Ode-Neisser Line as Poland's western frontier.
He also asserted the SPD's interest in a stable Poland and declared his wish to influence the
Kohl government so that it would broaden cooperation with the Polish authorities.
Regarding the historical burden in German-Polish relations, Brandt spoke of the magnitude
of Poland's suffering during WWII and stated his belief that the young generation in the
FRG should know more about history. Expressing his support to a wide range of bilateral
cooperation and exchange of information, Brandt particularly emphasized the importance of
the Textbook Commission and hoped that the implementation of the "Recommendations"
would move forward more quickly.826
It is not an easy task to evaluate the effect of the SPD's "second Ostpolitik." On the
one hand, the party's shadow diplomacy did not seem to have brought about concrete
changes in the FRG's foreign policy. On the other hand, these talks and working groups
constituted an important channel of communication between the FRG and the Eastern bloc
countries, given the pressure from the superpowers to curtail inter-bloc official contacts. In
addition, in the eyes of the Eastern bloc countries, the personal charisma and prestige of
prominent SPD politicians like Willy Brandt greatly empowered their statements even
though they were not government leaders. Among others, Brandt's remarks on preserving
peace in Europe and remembering Polish suffering considerably mitigated Polish antipathy
to Germany. Historical memory was no small issue in Polish perception of Germany, as
indicated by the following speech by Jaruselski at a dinner with Brandt:
"Also of key importance for us, for well known historical reasons, is the moral climate accompanying
the development of our relations. Casual gestures will never substitute for honest self-examination.
One cannot win the credibility of Poles by cosmetic measures accompanied by revanchist and SS
rallies, historical falsifications and disgusting efforts to rehabilitate criminals who have been
condemned by the entire human race. We are not concerned with complexes or morbid memories but
with the truth, because only on this can a secure future be constructed..." 827
So Brandt's forthright attitude to German war responsibility had a very salutary effect on
nurturing mutual trust and understanding in West German-Polish relations.
826 "Text of report of Willy Brandt's press conference," Warsaw Home Service, December 9, 1985, in BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, December 11, 1985
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The "second Ostpolitik" also influenced West German public opinions if not the
actual government policy, as reflected in the anti-missile movement led by the New Left in
the FRG in the 1980s. The young, mostly well-educated German left wingers, were
particularly resentful of Reagan administration's presumptuous push for Euromissile
deployment and reluctance to pursue arms negotiations with the Soviet bloc.82 8 They
advocated German withdrawal from NATO and the neutralization of both Germanys. An
independent political campaign, the peace movement was inextricably connected to the SPD,
who provided moral and financial support. Although the peace movement failed to stop the
government from deploying INF missiles or disrupt the FRG's strategic ties with the U.S., it
aroused widespread anti-American and anti-missile sentiments in the West German public.8 29
Kohl's Djplomacy to the East and Polish Economic Needs
Kohl's ascendance to power sparked fear in Warsaw that he would make a
fundamental departure from the FRG's previous acknowledgement of the territorial status
quo in Europe and its cooperation programs with the East. Shortly before the fall of the
SPD government, the Poland News Agency (PAP) published a commentary expressing
worry that "many major cabinet posts might be entrusted to people who have notoriously
questioned in public the final character of Poland's Oder-Neisse Frontier." It went on to
make alarmist comments that a CDU government would place greater emphasis on
revanchism with respect to Poland and nationalist trends with respect to the GDR.830
Despite his emphasis on cross-Atlantic relations, however, Kohl's Eastern policy
embodied a remarkable continuity from his social democratic predecessors. One obvious
signal was that Genscher, Schmidt's foreign minister and a key supporter of Ostpolitik,
retained the post in the Kohl government. Another factor of policy continuity was the West
German national consensus on the importance of a stable relationship with the East, thanks
827 "Willy Brandt's Visit to Poland," Warsaw Home Service, December 7, 1985, in BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, December 11, 1985.
828 Harald Mueller and Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Origins of Estrangement: Movement and the Changed Image
of America in West Germany," International Security 12, No. 1 (1987), pp. 81-84.829 Herf, 'War, Peace, and the Intellectuals."
830 "The Collapse of the West German Coalition Government," in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,September 23, 1982.
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to the resounding success of Brandt's Ostpolitik in the 1970s. Many CDU politicians had
taken to heart the idea that keeping dialogue and cooperation with Eastern Europe would
contribute to a European peace order and promote the FRG's national security.8 31 As soon
as he took office, Kohl reassured Mikhail S. Solomentsev, an alternate member of the Soviet
Politburo, that Bonn would be a "solid honest and reliable partner in relations to the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe on the basis of existing contracts and agreements." This
statement was tantamount to an implicit acceptance of the Eastern treaties with Moscow,
Warsaw, and the GDR.832
One of Kohl's policy priorities, Germany's national unity, also mandated a
cooperative relationship with the Soviet bloc countries. He emphasized the promotion of a
common German culture and heritage between the two German states through intimate
economic and personal contacts. But inter-German relations could not be insulated from
the outside events. This linkage was evident in 1982-83 when the deterioration of the FRG's
relationship with the Soviet Union and Poland undermined its diplomacy to East Germany:
Soviet and Polish anti-German attitude as a result of West German economic sanction on
Poland and the Euromissile deployment was the chief cause of Honecker's twice
cancellation of his visit to Bonn. The Kohl government realized that in order to limit the
damage to German-German relationship it must improve relationship with Moscow and
Warsaw.
Kohl's attempt to amend relationship with Poland started with economic diplomacy.
In January 1984, Kohl gave Economics Minister Lambsdorff the go-ahead to reopen
economic relationship with Poland. But he also warned that the FRG should take these
"small steps" cautiously without incurring suspicion of other Western countries. Another
opportunity was the Polish invitation to Richard von WeizsHcker who became West German
president in summer 1984 to pay a state visit to Poland. Weizsaecker made German-Polish
reconciliation in the sense of the postwar Franco-German reconciliation as one of his main
goals in office. But at last he declined the invitation to avoid embarrassing Kohl."33 To be
sure, the Polish interest in normalization with the FRG at the time should not be
831 Davis, The Uses andAbuses of Economic Statecraft, p. 90; Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 128.
832 "Kohl Meets Soviet Aide, Urges 'Genuine D6tente'," Washington Post, October 8, 1982.
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overlooked. The Western economic sanction denied the Jaruzelski regime of economic aid
that could pull it out of its serious currency debt crisis and help the Polish economy back on
its feet. Jaruzelski was eager to reopen economic cooperation with the FRG, the Poland's
largest western creditor and trading partner.
The real breakthrough did not come until the new Economics Minister Martin
Bangemann, accompanied by prestigious members of the German business circle, visited
Warsaw in March 1985. In this trip Bangemann renewed the bilateral trade agreement
signed in 1974, and promised to restore export credit guarantees to Poland, which was the
first western government to do so after the declaration of martial law. Moreover, he offered
Bonn's influence to support Poland's application to join the International Monetary Fund, a
significant gesture both to help rebuild the financial credit of the Polish state and end its
international isolation. With government sponsor, by 1987 most German banks had written
off up to 80 percent of their debt claims on Poland.834
Under such circumstance, West German-Polish economic cooperation made big
strides. From 1985 German-Polish trade recovered to the level of 1980 after suffering
setback during German economic sanction. When Poland's Deputy Prime Minister Szalajda
and Foreign Minister Orzechowski visited Bonn in March, he got DM 100 million Hermes
credit guarantee. Following Gorbachev's launching of the policy of glasnost ("openness")
and perestroika ("restructuring") in the Soviet Union, Jaruzelski also embarked on
stabilization and restructuring programs. Bonn took great interest in encouraging political
changes in Poland through economic cooperation. In May 1987, Bangemann visited
Warsaw again and promised to provide further grace period for Poland's debt repayment,
promote German investment and develop joint ventures, and resume government
guarantees for credits to Poland. Overall, Kohl's economic diplomacy to Poland was an
integral part of Bonn's overall strategy to promote trust and security in Europe and reactive
inter-German relations. In September 1987 Honecker was finally able to make his much
delayed visit to Bonn.83 5
833 Davis, The Uses andAbuses of Economic Statecraft, pp. 96-98
834 Davis, The Uses andAbuses of Economic Statecraft, pp. 215-218, 225, 228.
III. Progressive Development of Historiographic Convergence
Another important force favoring bilateral reconciliation in addition to domestic
political factors was the continuing trend of active internal debate on war memory in the two
countries and bilateral textbook cooperation. It enabled gradual de-mythification of their
national history and created greater common ground between their understanding of the
past conflict history.
Bitburg and Historikerstreit: German War Memory from Polarization to Consensus
As previously discussed, West German war memory in Phase One and Phase Two
was highly polarized between the political left represented by the Social Democrats and right
represented by the conservative. The struggle over national collective memory carried on
into the 1980s. After the Christian Democrats recaptured power in 1982, the government
interpretation of history stressed the conflict between innocent German people and the
"Communist totalitarianism" in the Soviet bloc countries, a narrative that could best serve
the new Westpolitik. The conservatives also downplayed German war guilt to foreign nation.
When visiting Israel in January 1984, Kohl suggested that the German postwar generation
including himself should not be held responsible for the Nazi crimes because they had not
been adults during the war.83 6
Since the mid-1980s, however, active public debates on war memory broke out, in
the course of which a national consensus on German war responsibility began to emerge.
Several key events constituted the turning point of national historical consciousness. The
first was the Bitburg incident in 1985. Kohl invited American president Reagan to attend a
memorial service in honor of German war dead at the Bitburg military cemetery in order to
symbolize the reconciliation and firm Cold War alliance between the two belligerent states
during WWII. But the plan provoked immediate attack from German leftwing and the
Jewish and veterans' community in the U.S. because among those buried at Bitburg were
also 49 men of the notorious Waffen Schutzstaffel (SS). By portraying the SS men as equal
835 Jain, Germany, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1949-1991, p. 199.
836 Herf, DividedMemory, p. 351.
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victims of the war, the Bitburg history that the German conservatives tried to promote
blurred the formal and logical distinction between the victims and victimizers and refuted
the notion of German collective responsibility.837
At last President Reagan went to Bitburg on May 5, but only after laying a wreath
first at Bergen-Belsen concentration camp. But the incident galvanized political debate
surrounding the Nazi past. One important driving force of the debate was the liberal faction
of the ruling CDU/CSU represented by President Weizacker. Only three days after the
Bitburg incident, Weizacker made a world-famous speech in the Bundestag to commemorate
the 40 h anniversary of VE Day of WWII. This speech was a straightforward rejection of the
conservative historical myth that the German nation was an equal victim of the war and the
young German generation bore no responsibility for the Nazi past. Instead, he explicitly
acknowledged Germany's collective responsibility, for there was no doubt that ordinary
Germans witnessed or heard about Nazi crimes and yet allowed them to happen. Moreover,
when speaking of the victims of Nazi Germany he crossed the Cold War fault lines and
included "countless citizens of the Soviet Union and Poland" in his list. He also traced the
roots of the postwar German division to the Nazi expansion rather than fixating on the
evilness of communism. In short, Weisacker refused political manipulation of history but
advocated a truthful interpretation. "Look truth straight in the eye - without embellishment
or distortion," he said.838
Weizaicker's speech won remarkable resonance among the German public. Over
60,000 Germans wrote letters to him, 90 percent of which praised the speech. Over two
million copies of the speech were distributed to schools.839 After the VE-Day
commemoration, public debates between the conservative and liberal views of history
intensified, first among the historians and then spilled over to the mass media. The well-
known Historikerstreit, or the historians' conflict was stimulated by the publication of the
works of several conservative historians around 1986, such as Andreas Hillbruber, Ernst
837 Charles S. Maier, The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1988), pp. 10-16.
838 Herf, DividedMemo.y, pp. 355-359.
839 David Art, "Debating the Lessons of History: Germany and Austria Compared," paper presented at the
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, 2003, p. 16.
Nolte, and Michael Sturmer. This group of historians attempted "normalization" of
National Socialism and Holocaust by comparing them with the atrocities of other brutal
regimes in modern history, especially the Stalinist Russia. Nolte even suggested that Hitler's
Final Solution was inspired by the Stalinist purges of the 1930s, so Auschwitz was not
"absolute evil" but simply a German copy of Soviet terror.84
Such apologetic views of conservative historians sparked sharp criticism from liberal
historians such as Christian Meier and Han Mommsen. Meier argued that Holocaust was
singular in human history and remembering the crimes "must be an important part of the
historical consciousness of the Germans." He called on the Germans to learn to "bear the
truth" and "accept responsibility for all that we caused and that was done in our name."8 41
Mommsen charged that the new Right in West Germany was carrying out "the politics of
revision" for instrumental purposes: the equating of Nazi dictatorship with Communist
regimes was designed to justify the anti-communist Atlantic Alliance and serve the domestic
political agenda of the CDU.8 42
The historians' debate culminated upon the intervention by Jurgen Habermas, one of
the most influential philosophers in West Germany. Habermas sharply castigated the
"apologetic tendencies in German history writing," which he saw as part of the conservative
agenda to whitewash the horrors of the Nazi past and revive "a sense of (German) identity
naively rooted in national consciousness." The danger of the revisionist view of history was
that it would overturn the liberal democratic trajectory of postwar Germany and "destroy the
only reliable foundation for our ties to the West."8 43 So he reaffirmed that it was obligation
of all Germans to "keep awake the memory of the suffering of those murdered by German
840 Maier, The Unmasterable Past, pp. 16-33.
841 Christian Meier, "Condemning and Comprehending," in Forever in the Shadow of Hitler? Original Documents of the
Historikerstreit, the controversy concerning the singularity of the Holocaust. (Atlantic Highlands: N.J.,
Humanities Press, 1993), p.28.
842 Hans Mommsen, "Search for the 'Lost History'? Observations on the Historical Self-Evidence of the
Federal Republic," in Forever in the Shadow ofHitler, p. 103.
843 Jurgen Habermas, "A Kind of Settlement of Damages: the Apologetic Tendencies in German History
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hands," and warned that "otherwise we cannot respect ourselves and cannot expect respect
from others."' 44
The historiographic controversy sparked by the Bitburg Incident and the
Historikerstreit in 1986-1987 embodied an unprecedentedly intense process of memory
contestation in postwar West Germany. Interestingly, more public debates did not magnify
but dramatically lessened the polarization of historical consciousness because the majority of
German public came to endorse the liberal school's historical narrative. After the debates, a
national consensus emerged that West Germany's democracy and international status must
be premised on a national identity more forthright about the nation's responsibility for the
Nazi past.
Continuing Liberation of Polish History Discipline and Bilateral Textbook Cooperation
The liberalization trend in Poland's history profession and history education in
schools continued in the 1980s. The Solidarity revolution in 1980-1981 brought about an
outburst of societal demands for intellectual freedom.8 45 Soon after the Gdansk strike, the
Historical Association passed resolutions to honor the striking workers and call for the
removal of political constraints on scholarly research. At the same time, the teachers' strike
in Gdansk resulted in the formulation of guidelines for history education reform, which
emphasized the necessity of teaching history based on facts rather than political needs. It
stated, "the student has the right to get to know the history and culture of his country in
their fullness. To this end, textbooks on history and literature, especially on modem history,
should be verified.., so that their contents do not contradict reality." These guidelines were
incorporated into the settlement between the government and the striking teachers, and also
endorsed by the Historical Association when it negotiated with the government a written
agreement that promised to overhaul the history curricula and granted teachers autonomy in
classrooms. Besides the loosening of government sanction on school textbook content,
844 Jurgen Habermas, "On the Public Use of History: the Official Self-Understanding of the Federal Republic Is
Breaking Up," in Forever in the Shadow of Hitler.
845 The following discussion of the liberalization trend in Polish history profession during and after the
Solidarity movement is distilled from Valkenier, "The Rise and Decline of Official Marxist Historiography in
Poland, 1945-1983," pp. 672-680.
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unofficial organizations emerged during the Solidarity period to articulate bottom-up,
society-based historical memory. One example was the National Education Booklets
produced by the Committee for Independent Education that contained a drastically different
narrative than the official one."8
Not only to reform the history education in schools, historians also strived to
reconstruct and publicize an objective interpretation of those sensitive episodes of recent
Polish history, such as the Polish-Soviet relations, the history of the Communist Party, and
the communist rule in postwar Poland. Leaders of this wave of historiographic rethinking
came from not only Solidarity organizations but also the church, the universities, the army,
and even the party. Their effort led to the compilation of several important scholarly works
offering a reappraisal of some major political crises in communist Poland.
The liberalization movement in Poland's history research and teaching was so
widespread and deep-reaching that the same degree of crude political manipulation of
history never resumed even after the martial law. The entire intelligentsia had been
transformed by the democratizing Solidarity revolution. Even though from 1982 the
government reasserted their control over academic discussions and curricula content on
history, the new censorship was much milder than before. While the liberal faction in the
party was increasingly outspoken about the harmful consequences of manipulating history,
even the conservative faction felt compelled to recognize the society's "historical
consciousness." Liberal historians did not suffer severe persecution, and the Historical
Association continued to press on the textbook reform agenda. The official intervention in
the cultural life further waned since the mid-1980s when the government adopted a
moderate, reformist policy agenda. Meanwhile, underground intellectual activities thrived.
The underground presses provided the public with uncensored materials on Poland's recent
history, and underground educational networks such as the Council of National Education
taught history courses to the working class.
846 Timothy Garton Ash, The Uses ofAdversity: Essays on the Fate of CentralEurope (Cambridge: Granta Books in
association with Penguin Books, 1989), p. 109.
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So even after the crackdown of Solidarity, Polish public debates on national history
continued both above and under the ground, effectively preventing the old historical myths
from seizing the monopoly once again. One phenomenon epitomizing the societal desire to
seek a more honest and balanced national history was the outbreak of intellectual debates on
Polish-Jewish relations. Poland had a history of virulent anti-Semitism even before WWII,
and the Poles acted as silent onlookers, collaborators, and sometimes even willing
perpetrators in Hitler's genocide of Jews. A national embarrassment, Polish-Jewish relations
was a taboo in postwar Polish historiography. In 1987 a Polish literary historian and critic
Jan Blonski published an essay entitled "The Poor Poles Look at the Ghetto," which
initiated a heated discussion among Polish intellectuals about the Poles' moral responsibility
during the Holocaust. Another notable trigger of Polish reexamination of the Polish-Jewish
past was Claude Lanzmann's film Shoah, a nine-hour documentary that purported to be "an
oral history of the Holocaust." When Shoah was shown in Poland, reactions were mixed.
While most Poles did not like the separation of division of European society into the
murders, their victims, and the bystanders during the Holocaust, many were shocked by
persistence of crude anti-Semitic stereotypes in Polish society.8 47 Such open debates on the
Polish-Jewish relations increased societal awareness of the negative aspects of the nation's
past and called into question Polish victimhood, a major national myth. It contributed to the
general trend in Polish society to unmask the history that had been distorted by politics.
At the same time of the de-mythification of national history in West Germany and
Poland, bilateral textbook cooperation continued. As noted earlier, by the beginning of the
1980s the project had won wide recognition and respect in West Germany. The power
transition from the social liberal coalition to the conservative CDU/CSU in 1982 did not
bring the project to a halt. It was because, mainly financed by SPD-dominant Lander and
run by professional historians, the Textbook Commission did not depend on federal
government support for its operation. Another reason was the profound legacy of Brandt's
Ostpolitik in West Germany, which had convinced many Germans, including conservative
elites, that Germany's democracy, national security and unification were all hinged on its
reconciliation with eastern neighboring countries.
847 Antony Polonsky ed., 'My Brother's Keeper?': Recent Polish Debates on the Holocaust (London; New York:
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The Textbook Commission continued to meet regularly during this period and, since
Kohl moved to repair relationship with the Eastern bloc in the mid-1980s, received formal
endorsement from the CDU/CSU government. Under fire for the upcoming Bitburg affair,
Kohl issued a statement on April 26, 1985 that acknowledged the contribution of the
Textbook Commission to German-Polish reconciliation and expressed government support
to the Commission's activities. West German president Weizacker and the
Bundestagpresident Rita Sussmuth, both members of the CDU, openly praised the
Textbook Commission as a matchless undertaking to hold continuous, free, and
fundamental discussions between two nations that had fought intensely in the past.848
PHASE FOUR: THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
Since the beginning of the 1990s, German-Polish relations have gradually advanced
toward the stage of deep reconciliation. Their frontier treaty signed in November 1990 not
only brought about a permanent settlement of bilateral sovereignty disputes but also
precluded the possibility of armed conflict over such disputes. Poland's entry to NATO,
with crucial support from Germany, provided further guarantee for bilateral stable peace.
Economic interactions also boomed and reached a high degree of interdependence, thanks
to the expansion of German investment and economic aid to Poland as well as Poland's
integration with European economy through the EU. Their popular relationship
experienced remarkable improvement during this period. Although residual feeling of
repugnance still existed between the two peoples, they did not cite history as a reason to
limit bilateral political and economic cooperation.
Such significant progress in German-Polish reconciliation could be hardly attributed
to the post-Cold War systemic setting in Europe, which was laden with uncertainty. What
actually contributed to bilateral harmony were two other factors than the international power
distribution. First was the need to settle the German Question and meet the security and
economic interests of the two countries, which facilitated the resolution of bilateral territorial
disputes and pushed for their security and economic integration with the European
848 Kondo, Kokusai Rekishi Ky6kasho Taiwa, p. 127.
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community. Second was the rise of a shared, honest historical memory between the two
countries. The increased public awareness of German war responsibility marginalized the
German right-wing force and the national myths it supported, and Poland's democratization
also divest xenophobic nationalism of political currency. Meanwhile, bilateral textbook
cooperation and youth exchange programs focusing on history education carried on, and
Germany took additional measures to atone for Polish suffering at the hands of the Nazis.
Their converging collective memories of the past conflict and Germany's policy of
restitution fulfilled bilateral historical settlement.
I. The Indeterminate Structural Force
Poland and Germany were directly involved in two major events marking the
disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the beginning of the "great transition" of the Cold
War international system. One was the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern European
countries, including Poland. In early 1989, the ever-increasing influence of the underground
opposition movement forced the Polish government to convene round table talks with
various political organizations, which granted Solidarity with legal status. In the national
election held two months later, Solidarity won landslide victory and formed the first non-
communist government in Poland.8 49 The other turning point was the fall of the Berlin Wall.
A spontaneous, massive traffic of East Berliners to West Berlin starting from the night of
November 9, 1989 quickly led to the dismantlement of the Berlin Wall, the symbol of the
iron curtain between the East and West.8s" Soon after the Wall fell, the SED regime in East
Germany crumbled. On September 12, 1990, Germany's four occupation powers, Britain,
France, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a two-plus-four treaty with the two
Germany states, which cleared external obstacles to German unification.
The demise of Polish communist regime and German unification signified that the
Cold War structural constraints on both countries had shattered. The two-plus-four treaty
ending the four powers' right and prerogatives in Germany and subsequent Soviet troops
849 "Solidarity One Seat Short Of Clean Sweep," Financial Times, June 20, 1989.
850 For a classic chronicle of the events leading up to and immediately after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, see
Henry Ashby Turner, Germany from Partition to Reunification (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 225-
239.
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withdrawal from Polish and East German territories removed the last traces of superpower
supervision. Poland finally won complete independence from their Soviet overlord.
Germany remained in NATO, but it was a policy by choice not by force.
What does the international structural change mean to German-Polish relations? On
the one hand, they were no longer obligated to confront each other on behalf of their
respective alliances. On the other hand, the systemic shift from bipolarity to an ambiguous
unipolarity, or "uni-multipolarity" in Samuel Huntington's words, generated considerable
uncertainty and anxiety for Polish and German foreign policy-makers.851
Central to the uncertainty that Poland faced was the advent of a unified Germany
whose power had no equal in Europe. German unification reopened the frontier issue
because previous bilateral agreements only committed to the current Western border of
Poland if Germany was divided. The Poles felt nervous that a unified Germany would
challenge the postwar territorial status quo in Europe and revive its traditional inclination for
eastward expansion. While Poland used to depend on the Soviet Red Army for national
security, the formal dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 left Poland to face the perceived
German threat alone. Moreover, its ancient fear of the expansionism of its historical rival
Russia rekindled. So Poland found itself again being sandwiched between the two powerful
neighbors, and many Poles worried about becoming a frontline state in any future military
conflict involving NATO and Russia.852
Germany was also standing at the crossroad at the beginning of the 1990s. The
demise of the Soviet bloc wiped out the strategic threat to Germany from the east. But how
to deal with former Warsaw Pact states became a new challenge to German foreign policy.
For one thing, these countries' embattled economy and fragile young democracy was a heavy
burden for Germany, who itself was trying to absorb the daunting economic and social costs
of unification. More seriously, the end of the Cold War gave a new context to the long-
standing German Question, which threatened to bedevil Germany's relations with its
851 Samuel Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower," Foreign Affairs 78, No. 2 (March/April 1999).
852 On Polish national security thinking at the beginning of the 1990s, see the report of a conference sponsored
by RAND and the Polish Senate Center of International Studies in Warsaw in June 1990. Ronald D. Asmus &
Thomas S. Szayna, Poish National Security Thinking in a Changing Europe: A Conference Report (Rand: 1991).
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Eastern neighbors. In 1990-1991 the previously marginalized expellee organizations in
Germany resumed their push for recovering the lost homeland. They collected signatures in
support of a referendum in Poland under the slogan "Peace through Free Choice." They
then proposed two more initiatives for the Europeanization of the Oder-Neisse territories
and the enfranchisement of the German minorities in Poland to vote in German
parliamentary elections. Expellee activists also demanded "limited sovereignty" for Sudeten
Germans in their homeland which had been Czechoslovak territory after WWII.853 Even
though none of these demands succeeded, they did raise the specter of German revanchism
in the eyes of countries like Poland and Czech Republic who had territorial disputes with
Germany.
Not only Germany's relationship with the East but also that with the West needed
redefinition. After the bipolar international structure vanished, whether Germany should
stay in NATO became questionable because of the lack of a clear common threat. During
the German unification negotiation, Moscow explicitly stated its desire to keep a unified
Germany outside NATO and demilitarized. But the prospect of German neutrality aroused
deep concerns in some Western European countries, especially France, about the potential
threat of a strong, unified Germany on the European continent. French President Mitterand
initially did not encourage German unification because the sheer weight of German
economy would challenge France's influence inside the European Community. Later
Mitterand changed his position to endorse the German unification timetable, but he set a
precondition that German unification must be imbedded firmly in NATO and the European
integration process.85 4 Therefore, Germany now had to reconsider how to position itself in
Europe. Just because the Cold War ended does not mean that it was an easy decision for
Germany to make.
II. German Question, European Integration, and Greater Bilateral Cooperation
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The above analysis demonstrates that one major effect of the uncertain international
system after the Cold War was the fear and mistrust that neighboring countries held towards
Germany. For German-Polish relations that had yet to overcome their negative historical
legacy, the end of bipolarity particularly gave rise to two new sources of Polish suspicion,
which was the reopening of the frontier issue and the rise of a unified, powerful Germany.
From the turn of the decade the two countries began to search for solutions to these thorny
problems. In the process, Germany's unification agenda and desire for a secure, prosperous
surrounding environment accounted for a significant driving force for reconciliation with
Poland. Meanwhile, Poland also sought greater security and economic interests through
cooperation with Germany. The result was a bilateral agreement that permanently settled
their territorial disputes, and the security and economic cooperation in the framework of
European institutions.
Frontier Settlement: Landfor Unification and Trust
Germany's goal of early unification was a decisive factor pushing for the final
settlement of bilateral sovereignty disputes over frontiers. In some sense, Germany's
renouncement of the eastern territories was the quid pro quo for its long-sought national
unification. In addition, Germany was aware that a proper settlement of the sovereignty
issue was a key to winning the trust and respect of its Eastern European neighbors.
From the inception of the German unification process, the Oder-Neisse Line
became the primary issue in Germany's negotiations with Poland. Poland expressed
nervousness about new German claim for territories east of the line. Such concern was not
unfounded because, after the Warsaw Treaty was ratified in Bundestag in 1972, the German
Constitutional Court held that a united German state would exist within the German borders
as of December 31, 1937.855 Since 1989, German Foreign Minister Genscher expressed his
acceptance of the Oder-Neisse Line several times, but Chancellor Kohl did not publicly state
his position, which stirred great uneasiness in Poland. Even in a far-reaching statement
issued in Paris in January 1990 when Kohl said Germany would not "provoke in the Europe
of tomorrow a discussion about frontiers," he stopped short of promising German
855 Alison Therese Millett, Neorealist Claims and Post-Cold War Realities: The Case of German-Polish Relations, 1989-
1999. Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia, 2000, p. 103.
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renouncement of eastern territories once and for all. He repeated previous government
policy that the definitive establishment of the country's borders could only come in a freely
negotiated peace settlement after German unification.As5 It was widely suspected that Kohl
kept reservation because he wanted to appease domestic hardliners, especially the expellee
organizations.
Therefore, once the two-plus-four talks on German unification began, Poland
insisted that German unification must occur with the agreement of "all the interested parties
and in a manner which, from the outset, will offer a credible sense of security to all those
who require it and above all will guarantee the inviolability of the Western frontier of
Poland.""" Poland even wanted the Four Powers to withhold full German sovereignty until
Poland and Germany signed a border treaty.858 It argued that for Germany the frontier issue
was "a historical-sentimental question" or "a card in the electoral game," but for Poland it
was "a question of life and death, this is one third of our territory, this is one third of the
populace, this is 85 percent of our access to the sea."85" Polish anxiety received sympathy
from France, Britain and the US. From July 1990 Poland was invited to sit in the two-plus-
four talks.
The pressure from Poland, other major powers, and even his coalition partner
Genscher made Kohl realize that a frontier settlement was the price that Germany had to
pay for unification. Bonn's policy began to change. On March 7, Kohl dropped a
precondition he attached to the formal acceptance of the existing German-Polish border,
which was for Poland to renounce WWII reparations claims against Germany.860 The next
day he announced a coalition agreement to request the West German Bundestag and the East
German Volkskammer to issue a joint declaration confirming the current frontier. 861 In a
statement on June 17, Kohl spelt out the importance of the territorial settlement to German
unification. He said that although the Bundestag resolution was tough for the expellees to
856 "Kohl Says Germans Do Not Want Discussion of Changing Borders," The Associated Press, January 17,1990; "Kohl Pledges Reunification Will Not Affect Frontiers," Financial Times, January 18, 1990; "Kohl Says
Germans Don't Want Border Debates," The New York Times, January 18, 1990.
"
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take, but anyone who advised him against it would be asking him to put German unity in
jeopardy. A few days later the Bundestag and the Volkskammer issued identical resolutions on
the permanent inviolability of the border.8 62
In the meantime, Poland also backed down from its demand that the border treaty
had to be signed before German unification. Formal bilateral negotiation began at the end
of October, leading to the conclusion of a frontier treaty in November, where the two
countries "declare that the existing border between them is inviolable now and in the future
and obligated themselves to mutual and unconditional respect for sovereignty and territorial
integrity.""63 The frontier settlement then paved the way for the signing of the bilateral
Treaty on Good Neighborly Relations and Friendly Cooperation in June 1991.
The frontier settlement should not be viewed simply as a deal of "Land for
Unification" but also had a far-reaching function of creating trust and security in East-
Central Europe. German leaders understood that Germany would not enjoy a stable peace
with its Eastern neighbors unless they could prove that Germany had no territorial
ambitions to these countries. In his response to Polish demand for a border treaty,
Genscher said that "Germany's decision to place its fate within the fate of Europe is
definitive and final. We Germans want nothing more than to live with our neighbors in
unity, liberty, and peace."8 64 The following excepts from Genscher's speech at the signing
ceremony of the treaty on November 14 further explicated that a border settlement was
indispensable to eliminating mistrust and enmity in German-Polish relations and forging
stable peace for Germany and Europe:
"The Treaty on the Final Settlement on Germany rightly describes the confirmation of the final
nature of the borders of the united Germany as a fundamental component part of the peace order in
Europe...Because the border between our states is now definite it puts an end to mistrust. Now
people, Poles and Germans, can meet anew. They learn that they can make a joint contribution to the
emerging Europe. A border that is not being questioned does not divide, it unites." '8 6
Institutionalization of Security and Economic Cooperation
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The same desire to win the trust of surrounding countries and secure a long-standing
peace order in Europe also accounted for Germany's championing of the expansion of West
European community to Eastern Europe, including Poland. As soon as the unification
process began, Bonn was aware of the uneasiness and even perception of threat that other
European countries felt about a unified Germany. Although Germany had the choice to
return to realist normalcy, using its power advantage to maximize national interests, political
leaders did not want Germany to be surrounded by an array of mistrustful countries. They
decided to endorse "multilateral, institutionally mediated systems" that "softened" or
"tamed" its newly gained sovereignty power.866 The unified Germany opted to stay in
NATO, and acted as the major supporter of Poland's accession to NATO and EU. As a
result, German-Polish security and economic cooperation became institutionalized in the
framework of the European integration.
As soon as the Berlin Wall fell, Genscher reassured American Secretary of State
James Baker that Germany would retain its membership in NATO and the EC. "Germany
will not go its own way. We will develop our policy together with our allies," said
Genscher.8 67 Soon Bonn began strenuous negotiations with Moscow to get Soviet
agreement on the NATO membership for the united Germany. Bonn promised large
amount of economic assistance and offered to reduce German troop levels to allay Soviet
fears. At the time, other European powers wanted Germany to remain in NATO. For
example, British Prime Minister Thatcher spoke in March 1990 that it was necessary to
ensure that a unified Germany was "rooted in NATO and the European Community;
content with its borders; and democratic in its government, strengthens the security and
stability of Europe as a whole."8 68 Realizing that he could not prevent the inevitable from
happening, Gorbachev finally accepted Germany's NATO membership.
At the same time, Germany began the push for their expansion of these Western
European institutions to the East. His Ten-Point Plan for Unification issued at the end of
865 "Speech by German Foreign Minister on Signing of Polish-German Treaty," November 14, 1990, in BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, November 16, 1990.
866 Peter J. Katzenstein, Tamed Power. Germany in Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 4.867 Quoted in Millett, Neorealist Claims and Post-Cold War Realities, p. 110.
868 Quoted in Jain, Germany, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1949-1991, p. 212.
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November 1989 included a point that the EC should be open to the East, beginning with
East Germany and extending to "other democratic countries in Central, East, and
Southeastern Europe...The EC must not end at the Elbe...",,869 When signing the German-
Polish border treaty, Genscher promised full support to Poland's membership in the EC.
Genscher claimed that "together with our partners in the EC, we are working to integrate
Poland and other reforming states in central Europe into the market economy-oriented
trading and economic system...The nearer Poland gets to the EC, the more intensively we
can use this framework also for German-Polish cooperation.""87
Poland also had great interest in returning to the West, compared to which other
options such as keeping a neutral or non-aligned status or realigning with the Soviet
Union/Russia, were undesirable because they would either turn Poland into a buffer zone
again or force Poland to rely on a country that it actually feared. If allowed to join NATO
and the EU, Poland would obtain security guarantee and regional economic benefit without
becoming dependent on either the Soviets or Germans. The first country that supported
that Poland's application to European institutions was Germany, whose position was crucial
in persuading the U.S. and France to give their support. According to Polish Prime Minister
Hanna Suchocka, Germany's attitude on NATO expansion was that "Poland's security
(became) the security of Germany, and the security of Germany is the security of NATO."
In early 1993, German Defense Minister Volker Ruhe became the first major Western
official to state his support to Poland's membership in NATO.871
From the early 1990s, German-Polish security cooperation made considerable
progress. In 1993 the two countries opened their military academies and training facilities to
each other's military.872 Before Poland officially joined NATO in March 1999, more than
one thousand Polish officers had received training in NATO countries, mostly in Germany
and the U.S.87 3 Bilateral military cooperation received another boost in a commemorative
869 Millett, Neorealist Claims and Post-Cold War Realities, pp. 111-112.
870 "Speech by German Foreign Minister on Signing of Polish-German Treaty," November 14, 1990.
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and Culture (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 9.
873 Phillips, Power and Influence after the Cold War, p. 93.
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ceremony held at Westerplatte, where Nazi Germany launched its first attack against Poland
in WWII. At the ceremony held on September 1, 1994, the head of German military,
General Klaus Naumann, laid a wreath at the Westerplatte memorial as a gesture of
reconciliation. During his visit to Poland, Naumann also signed a military cooperation
agreement with Polish army chief of staff, General Tadeusz Wilecki. Naumann said the
agreement proved that "the German and Polish armed forces have stepped out of the past's
shadow and want to forge ahead into a good future."874 It paved the way for the first
maneuver on Poland's soil that included the German military. From September 12, NATO
conducted a weeklong joint military exercise with former East Bloc countries outside
Poznan in Western Poland. The exercise signified a significant breakthrough in bilateral
security cooperation. As Volker Ruhe said, "anyone who knows even a little bit about
history knows this is not a routine event when Polish and German soldiers are working
together. It shows how well German-Polish relations are developing."8 75
Poland finally received an invitation to become a full NATO member at the Madrid
Summit in July 1997, after which German-Polish military cooperation was further tightened
within the collective security system. In September 1998, the Polish, German and Danish
Ministries of Defense signed an agreement to set up the staff and headquarters of a North-
East Corps in Szczecin, Poland, which was tasked to strengthen NATO's Northeastern
frank.8 76 Since the new NATO was not a traditional security alliance only designed to
balance a common threat, but also constituted a security community that ensured peaceful
settlement of inter-state disputes, Poland's membership in NATO diminished the danger of
German-Polish armed conflicts. 877 The high degree of mutual trust and solidarity was
illustrated by a widespread public enthusiasm for bilateral military cooperation. According
to an opinion poll conducted in 1998 by the Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS), a
leading polling center in Warsaw, Germany was the Poles' second most favorite military
partner (43%), only next to the U.S. (59%) and much more popular than Poland's traditional
allies like Great Britain (15%), France (14%), Russia (12%), and the Czech Republic (60/0).878
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Like their security cooperation, bilateral economic cooperation was also close and
institutionalized during this period. It was a function of not simply the economic interests
of the two countries but also Germany's policy of assisting the economic transition in
Eastern European countries and pushing for their inclusion in the EC. The policy was
designed to stabilize the domestic situation in these countries and mollify their feeling of
uncertainty and suspicion about the German power. In 1989 Germany led the creation of
the PHARE (Poland and Hungary Assistance for the Restructuring of their Economies)
program by the EU. By 1995, Poland had received ECU 30,394 million, or 35 percent of
total EU aid to Central and Eastern European countries, more than any other country in the
these areas. Poland also received a 45 percent reduction of its debts from the London and
Paris Clubs in 1994. Germany was the main contributor to these clubs. Such massive
economic aid greatly improved Poland's economic conditions and prepared it for the
accession to the EU. Poland's accession finally realized in May 2004. German support was
crucial to Poland's economic integration with the West.
German-Polish economic interaction in the 1990s was indeed smooth and
comprehensive. First of all, bilateral trade grew rapidly during this period. The total trade
volume jumped more than four-folded in 1989-1999. Germany's share in Poland's total
foreign trade increased from 14.2 percent in 1989 to over one third after 1993.87" While
Germany was undoubtedly Poland's most important trading partner, Poland also became the
tenth largest importer of German goods, and Germany's top trading partner among Central
and Eastern European countries. In addition to the flourishing trading relations, by the mid-
1990s Germany became the biggest foreign investor in Poland.880 Industrial cooperation also
thrived, with Polish factories making product components or providing outward processing
traffic (OPT) services for German companies in such areas as automobile, textile, and
chemical industries. The two countries also developed close cooperation in cross-border
regions. Under the supervision of an intergovernmental commission for regional and cross-
879 United Nations Yearbook of International Trade Statistics.
880 Witold Malachowski, "Polish-German Economic Relations in the 1990s: The Track Record and Its
Implications," in Stilting, Change Management in Transition Economies, pp. 18-24.
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border cooperation, several Euroregions were established since 1991, and cooperation there
spanned the areas of environmental protection, infrastructure, scientific research.8 81
Bilateral economic cooperation made such big strides in the 1990s that the Polish
public commonly viewed Germany as the economic future of their country. In the same
survey by the CBOS in 1998, 61 percent of the respondents chose Germany to be the
country that they wished to be Poland's closest economic partners, overtaking the next two
countries Russia (31%) and the US (300/0) by a large margin.882
German-Polish economic relations in this period were not only highly
interdependent but also characterized by remarkable stability. Unlike the Sino-Japanese case,
incidents of German-Polish economic friction were not messed up by the bilateral historical
legacies and never escalated into political disputes. Although Poland recorded a trade deficit
with Germany almost throughout this period, and the cumulative deficit was even bigger
than Poland's annual export to Germany, the problem of serious trade imbalance did not
spark anti-German sentiments among the Polish public. Hardly anyone in Poland perceived
German economic policy to Poland as "economic invasion" or trying to take advantage of
Poland, as the Chinese public did about Japan. Another issue of economic friction was
related to German FDI. While a few ardent Polish nationalists opposed German investment
because they thought Polish economy would be sold out to Germany, most Poles felt the
investment should be increased. The Polish government sided with the majority opinion,
appealing for more rather not less German investment.883
III. De-mythification of National Collective Memory, Historians' Dialogue, and
Popular Reconciliation
After the Cold War, both the unified Germany and democratized Poland began to
search for a new national identity, in the process of which the national collective memories
of the two countries both abandoned self-centered, mythical narratives. The national
881 Malachowski, "Polish-German Economic Relations in the 1990s," pp. 22-25. For a detailed study of
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1 (April 1995).
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consciousness of the new Germany was firmly predicated on an unswerving commitment to
European integration and a forthright acknowledgement of Germany's responsibility for the
Nazi guilt, while the resurgence of a xenophobic, bellicose nationalism was largely contained.
In Poland, the democratic transition de-legitimized historical mythmaking and propelled
dramatic reform of educational policies and commemorative institutions in favor of an
honest, balanced interpretation of the national history. Such a historigraphic de-
mythification process cleared political and ideological barriers in German-Polish historians'
dialogue. In this period, such dialogues greatly deepened, not only contributing to a shared
memory of their past conflict but also nurturing their sense of European community and
European identity.
German National Identity and Historical Memory after Unification
In the wake of German unification, many expressed concerns about the resurgence
of ultranationalism as Germany once again became strong and proud. Their concerns were
supported by the dramatic increase of violent crimes in Germany against immigrants and
ethnic minorities in the early 1990s. German official data show a hike of criminal offences
with racist motivation from 270 in 1990 to 1,483 in 1991, and to 2,285 in 1992.884 Although
neo-Nazi activism rose in both East and West Lander, it was feared that East Germans were
more amenable to nationalism because of its short history of democracy and the high
unemployment rate.885 The right-wing extremism won sympathy from the New Right, a
nationalist movement made up of young German intellectuals who sought to normalize the
Nazi past, free the nation from the so-called "guilt mythology," and shift the core of national
collective memory to German sufferings. In an ad published on the 50th anniversary of the
end of WWII, representatives of the New Right such as Rainer Zitelmann reminded people
that May 8, 1945 was the "beginning of the expulsion, terror, and new oppression in the
East and the division of our nation."" '86 The New Right was hostile to immigration and a
multicultural society, which they saw as deadly threats to Germanness. They also advocated
883 Phillips, Power and Influence after the Cold War, p. 93.
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a normal, self-confident "Berlin republic" free of the institutional constraints of the western
community.
The New Right was a seemingly dangerous movement because it boosted a populist
trend in German party politics. Not only that Zitelmann joined the FDP and tried to
transform it into a right-wing party, but also some young members of the CDU showed
interest in collaborating with the New Right. The influence of the New Right also lent
support to far-right parties, such as the Republikaner. The central plank of Republikaner's
platform was to promote a new nationalism that was rooted in a German-centered rather
than Holocaust-centered memory of the Nazi past.887
However worrisome, the right-wing nationalism in the 1990s was too weak to
challenge the dominant progressive historiography. First of all, far-right forces were actually
marginalized in German politics. Despite its initial limited success in local and state
elections, the Republikaner failed to surpass the 5 percent threshold to enter the Bundestag
in 1994. It also lost all of its state seats and most of its communal seats in the following
years in the 1990s. The New Right's attempt to push the FDP rightward also miscarried.
Pressure from the party's liberal leaders and the rank and file eventually forced the right-
wing members of the FDP to quit the party.888
Second, the danger that former East Germany would provide a fertile ground for
nationalism to thrive was overstated. According to a poll in 1994, 18 percent of respondents
in the west but only 4 percent in the east "strongly" agreed with the statement that Jews
were exploiting the Holocaust for their own purposes. Another poll in 1993 shows that East
Germans were more willing than West Germans to accept foreign refugees fleeing from
human rights violations in their own countries.88"' It is true that the historical consciousness
of East Germans used to blame the monopoly capitalism for German fascism but lack
887 Roger Eatwell, "Towards a New Model of the Rise of Right-Wing Extremism," German Politics 6, no. 3(December 1997), p. 167.
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painful reflection on Nazi crimes and the long-time anti-Semitism in German society.890
When redefining their national identity after the unification, the Germans grappled with the
dual legacies of Hitler and the Cold War. One immediate step they took was to overhaul the
higher education system in East Germany to restore academic freedom to history research.
This included closing down certain colleges, dissolving or reorganizing the entire history
departments of many institutions, and setting up structural commissions with equal
representation of academics from east and west to revamp history curriculum. 8"'
Another important measure to bridge the social psychological divide between the
east and west included youth programs held at sites of Nazi atrocities for pupils from across
Germany. A much highlighted location for such programs was Buchenwald concentration
camp in East Germany, where the 250,000 inmates included Jews, Soviet citizens, German
communists, and members of ethnic or religious minorities. During the Cold War,
Buchenwald was a site for exposing Nazi crimes, condemning monopoly capitalism, and
praising the courage and heroism of the inmates from the Red Underground. After
unification, the teaching model of Buchenwald was transformed. The Service Civil
International brought numerous student groups comprising of both east and west German
youth to Buchenwald, where they learned the horror of the Nazi persecution and the multi-
faceted resistance campaign through seminars, on-site research, and dialogues between the
east and west youth. These education programs promoted a common, more objective
German memory and encouraged the youth to recognize and the danger of contemporary
xenophobia and racism.892
Third, despite the reemergence of Adenauer-era conservative historiography
centered on "German victims," the progressive view of history focusing on the "victims of
Germans" prevailed in commemorative activities and public discourses. War
commemoration in 1995 was a milestone for the victory of the left. Official
890 On the highly politicized historiography of the GDR on German national socialism and WWII history, see
Wolfgang Ruge, "Historiography in the German Democratic Republic: Rereading the History of National
Socialism," in Alter and Monteath, Rewriting the German Past, Herf, Divided Memory, Chapters 5-6.
891 Siegfried Hoyer, "The Path to Academic Freedom: An East German Perspective," in Alter and Monteath,
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892 Gregory Wegner, "The Power of Selective Tradition: Buchenwald Concentration Camp and Holocaust
Education for Youth in the New Germany," in Hein and Selden Censoring History.
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commemoration of the bombing of Dresden and postwar expulsion of ethnic Germans
from East Europe stressed the German initiation of the war rather than the acts of allied
countries as the causes of German sufferings. On April 27, together with former Israeli
president Chaim Herzog, and president of the Central Council of Jews in Germany Ignatz
Bubis, Chancellor Kohl attended an assembly at Bergen-Belsen concentration camp to
memorialize victims of the Nazis. Commemorations were also held widely in other
concentration camps on the anniversary of their liberation. Museums in all major cities
staged exhibitions about Nazism.8 93
One distinct feature of the commemorative activities in 1995 was their emphasis on
the perpetrator role of not just the Nazis but also ordinary Germans. When delivering the
central official speech to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the end of war,
Bundespresident Roman Herzog explicitly stated that while the Nazi regime was responsible
for the war, those who carried out Holocaust were "the Germans." "The basic feeling of
collective shame, as Theodor Heuss put it so well, was there and became clearer with time,"
said Herzog. The Bundestag even approved Bubis's proposal to turn January 27, the
anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz into a German national day of remembrance for
the victims of Nazi persecution and genocide.8 94
In the second half of the 1990s, the Holocaust-centered historiography further
consolidated its hegemonic position in national collective memory. Several debates
hightened public consciousness about the war responsibility of individual Germans. One
surrounded the publication of Daniel Goldhagen's book Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary
Germans and the Holocaust. Goldhagen argued that the German people willingly endorsed
Hitler's genocidal project because of their deeply rooted tendency toward "eliminationist
anti-Semitism" dating back to the 19h century. While widely criticized among American
historians for lacking historical evidence, this book was received by the German public with
extraordinarily enthusiasm, rendering the so-called "Goldhagen effect." The book was a
best-seller in Germany, and the Journalfor German and International Politics, a mainstream
political and intellectual monthly in Germany, selected Goldhagen for the 1997 Democracy
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Prize. Because the book accentuated personified German accountability, it served the
German left-wing as a powerful weapon to counter the renewed conservative attempt to
normalize Nazi past and downplay German guilt.89"
Other important events of memory contestation included the controversy over the
Wehrmacht exhibition from its beginnings in Hamburg in 1995, the 1998/99 Walser-Bubis
debate between the revisionist German writer Martin Walser and Ignatz Bubis, the leader of
German Jews and a Holocaust survivor, and the 1999 Bundestag debate on the construction in
Berlin of the Memorial to the Murdered Jews in Europe. These debates stimulated lively,
fruitful public discussions on how to remember the nation's shameful past and placed
German perpetration rather than German victimization firmly at the center of German
national consciousness.8 96
Fourth, the progressive historiography was institutionalized through international
arrangements of war reparation. In the Cold War, East Germany did not pay compensation
to any foreign victims of Nazi atrocities and West German legislations on war compensation
excluded claims by victims living in Soviet bloc countries. Even the pension fund that the
FRG gave Poland in 1975 was neither war reparation in strict legal term nor sufficient to
meet the demands of numerous Polish victims. After unification, the German and Polish
governments agreed to establish a German-Polish reconciliation foundation, which
committed German government to pay DM 500 million to Polish war victims. It was a sorry
amount of compensation, given the huge number of claims by nearly 600,000 victims. It
was only due to the relentless prodding of German opposition parties that situation began to
improve. One outstanding issue in this political battle was the compensation for forced
laborers, whom the German government had long denied of the status of Nazi victims and
eligibility for compensation payments. In 1997 the Greens and Social democrats pushed for
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government legislation to mandate compensation to forced laborers by German
companies."'
A breakthrough arrived after Gerhard Schroeder of the SPD became chancellor in
1998 and the lawsuits filed by Nazi victims demanding compensation in German and
American courts mushroomed, including the sensational success of a class-action lawsuit
against Swiss banks. Mounting domestic and international pressure compelled a significant
solution. At the end of 1999, German government and industry reached an agreement to
each contribute half of a $5 billion fund to compensate former slave and forced laborers.
The Bundestag then passed the bill with a large margin of 556 to 42, a clear manifestation of
the consensus across the political spectrum on the need to settle Germany's historical
account. Beginning mid-2001, payments began to arrive in the hands of surviving forced
laborers in 25 countries including Poland. As many as 500,000 Poles were eligible for the
compensation, the largest among all the beneficiary countries.8 98 Successfully addressing a
major grievance of ordinary Poles towards Germans, the settlement of forced labor issue
contributed to the dissolving of emotional and psychological barriers to German-Polish
popular reconciliation. Annual CBOS polls show that the percentage of Poles who
considered German-Polish reconciliation possible increased from less than 50% in 1990 to
nearly 80% in 2001. 899
Democratic Identity and the Decline of Nationalism in Poland
Poland's democratic transition created a cosmopolitan, reconciliation-oriented
national identity because the new political leaders relied on democratic values rather than
communist ideology or self-centered nationalism to legitimize their power. The "Solidarity
ethos" that served as the spiritual glue of the new regime was defined as an ideology "based
on truth, dignity, community, Christian humanism, respect for the individual, and solidarity
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with the weak."'" True that Solidarity value had a nationalist dimension, as the movement
presented itself as the "national front of all patriotic forces." 0 '' But the nationalist ideas that
the Solidarity leaders promoted by no means embodied intolerance or chauvinism. Having
fought the authoritarian regime for years, they deeply appreciate the merit of cosmopolitan,
pro-West beliefs. Even the Communists were forced to adapt, abandoning ideological
dogma and narrowly defined nationalism. As Vachudova and Snyder comment, "the
democratic redefinition of the state, which took place under the aegis of former dissidents,
granted state institutions a new legitimacy and marginalized extreme nationalism." 902
The impact of Polish democratization on national consciousness was directly felt in
history education reform. The reform started in June 1990, when the government closed the
Main Office of Control of Publications and Presentations, ending censorship of mass media
and creating free space for alternative discourses. As a result, the formerly state-owned
publishing industry quickly privatized, and education reform programs aimed at
decentralizing the decision-making process of the educational policy were set afoot. In 1991
the Ministry of Education formed the history curriculum reform group consisting of
historians with different opinions, backgrounds, and working experiences in the educational
system. Three rounds of history curriculum reform ensued, producing three versions of the
basic curriculum in 1992, 1994, and 1997.
While shattering the monopoly of the official communist historiography, curriculum
reform projects also brought a variety of previously unofficial historical narratives into the
classroom, some of which smacked of narrow-minded nationalism. To steer the national
collective memory to a liberal, healthy direction, a new wave of reform began in the fall of
1997 to fundamentally restructure the Polish school system. After the parliamentary
elections in September, the leadership at the Ministry of Education changed hands. The new
Ministry leadership introduced a three-tier, compulsory 9-year elementary school system that
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was more compatible with that in other European countries. In terms of the goal of history
teaching, the new curriculum stressed the importance of teaching pupils moral, cultural, and
social values, and directing them to not only learn about the national history but also
understand the connections between the nation and the surrounding world."3 As the
"Pronouncement on the Basic Curricula for General Education Subjects" published by the
Ministry in 1999 summarizes, the reform was aimed to create a school system that while
"respecting the Christian system of values...embraces universal ethical principles,...serves to develop
children's feelings of responsibility, love for the fatherland and respect for the Polish cultural heritage
while simultaneously being open to values of European culture and the world... Stress is put on
developing abilities which prepare the students for a responsible life in a democratic society with a
free-market economy." 904
This document indicated that history education in Poland would not indoctrinate the
younger generation a nationalist ideology fixated on national virtues and repulsion to other
nations but teach them to embrace a more cosmopolitan, pro-democracy, and pro-Europe
perspective.
The final version of the Basic Curriculum, signed into law in 1999, made notable
improvement than previous versions. Among others, two previous taboo topics received
prominent coverage. One was the inglorious aspect of Soviet policy to Poland during and
after the war. The other topic was the Polish-Jewish relations.9°s While the first topic
debunked a primary national myths created by the communist regime, the second topic
advanced a balanced view of the relationship between the Poles and other ethnic groups and
repelled the influence of another old myth, the Polish victim consciousness. Although
rooted in the long-held prejudices in the society, Polish public ignorance about the Jews was
encouraged and reinforced by the communist indoctrination. Before the 1990s the national
curricula was silent on Jewish subjects. Only from the mid-1990s did Polish education
reformers begin to address this shortcoming. Of particular importance was the Polish-Israeli
Textbook Commission established in 1994 to evaluate the treatment of Polish-Jewish
relations in each other countries' history textbooks. In 1995 the Commission published its
903 Christine S. Parker, History Education Reform in Post-Communist Poland, 1989-1999 Ph.D. dissertation
(Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University, Department of Educational Policy & Leadership, 2003), pp. 175-
184.
904 Parker, History Education Reform in Post-Communist Poland, 1989-1999, p. 152.
905s See "Figure 2: Comparison of Contents of Basic Curricula for gimnazjum, 1997-1999," in Parker, History
Education Reform in Post-Communist Poland, 1989-1999, pp. 185-186.
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recommendations for future Polish textbooks, which were the Basic Curriculum that
Ministry finalized in 2001."06 In addition to the textbook improvement, a Polish-Swedish
pilot project for increasing Holocaust awareness among high-school students was set up in
Warsaw in 1998 with the title "The Holocaust and Contemporary Forms of Ethnic and
Religious Prejudice." In the same year, the first teacher's guide for primary-school
multicultural education was published. 90 7
Youth Exchanges and Textbook Cooperation: Toward Mutual Understanding andA Common European
History
The end of the Cold War brought about an instant boom to German-Polish
personnel exchanges, similar to the case of Sino-Japanese relations. While in 1989 only 7.2
percent of total foreign visitors to Poland were from West Germany, by the mid-1990s the
ratio of German visitors had increased to over 57 percent. In 2000 Germans made far more
trips to Poland than any other people in the world.9"8 But different from the Sino-Japanese
contacts that were mostly limited to economic and cultural areas, Germany and Poland
devoted an important dimension of their societal contacts to building a shared memory of
past traumatic conflict. One type of such contacts was the thick network of youth exchange
programs designed to foster understanding of each other countries' culture, society, and
historical perspectives.9" 9 The other was the bilateral textbook cooperation project that
continued and expanded in light of the new international settings during this period.
The most influential youth exchange programs during this period were organized
by the German-Polish Youth Office (GPYO) founded in 1991. The GPYO was modeled
after the Franco-German Youth Office that was created several decades earlier. Financed
by the two governments and run by a board filled with Germans and Poles proportionally,
its structure reflected egalitarian and bi-national commitment. The GPYO sponsored
exchanges and workshops for youth and journalists, and training for teachers. Young
906 Parker, History Education Reform in Post-Communist Poland, 1989-1999, pp. 191-204.907 Jolanta Ambrosewicz-Jacobs, "Attitudes of Yong Poles Toward Jews in Post-1i 989 Poland," East European
Politics and Societies 14, No. 3 (2000).
908 Poland Central Statistical Office, Concise Statistical Yearbook of Poland, 1991; Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of
Poland, 2001.
909 1 appreciate Verena Blechinger's help with my research on German-Polish youth exchanges in the 1990s.
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students from Germany and Poland were brought together not only to learn each other
country's language, social life, and culture and religion but also to develop deeper
understanding of the history of bilateral relations through history workshops, internships at
museums, and tours of Holocaust concentration camps.910
Besides government-sponsored programs, a number of private organizations also
carried out youth exchanges. One example was the German War Graves Commissions
(Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgraeberfuersorge), which organized summer work camps for youth,
including Polish students, to visit soldier's graves and war memorials in Europe and attend
seminars discussing issues of war, peace, and international understanding.91 Another private
organization, German-Polish Youth Academy (Deutsch-Polnische Jugendakademie e. V.) of the
European Youth Exchange Network, organized exchange programs aimed at facilitating
mutual understanding between German and Polish youth.912 In addition, the party
foundations of major German political parties - Konrad-Adenauer Foundation for the
CDU, Hanns Seidl Foundation for the CSU, Friedrich Ebert Foundation for the SPD, and
Friedrich Nauman Foundation for the FDP - all provided scholarships for talented
university or graduate school students. Part of the fellowship was to pay for students to
participate in seminars and workshops, including those held in historical sites in Poland.
The other major mechanism for bringing German and Polish historical memories to
convergence was historians' dialogue, which gained unprecedented momentum as the Soviet
bloc collapsed and the democratization movement proceeded in Poland. Since mid-1989,
historians from the two countries set out to write a handbook series to support history
teachers in their classroom instruction on twenty "cross-points in the history of German-
Polish relations" selected by the Textbook Commission. In the spirit of constructing a
genuinely shared memory, typically two historians, one from Germany and one from Poland,
would team up to work on each cross-point subject. They jointly wrote the text of every
historical event, compiled relevant source materials, and laboriously translated all the text
and source materials into German and Polish languages. In 1991, the first handbook was
910 See the website of the GPYO at http://www.dpjw.org/html/index.php.
911 For information on the youth work camps organized by the German War Graves Commission, see
http://www.volksbund.de/jugendschule/workcamps/
912 See the website of the German-Polish Youth academy at http://www.muenster.org/dpja/
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published as a model, followed by a number of more handbooks and also tool books
containing shared glossary and pedagogical details."'3 Another evidence of more
comprehensive, free historians' dialogue was the involvement of East German teachers who
had been excluded from the German-Polish textbook cooperation project in the past.
In addition to shaping convergence in memories of bilateral relations, the Textbook
Commission decided in the 1990s to expand the topics of historians' dialogue beyond those
related only to Germany and Poland. True that the "Recommendations" published during
the 1970s needed improvement, such as to include facts about Soviet occupation of Poland
and massacre of Poles during WWII. But it would be too narrowly focused to only deal with
the history of German-Polish relations. The German side particularly opposed paying
excessive attention to Soviet atrocities because that would dilute German sense of their own
responsibility. Therefore, at the 26t conference of the Textbook Commission in 1994,
German delegates proposed to conclude the discussions on the history of bilateral relations
that had been going on since 1977 and shift the textbook cooperation project to a new
agenda.
Acting on the German proposal, historians began to examine topics related to
Germany and Poland's relations with other nations, such as minorities and neighboring
countries of Germany and Poland, not least the Jews. The Textbook Commission
conference in 1995 was held under the theme of "The Germans, Poles, Jews from the
Enlightenment Era to the Onset of WWII," the first time that the Commission had a
conference theme that included a third party than Germany and Poland. Not only German
and Polish historians but also Israeli scholars attended the conference. The next year the
Textbook Commission sponsored a seminar entitled "Understanding the Others: The
Contribution of History Education to Europe" in Berlin.914 In addition, it published a new
teachers' manual in 2001 that spelt out the reorientation of the bilateral textbook
cooperation project. The following quote from the summary of the manual drives home its
broader commitment:
"The teachers' manual will make it difficult to sustain a portrayal of history that mainly emphasizes
the national dimension, national homogeneity, and promotes latent xenophobic rejection of foreign
913 Kondo, Kokusai Rekishi Kyokasho Taiwa, pp.139- 142 .
914 Kondo, Kokusai Rekishi Kyokasho Taiwa, pp.139 -14 8.
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influences. The multitude of perspectives, especially expressed in the didactical reflections and the
choice of primary sources, is intended to challenge national narrow-mindedness and one-sided
emotional evocations. It encourages a common European future based on universal values."'915
Therefore, in expanding the scope of textbook cooperation to the complex ethnic,
cultural and social history of Europe, the Textbook Commission intended to transcend the
psychological obsession of the Germans and Poles with their own national history and
cultivate an atmosphere of reconciliation and community for the whole region.
SUMMARY
Summary of theory-testing results for postwar (West) German-Polish reconciliation
development in Table 14 indicates that, while both theories fit the evidence of Phase One
and Two, historical mythmaking theory makes better predictions than realist theory for
Phase Three and Four.
Negative structural conditions in the first two decades after WWII determined that
West German-Polish relations were in the stage of Non-Reconciliation. The two countries
were set against each other by both the security dilemma between the Eastern and Western
blocs and by two issues of direct bilateral conflict - both being products of superpower
struggle - the frontier dispute and the German Question. Meanwhile, ruling elites of both
countries aggressively practiced historical mythmaking. The conservative ruling elites in
Adenauer's Germany encouraged German amnesia about Nazi crimes and German victim
consciousness so that they could build a positive postwar German national identity, ensure
electoral success, and justify the FRG's foreign policy of western integration. The official
historiography of the Polish communist government highlighted Polish victimhood and
German perpetuation but whitewashed Soviet victimization of Poland and the Poles' own
inglorious relations with minorities. These pernicious national myths created combative
narratives about each other nations, which greatly exacerbated the bilateral hostility both at
inter-governmental and popular level that had been generated by structural factors.
915 The text of this summary can be found at the official website of the Georg Eckert Institute for International
The superpower detente since the late 1960s changed the previous negative
structural conditions towards neutral conditions, creating strong structural incentives for
bilateral cooperation. In the context of detente, the social liberal government led by Brandt
and later by Schmidt implemented a new Ostpolitik that Poland also welcomed with
enthusiasm. The two countries normalized diplomatic relations, temporarily settled frontier
disputes, and developed moderate economic interaction and more societal contacts, all
characteristic of the stage of Shallow Reconciliation. But West Germany's image among
Polish public would not have improved considerably if the Bonn government had not paid
serious apology and financial compensation to Polish war victims and Poland's own anti-
German official historiography had not been challenged by a liberalizing history profession.
Also instrumental to promoting popular feelings was the historians' dialogues organized by
the non-governmental German-Polish Textbook Commission.
Bilateral relations in the 1980s suffered some setback, mainly due to the impact of
negative systematic conditions under the collapse of East-West detente and the tightening of
the connection between Poland and Germany and their respective alliance. On the other
hand, the two countries remained in the stage of Shallow Reconciliation without returning to
Non-Reconciliation, contrary to what realist theory predicts. What served to cushion the
structural shock were two important countervailing factors. One was the independent
diplomatic agenda of both the opposition and ruling West German elites Germany to seek
contacts with the East despite the new East-West tension. The other was the decline of
nationalist myths in West Germany and Poland as well as the bilateral textbook cooperation
during this period, which further increased the common ground between their historical
understanding and promoted mutual trust despite the worsening of the systemic
environment at the time.
After the Cold War ended, the international structural conditions were neutral for
German-Polish relations because both countries felt security anxiety and uncertainty but also
faced multiple foreign policy choices. Nevertheless, bilateral relations did not remain in
Shallow Reconciliation, as realist theory predicts, but progressed toward Deep
Reconciliation, due to two main driving forces. One was Germany's desire for early
Textbook Research at http://www.gei.de/english/indexl.shtml.
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unification and winning the trust of countries surrounding the new, unified Germany, as well
as Poland's security and economic interests in joining the European community. These
factors facilitated a permanent territorial settlement and institutionalized bilateral security
and economic cooperation. The other driving force was the de-mythification of German
and Polish national memories and the convergence of their interpretation of past traumatic
conflict through extensive youth exchanges, German restitution policy, and the bilateral
textbook cooperation project. These factors not only diminished popular grievances about
past suffering and promoted mutual trust, but also cultivated a sense of European
community in both societies.
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Table 14: Theory-testing Summary: (West) Germany-Poland Relations
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PREDICTIONS THEORY
(I) Realist Theory (II) Theory of OUTCOMES ASSESSMENT
Historical Mythmaking
Phase One: Negative Structural Conditions Combative Historical Superpower struggle in Europe caused inter-bloc Theory I and II both
1945 to the predict Non-Reconciliation Narratives predict Non- security dilemma, the frontier dispute, and the German have explanatory
Mid-1960s Reconciliation Question; they determined the heightened expectation power
of bilateral conflict, national non-recognition, minimal
economic ties, and hostile societal relations.
Historical Mythmaking in West Germany and Poland
caused combative narratives, reinforcing mutual threat
perception and popular hostility.
Phase Two: Negative Structural Conditions Combative Narratives Superpower D6tente enabled West Germany's new Theory I & II both
the Late 1960s changing in the direction of changing in the direction Ostpoltik and Soviet permission of Polish positive have explanatory
to the Late Neutral Structural Conditions, of Conflictual Narratives, response to Ostpolitik; they caused partial national power
1970s predicting Shallow predicting Shallow recognition based on a temporary settlement of
Reconciliation Reconciliation sovereignty disputes, moderate economic interaction,
and reduced public tension.
West Germany's limited measures of restitution
partially addressed Polish public grievances; the decline
of national mythmaking in both countries and bilateral
textbook cooperation project promoted mutual
understanding and mitigated mutual threat perception.
Table 14 continued
Phase Three:
the End of the
1970s to the
Late 1980s
Phase Four:
the Post-Cold
War Era
Negative Structural
Conditions predict Non-
Reconciliation
Neutral Structural Conditions
predict Shallow Reconciliation
Conflictual Historical
Narratives predict Shallow
Reconciliation
Conflictual Narratives
changing in the direction of
Convergent Narratives,
predicting a trend from
Shallow to Deep
Reconciliation
Renewed superpower tension caused the
deployment of Euromissiles, inter-bloc
confrontation over Polish Solidarity crisis, and
Kohl's decision to refocus on Westpolitik; they
determined greater danger of West German-Polish
military conflict and scaling back political and
economic ties.
Domestic factors like the "Second Ostpolitik" the
SPD in opposition, Kohl's desire to solve the
German Question, and Poland's economic needs
determined the maintenance of formal diplomatic
ties, territorial agreement, and moderate economic
interaction.
West German national consensus on war
responsibility, liberalization of Polish history
discipline, and bilateral textbook cooperation
promoted mutual understanding and trust, and
prevented popular relations from returning to open
hostility.
The collapse of Cold War structure brought about
Polish uncertainty about Germany and Russia, and
compelled Germany to redefine its relationship with
the East and West.
Germany's desire for unification and the trust of its
neighbors and Poland's security and economic
interests in joining the European community
brought about a permanent territorial settlement and
institutionalized security and economic cooperation.
De-mythification in German and Polish national
memories and their convergence shaped through
history-related youth exchanges, German restitution
policy, and bilateral textbook cooperation promoted
mutual understanding and even cultivated a sense of
European community.
Theory II fits the
evidence better than
Theory I;
Some domestic factors
not included in either
theory also have causal
effect
Theory II fits the
evidence better than
Theory I;
Other factors such as
German unification
and European
institutions not
included in either
theory also have causal
effect
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Chapter Seven
Conclusion
In the aftermath of traumatic conflict, erstwhile adversaries Germany and Poland
have approached the stage of deep reconciliation, while China and Japan remain politically
and emotionally antagonistic. Having examined these two cases with different outcomes of
post-conflict interstate relations, this dissertation concludes that a history of traumatic
conflict does not necessarily doom states to future conflict. Instead, how relevant actors
interpret and manipulate public memory of the conflict history largely shapes the likelihood
of reconciliation. Elite mythmaking of national history in order to fulfill immediate practical
goals would bring about substantial divergence between the national collective memories of
former adversary states and spur both mutual perception of hostile intention and virulent
popular emotions. Although international structural incentives are instrumental in scrapping
certain barriers to inter-governmental cooperation, without curbing pernicious historical
myths and fostering bilateral historigraphic convergence, a state of deep trust and harmony
between both the governments and the societies would not truly arise.
This chapter first reviews the two theories of interstate reconciliation, realist theory
and historical mythmaking theory, and assesses their relative explanatory power against the
main evidence presented in the case studies. I then consider the extension of my arguments
to other cases of post-conflict interstate relations. Finally, I discuss the implications of my
research for international relations theory and draw some policy-relevant conclusions on
interstate reconciliation and current Chinese and Japanese international relations.
Explaining Post-conflict Interstate Reconciliation
In this dissertation I use a concept of "deep reconciliation" to capture the state of
successful reconciliation between two former enemy states. To be characterized as "deep
reconciliation," an interstate tie must meet two standards. The first is stable peace, which
means the two states share a common expectation that armed conflict is not a conceivable
means to solve their disputes. So war has become unthinkable. The second yardstick is an
amicable atmosphere between the people of the two countries: people should feel a sense of
closeness and mutual trust; more importantly, history should no longer be a source of
popular resentment against each other nation.
I propose two theoretical explanations for post-conflict international relations. The
first is realist theory, the dominant theory in the field of international relations. This theory
treats reconciliation as a form of international cooperation. According to standard realist
assumptions, cooperation is rare in a world of anarchy and tends to take place only when
states share common security interests. So realist theory predicts that the more common
security interests states share, the more positive the structural conditions for their
cooperation are, and the more likely they are to reach deep reconciliation. If their security
interests are in direct conflict, states face negative structural conditions for bilateral
cooperation, and therefore hard to reconcile. When the shared security interests dissipate or
direct security conflicts attenuate, interstate relations are governed by neutral structural
conditions. The two states may develop certain degree of cooperation but lack mutual
strategic dependence and genuine trust. Such reconciliation is superficial and fragile. It is
not deep but shallow reconciliation.
Realist theory also assumes that international balance of power pressure can trump
preferences and interests at societal and individual levels. So the patterns of popular
relations should completely parallel those of the inter-governmental relations without any
independent dynamics. In addition, historical memory should not make any difference in
shaping post-conflict interstate relations because ideas and human emotions are simply
determined by or serve as justifications for states' national security interests.
The second explanation is derived from historical mythmaking theory, a theory that I
build in this dissertation. A central concept of the theory is national myths, which are false
representations of national history. These myths tend to glorify their own nation's actions
and experiences, whitewash its wrongdoings, and blame others for all the mistakes and
sufferings. They are usually created by political elites, especially ruling elites, to serve various
practical purposes, including the need to justify national security policy, but also some
domestic political goals such as to boost regime legitimacy, facilitate social mobilization, or
establish the dominance of a certain ideology. Myths do not become politically influential
until they are widely disseminated and institutionalized by such tools as school textbooks,
mass media, commemorative rituals, and war crimes trials. If both nations adopt myths as
the core ideas of their collective memory, then they will sharply disagree on what happened
in their past conflict and who should take responsibility for it.
What are the consequences of historical mythmaking for post-conflict interstate
reconciliation? The theory argues that mythmaking can obstruct reconciliation through two
specific mechanisms, emotions and intentions. Specifically, the victim country will hold
deep grievances and a strong sense of historical entitlement toward the perpetrator state for
their suffering in the past conflict. But the perpetrator country, because of its different
interpretation of the conflict history, tends to think the victim's attitude is unreasonable and
self-indulgent. Therefore people in the perpetrator country will develop such emotions as
disgust and frustration toward the victim country. In terms of intentions, the perpetrator
that evades its war responsibility makes people in the victim country suspect that it will
launch new aggression again in the future. Meanwhile, the victim that keeps bringing up
history and demanding contrition makes people in the perpetrator country believe that it
poses a revanchist threat. These bitter emotions and perception of hostile intentions will
then seriously aggravate mutual threat perception, poison popular feelings about each other
nation, and also put great pressure on the government to adopt a hard-line policy when there
are any bilateral disputes.
Therefore, historical mythmaking theory predicts that historical memory matters in
international relations: the more states' memories of past traumatic conflict diverge, the less
likely they will reconcile. When their historical narratives are combative, meaning they
demonize the whole nation of the other country, and/or clash on issues with direct
implications for the current boundaries of their homeland, historical burden will be placed in
the center of bilateral relations and effectively block reconciliation process. If their
narratives are conflictual over some important aspects of history but nevertheless do not
blame the entire population of the other side indiscriminately or involve current territorial
disputes, deep reconciliation would not take place but limited cooperation symptomatic of
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shallow reconciliation would be likely. A variant of conflictual narratives is quasi-convergent
narratives, where two countries agree on a shared but false historical memory. I argue that
this type of narratives is usually based on political expediency and fragile, and would not
promote genuine mutual understanding and trust. Only when the two countries adopt joint
history-writing and substantial restitution measures would they be able to bridge the gap
between their historical interpretations and embrace an honest, shared memory of their past
traumatic conflicts. The theory predicts that historiographic convergence would lead to
deep reconciliation because it could eradicate negative emotions, foster mutual trust, and
facilitate comprehensive bilateral cooperation.
Chapters 3-6 tested the above two theories against the historical evidence of postwar
Sino-Japanese and (West) German-Polish relations. The findings of both cross-case and
within-case investigations are illustrated in Table 15. I argue that historical mythmaking
theory provides a better explanation than realist theory for post-conflict interstate relations,
but both theories have significant absolute explanatory power.
Table 15: Summary of Theory Tests
PREDICTIONS OUTCOMES THEORY
(I) Realist Theoty (II) Historical ASSESSMENT
Mythmaking Theor
China- 1950s
Japan -60s Non-Recon Shallow Recon Non-Recon Theory I fit
Shallow Recon
1970s Deep Recon Shallow Recon -Rapprochement Theory II fit
1980s 80s Deep Recon Shallow Recon Theory I partial fit
-90s 90s Shallow Recon Shallow Recon -Friction Theory II fit
(West) 1950s- Theory I fit
Germany mid 60s Non-Recon Non-Recon Non-Recon Theory II fit
-Poland late 60s Theory I fit
-late 70s Shallow Recon Shallow Recon Shallow Recon Theory II fit
1980s Non-Recon Shallow Recon Shallow Recon Theory II fit
1990s Shallow Recon Deep Recon Deep Recon Theory II fit
409
First of all, the predictions of realist theory fit the reconciliation outcomes in only
half of the total seven sub-cases: China-Japan 1950s-60s, China-Japan 1990s (but not the
1980s of the same sub-case), FRG-Poland 1950s-60s, and FRG-Poland 1970s. The theory is
right that negative structural conditions constituted the key obstacle to reconciliation in the
initial postwar phase of both cases, but it cannot explain why West German-Polish relations
did not regress to the stage of non-reconciliation in the 1980s despite the systemic
environment turned negative during the "second Cold War." Similarly, the theory correctly
predicts shallow reconciliation when the structural conditions were neutral in the Sino-
Japanese case in the 1990s and West German-Polish case in the 1970s, but it fails to foresee
the emergence of German-Polish deep reconciliation in the post-Cold War neutral system in
Europe. Moreover, realist theory fails the test when positive structural conditions did not
bring about deep reconciliation in Sino-Japanese relations in the 1970s and 1980s. In both
periods, the favorable international environment merely sustained limited inter-governmental
cooperation but failed to eliminate the relative gains concerns in bilateral security and
economic relations, nor was it able to produce an amicable people-to-people relationship.
In contrast, historical mythmaking theory well explains six out of the seven sub-
cases, a higher successful rate than realist theory. It only fails the test of Sino-Japanese
relations in the 1950s-60s, when non-reconciliation occurred even though the two countries'
war narratives were not combative but quasi-convergent, a special type of conflictual
narratives. In this sub-case, the structural tension between the two power blocs that China
and Japan separately belonged to dictated their political isolation and confrontation, while
the conflictual narratives only explained the policy preferences of the two countries rather
than the policy outcomes.
The pre-normalization Sino-Japanese relations stands in contrast to West German-
Polish relations in the 1980s, where the systemic environment was similarly negative and the
historical narratives were mutually conflictual but shallow reconciliation rather than non-
reconciliation arose. The difference should be ascribed to the political legacies of Ostpolitik
of the 1970s. Ostpolitik prompted some dramatic actions of restitution by the FRG
government to address its historical debts to Poland, facilitated the onset of bilateral
textbook cooperation project, and shifted elite opinions about history and reconciliation. In
the 1980s, not only that the West German-Polish textbook cooperation continued, but also
nationalist mythmaking declined in both countries as a result of the galvanizing domestic
debate on war history and national identity. As bilateral disagreement on historical
interpretation narrowed rather than widened, their mutual perception of threat and popular
feeling of animosity also moderated, effectively offsetting the adverse impact of the "second
Cold War."
Two caveats limit the relative explanatory power of historical mythmaking theory.
One is that, in a few cases - FRG-Poland 1950s-60s, FRG-Poland 1970s, China-Japan 1990s
(but not the 1980s of the same sub-case) - the two theories make identical predications.
Process-tracing evidence shows that both structural power and historical ideas were at work
in shaping the specific reconciliation outcomes in these cases and, in the sub-case of FRG-
Poland relations in the 1950s-60s, historical mythmaking was not a decisive but just an
aggravating factor. However, in those strong tests where the two theories make different
predictions, historical mythmaking theory still performs better than realist theory.
The second caveat is that negative structural conditions tend to make such actions as
apologies, reparations, and joint history-writing out of the question. Even in the European
case, the trend of historical settlement did not first emerge until East-West detente created a
more relaxed external environment for the FRG and Poland to develop formal contacts.
This finding suggests the strong absolute power of realist theory, that certain degree of
compatibility between states' security interests is useful to enabling the reconciliation
process. My case studies of Sino-Japanese relations in the 1970s and (West) German-Polish
relations in the 1970s and 1990s also show that whenever the structural environment
improved, inter-governmental relations also progressed.
The weakness of realist theory mainly lies in the limited government ability to dictate
popular relations, as demonstrated in Sino-Japanese relations in the 1970s. Chinese and
Japanese governments were able to create an atmosphere of friendship boom through
propaganda campaigns and manipulation of public opinions, but they failed to impose
genuine mutual trust and understanding between the two nations becaused they clung to
pernicious national myths. Based on the findings of this sub-case and the German-Polish
deep reconciliation in the 1990s despite neutral structure context, I argue that positive
international structure is neither a sufficient nor necessary condition for deep interstate
reconciliation.
My study also supports the absolute power of historical mythmaking theory.
Historical ideas like national myths clearly have independent power in shaping international
relations. In all four countries examined in this dissertation, historical myths are not totally
penetrated by the international power structure but also shaped by domestic political and
ideological motivations. Elite mythmaking is more likely driven by national security interests
under negative structural conditions than under neutral or positive conditions. But even
with the negative external environment in Sino-Japanese and West German-Polish relations
in the 1950s-60s, such internal goals as consolidating ruling power to counter the political
opponents, constructing certain type of national identity, or mobilizing public support for
government political and economic policies played a significant role in framing the main
parameters of national myths.
In addition, national myths can generate policy outcomes independent of their
creators. On the one hand, elites create national myths to serve practical purposes. On the
other hand, once in place, historical myths can create negative emotions and perception of
hostile intentions. These two mechanisms cannot be easily shut down at will, and can
seriously constrain government policy options.
But this theory also has its limitations. Investigation of German-Polish relations in
the 1990s indicates that historiographic convergence alone may not be a sufficient condition
for deep reconciliation, either, even though it is undoubtedly a necessary condition. In this
sub-case, Germany's desire for quick unification and secure surrounding environment after
unification was a main driving force for its steadfast commitment to staying in the European
integration itself as well as incorporating Poland into the European community. The
German overture was well accepted by Poland, who also had strong economic and security
interests in rejoining the European community. True that the thriving societal exchanges
related to historical studies, German restitution diplomacy to Poland, and bilateral textbook
cooperation all contributed to mutual understanding and trust. But without the parallel
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process of European integration, Germany and Poland may not have developed such tight,
institutionalized security and economic cooperation so fast.
Future Research
In this dissertation I tested realist theory and historical mythmaking theory against
two cases of post-conflict interstate relations that evolved in largely comparable systemic
context but arrived at the stages of shallow reconciliation and deep reconciliation
respectively. The current research can be advanced by applying my theoretical findings to
more cases with different initial structural settings and eventual outcomes. Specifically, my
argument regarding the relative power of international structural factors versus historical
ideas in shaping interstate reconciliation is applicable to two more categories of cases, other
things being equal. The first category includes cases where the systemic environment is
favorable to reconciliation, such as postwar Japanese-South Korean relations and Greco-
Turkish relations. The second category refers to cases with the final outcome of interstate
non-reconciliation that has not been included in the dissertation. A typical example of this
category is Israeli-Palestinian relations. With the acknowledgement that area-specific
knowledge and language skills are needed for a in-depth, systematic study of these different
cases, below I offer a preliminary probe to demonstrate the general applicability of my
arguments.
Postwar Japanese-South Korean relations developed in the shadow of a history of
traumatic conflicts. In 1910 Japan annexed Korea and completely deprived the Korean
nation of its sovereignty. During the 36 years of Japanese colonization since then, not only
immeasurable Korean national resources were looted and hundreds of thousands of people
were tortured, killed, or conscripted - as soldiers, forced laborers, or even sex slaves - but
also the symbols of Korean nationality, the Korean language and Korean names, were wiped
out.916 However, unlike in Sino-Japanese and West German-Polish relations where the
former rivals were alienated by the East-West power struggle at least in the first two postwar
decades, there were never any systemic obstacles to Japanese-South Korean reconciliation.
916 For a classic overview of the legacies of Japanese colonization of Korea, see Chong-Sik Lee, Japan and Korea:
The PolticalDimension (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1985), Chapter 1.
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These two countries belonged to the Western bloc through their separate alliances with the
U.S. during the entire Cold War period. But the positive structural conditions did not bring
about reconciliation. Despite repeated U.S. push for their rapprochement since the late
1940s, Japan and South Korea failed to come close to establish a normal diplomatic
relationship until the mid-1960s. Even after they signed the Basic Treaty in 1965, the inter-
governmental ties were characterized by a high degree of volatility, and popular relationship
barely improved from the open hostility of the pre-normalization period. Only from the
early 1990s did twilight of deep reconciliation begin to appear, but it happened after the
Cold War international structure had dissolved.
With the systemic factor playing a minimal role, Japanese-South Korean relations
were largely shaped by the interplay among non-systemic variables. In the 1950s, domestic
conditions were least favorable to reconciliation because the Rhee Syngman government
hinged its regime legitimacy and nation-building strategy on fanning the flame of anti-
Japanese nationalism among the public. With his heavy-handed dictatorship, Rhee was able
to set the tone for a hostile policy to Japan. In Japan, pro-South Korea forces were nearly
non-existent, due to the general lack of interest in that country. As a result, historiography in
both countries was grossly mythified, constituting the largest impediment to bilateral
reconciliation. In South Korea, history textbooks and media propaganda never relented to
accentuate memory of Japanese brutality and Korean suffering, but lacked adequate studies
of the current Japanese society and government that might have modified the public
stereotypes of Japan.917 In Japan, the memory of the colonial experiences was truncated by
an elite-sponsored national amnesia. The Japanese government refused to make concessions
on issues of historical responsibility and compensation during the bilateral negotiation, and
the society had nothing but ignorance of and contempt for Korea. Even the Japanese
leftists, while protesting Rhee's dictatorial rule, failed to reflect on the historical trauma that
Japan inflicted on the Koreans.918
917 Kazuhiko Kimijima, Ky6kasho no Shisd: Nihon to Kankoku no Kingendaishi (Textbook Thoughts: Modern and
Contemporary History ofJapan and Korea) (Tokyo: Suzusawa Shoten, 1996), pp. 56-58; Tsutomu Nishioka, "Sengo
Kankoku Chishikijin no Nihon Ninshiki (Postwar Korean Intellectuals' Perception ofJapan)," Ch6sen Kenkyfi
(Korea Studies) No. 6-11 (1983).
918 Tsutomu Nishioka, "Zasshi 'Sekai' Wa Ch6sen o Do Mita Ka? (How Does the Journal 'Sekai' View
Korea?)," Ch6sen Kenkyfi No. 1-3, 7 (1980). On the history issue as a major stumbling block in Japanese-
South Korean normalization negotiation in the 1950s, see Dong-Jo Kim, Kannichi no Wakai: Nikkan K6shodJuyo
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After Park Chung Hee took power by a coup in 1961, domestic conditions turned
more favorable to reconciliation. The Park government made economic modernization the
top policy priority, to realize which it needed large amount of financial and technological aid
from Japan. For Japan, cooperating with South Korean was also beneficial to its economy
that was increasingly reliant on foreign market. In order to obtain early diplomatic
normalization, both governments compromised on history-related issues, with Park making
concessions on Korea's property claims to Japan and Japanese Foreign Minister Shiina
Etsusabur6 issuing an apology speech in Seoul on the eve of treaty signature. But all these
measures were taken in a tactical, politically motivated matter without truly settling the
bilateral historical account.
National historiography since the 1960s continued to be manipulated by political
interests, which prevented popular reconciliation from progressing and also hurt political
relationship. True that the Park government adjusted education policy in the 1970s to
promote "national history education" that aimed more at constructing South Korea's
national identity under the condition of national division than at stimulating anti-Japanese
sentiments. But until the beginning of 1990s, South Korean textbook coverage of Japan still
centered on the colonial period and postwar Japanese history was completely missing
Japanese textbooks also maintained an imperialistic view of history, trying to justify Japan's
colonization of Korea rather than reflect on its historical responsibility.919 Japanese official
apologies were deliberately kept vague, and the financial packages it extended to South
Korea were dubbed the name of economic aid rather than compensation. 920 Neither was any
serious transnational historian's dialogue held before the end of the 1980s. So it was hardly
Nen no Kiroku (Korea-Japan Reconciliation: Seoul's Negotiator Recollects Normalization Talks) (Tokyo: The Simul Press,
INC., 1993), pp. 3-95; S6ji Takasaki, Kensho Nikkan Kaidan (Investigating Japanese-Korean Negotiation) (Tokyo:
Iwanami Shoten, 1996), pp. 1 -64 .
919 Kimijima Kazuhiko, "Rekishi Ky6kasho o Meguru Nihon-Kankoku no Taiwa (Japan-Korea Dialogues on
History Textbook)," Rekishigaku KenkyWi (Journal of Historical Studies) No. 651 (October 1993, An Extra
Edition).
920 Japanese official apologies to South Korea in the 1970s-80s were largely modeled on the sentence that
Shiina said in 1965: "We feel great regret and deep remorse over the unhappy phase in the long history of
relations between the two countries." This statement conspicuously left out who caused the "unhappy phase"
and what happened during that phase. When Emperor Showa apologized to visiting South Korean president
Chun Doohwan in September 1984, he used almost identical expression except that he dropped the word
"remorse." In his statement on the following day, Prime Minister Nakasone clearly specified that it was Japan
that caused "great suffering" to South Korea. But even his statement failed to include the word "remorse" or
"apology." See Wakamiya, The Postwar Conservative View ofAsia, Chapter 14, "The Political History of Japan's
Apology Diplomacy."
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surprising that the Sino-Japanese textbook controversy in 1982 quickly spread to South
Korea and escalated into a major political dispute.921
The momentum for Japanese-South Korean reconciliation in the 1990s was primarily
not structural because the Cold War had ended. Even the existence of the common North
Korea threat was not a persuasive explanation, given that the U.S. military presence in
Northeast Asia continued to serve as effective deterrence and inter-Korea reconciliation was
under way. Instead, increasing bilateral historigraphic convergence accounted for the
reconciliation progress. The triumph of the democratization movement in South Korea
dramatically diminished the political motivation to use xenophobic propaganda to strengthen
regime legitimacy. New South Korean leaders staked their political fate mainly on the
fulfillment of such agendas as reinvigorating economy, improving legal order, combating
corruption, and unifying the Korean nation through peaceful dialogues. In order to achieve
these goals, close cooperation with Japan in various areas is considered highly important.
President Kim Dae-jung in particular strongly believed that reaching deep reconciliation with
Japan in the earliest possible time was in the long-term interest of the Korean nation. Kim's
personal enthusiasm and charismatic leadership captured the imagination of the two nations
and largely nullified stubborn opposition on either side against reconciliation. Meanwhile,
ROK's democratization, its diplomatic normalization with Soviet Union/Russia and China,
as well as the simultaneous entry of two Koreas into the UN quickly ended Japanese public
antipathy to the Seoul regime. The Japanese government was interested in expanding
cooperation with neighboring countries such as South Korea in order to attain greater
international influence and prestige for Japan.
It was against such a backdrop of increasing domestic consensus on bilateral
cooperation that the trend of historical settlement was set afoot. Different from before,
Japanese official apologies about the colonial history were now much more forthright.
When President Roh Taewoo visited Japan in 1990, Emperor Akihiko explicitly remarked
that Japan brought suffering to Korean people during an "unhappy phase," for which he
expressed the "deepest regret." The milestone in Japanese official contrition was the signing
of the Japan-South Korea Joint Declaration in 1998, when Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo
921 Cha, Ahgnment despite Antagonism, 185-196; Lee, Japan and Korea, 141-151.
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expressed "deep remorse and heartfelt apology" and President Kim Dae-jung accepted this
apology with a future-oriented vision about their relationship. This was the most significant
step made by the two governments to address bilateral historical debts. Outside the
government, since the end of 1980s historians of the two countries have held multiple
workshop series to conduct joint history textbook research. While the first two stages of the
historians' dialogues, 1988 and 1991-93, focused on examining the weak points in Japanese
textbook coverage of bilateral relations history, from the third stage of 1998-2000 the project
extended to mutual critiquing of history textbooks. The goal of the current fourth stage
starting from 2000 is to produce reference books based on the joint research to be used by
secondary school history teachers in both countries." Although not sponsored by
governments, the textbook cooperation projects have made such prominent progress that
their teaching recommendations have been gradually reflected in the history textbooks in
both countries published in the recent decade.
The path leading to thorough historical settlement between Japan and South Korea
is by no means straightforward. There are still many issues that have yet to be satisfactorily
addressed, including most notably the lack of official Japanese apology and material
compensation to Korean sex slaves and forced laborers. In the meantime, right-wing
nationalism in Japan has grown more aggressive in a startling backlash against the apologetic
moves by the government and progressive historians, which then provokes anti-Japanese
sentiments among the South Korean public. Another challenge to attaining deep
reconciliation between the two nations is for Japan to settle the historical account with
North Korea. If handled poorly, the history issue may flare up again in the future, especially
after Korean unification, and spark new hatred of Japan among the Korean people in both
the north and south. Despite these potential problems, one can still claim cautious optimism
for Japanese-South Korean reconciliation because of the increasingly open, resilient, and
active citizens' movements in both countries, who will tenaciously push for deep-going and
widespread campaigns of historical settlement in the future.
922 For an overview of the four stages of the development of Japanese-South Korean textbook cooperation
projects, see Kazuhiko Kimijima, "Kytkasho Kokusai Ktryfi no Keiken Kara Mita 'Kokumin no Rekishi'."
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Another case of post-conflict dyad that enjoyed similarly positive structural
conditions is the postwar Greco-Turkish relations. Situated on the cultural fault line
between the Eastern and Western civilizations, the two countries had a long history of
conflict dating back to more than two thousand years ago, such as during the Trojan War
and the Battle of Marathon. More recent traumas include the brutal Ottoman rule of Greece
from the 15t century until the early 19" century, the bloody clashes during the Greek War of
Independence in 1821-28, and Turkish resistance against Greek invasion in 1919-21. After
WWII, the Eastern Mediterranean region became a focal point of American-Soviet power
struggle. The famous Truman Doctrine that set the stag for the Cold War was issued exactly
because the US government wanted to show its determination to prevent Soviet expansion
to Greece and Turkey. Washington extended generous economic aid to both countries, and
in 1952 brought them into NATO.
Despite their simultaneous memberships in the Western collective defense system,
Greece and Turkey were mired in outright confrontation in both inter-governmental and
popular dimensions throughout the Cold War era. In 1974, a full-scale war almost broke out
when Turkey invaded the disputed island of Cyprus. The high degree of security tension
between the two US allies would be hard to explain without taking into account the political
manipulation of history that elites in both countries employed to legitimize their ruling
power. Postwar Greek and Turkish national identity was defined on the basis of hatred and
hostility to each other country. Textbooks typically included a militant interpretation of
history that glorified their own nation, whitewashed their atrocities, and belittled the other
nation. So for generations "Greeks and Turks have been educated to become antagonists
and opponents." 923 As one student of contemporary Greco-Turkish relations comments, the
case "follows the by now well-established finding that the existence of the other side as the
'enemy' is vital for the preservation of the ingroup-outgroup boundary. Arguably, the
ultimate stumbling block to genuine rapprochement between Turk and Greek can be traced
to the national historical narrative and the resultant national identity, an essential ingredient
of which is the need to despise and belittle 'the other'." 924
923 Hercules Millas, "History Textbooks in Greece and Turkey," History Workshop No. 31 (1991).
418
_ __ I
After the Cold War, bilateral disputes such as the Cyprus issue and the boundary
controversy in Aegean persisted and even twice drove the two countries to the brink of war
in 1996 and 1998 respectively. 925 Nevertheless, towards the end of the 1990s the push for
reconciliation strengthened, due to a range of factors including the liberalization of political
system and culture in the two countries, the linkage between regional stability and the
pending EU enlargement to Cyprus and Turkey, and business interests in bilateral
cooperation. 926 A turning point came in1999 when a terribly destructive earthquake hit both
Turkey and Greece that promoted a wave of mutual humanitarian aid and public emotions
of solidarity. Since then the two governments have developed broad cooperation and taken
restraint in coping with bilateral disputes. Right now it is still too early to predict the
durability of the Greco-Turkish rapprochement because the mutual suspicion and ill feeling
held by the ordinary people will not abate quickly. But hope for their long-term, deep
reconciliation arose when, following the "earthquake diplomacy," the two governments
agreed to review each other's school textbooks. According to this agreement, a joint
textbook commission has been established to rewrite textbook coverage of the history of
bilateral relations in the spirit of ending their combative historical narratives and
constructing a shared memory of their past traumatic conflicts. 927
As for the second category of cases for further research, Israeli-Palestinian relations
is a classic example of persistent non-reconciliation after traumatic conflicts. Although the
Palestinians did not win self-rule until the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) was
inaugurated in 1993 according to the Oslo Accords, I treat Palestine as a national entity
whose national aspirations greatly solidified after it was defeated in the 1948 Israeli War of
Independence and began to strive for its own national independence. 928 That war was
traumatic to both the Israelis and Palestinians as each side committed appalling atrocities to
the other. But the Palestinians clearly suffered much more because they lost a bigger part of
their homeland and more than 700,000 of the Arab populations in Palestine were dislocated
924 Alexis Heraclides, "Greek-Turkish Relations from Discord to Detente: A Preliminary Evaluations," The
Review of International Affairs 1, No. 3 (Spring 2002), p. 28.
925 Erik Siegl, "Greek-Turkish Relations -- Continuity or Change?" Perspectives: Central European Review of
International Affairs No. 18 (Summer 2002), p. 41.
926 Siegl, "Greek-Turkish Relations -- Continuity or Change?"
927 Jon Gorvett, "Truce Declared in Textbook War," Times Education Supplement,12/03/1999, Issue 4353.
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and ended up in refugee camps in the Arab-controlled Palestinian territories and surrounding
Arabic countries. 929
After the UN-mediated armistice in 1949, a state of war persisted between the Arabs
and Israelis and open hostilities repeatedly erupted, in 1956, 1967, and 1973. These conflicts
inflicted further territorial loss on the Palestinians and human casualties to both nations.
Moreover, for several decades they both rejected each other's national survival rights. Until
the Oslo Accords was signed, the Palestinians did not recognize the Israeli state and the
Israeli government insisted that Palestinians should be incorporated into the existing Arab
states. After the 1978 Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement at the Camp David, a large-scale
Arab-Israeli war has been absent, but conflicts between the Israelis and Palestinians did not
end. The Palestinian uprisings in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strips in 1987-1991
and from 2000 till today are the recent indicators of the total lack of bilateral reconciliation.
The post-1949 Israeli-Palestinian rivalry is first and foremost a territorial struggle,
regarding who should have more or even full control of the land of Palestine. Other factors,
such as religious and cultural clashes, are the consequences rather than causes of the
territorial conflict. The interference of great powers and other Arabic states also did not
create but only complicated or exacerbated their conflicts. The superpowers had much less
success in building a clear-cut, stable alliance structure in the Middle East than in Asia and
Europe, and the balance of power among the Arabic countries themselves had a high degree
of fluidity.93 0 So the causes of Israeli-Palestinian relations were more internal than external,
and more regional than global.
The theory of historical mythmaking seems a plausible domestic explanation for the
failure of bilateral reconciliation. Elite manipulation of historiography accounted for the
prevalence of pernicious myths in the national collective memory of both nations. After the
1948 War, the Israeli Zionists promoted "an extremely one-sided and narrow-minded
928 Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identily: The Construction ofModern National Consciousness (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1997).
929 Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's), 140-148.
930 A systematic study of the Middle-East alliance system during the Cold War can be found in Walt, The Origins
ofAlfances, Chapters 3-4.
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ideology in order to mobilize the forces necessary for its (Zionism) fulfillment, consequently
distorting the perceptions and ethos of the younger generation of Israelis.""931 Palestinian
political leaders also fostered an anti-Israeli nationalism to mobilize and sustain the
resistance campaign. As a result, the school education and media propaganda of both sides
purveyed flagrant historical myths glorifying their own peace-loving national character and
military victories, blaming one other for provoking violence and blocking peace process, and
whitewashing their own atrocities to the innocent women and children of the other nation.
Moreover, both sides depicted themselves to be the victims of the conflict and disregarded
each other's pain and suffering. Israel used the history of Jewish victimization to justify its
territorial acquisition in Palestine by force and claimed that Palestinian refugees left their
homeland voluntarily. The Palestinian narrative accused the Israelis of causing the refugee
problem but conspicuously neglected the Holocaust history. Besides, negative stereotypes
prevailed in their portrayal of each other's national image. Israeli and Palestinian textbooks
refused to apply the term of "state" to the governments and territories of each other nation,
and routinely used a hostile language that named each other "victimizer," "gangs,"
"terrorists," and "incited mobs."932
The two nations' combative narratives about their conflict history was a major cause
of the high degree of mutual hatred and mistrust that fed the perception of war danger and
prevented the two sides from settling their territorial disputes and accepting each other's
national existence. Efforts to restrain historical mythmaking have been attempted in the
recent decade, including the New Historians debate in Israel and the joint textbook research
between Israeli and Palestinian historians. The New Historians is a group of young Israeli
931 Mordechai Bar-On, "Historiography as An Educational Project: The Historians' Debate in Israel and the
Middle East Peace Process," in Ilan Peleg ed. The Middle East Peace Process: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1998), p. 23.
932 For an overview of pernicious historical myths in Israeli and Palestinian national collective memories, see
Stephen Van Evera, "Memory and The Israel-Palestinian Conflict: Time for New Narratives," unpublished
paper, 2003; Elie Podeh, "History and Memory in the Israeli Educational System: The Portrayal of the Arab-
Israeli Conflict in History Textbooks (1848-2000)," History and Memory 12, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 2000).
For a comprehensive study of Israeli and Palestinian textbook content (both Jordanian and Egyptian textbooks
for use in the occupied territories and the new textbooks published by the Ministry of Education of the PNA),
pedagogical issues, and curricular development in the past decade, see Ruth Firer and Sami Adwan, "The
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in History and Civics Textbooks of Both Nations," Studies in International
Textbook Research (Georg-Eckert Institute), Band 110/1(2004); Falk Pingel, ed., "Contested Past, Disputed
Present: Curricula and Teaching in Israeli and Palestinian Schools," Studies in International Textbook Research
Band 110/2 (2003).
historians and social scientists who launched a crusade from the late 1980s against the
mythical historical interpretation in Israel. Attacking the Zionist propaganda for instilling
arrogance, prejudice, and hatred against the Arabs, the New Historians advocated an
objective and self-critical reassessment of the Israeli historical experience.933 Besides, since
1990 the Georg-Eckert Institute has organized symposiums and seminars for Israeli and
Palestinian historians to meet and discuss how to bridge the gap between the two nations'
textbook treatment of their past conflicts. 934 The prospect of Israeli-Palestinian
reconciliation will largely depend on whether the trend of demythifying national history and
nurturing a common historical consciousness can win out in the contestation of collective
memory in the two nations.
Implications for Theory
My dissertation contributes to theory of international relations in several ways.
First, I question the decisive power of systemic constraints and argue that international
relations theory should allow a major role for ideas. My study not only invalidates the realist
assumption that ideas are subordinate to structure, but also advances the existing studies,
such as the constructivist literature, that acknowledges the importance of ideas but fails to
account for the origins of ideas or the causal mechanisms between ideas and foreign policies.
My research provides a systematic exploration of both the causes and consequences of
historical myth, an important ideational force in shaping post-conflict interstate relations.
Concretely speaking, I propose a multi-step approach to address the role of historical
myths in interstate reconciliation that starts with determining whether political elites in a
given country benefit from mythmaking and whether such benefit outweighs its cost. It
should also examine the domestic political context to determine whether elites dominate the
process of constructing national collective memory. It then measures the degree of
divergence between the two countries' national memories and establishes causal links from
933 More on the recent debate between the old and new historians in Israel, see Bar-On, "Historiography as An
Educational Project"; Jose Brunner, "Pride and Memory: Nationalism, Narcissism and the Historians' Debates
in Germany and Israel," History and Memory 9, No.1 (Spring/Summer 1997); Haim Gerber, "Zionism,
Orientalism, and the False Palestinians," Journal of Palestine Studies 33, No.1 (2003).
934 See the Editorial Note of Firer and Adwan, "The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in History and Civics
Textbooks of Both Nations."
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the historiographic divergence to the specific characteristics of mutual emotions and
perceptions of intentions. Finally, it should process trace the impact of such emotions and
intentions on government policies and popular feelings about each other country.
My dissertation also sheds light on the linkage between state-society relations and
international relations. My case studies reveal that the elite-sponsored, top-down
construction of memory does not eliminate competing voices from the bottom up. The
formation of national collective memory is a process of constant negotiation and
contestation between these different historical interpretations. The control of the
institutional tools of memory-making does not always bring about a decisive victory in this
struggle over the past. In authoritarian Poland in the 1980s and China in the 1980s-90s, for
example, the society was able to pose a credible challenge to the official historiography by
underground publication and schooling, mass demonstration, and a culture of cynicism. The
two societies obtained new instruments of interest articulation and opinion advocacy
because the Solidarity and Chinese reform programs caused the ruling elites to cede political
power to the society-based sub-elites and the general public. So the changes in the state-
society power distribution at certain critical junctures can alter the outcome of the national
memory contestation and the degree of historiographic convergence with another state,
significantly affecting their reconciliation development.
Another implication of my research concerns the importance of first-image variables
in theory of international relations. Empirical evidence suggests that some government
leaders, such as Mao Zedong, Adenauer, and Nakasone, presided over history manipulation
with little concern about historical truth and the feelings of their own people and the other
nation. They often did not believe in the myths they created themselves, and/or ignore the
moral and international political consequences of these myths. However, other political
elites attach great importance to presenting an honest history, upholding justice, fulfilling
moral responsibility of their nation, and pursuing reconciliation. Chancellor Willy Brandt
and President Richard von Weizsaicker are two good examples. The difference between
these two types of elites may be ascribed to their individual personalities (e.g. narcissist vs.
modest leaders), moral principles (e.g. the philosophy of ends and means), ideologies for
nation-building (us-versus-them, self-centered ideology as opposed to cosmopolitan, liberal
ideas), and world views (valuing short-term practical gains or long-term peace and stability).
So the personal attitude of political entrepreneurs to historical issues can play a critical role
in shaping national collective memory and directing post-conflict interstate relations.
Implications for Policy
My dissertation is the first comprehensive study on the subject of post-conflict
interstate reconciliation. The findings presented here contribute to the understanding of and
policy response to contemporary issues of international peace and conflict. My dissertation
particularly advances the study of Sino-Japanese relations. Historical legacy is commonly
believed to have a negative impact on Sino-Japanese relations, but a systematic testing of the
political power of history and the causal mechanism from history to bilateral relations is
lacking. Filling this gap in the field, my dissertation has important implications for China
and Japan's international relations.
So far the common approach to international peace has focused on terminating
ongoing international conflicts through such means as international mediation and
negotiation, arms control and disarmament, and confidence-building measures. But my
research emphasizes the importance of post-conflict reconciliation to preventing recurring
conflicts and attaining long-term, stable peace. My findings lead to an important policy
prescription that world leaders who are concerned about interstate reconciliation should take
historical memory seriously. Empirical evidence of postwar (West) German-Polish and
Sino-Japanese relations clearly suggest that a shard memory between former adversary states
about their past traumatic conflicts can greatly facilitate reconciliation while their memory
divergence can obstruct reconciliation. Yet the normal ways of bilateral exchanges, such as
economic and cultural ties, and official or non-official security dialogues, do not necessarily
help bridge the bilateral memory gap unless they include the exchanges of opinion on
historical interpretation.
My research particularly highlights joint textbook commission as an effective means
to deepen mutual understanding of historical perspectives and promote the homogenization
of national memory. Three lessons can be drawn from my case studies regarding textbook
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cooperation and historians' dialogue. One is that a textbook cooperation project usually
cannot proceed smoothly without government support, either financially or politically, but
the historical dialogue itself should be carried out not by government officials but
professional historians whose respect to academic integrity make them relatively impervious
to the desire of instrumental use of history. Second, transnational historians' dialogue
should critique textbooks of not just each other countries but also their own countries.
Historians from two different countries can first lay out points of contention in the history
of their interaction and present the interpretations of their own countries, and then jointly
examine available source materials to evaluate these interpretations in order to narrow if now
completely eliminate the area of disagreement. Finally, historians can contribute to the
spread of a shared memory if they can incorporate the conclusions of transnational dialogue
into school curricula at home and influence national collective memory.
My dissertation also illuminates the influence of regime type on international conflict
and peace. Is democratization the necessary condition for interstate reconciliation? This
question has important practical implications because it is commonly believed among
Western policymakers that democracy can solve most problems of international conflict.
But my research suggests that neither democratic states nor autocratic states are immune to
historical mythmaking practices. Postwar history has seen crude political manipulation of
historical memory in such liberal democracies as Japan and West Germany that constituted a
major obstacle to their reconciliation with neighboring countries. Political liberalization is
indeed contributive to the decline of national myths, such as in Poland after the Solidarity
Revolution. But the onset of German-Polish textbook cooperation nearly a decade before
the Polish communist regime was shaken by the Solidarity indicates that reconciliation
process does not have to wait until democratization has taken place or succeeded.
Therefore, rather than to pursue the regime change in authoritarian states, which is
often a daunting task and often creates instability both internally and externally, 935 politics of
reconciliation should instead focus on fostering a shared historical memory through joint
history research. It is better to start such joint research sooner than later because the
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legacies of earlier efforts, even if limited in academic depth and policy application, can
prepare public opinion, build elite consensus, and create institutional framework for future
work of reconciliation.
Another contribution is that this dissertation reveals the importance of historical
memory and nationalism in contemporary Chinese politics and Sino-Japanese relations.
Since the 1980s, Chinese official propaganda about national history has been focused on
promoting an official nationalism that would facilitate social mobilization for economic
reform and rapid growth strategy, stabilize the society, and enhance regime legitimacy.
Wwhen promoting the official nationalism, the government resorted to pernicious national
myths, including those that highlighted the conflict between the Chinese and Japanese
nations. Such government mythmaking attempts inadvertently stimulated an outburst of
anti-Japanese popular nationalism.93" While popular nationalism may be to certain extent
conducive to national cohesion, it can easily turn into an anti-government force and stir
social unrest.
Popular nationalism can constrain China's foreign policy options by forcing the
government to adopt a hard-line position to the outside world. Not all scholars of
contemporary Chinese nationalism believe that popular nationalism is potent enough to
divert the fundamental course of Chinese foreign policy. Many point to the weak influence
of public opinion on national policy-making in an authoritarian state, and argue that overall
the Chinese government has exercised restraint when handling international disputes. These
skeptics, however, overlook the reality that the reform and open-door policy has provided
more public space for bottom-up emotional venting and policy advocacy, to which the
government must cater to ensure its public support. The recent trend of media
diversification, internet expansion, and the increasing influence of nationalist subelites also
strengthens the power of Chinese popular nationalism. Meanwhile, the rise of the neo-
935 On the conflict-proneness of states in democratization process, Jack Snyder and Edward Mansfield,
"Democracy and the Danger of War," International Security 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995); idem., From Voting to
Violence.
936 On the domestic agenda driving the official discourse of nationalism and the distinction between official
nationalism and popular nationalism in China, see Yongnian Zheng, Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China:
Modernization, Identity, and International Relations (Cambridge; New York, Cambridge University Press, 1999),
Chapter 5, "The Official Discourse of Nationalism: Patriotism and the Constraints of Nationalism."
nationalist, arrogant perspective on history and foreign relations in Japan constantly incites
China and provokes popular demand for extreme responses. The clash of Chinese and
Japanese nationalism has severely destabilized Sino-Japanese relations in a number of ways:
politicizing and escalating small, isolated friction into major diplomatic disturbance;
preventing smooth, expeditious settlement of bilateral disputes; keeping controversial issues
alive and inviting even more acrimonious disputes.
With Chinese economic success and military buildup and the resurgence of Japanese
international assertiveness at the beginning of the 2 1st century, bilateral tensions have been
particularly mounting in three issue areas. One is the increasing Sino-Japanese competition
for energy supplies around the world, including the Russian oil pipelines through Sibera and
potential oil reserves in East China Sea. Second is their territorial dispute over the
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. Third is regarding the Taiwan issue, where China threatens the use
of force to deter Taiwan independence while Japan fears that cross-Strait violence would not
only jeopardize the security of its crucial oil routes from the Strait of Malacca to Japan but
also entangle Japan into a catastrophic Sino-American war. None of these issues warrant
another Sino-Japanese war, either due to their ambiguous strategic importance, such as the
island dispute, or because alternative, peaceful solutions are much more attractive, such as
on the energy security and Taiwan issues. However, if the hostile popular sentiment
continues to grow, it would greatly exacerbate mutual threat perception, create a strong
sense of zero-sum game between the two countries, and embolden hawkish policies.
Therefore, popular nationalism can serve as a catalyst to future Sino-Japanese conflict that
would otherwise be avoided.
Although realizing its danger of popular nationalism, the Chinese government has
found it more and more difficult to reign in the popular nationalism that originally resulted
from the mythmaking practice of the government itself. Clearly, the remedy to the rise of
the baneful popular nationalism is to stop political intervention of historiography and
nationalist history propaganda, and to allow professional historians to write unbiased, honest
national history.
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My dissertation also has implications for the study of Japanese foreign relations.
Existing literature mostly emphasizes structural or material factors as the sources of Japanese
foreign policy, such as external pressure from the United States, economic strategy, and
domestic factional politics. Confirming the importance of these factors, my research
identifies a new, increasingly significant constraining force on Japanese foreign relations,
which is the emergence of an international normative context. Whereas the social
democratic leaders in West Germany in the 1970s-80s took initiative to incorporate morality
into their foreign policies to Eastern European countries, foreign policymakers in Japan,
another major perpetrator country, had largely shunned the country's moral responsibility to
compensate its former victim countries in Asia.
But with the spread of truth and reconciliation commissions and the concomitant
diffusion of the ideas about morality, justice, and reconciliation in world politics, Japan can
no longer insulate itself from the pressure of international norms. Such pressure is
exacerbated by the widespread awakening of private memories in Asian countries of past
trauma inflicted by the war of the imperial Japan and the increase of public demands for
Japanese war compensation. The international moral offensive launched by Asian war
victims and their numerous supporters all over the world in the past decade has not just
brought Japan outright embarrassment and reputation cost, but also can severely damage
Japan's economic and strategic interests. Japan needs to socialize itself with the new
international normative tide that elevates morality and reconciliation in foreign policies, or its
national goals and aspirations will be severely imperiled.
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Appendix 1. Chinese Secondary School History Textbooks Examined In
This Dissertation
Substitute Teaching Materials (STM):
1. Chuji Zhongxue Shiyong Zhandai Keben:Jinbainian Shihua, Xinhua Shudian, 1950
2. Chuji Zhongxue Benguo Jindaishi Keben, Xinhua Shudian, 1950
3. Zhongguo Xinminzhuzhuzyi Geming Shi: Chugao, the People's Education Press, 1950
Middle School Textbooks (MST):
1. Chuji Zhongxue Keben Zhongguo Lishi, the People's Education Press, 1952
2. Chuji Zhongxue Keben Zhongguo Lishi, the People's Education Press, 1955
3. 9 Nian Yiguanzhi Shiyong Keben, Quanrizhi: Lishi, the People's Education Press,
1960
4. 12 Nianzhi Xuexiao Chuji Zhongxue Keben: Zhongguo Uishi, Sh/iaoben, the People's
Education Press, 1962
5. Quanrizhi 10 Nianzhi Xuexiao Chuzhong Keben Shiyongben: Zhongguo Lishi, the
People's Education Press, 1978
6. Chuji Zhongxue Keben Zhongguo Lishi, the People's Education Press, 1981
7. 9 Nian Yiwu Jiaoyu 4 Nianzhi Chuji ZhongxueJiaokeshu Zhongguo Lishi, the People's
Education Press, 1992
High School Textbooks (HST):
1. Gaoji Zhongxue Keben Zhongguo Lishi, the People's Education Press, 1953
2. Gaoji Zhongxue Keben Zhongguo Lishi, the People's Education Press, 1957
3. Gaoji Zhongxue Keben Zhongguo Lishi, the People's Education Press, 1963
4. Gaoji Zhongxue Keben Zhongguo Jindai Xiandai Shi, the People's Education Press,
1992
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